Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Corporate Governance and Value of Cash Holding
2.2. CG, External Market Discipline and Value of Cash Holding
2.3. Corporate Governance (CG) and Usage of Excess Cash
2.4. Excess Cash Utilization and Firm Performance
2.5. Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Firm Performance
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample and Data
3.2. Variables of Study and Analytical Models
3.2.1. Corporate Governance (CG)
3.2.2. Product Market Competition
3.2.3. Usage of Excess Cash
3.2.4. Value of Cash Holding
3.2.5. Usage (Spending) of Excess Cash and Firm Performance
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Effect of Corporate Governance and Value of Cash Holding
4.3. Effect of CG on Utilization of Excess Cash
4.4. Effect of CG on Relationship of Excess Cash and Firm Performance
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Variable | Full Sample | Competitive Firms | Concentrated Firms | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Mean | St. Dev | Mean | St. Dev | Mean | St. Dev | |
Excess Cash | 0.054 | 0.115 | 0.041 | 0.095 | 0.078 | 0.142 |
Cash Flow | 0.095 | 0.112 | 0.088 | 0.102 | 0.107 | 0.127 |
Industry Adjusted Cash Flow Volatility | 0.010 | 0.051 | 0.012 | 0.053 | 0.008 | 0.046 |
Leverage | 0.552 | 0.201 | 0.555 | 0.198 | 0.546 | 0.207 |
Net Working Capital | 0.039 | 0.218 | 0.031 | 0.210 | 0.053 | 0.233 |
Dividend | 0.588 | 0.492 | 0.556 | 0.497 | 0.646 | 0.479 |
Governance | 0.453 | 0.198 | 0.465 | 0.202 | 0.431 | 0.191 |
Size | 15.465 | 1.491 | 15.127 | 1.252 | 16.084 | 1.686 |
Market to Book Value | 0.066 | 0.606 | −0.001 | 0.602 | 0.188 | 0.595 |
Capital Expenditure | 0.064 | 0.045 | 0.058 | 0.025 | 0.074 | 0.067 |
ER | Full Sample | Competitive Industries | Concentrated Industries |
---|---|---|---|
∆Cash | 0.860 *** | 1.105 *** | 0.184 |
(0.299) | (0.400) | (0.481) | |
∆Earning | 0.050 *** | 0.047 ** | 0.093 ** |
(0.016) | (0.019) | (0.040) | |
∆Net Assets | 0.004 | −0.009 | −0.023 |
(0.008) | (0.009) | (0.018) | |
∆Interest Expense | −0.202 *** | −0.116 | −0.575 *** |
(0.074) | (0.086) | (0.169) | |
∆Dividend | −0.031 * | −0.037 | −0.034 |
(0.017) | (0.023) | (0.093) | |
Casht−1 | 0.125 *** | 0.0153 ** | 0.113 ** |
(0.043) | (0.069) | (0.056) | |
Casht−1 * ∆Cash | 0.084 *** | 0.097 ** | 0.170 ** |
(0.038) | (0.046) | (0.083) | |
Market Leverage | 0.250 *** | 0.283 *** | 0.148 * |
(0.056) | (0.075) | (0.082) | |
Market Leverage * ∆Cash | −0.774 *** | −0.951 ** | −0.326 |
(0.353) | (0.464) | (0.610) | |
Governance * ∆Cash | 0.628 *** | 0.904 *** | 0.328 |
(0.135) | (0.20) | (0.201) | |
Governance | −0.065 ** | −0.053 | −0.100 ** |
(0.033) | (0.043) | (0.049) | |
Cons | −0.188 ** | −0.199 *** | −0.149 *** |
(0.036) | (0.051) | (0.049) | |
Prob of F-value | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
R2 | 0.069 | 0.082 | 0.103 |
N | 2664 | 1708 | 956 |
∆Industry Adj-Capex | Dividend | Diversification | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Competitive Firms (1) | Concentrated Firms (2) | Competitive Firms (3) | Concentrated Firms (4) | Competitive Firms (5) | Concentrated Firms (6) | |
Excess Casht−1 | −0.055 *** | −0.065 *** | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.135 *** | 0.106 *** |
(0.065) | (0.009) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.028) | (0.035) | |
Excess Casht−1 * Governance | −0.317 * | 0.043 | −0.070 * | 0.242 ** | −0.106 ** | 0.021 |
(0.182) | (0.267) | (0.039) | (0.097) | (0.038) | (0.067) | |
Governance | 0.003 | 0.006 | 0.003 | −0.018* | −0.483 *** | −0.873 *** |
(0.012) | (0.026) | (0.003) | (0.009) | (0.118) | (0.200) | |
Cash Flow | 0.332 *** | 0.264 *** | 0.056 *** | 0.010 | 0.004 | −0.001 |
(0.065) | (0.098) | (0.014) | (0.036) | (0.008) | (0.009) | |
Industry Adjusted Cash Flow Volatility | 0.511 *** | 0.821 *** | −0.035 * | −0.090 | −0.034 ** | −0.060 |
(0.091) | (0.177) | (0.019) | (0.065) | (0.016) | (0.040) | |
Net Working Capital | −0.409 *** | −0.462 *** | 0.015 * | 0.012 | 0.001 | −0.013 |
(0.042) | (0.057) | (0.009) | (0.020) | (0.013) | (0.023) | |
Leverage | −0.404 *** | −0.489 *** | −0.008 | −0.039 | 0.003 | 0.018 ** |
(0.052) | (0.079) | (0.011) | (0.028) | (0.005) | (0.009) | |
Size | 0.144 *** | 0.071 *** | −0.005 ** | 0.011 | 0.002 | 0.013 ** |
(0.017) | (0.024) | (0.004) | (0.008) | (0.002) | (0.006) | |
Market to Book Value | 0.030 | 0.053 ** | 0.006 ** | 0.004 | −0.050 *** | −0.050 ** |
(0.012) | (0.023) | (0.003) | (0.008) | (0.019) | (0.027) | |
Cons | −1.835 *** | −0.723 ** | 0.073 * | −0.154 | 0.138 | −0.088 |
(0.247) | (0.367) | (0.053) | (0.131) | (0.315) | (0.467) | |
Prob of F value | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
R2 | 0.061 | 0.035 | 0.223 | 0.247 | 0.160 | 0.180 |
N | 1708 | 956 | 1708 | 956 | 1708 | 956 |
Full Sample | Competitive Firms | Concentrated Firms | |
---|---|---|---|
Cash Flow | −0.209 *** | −0.16 ** | 0.585 *** |
(0.051) | (0.064) | (0.1) | |
Industry Adjusted Cash Flow Volatility | 0.111 | 0.129 | 0.093 |
(0.097) | (0.116) | (0.179) | |
Net Working Capital | 0.025 | 0.059 * | −0.034 |
(0.027) | (0.035) | (0.047) | |
Leverage | 0.066 ** | 0.105 *** | 0.117 ** |
(0.032) | (0.04) | (0.053) | |
Size | 0.003 | 0.004 | 0.001 |
(0.004) | (0.005) | (0.005) | |
Capital Expenditure | −0.058 | −0.056 | 0.000 |
(0.039) | (0.051) | (0.086) | |
Market to Book Value | −0.017 | −0.027 * | −0.06 *** |
(0.012) | (0.015) | (0.02) | |
Excess Casht−1 | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** | −0.159 |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.247) | |
Excess Casht−1 * Governance | 0.488 *** | 0.612 *** | 0.207 |
(0.186) | (0.226) | (0.35) | |
Governance | −0.032 *** | −0.027 * | −0.043 |
(0.013) | (0.014) | (0.028) | |
Cons | 0.96 *** | 0.908 *** | 0.92 *** |
(0.066) | (0.089) | (0.095) | |
Prob of F-value | 0 | 0 | 0 |
R2 | 0.101 | 0.101 | 0.225 |
N | 2664 | 1708 | 956 |
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Shah, I.A.; Ali Shah, S.Z.; Nouman, M.; Khan, F.U.; Badulescu, D.; Cismas, L.-M. Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries. Sustainability 2021, 13, 4816. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13094816
Shah IA, Ali Shah SZ, Nouman M, Khan FU, Badulescu D, Cismas L-M. Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries. Sustainability. 2021; 13(9):4816. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13094816
Chicago/Turabian StyleShah, Idrees Ali, Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah, Muhammad Nouman, Farman Ullah Khan, Daniel Badulescu, and Laura-Mariana Cismas. 2021. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries" Sustainability 13, no. 9: 4816. https://doi.org/10.3390/su13094816