New Evidence on National Culture and Corporate Financing: Does Institutional Quality Matter?
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
2.1. Determinants of Corporate Financing
2.2. Hypothesis Development
2.2.1. Individualism and Corporate Financing
2.2.2. Power Distance and Corporate Financing
2.2.3. Masculinity and Corporate Financing
2.2.4. Uncertainty Avoidance and Corporate Financing
2.2.5. Moderating Impact of Institutional Quality
3. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
3.2. Variables Descriptions
3.2.1. Corporate Financing
3.2.2. National Culture
3.2.3. Institutional Quality
3.2.4. Control Variables
3.3. Economatric Model
3.4. Econometric Estimator
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis
4.2. Baseline Results
4.3. Role of Institutional Quality
4.4. Robustness Check
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Panel A. Country Level Summary Statistics | ||||||||||||||
China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Philippines | Thailand | ||||||||
Variables | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std | Mean | Std |
(1) Leverage | 0.387 | 0.73 | 0.648 | 1.034 | 0.484 | 0.865 | 0.598 | 1.049 | 0.478 | 0.876 | 0.298 | 0.161 | 0.502 | 0.747 |
(2) Equity-to-asset | 0.415 | 0.271 | 0.403 | 0.222 | 0.443 | 0.263 | 0.466 | 0.226 | 0.445 | 0.241 | 0.406 | 0.164 | 0.411 | 0.198 |
(3) Long-term leverage | 1.736 | 0.953 | 7.462 | 6.317 | 7.337 | 3.681 | 8.063 | 5.999 | 1.609 | 0.549 | 10.126 | 6.464 | 8.633 | 6.196 |
(4) Stort-term leverage | 1.785 | 0.853 | 1.933 | 2.244 | 1.111 | 0.099 | 1.296 | 1.224 | 1.279 | 0.215 | 1.929 | 2.061 | 1.932 | 2 |
(5) Market leverage | 5.77 | 6.631 | 11.964 | 5.6 | 11.458 | 4.19 | 13.125 | 5.14 | 3.513 | 5.398 | 12.549 | 7.437 | 12.658 | 6.365 |
(6) IDV | 74.374 | 5.989 | 54 | 0 | 54 | 0 | 66.043 | 17.993 | 77 | 0 | 94 | 0 | 64 | 0 |
(7) PDI | 22.344 | 2.495 | 46 | 0 | 46 | 0 | 39.743 | 11.589 | 48 | 0 | 32 | 0 | 20 | 0 |
(8) Mas | 61.78 | 4.492 | 95 | 0 | 95 | 0 | 79.2 | 21.458 | 56 | 0 | 64 | 0 | 34 | 0 |
(9) Uai | 29.531 | 0.499 | 92 | 0 | 92 | 0 | 73.931 | 24.583 | 40 | 0 | 44 | 0 | 64 | 0 |
(10) IQ | 85.214 | 2.999 | 85.893 | 2.094 | 85.893 | 2.095 | 72.573 | 19.411 | 44.369 | 1.927 | 39.595 | 2.949 | 46.156 | 5.386 |
(11) Firm size | 13.582 | 3.211 | 14.198 | 2.324 | 13.725 | 2.227 | 15.236 | 2.077 | 13.688 | 2.749 | 14.278 | 2.119 | 14.468 | 1.4 |
(12) ROA | 0.515 | 2.404 | 0.535 | 2.381 | 0.489 | 2.239 | 0.87 | 3.081 | 0.366 | 2.013 | 0.037 | 0.885 | 0.741 | 2.797 |
(13) Dividend payout | 8.801 | 2.792 | 10.819 | 6.355 | 11.215 | 0.516 | 9.013 | 4.166 | 8.125 | 2.963 | 9.012 | 4.65 | 11.321 | 6.675 |
(14) Tangibility | 3.004 | 0 | 3.004 | 0 | 3.004 | 0 | 2.973 | 0.278 | 3.004 | 0 | 3.004 | 0 | 3.004 | 0 |
(15) Liquidity | 2.558 | 2.139 | 2.441 | 1.139 | 2.864 | 1.571 | 2.922 | 1.886 | 2.76 | 1.56 | 2.383 | 1.041 | 2.371 | 1.031 |
(16) Capital expenditure | 0.811 | 1.025 | 3.676 | 2.814 | 3.162 | 1.331 | 4.504 | 3.024 | 0.568 | 0.95 | 3.002 | 2.205 | 2.538 | 2.025 |
(17) Growth opportunity | 1.391 | 2.195 | 13.087 | 12.423 | 60.214 | 24.678 | 22.482 | 19.849 | 0.564 | 0.729 | 13.02 | 7.596 | 10.8 | 7.619 |
(18) Inflation | 2.195 | 2.053 | 0.18 | 0.922 | 0.18 | 0.923 | 1.864 | 3.031 | 6.571 | 2.73 | 3.85 | 1.848 | 2.203 | 1.821 |
(19) Log of GDP | 4.491 | 0.978 | 6.609 | 0.017 | 6.609 | 0.017 | 5.971 | 1.405 | 3.052 | 0.19 | 3.305 | 0.175 | 3.637 | 0.164 |
(20) FDI | 15.433 | 15.743 | 0.26 | 0.219 | 0.26 | 0.219 | 0.994 | 1.256 | 1.706 | 0.715 | 1.58 | 0.789 | 2.798 | 1.1 |
Panel B. No. of observations per country | Panel C: Annual No. of firms | |||||||||||||
Country | No of observations | Country | No of observations | Year | No of firms | Year | No of firms | Year | No of firms | |||||
Percent | Percent | 2002 | 920 | 2008 | 920 | 2014 | 915 | |||||||
China | 6273 | 40.198 | Malaysia | 731 | 4.68 | 2003 | 920 | 2009 | 919 | 2015 | 915 | |||
India | 1309 | 8.39 | Philippines | 335 | 2.15 | 2004 | 920 | 2010 | 918 | 2016 | 915 | |||
Indonesia | 544 | 3.49 | Thailand | 463 | 2.97 | 2005 | 920 | 2011 | 918 | 2017 | 915 | |||
Japan | 5950 | 38.13 | 2006 | 920 | 2012 | 918 | 2018 | 916 | ||||||
2007 | 920 | 2013 | 916 |
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Variables Name | Description | Source |
---|---|---|
Book leverage (BkLev) | Ratio of total debt to book value of assets | DataStream |
Equity financing | Ratio of equity financing to total assets | As above |
Long-term debt (LTD) | Ratio of long-term debt to total assets | As above |
Market leverage (MLev) | Ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market capitalization to total assets | As above |
Short-term debt (STD) | Ratio of short-term debt to total assets | As above |
National culture | ||
Institutional quality index ( IQ) | Defined as political stability and absence of violence + control of corruption + the rule of law + regulatory quality + government effectiveness + voice and accountability/6. | Author’s calculation |
Firm size | Natural log of total assets | As above |
Liquidity | Ratio of current assets to current liabilities | As above |
Growth opportunities (Tobin Q) | Defined as the ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total assets. | As above |
Profitability | Return on assets | DataStream |
Tangibility (TANG) | Measured as tangible assets to total assets | As above |
Dividend payout | Ratio of dividend to net income | As above |
Capital expenditure (Capexp) | Capital expenditure to total assets | As Above |
GDP growth | GDP growth (annual%) | World Bank |
Inflation | Inflation, consumer price index process (annual) | As Above |
FDI | Foreign direct investment, inflows % to GDP | As Above |
Mean | Std. Dev. | Max | Min | p25 | Median | p75 | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) Leverage | 0.498 | 0.902 | 4.003 | 0.03 | 0.098 | 0.253 | 0.42 |
(2) Equity-to-asset | 0.435 | 0.246 | 2.002 | −0.933 | 0.264 | 0.434 | 0.611 |
(3) Long-term leverage | 5.203 | 5.474 | 19.201 | 1.04 | 1.072 | 2.349 | 9.023 |
(4) Stort-term leverage | 1.571 | 1.255 | 12.095 | 1.095 | 1.103 | 1.103 | 1.43 |
(5) Market leverage | 9.536 | 6.939 | 30.000 | 0.008 | 2.51 | 13 | 13 |
(6) IDV | 33.127 | 12.342 | 48.000 | 14 | 20 | 26 | 46 |
(7) PDI | 69.015 | 14.024 | 104.000 | 54 | 54 | 68 | 80 |
(8) Mas | 71.32 | 19.078 | 95.000 | 34 | 57 | 66 | 95 |
(9) Uai | 55.702 | 28.382 | 92.000 | 29 | 30 | 40 | 92 |
(10) IQ | 76.423 | 17.344 | 90.100 | 23.489 | 79.598 | 84.712 | 87.264 |
(11) Firm size | 14.316 | 2.74 | 20.693 | 5.142 | 13.688 | 14.914 | 15.967 |
(12) ROA | 0.641 | 2.66 | 11.203 | −0.1 | −0.069 | −0.047 | −0.001 |
(13) Dividend payout | 9.183 | 3.996 | 38.995 | 2.032 | 6.692 | 6.692 | 11.203 |
(14) Tangibility | 2.992 | 0.172 | 3.004 | 0.011 | 3.004 | 3.004 | 3.004 |
(15) Liquidity | 2.698 | 1.897 | 27.413 | 0.045 | 1.813 | 2.333 | 3.032 |
(16) Capital expenditure | 2.628 | 2.806 | 16.923 | 0 | 0.333 | 1.978 | 3.659 |
(17) Growth opportunity | 12.955 | 19.047 | 103.032 | 0.042 | 0.042 | 2.751 | 19.29 |
(18) Inflation | 2.07 | 2.699 | 13.109 | −2.983 | −0.009 | 1.623 | 3.609 |
(19) Log of GDP | 5.188 | 1.473 | 7.591 | 2.673 | 3.747 | 5.514 | 6.608 |
(20) FDI | 6.811 | 12.267 | 58.519 | −0.254 | 0.381 | 1.929 | 4.004 |
Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | (19) | (20) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) leverage | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||||
(2) Equity to asset | 0.244 a | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||||
(3) Long term leverage | −0.134 a | −0.118 a | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||||
(4) Stort-term leverage | −0.047 a | −0.163 a | 0.009 | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||||
(5) Market leverage | 0.116 a | 0.316 a | 0.378 a | −0.130 a | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||
(6) IDV | −0.065 a | −0.062 a | −0.149 a | 0.067 a | −0.113 a | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||
(7) PDI | 0.103 a | 0.100 a | 0.278 a | −0.129 a | 0.232 a | −0.631 a | 1.000 | |||||||||||||
(8) Mas | 0.080 a | 0.026 a | 0.219 a | −0.063 a | 0.217 a | −0.740 a | 0.733 a | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
(9) Uai | 0.103 a | 0.047 a | 0.422 a | −0.101 a | 0.374 a | −0.784 a | 0.784 a | 0.848 a | 1.000 | |||||||||||
(10) IQ | 0.008 | −0.024 a | −0.179 a | 0.058 a | −0.133 a | −0.491 a | 0.095 a | 0.566 a | 0.217 a | 1.000 | ||||||||||
(11) firm size | 0.113 a | 0.262 a | 0.329 a | 0.114 a | 0.345 a | −0.049 a | 0.120 a | 0.074 a | 0.162 a | −0.070 a | 1.000 | |||||||||
(12) ROA | −0.005 | −0.033 a | 0.074 a | 0.114 a | 0.035 a | −0.042 a | 0.025 a | 0.010 | 0.037 a | −0.010 | 0.041 a | 1.000 | ||||||||
(13) Dividend payout | 0.088 a | −0.043 a | −0.086 a | −0.032 a | −0.052 a | −0.117 a | 0.072 a | 0.112 a | 0.139 a | 0.046 a | −0.215 a | 0.131 a | 1.000 | |||||||
(14) Tangibility | 0.005 | 0.018 b | −0.058 a | 0.026 a | −0.049 a | −0.044 a | 0.107 a | 0.091 a | 0.019 b | 0.207 a | −0.016 b | −0.036 a | −0.001 | 1.000 | ||||||
(15) Liquidity | 0.220 a | 0.583 a | −0.096 a | −0.115 a | 0.187 a | −0.045 a | 0.087 a | 0.015 | 0.033 a | −0.032 a | 0.107 a | 0.035 a | −0.001 | 0.007 | 1.000 | |||||
(16) Capital expenditure | −0.027 a | −0.051 a | 0.426 a | −0.143 a | 0.297 a | −0.110 a | 0.320 a | 0.251 a | 0.418 a | −0.147 a | 0.051 a | 0.025 a | 0.057 a | −0.035 a | −0.082 a | 1.000 | ||||
(17) Growth Opportunity | −0.077 a | −0.201 a | 0.589 a | −0.010 | 0.368 a | −0.169 a | 0.310 a | 0.292 a | 0.442 a | −0.081 a | 0.294 a | 0.132 a | −0.013 | −0.083 a | −0.127 a | 0.402 a | 1.000 | |||
(18) Inflation | −0.019 b | 0.070 a | −0.092 a | −0.017 b | −0.075 a | 0.460 a | −0.240 a | −0.546 a | −0.451 a | −0.585 a | 0.070 a | −0.017 b | −0.092 a | −0.113 a | 0.065 a | −0.106 a | −0.132 a | 1.000 | ||
(19) Log of GDP | 0.062 a | 0.049 a | 0.297 a | −0.094 a | 0.235 a | −0.542 a | 0.396 a | 0.605 a | 0.536 a | 0.349 a | 0.182 a | 0.064 a | 0.042 a | −0.100 a | 0.040 a | 0.275 a | 0.345 a | −0.380 a | 1.000 | |
(20) FDI | −0.050 a | 0.044 a | −0.280 a | 0.059 a | −0.301 a | 0.051 a | −0.358 a | −0.392 a | −0.481 a | 0.261 a | 0.008 | 0.022 a | −0.113 a | 0.038 a | 0.026 a | −0.337 a | −0.286 a | 0.145 a | 0.018 b | 1.000 |
Mode 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Mode 4 | Model 5 | |||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Equity to Total Assets (Lev1) | Total Debt to Total Assets (Blev) | Market Leverage (Mlev) | Variable | Long-Term Debt (LTD) | Short-Term Debt (STD) | |||||||||||||||
Levt−1 | 0.827 *** | 0.469 *** | 0.730 *** | 0.850 *** | LTDt−1 | 0.339 ** | 0.302 ** | 0.277 ** | 0.432 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.096 | −0.173 | −0.191 | −0.113 | −0.146 | −0.125 | −0.14 | −0.112 | ||||||||||||||
Blevt−1 | 0.217 *** | 0.863 *** | 0.199 *** | 0.193 *** | STDt−1 | 0.313 *** | 0.154 | 0.113 | 0.280 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.071 | −0.115 | −0.074 | −0.074 | −0.055 | −0.124 | −0.099 | −0.043 | ||||||||||||||
Mlevt−1 | 0.625 *** | 0.499 *** | 0.627 *** | 0.694 *** | Individualism | 0.706 ** | 0.258 ** | ||||||||||||||
−0.067 | −0.086 | −0.075 | −0.084 | −0.308 | −0.125 | ||||||||||||||||
Individualism | 0.029 ** | 0.364 ** | 14.002 *** | Power distance | −0.512 ** | −0.43 | |||||||||||||||
−0.013 | −0.177 | −2.291 | −0.204 | −0.377 | |||||||||||||||||
Power distance | −0.060 *** | −0.133 ** | −13.971 ** | Masculinity | 0.497 *** | 0.748 ** | |||||||||||||||
−0.017 | −0.057 | −5.755 | −0.174 | −0.374 | |||||||||||||||||
Masculinity | 0.034 ** | 0.173 ** | 6.790 *** | Uncertainty avoidance | 0.162 *** | 0.107 ** | |||||||||||||||
−0.016 | −0.072 | −1.4 | −0.05 | −0.044 | |||||||||||||||||
Uncertainty avoidance | 0.012 ** | 0.132 ** | 2.024 ** | Firm size | 0.967 | 1.274 ** | 1.002 ** | 0.595 *** | 0.216 ** | 1.352 | 1.333 ** | 0.193 | |||||||||
−0.001 | −0.061 | −1 | −0.498 | −0.577 | −0.48 | −0.213 | −0.108 | −0.748 | −0.602 | −0.102 | |||||||||||
Firm size | 0.030 ** | 0.108 *** | 0.134 *** | 0.036 *** | 0.274 ** | 0.111 | 0.315 *** | 0.234 ** | 6.543 *** | 9.361 ** | 5.065 ** | 3.822 | ROA | 0.306 | 0.014 | 0.338 | −0.023 | 0.165 | 0.408 | −0.002 | 0.001 |
−0.013 | −0.025 | −0.037 | −0.013 | −0.112 | −0.068 | −0.109 | −0.114 | −2.11 | −4.544 | −1.988 | −3.582 | −0.796 | −0.303 | −0.917 | −0.123 | −0.172 | −0.446 | −0.001 | 0 | ||
ROA | −0.02 | −0.107 ** | −0.139 ** | −0.016 | −0.019 | −0.001 | −0.013 | −0.057 | −15.278 ** | −9.156 ** | −8.662 | −3.681 | Dividend payout | −0.185 | −0.242 | −0.168 | −0.169 ** | −0.061 | −0.313 | −0.358 ** | −0.076 |
−0.035 | −0.048 | −0.067 | −0.04 | −0.044 | −0.054 | −0.045 | −0.05 | −6.487 | −3.935 | −6.116 | −2.161 | −0.125 | −0.129 | −0.13 | −0.067 | −0.035 | −0.181 | −0.17 | −0.044 | ||
Dividend payout | −0.019 | −0.028 ** | −0.078 *** | −0.009 | −0.295 *** | −0.012 | −0.303 *** | −0.327 *** | 2.085 ** | 1.719 | 2.132 *** | 3.469 *** | Capital expenditure | 0.024 | −0.008 | −0.037 | 0.051 | 0.018 | 0.046 | −0.114 | 0.009 |
−0.01 | −0.014 | −0.026 | −0.008 | −0.097 | −0.035 | −0.101 | −0.105 | −0.958 | −1.383 | −0.824 | −1.07 | −0.032 | −0.028 | −0.038 | −0.028 | −0.014 | −0.071 | −0.063 | −0.01 | ||
Capital expenditure | −0.004 ** | 0.013 *** | 0.018 *** | −0.001 | −0.089 *** | −0.011 | −0.123 *** | −0.072 *** | −1.801 *** | −1.597 *** | −1.762 *** | −0.196 | Liquidity | −0.137 | −0.043 | −0.129 | −0.246 | −0.119 | −0.241 | −0.452 | −0.067 |
−0.002 | −0.004 | −0.006 | −0.001 | −0.023 | −0.008 | −0.026 | −0.025 | −0.563 | −0.379 | −0.507 | −0.386 | −0.136 | −0.087 | −0.141 | −0.137 | −0.07 | −0.158 | −0.24 | −0.053 | ||
Liquidity | 0 | −0.011 | −0.043 | 0.003 | −0.213 *** | 0.003 | −0.223 *** | −0.235 *** | −5.710 ** | 0.793 | 0.389 | 1.077 | Growth opportunity | 0.276 *** | 0.304 *** | 0.310 *** | 0.241 *** | 0.034 | 0.198 | 0.091 | 0.045 ** |
−0.011 | −0.025 | −0.041 | −0.012 | −0.074 | −0.056 | −0.076 | −0.09 | −2.885 | −1.976 | −0.937 | −1.749 | −0.09 | −0.077 | −0.092 | −0.087 | −0.027 | −0.159 | −0.054 | −0.023 | ||
Growth opportunity | 0.004 | −0.001 | −0.007 | −0.002 | −0.055 ** | −0.027 | −0.053 | −0.059 *** | −4.114 *** | −1.660 *** | −2.802 *** | −2.396 | Tangibility | 0.151 | 0.319 | 0.111 | 0.075 | −0.063 | 0.224 | 0.052 | −0.026 |
−0.004 | −0.01 | −0.011 | −0.003 | −0.026 | −0.015 | −0.033 | −0.023 | −0.883 | −0.569 | −0.718 | −1.536 | −0.165 | −0.221 | −0.179 | −0.097 | −0.044 | −0.227 | −0.13 | −0.061 | ||
Tangibility | −0.016 | 0.023 | 0.039 | 0.017 | −0.185 | 0.031 | −0.159 | −0.275 | 0.223 | 0.875 | 0.573 | 0.24 | Inflation | −0.064 | −0.052 | 0.014 | −0.05 | −0.041 | −0.187 | −0.018 | −0.068 |
−0.013 | −0.013 | −0.023 | −0.01 | −0.335 | −0.159 | −0.363 | −0.379 | −1.618 | −1.366 | −1.524 | −1.736 | −0.123 | −0.088 | −0.097 | −0.087 | −0.053 | −0.2 | −0.071 | −0.039 | ||
Inflation | 0 | 0 | 0.0021 | 0 | −0.012 | 0.051 | −0.009 | −0.024 | 1.257 | 1.917 *** | 1.389 | −1.136 ** | Ln_GDP | −2.328 | −2.511 | −2.223 | −0.655 | −0.495 | −2.999 | −3.931 | −1.330 ** |
−0.003 | −0.014 | −0.026 | −0.002 | −0.024 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −0.026 | −1.101 | −0.71 | −1.301 | −0.469 | −1.678 | −1.648 | −1.592 | −0.934 | −0.376 | −1.722 | −2.214 | −0.595 | ||
Ln_GDP | −0.076 | −0.213 | 0.196 | −0.188 *** | 0.323 | −0.477 ** | 0.431 | 0.373 | −72.125 *** | −71.796 *** | −67.367 *** | −72.958 *** | FDI | −0.02 | −0.034 | −0.041 | 0.016 | −0.017 | −0.007 | 0.126 | 0.219 ** |
−0.066 | −0.126 | −0.102 | −0.062 | −0.883 | −0.199 | −0.913 | −0.896 | −15.058 | −15.435 | −13.064 | −24.928 | −0.061 | −0.037 | −0.058 | −0.049 | −0.024 | −0.085 | −0.167 | −0.108 | ||
FDI | 0.015 ** | −0.009 ** | −0.01 | 0.012 ** | 0.0101 *** | −0.025 | 0.092 *** | 0.113 *** | −1.196 | −2.765 *** | −1.139 | −2.473 | Constant | −23.621 *** | 33.885 | −32.244 *** | −15.080 ** | −9.450 ** | 23.341 | −40.964 | −3.227 |
−0.006 | −0.004 | −0.007 | −0.005 | −0.0206 | −0.017 | −0.021 | −0.023 | −0.747 | −0.78 | −1.184 | −1.609 | −9.103 | −18.175 | −11.5 | −6.051 | −4.61 | −29.451 | −21.921 | −2.506 | ||
Constant | −0.549 | 3.292 | −5.77 *** | −0.102 | −5.643 | 11.537 ** | −4.341 | −1.411 | 22.76 | 1368.124 *** | −36.379 | 257.532 ** | Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
−0.488 | −2.011 | −1.77 | −0.29 | −6.113 | −5.443 | −5.39 | −4.664 | −111.252 | −422.506 | −113.771 | −116.153 | Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | No | No |
Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Observations | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 |
Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | No | No | No | NO | NO | NO | AR(1) | 0.454 | 3.36 × 10−8 | 0.532 | 0 | 0.302 | 0.0679 | 0.0219 | 3.13 × 10−9 |
Observations | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | AR(2) | 0.36 | 0.984 | 0.452 | 0.42 | 0.0638 | 0.569 | 0.236 | 0.219 |
AR(1) | 0.403 | 0.066 | 0.026 | 0.572 | 0 | 0.001 | 0 | 0 | 0.28 | 0.239 | 0.299 | 0.0979 | Hansen test | 0.13 | 0.307 | 0.282 | 0.187 | 0.0638 | 0.334 | 0.968 | 0.24 |
AR(2) | 0.818 | 0.712 | 0.465 | 0.82 | 0.313 | 0.138 | 0.323 | 0.246 | 0.434 | 0.605 | 0.475 | 0.554 | No of instruments | 20 | 25 | 20 | 25 | 24 | 17 | 18 | 18 |
Hansen test | 0.129 | 0.346 | 0.767 | 0.142 | 0.196 | 0.319 | 0.235 | 0.342 | 0.27 | 0.517 | 0.16 | 0.178 | |||||||||
No of instruments | 24 | 24 | 24 | 24 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 17 | 21 | 21 | 24 |
Mode 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variable | Equity to Total Assets (Lev1) | Total Debt to Total Assets (Blev) | Market Leverage (Mlev) | Variables | Long-Term Debt (LTD) | Short-Term Debt (STD) | |||||||||||||||
Levt−1 | 0.859 *** | 0.766 *** | 0.908 *** | 0.762 *** | LTDt−1 | 0.609 *** | 0.437 *** | 0.424 *** | 0.671 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.078 | −0.085 | −0.015 | −0.038 | −0.182 | −0.144 | −0.103 | −0.097 | ||||||||||||||
Blevt−1 | 0.485 *** | 0.530 *** | 0.507 *** | 0.512 *** | STDt−1 | −0.309 *** | 0.311 *** | 0.237 *** | 0.322 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.042 | −0.031 | −0.034 | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.033 | −0.068 | −0.052 | ||||||||||||||
Mlevt−1 | 0.207 *** | 1.101 | 0.229 *** | 0.368 ** | Individualism × IQ | 0.019 ** | 0.052 *** | ||||||||||||||
−0.049 | −0.598 | −0.048 | −0.145 | −0.01 | −0.016 | ||||||||||||||||
Individualism × IQ | 0.003 *** | 0.007 | 0.040 *** | Power distance × IQ | 0.019 | 0.003 *** | |||||||||||||||
−0.001 | −0.004 | −0.012 | −0.01 | −0.001 | |||||||||||||||||
Power distance × IQ | 0.000 *** | 0.005 *** | 0.148 ** | Masculinity × IQ | 0.010 ** | 0.005 ** | |||||||||||||||
0 | −0.002 | −0.071 | −0.004 | −0.002 | |||||||||||||||||
Masculinity × IQ | 0.000 ** | 0.003 ** | 0.009 ** | Uncertainty avoidance × IQ | 0.016 *** | 0.003 | |||||||||||||||
0 | −0.001 | −0.004 | −0.005 | −0.001 | |||||||||||||||||
Uncertainty avoidance × IQ | 0.000 ** | 0.006 ** | 0.001 | Individualism | −1.361 | −1.483 ** | |||||||||||||||
0 | −0.002 | −0.008 | −0.787 | −0.655 | |||||||||||||||||
Individualism | −0.074 ** | −0.411 | −2.579 ** | Power distance | −2.265 ** | −0.112 | |||||||||||||||
−0.035 | −0.285 | −1.038 | −0.934 | −0.062 | |||||||||||||||||
Power distance | −0.031 *** | −0.312 ** | −8.784 ** | Masculinity | −0.678 | −0.215 | |||||||||||||||
−0.008 | −0.137 | −3.631 | −0.469 | −0.158 | |||||||||||||||||
Masculinity | −0.012 | −0.225 | 0.204 | Uncertainty avoidance | −1.657 *** | −0.245 ** | |||||||||||||||
−0.008 | −0.121 | −0.955 | −0.589 | −0.108 | |||||||||||||||||
Uncertainty avoidance | −0.016 ** | −0.445 | −0.074 | IQ | −0.209 | −1.229 | −0.490 *** | −0.651 ** | −1.741 *** | −0.206 *** | −0.262 | −0.163 | |||||||||
−0.008 | −0.228 | −0.776 | −0.227 | −0.725 | −0.184 | −0.312 | −0.574 | −0.072 | −0.185 | −0.087 | |||||||||||
IQ | −0.115 *** | −0.028 *** | −0.023 ** | −0.011 ** | −0.181 | −0.233 ** | −0.145 | −0.241 | 0.07 | −9.161 ** | −0.513 | 1.006 | Firm size | 1.306 *** | 1.25 | 1.655 *** | 0.982 | 2.465 *** | 0.110 *** | −0.376 | 0.115 |
−0.034 | −0.007 | −0.01 | −0.005 | −0.098 | −0.093 | −0.08 | −0.14 | −0.449 | −4.144 | −0.518 | −0.555 | −0.487 | −0.653 | −0.588 | −0.643 | −0.559 | −0.037 | −0.257 | −0.101 | ||
Firm size | 0.046 | −0.009 | 0.006 | 0.018 ** | 0.354 ** | 0.371 *** | 0.333 *** | 0.401 ** | 0.679 | 3.250 ** | 2.043 | 0.599 | ROA | 0.408 | −0.023 | −0.001 | 0 | −0.044 | −0.025* | 0.327 | −0.032 |
−0.028 | −0.005 | −0.007 | −0.008 | −0.141 | −0.128 | −0.12 | −0.185 | −0.409 | −1.281 | −1.319 | −0.515 | −0.478 | −0.338 | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.138 | −0.013 | −0.223 | −0.041 | ||
ROA | 0.001 | −0.004 | −0.028 *** | −0.004 ** | 0.093 | 0.044 | 0.06 | 0.023 | −0.939 | 0.197 | −0.762 ** | 1.742 | Dividend payout | −0.553 ** | −0.16 | −0.568 | −0.400 *** | 0.11 | 0.126 ** | 0.076 | −0.028 |
−0.014 | −0.004 | −0.01 | −0.002 | −0.079 | −0.035 | −0.075 | −0.092 | −0.539 | −0.771 | −0.32 | −1.02 | −0.259 | −0.127 | −0.324 | −0.086 | −0.146 | −0.051 | −0.136 | −0.031 | ||
Dividend payout | −0.026 | −0.013 | −0.013 ** | 0.005 | −0.051 | −0.044 ** | −0.045 | −0.070 ** | −1.612 *** | 1.108 | −0.163 | −2.930 *** | Capital expenditure | 0.287 | 0.275 | 0.184 | 0.991 | −0.798 *** | −0.180 *** | −2.377 *** | −0.404 |
−0.013 | −0.009 | −0.005 | −0.009 | −0.028 | −0.019 | −0.024 | −0.029 | −0.578 | −0.568 | −0.991 | −0.884 | −0.682 | −0.455 | −0.574 | −0.506 | −0.214 | −0.051 | −0.835 | −0.281 | ||
Capital expenditure | −0.001 | 0.007 | −0.023 | 0.007 | 0.183 | 0.348 *** | 0.265 ** | 0.277* | −0.461 | 3.017 | 0.13 | 0.303 | Liquidity | −0.36 | −0.369 | −0.393 *** | 0.347 | −1.207 *** | −0.030 *** | −0.306 ** | −0.062 |
−0.027 | −0.008 | −0.013 | −0.017 | −0.159 | −0.116 | −0.121 | −0.149 | −0.4 | −1.93 | −0.836 | −0.218 | −0.217 | −0.206 | −0.146 | −0.207 | −0.404 | −0.011 | −0.123 | −0.052 | ||
Liquidity | −0.047 ** | 0.006 | 0.001 | 0.017 *** | 0.001 | 0.006 | 0 | 0.03 | 0.012 | 0.049 | 0.27 | 0.661 *** | Growth opportunity | 0.028 | 0.105 | 0.118 | 0.04 | −0.416 *** | 0.010 *** | −0.012 | −0.012 |
−0.024 | −0.006 | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.049 | −0.043 | −0.046 | −0.079 | −0.395 | −0.543 | −0.357 | −0.194 | −0.077 | −0.103 | −0.071 | −0.085 | −0.148 | −0.003 | −0.038 | −0.017 | ||
Growth opportunity | −0.029 *** | −0.004 | −0.005 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.090 ** | −0.036 | −0.070 ** | −0.091 ** | 0.380 *** | −0.62 | −0.008 | −0.355 | Tangibility | −0.103 | 0.1 | −0.006 | −0.034 | 0.504 *** | −0.01 | −0.008 | 0.016 |
−0.009 | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.042 | −0.019 | −0.027 | −0.043 | −0.142 | −0.35 | −0.107 | −0.209 | −0.118 | −0.281 | −0.095 | −0.095 | −0.191 | −0.011 | −0.095 | −0.022 | ||
Tangibility | 0.029 ** | 0.003 ** | 0.004 | 0.002 | −0.008 | −0.028 | −0.01 | −0.028 | −0.506 ** | 0.707 | −0.2 | −1.246 *** | Inflation | −0.012 | −0.04 | −0.041 | 0.018 | −0.308 ** | 0.032* | 0.198 | 0.006 |
−0.013 | −0.001 | −0.006 | −0.001 | −0.031 | −0.018 | −0.022 | −0.032 | −0.249 | −0.539 | −0.178 | −0.285 | −0.073 | −0.166 | −0.046 | −0.081 | −0.126 | −0.017 | −0.172 | −0.023 | ||
Inflation | −0.014 | −0.003 ** | 0 | −0.003 | 0.006 | 0.028 | 0.038 | 0.041 ** | 0.279 | −1.33 | 0.031 | 0.381 | Ln_GDP | −1.586 | 0.072 | −0.006 | 2.987 | −11.621 *** | 0.169 | −1.559 | 0.428 |
−0.008 | −0.001 | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.025 | −0.018 | −0.02 | −0.021 | −0.434 | −0.852 | −0.136 | −0.227 | −2.497 | −1.87 | −3.27 | −3.231 | −3.075 | −0.158 | −0.946 | −0.422 | ||
Ln_GDP | −0.326 | −0.01 | −0.083 | −0.003 | −1.221 ** | 0.641 | −0.578 | −1.419 | −8.968 *** | 0.973 | −14.222 | 0.151 | FDI | −0.187 | −0.143 | 0.186 | −0.015 | −0.146 *** | −0.006 | −0.145 | −0.005 |
−0.188 | −0.028 | −0.045 | −0.021 | −0.62 | −0.424 | −0.431 | −0.764 | −2.728 | −7.983 | −7.895 | −1.314 | −0.168 | −0.079 | −0.225 | −0.114 | −0.054 | −0.005 | −0.082 | −0.018 | ||
FDI | 0.010 ** | 0.001 | −0.007 *** | −0.004 ** | −0.01 | −0.052 *** | −0.039 ** | −0.03 | 0.21 | −0.984 ** | −0.328 | −0.216 *** | Constant | 17.215 | 132.419 ** | 11.514 | 48.457 ** | 47.336 | 4.697 | 26.139 *** | 10.59 |
−0.005 | −0.001 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.012 | −0.014 | −0.015 | −0.017 | −0.232 | −0.494 | −0.638 | −0.066 | −18.258 | −59.285 | −21.344 | −24.638 | −27.786 | −5.05 | −10.112 | −6.336 | ||
Constant | 3.729 *** | 3.361 *** | 1.439 *** | 0.569 | 13.027 | 5.628 | 10.538 | 24.126 | 69.687 ** | 428.741 ** | 1.973 | 46.869 | Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
−1.379 | −0.654 | −0.537 | −0.393 | −9.593 | −8.987 | −6.536 | −14.838 | −31.871 | −202.61 | −53.645 | −47.304 | Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | NO | NO |
Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Observations | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 |
Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | NO | NO | AR(1) | 0.0384 | 3.92 × 10−7 | 0.00417 | 7.27 × 10−11 | 0.0182 | 0 | 0.0889 | 5.32 × 10−7 |
Observations | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | 14,642 | AR(2) | 0.901 | 0.547 | 0.671 | 0.514 | 0.711 | 0.101 | 0.241 | 0.12 |
AR(1) | 0.00985 | 2.81 × 10−7 | 0.15 | 6.32 × 10−7 | 0.00746 | 0 | 0.000757 | 4.78 × 10−6 | 1.74 × 10−8 | 0.0556 | 0 | 1.25 × 10−5 | Hansen test | 0.742 | 0.472 | 0.369 | 0.19 | 0.462 | 0.446 | 0.707 | 0.314 |
AR(2) | 0.183 | 0.955 | 0.603 | 0.695 | 0.434 | 0.138 | 0.232 | 0.269 | 0.402 | 0.882 | 0.48 | 0.119 | No of instruments/groups | 21 | 21 | 21 | 26 | 41 | 62 | 21 | 51 |
Hansen test | 0.802 | 0.0823 | 0.2 | 0.131 | 0.688 | 0.587 | 0.559 | 0.511 | 0.398 | 0.298 | 0.18 | 0.491 | |||||||||
No of instruments | 41 | 37 | 46 | 45 | 31 | 31 | 36 | 31 | 21 | 16 | 21 | 19 |
RE | 2SLS | |||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | Debt to Equity | Debt to Equity | Debt to Equity | Debt to Equity | 1st Stage | 2nd Stage | 1st Stage | 2nd Stage | 1st Stage | 2nd Stage | 1st Stage | 2nd Stage |
Individualism (IDV_TK) | 2.599 ** | 0.559 *** | ||||||||||
(1.337) | (0.061) | |||||||||||
Power distance (PDI_TK) | −0.554 ** | −2.035 *** | ||||||||||
(0.285) | (0.223) | |||||||||||
Masculinity (MAS_TK) | 1.113 ** | 3.252 *** | ||||||||||
(0.572) | (0.356) | |||||||||||
Uncertainty avoidance (UAI_TK) | 0.262 ** | 6.551 *** | ||||||||||
(0.135) | (0.270) | |||||||||||
Firm size | −0.020 *** | −0.020 *** | −0.020 *** | −0.020 *** | −0.006 *** | 0.029 *** | −0.003 *** | 0.019 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.012 *** | 0.001 | 0.026 *** |
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.004) | |
ROA | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 | −0.000 *** | −0.000 | 0.000 | −0.000 | 0.001 *** |
(0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | |
Dividend payout | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.006 *** | −0.008 *** | 0.014 *** | −0.002 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.005 *** | −0.008 *** | −0.006 *** | 0.054 *** |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.002) | |
Capital expenditure | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.006 | −0.035 *** | 0.042 *** | −0.012 *** | −0.002 | 0.030 *** | −0.075 *** | −0.023 *** | 0.218 *** |
(0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.006) | (0.000) | (0.006) | (0.001) | (0.011) | (0.001) | (0.010) | |
Liquidity | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.013 *** | 0.026 *** | −0.002 *** | 0.013 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.006 | −0.009 *** | 0.074 *** |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.000) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.001) | (0.005) | |
Growth opportunity | −0.006 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.006 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.001 *** | −0.008 *** | −0.000 *** | −0.004 *** | −0.003 *** | 0.021 *** |
(0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.001) | |
Tangibility | 0.068 *** | 0.068 *** | 0.068 *** | 0.068 *** | 0.006 *** | 0.058 *** | −0.001 *** | 0.060 *** | −0.003 *** | 0.072 *** | −0.000 | 0.022 *** |
(0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.002) | |
Inflation | −0.163 *** | −0.163 *** | −0.163 *** | −0.163 *** | −0.009 *** | −0.021 | −0.006 *** | −0.038 *** | −0.018 *** | 0.033 *** | 0.021 *** | −0.179 *** |
(0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.001) | (0.012) | (0.000) | (0.013) | (0.001) | (0.010) | (0.001) | (0.013) | |
Ln_GDP | −0.775 *** | −0.775 *** | −0.775 *** | −0.775 *** | −0.112 *** | −0.169 *** | −0.036 *** | −0.305 *** | 0.090 *** | −0.523 *** | −0.129 *** | 0.341 *** |
(0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.002) | (0.014) | (0.000) | (0.026) | (0.001) | (0.049) | (0.002) | (0.027) | |
FDI | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.004 ** | 0.002 *** | 0.004 *** | 0.007 *** | 0.020 *** | 0.011 *** | −0.029 *** | −0.007 *** | 0.044 *** |
(0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.000) | (0.003) | (0.000) | (0.002) | |
British Rule | 0.751 *** | 0.206 *** | 0.129 *** | 0.007 *** | ||||||||
(0.006) | (0.001) | (0.004) | (0.000) | |||||||||
Constant | 2.505 | 19.626 *** | 14.142 *** | 16.296 *** | 5.580 *** | 13.588 *** | 3.102 | 23.440 *** | 3.712 *** | 4.637 *** | 4.624 *** | −12.947 *** |
(7.555) | (1.267) | (1.575) | (0.488) | (0.026) | (0.429) | (0.006) | (0.719) | (0.017) | (1.378) | (0.018) | (1.339) | |
Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Country effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Wald chi(2) statistics | 885.61 *** | 3133.84 *** | 1942.99 *** | 7618.35 *** | ||||||||
Observations | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 | 15,556 |
R-sq (within) | 0.151 | 0.131 | 0.144 | 0.159 | 0.679 | 0.318 | 0.859 | 0.318 | 0.596 | 0.318 | 0.661 | 0.389 |
Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 | |||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Variables | Equity to Total Assets (Lev1) | Total Debt to Total Assets (Blev) | Market Leverage (Mlev) | Variables | Long-Term Debt (LTD) | Short-Term Debt (STD) | |||||||||||||||
Levt−1 | 0.593 *** | 0.343 ** | 0.518 *** | 0.407 *** | LTDt−1 | 0.356 *** | 0.153 *** | 0.365 *** | 0.335 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.021 | −0.173 | −0.108 | −0.14 | −0.016 | −0.017 | −0.019 | −0.04 | ||||||||||||||
Blevt−1 | 0.478 *** | 0.685 *** | 0.470 *** | 0.489 *** | STDt−1 | 0.553 *** | 0.492 *** | 0.421 *** | 0.516 *** | ||||||||||||
−0.01 | −0.142 | −0.013 | −0.013 | −0.03 | −0.102 | −0.01 | −0.096 | ||||||||||||||
Mlevt−1 | 0.158 *** | 0.240 *** | 0.193 *** | 0.188 *** | Individualism | 0.554 ** | 0.128 *** | ||||||||||||||
−0.021 | −0.046 | −0.029 | −0.05 | −0.222 | −0.033 | ||||||||||||||||
LTDt−1 | Power distance | −0.134 *** | −0.155 ** | ||||||||||||||||||
−0.051 | −0.076 | ||||||||||||||||||||
STDt−1 | Masculinity | 0.294 *** | 0.022 ** | ||||||||||||||||||
−0.067 | −0.01 | ||||||||||||||||||||
Individualism | 0.025 ** | 0.052 *** | 0.525 ** | Uncertainty avoidance | 0.541 ** | ||||||||||||||||
−0.012 | −0.016 | −0.217 | −0.209 | 0.074 ** | |||||||||||||||||
Power distance | −0.026 *** | −0.505 ** | −0.845 ** | Firm size | 0.116 ** | 0.166 *** | 0.362 *** | 0.525 ** | 0.004 | 0.109 ** | 0.049 *** | −0.035 | |||||||||
−0.009 | −0.22 | −0.417 | −0.052 | −0.038 | −0.099 | −0.25 | −0.019 | −0.05 | −0.009 | −0.057 | |||||||||||
Masculinity | 0.015 *** | 0 | 0.487 *** | ROA | −0.172 *** | 0.023 | −3.075 ** | 0.097 | −1.247 | −3.622 ** | −1.012 *** | −3.347 | |||||||||
−0.005 | −0.017 | −0.177 | −0.055 | −0.045 | −1.301 | −0.425 | −0.679 | −1.752 | −0.318 | −2.083 | |||||||||||
Uncertainty avoidance | 0.011 ** | 0.031 ** | 0.217 ** | Dividend payout | −0.038 | −0.036 | −0.051 *** | 0.019 | −0.044 ** | −0.008 | −0.009 *** | −0.024 | |||||||||
−0.004 | −0.012 | −0.092 | −0.021 | −0.04 | −0.02 | −0.127 | −0.021 | −0.018 | −0.003 | −0.017 | |||||||||||
Firm size | 0.019 *** | 0.023 *** | 0.022 *** | 0.022 *** | 0.047 *** | 0.182 | 0.073 *** | 0.040 *** | 0.355 *** | 0.772 *** | 1.057 *** | 0.497 ** | Capital expenditure | 0.103 | 0.054 | 0.131 ** | 0.121 | −0.036 *** | 0.005 | −0.015 | −0.001 |
−0.004 | −0.007 | −0.007 | −0.006 | −0.009 | −0.103 | −0.019 | −0.014 | −0.083 | −0.265 | −0.187 | −0.209 | −0.056 | −0.056 | −0.053 | −0.156 | −0.013 | −0.044 | −0.009 | −0.001 | ||
ROA | 0.473 *** | 0.224 | −0.003 ** | −0.017 *** | 0.004 | −4.21 | 0.13 | −1.553 ** | −0.003 | −0.093 | −0.091 | −0.004 | Liquidity | 0.359 *** | 0.309 *** | −0.483 *** | −0.437 | −0.070 *** | −0.117 | −0.078 *** | −0.066 |
−0.089 | −0.187 | −0.001 | −0.005 | −0.008 | −2.94 | −0.524 | −0.605 | −0.093 | −0.159 | −0.131 | −0.163 | −0.085 | −0.108 | −0.171 | −0.327 | −0.018 | −0.097 | −0.015 | −0.054 | ||
Dividend payout | −0.003 *** | −0.005 | −0.006 *** | −0.004 ** | 0.038 *** | −0.021 | 0.013 *** | 0.022 *** | −0.220 *** | 0.03 | −0.250 ** | 0.033 | Growth opportunity | 0.060 *** | 0.618 *** | 0.084 *** | 0.084 *** | −0.001 | −0.026 ** | −0.004 | −0.019 |
−0.001 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.004 | −0.044 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.066 | −0.038 | −0.107 | −0.051 | −0.015 | −0.013 | −0.024 | −0.032 | −0.007 | −0.012 | −0.003 | −0.014 | ||
Capital expenditure | 0 | −0.003 | 0.001 | 0 | −0.013 ** | 0.028 | −0.014 | −0.002 | 0.057 | −0.029 | 0.104 | 0.024 | Tangibility | 0.01 | 0.017 | −0.093 *** | −0.297 *** | 0.001 | −0.007 | −0.003 | −0.001 |
−0.001 | −0.002 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.006 | −0.055 | −0.022 | −0.009 | −0.049 | −0.151 | −0.099 | −0.131 | −0.007 | −0.017 | −0.018 | −0.107 | −0.003 | −0.005 | −0.004 | −0.005 | ||
Liquidity | 0.037 *** | 0.045 *** | 0.030 ** | 0.058 *** | 0.001 | −0.192 ** | 0.003 | −0.003 | −0.01 | −0.243 | −0.545 | 0.369 | Inflation | −0.031 | −0.016 | −0.063 ** | 0.119 | 0.037 *** | 0.019 | 0.019 *** | 0.031 |
−0.009 | −0.016 | −0.014 | −0.019 | −0.001 | −0.081 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.07 | −0.269 | −0.306 | −0.313 | −0.019 | −0.017 | −0.026 | −0.171 | −0.009 | −0.012 | −0.005 | −0.018 | ||
Growth opportunity | 0.005 *** | 0.006 | 0.004 ** | 0.005 ** | 0.037 ** | 0.261 | 0.033 | 0.158 *** | 0.183 *** | 0.012 | 0.071 | 0.121 | Ln_GDP | −0.526 *** | −0.411 ** | −2.977 *** | −4.289 ** | −0.132 | −0.54 | −0.203 | −0.627 |
−0.001 | −0.003 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.015 | −0.158 | −0.033 | −0.034 | −0.026 | −0.047 | −0.042 | −0.064 | −0.107 | −0.193 | −0.684 | −2.047 | −0.089 | −0.375 | −0.109 | −0.376 | ||
Tangibility | 0.001 | −0.002 | 0 | −0.001 | −0.007 ** | −0.039 | −0.020 *** | −0.010 ** | 0.029 *** | 0.004 | −0.013 | 0.014 | FDI | −0.456 *** | −0.099 | −0.326 *** | −1.344 *** | 0.039 | 0.083 | 0.015 | 0.065 |
−0.003 | −0.003 | −0.003 | −0.004 | −0.003 | −0.048 | −0.006 | −0.004 | −0.011 | −0.017 | −0.046 | −0.046 | −0.084 | −0.07 | −0.089 | −0.446 | −0.026 | −0.054 | −0.017 | −0.046 | ||
Inflation | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.001 | −0.002 | 0 | 0.137 ** | −0.004 | −0.009 | −0.025 | −0.025 | −0.067 | −0.053 | Constant | 19.825 *** | −10.393 *** | −1.278 | 1.026 | −4.425 *** | 12.804 ** | −0.001 | −2.465 |
−0.001 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.002 | −0.003 | −0.055 | −0.005 | −0.005 | −0.036 | −0.063 | −0.061 | −0.061 | −3.907 | −3.286 | −3.098 | −4.697 | −1.122 | −6.306 | −0.272 | −1.254 | ||
Ln_GDP | −0.041 ** | −0.135 ** | −0.130 *** | −0.115 ** | −0.021 | −0.749 | −0.387 ** | −0.252 | −1.517 *** | −3.265 | −5.066 *** | −3.262 ** | Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
−0.02 | −0.062 | −0.05 | −0.052 | −0.048 | −0.664 | −0.169 | −0.145 | −0.445 | −2.346 | −1.933 | −1.38 | Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
FDI | −0.004 | 0.01 | 0.004 | −0.001 | 0.006 | −0.052 | 0.005 | 0.030* | 0.012 | −0.074 | −0.108 | −0.331 | Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | No | No |
−0.004 | −0.006 | −0.005 | −0.062 | −0.011 | −0.089 | −0.021 | −0.016 | −0.118 | −0.193 | −0.196 | −0.224 | Observations | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | |
Constant | −0.893 ** | 2.438 *** | −0.559 *** | −0.298 ** | −2.851 *** | 48.246 ** | −2.042 *** | −1.125 *** | −18.531 ** | 66.972 | −14.276 ** | −10.675 | AR(1) | 0 | 0.001 | 0 | 0 | 1.06 × 10−6 | 3.01 × 10−5 | 7.27 × 10−7 | 1.45 × 10−5 |
−0.435 | −0.92 | −0.21 | −0.122 | −0.619 | −21.232 | −0.682 | −0.414 | −8.758 | −35.708 | −5.654 | −6.016 | AR(2) | 0.45 | 0.746 | 0.654 | 0.464 | 0.0662 | 0.0909 | 0.102 | 0.0762 | |
Year effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Hansen test | 0.204 | 0.691 | 0.178 | 0.26 | 0.696 | 0.233 | 0.77 | 0.59 |
Industry effect | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No of instruments/groups | 98 | 92 | 97 | 27 | 83 | 97 | 89 | 83 |
Country effect | NO | No | NO | NO | NO | No | No | No | No | NO | NO | NO | |||||||||
Observations | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | 3138 | |||||||||
AR(1) | 0.033 | 0.038 | 0.042 | 0.023 | 2.36 × 10−7 | 0.00017 | 1.67 × 10−7 | 1.47 × 10−7 | 1.23× 10−10 | 3.19 × 10−9 | 0 | 6.61 × 10−9 | |||||||||
AR(2) | 0.934 | 0.607 | 0.739 | 0.842 | 0.34 | 0.51 | 0.341 | 0.39 | 0.85 | 0.374 | 0.765 | 0.507 | |||||||||
Hansen test | 0.422 | 0.876 | 0.117 | 0.52 | 0.492 | 0.944 | 0.747 | 0.709 | 0.0773 | 0.0725 | 0.357 | 0.0743 | |||||||||
No of instruments/groups | |||||||||||||||||||||
75/198 | 72/198 | 95/198 | 95/198 | 96/198 | 23/198 | 81/198 | 93/198 | 96/198 | 94/198 | 71/198 | 97/198 |
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Hu, H.; Qi, M. New Evidence on National Culture and Corporate Financing: Does Institutional Quality Matter? Sustainability 2022, 14, 12689. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912689
Hu H, Qi M. New Evidence on National Culture and Corporate Financing: Does Institutional Quality Matter? Sustainability. 2022; 14(19):12689. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912689
Chicago/Turabian StyleHu, Haifeng, and Minjing Qi. 2022. "New Evidence on National Culture and Corporate Financing: Does Institutional Quality Matter?" Sustainability 14, no. 19: 12689. https://doi.org/10.3390/su141912689