Does the Collective Forestland Tenure Reform Promote Rural Households’ Forestry Inputs? Based on Dual Perspectives of Rural Households’ Divergence and Inter-Generational Differences

Abstract

As the most direct subject of collective forestland tenure reform, rural households’ forestry production behavior is an important guarantee for the promotion of sustainable forestry development. Based on the survey data of 12,760 rural households in 9 provinces in China, we construct a theoretical analysis framework of the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs from the perspective of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences, and elucidate the mechanism of the effect of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs in the context of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences. The results of the empirical analysis show that collective forestland tenure reform significantly increases rural households’ forestry inputs; this effect has a differentiated impact on rural households with different degrees of differentiation and inter-generational differences. Although the collective forestland tenure reform provides a good institutional environment for households to increase the enthusiasm of forestry inputs, the positive incentive effect of collective forestland tenure reform tends to decline as the degree of households’ differentiation and inter-generational differences deepen. Therefore, this research tries to provide an “indirect” policy adjustment idea to deepen the policies related to collective forestland tenure reform by starting from the differentiation of households and inter-generational differences.

1. Introduction

Since the reform and opening up, China’s dual economic structure of urban and rural areas has partially been overcome by the rapid progress of urbanization, industrialization, and agricultural modernization. As a result, many rural households have relocated from rural to urban areas in search of employment, with the proportion of the labor employed in rural areas falling from 75.31% in 1978 to 43.60% in 2017. Since the 1980s, China’s collective forestland tenure reform has experienced more than 40 years. The entire exploration process of the comprehensive reform is most representative of the “three definitions” of forestry reform in the 1980s and the new round of collective forestland tenure reform in 2003. From the 1950s to the 1970s, China’s collective forests were mainly operated and benefited from a form of collective “common property tenure”, under which rural households could not hold the tenure to collective forestland exclusively, which eventually led to serious damage to collective forestland at that time. The problems of forest cultivation are becoming more and more prominent. The existence of these problems not only severely restricted the supply of timber and forest products in China at that time, leading to the contradiction between supply and demand of timber and forest products, but also brought about the degradation of forest conditions and caused serious ecological and environmental problems. Therefore, reforming the tenure relationship of collective forestland and improving the condition of collective forestland became a realistic problem that the government urgently needed to solve at that time. In 1981, the Chinese government issued a decision on several issues concerning the protection of forests and the development of forestry, which put forward the forestry “three definitions” reform policy of “stabilizing the forest tenure of mountain forests, delineating the reserved mountains and determining the responsibility system for forestry production”.

Due to the lack of clarity in the definition of tenures in the forestry “three definitions” policy, some collective forest areas have the phenomenon of merging the responsible mountain and the reserved mountain, and even many collective forests have many unowned mountains, one mountain with multiple owners and other problems of an unclear definition of tenures, making rural households over-harvest forest resources due to the lack of stable policy expectations, resulting in collective forest areas. As a result, the accumulation of collective forests has been declining again, forcing the central government to call a halt to the forestry “three definitions” reform. As China continued to promote the reform of the market economy system, the Chinese government issued the Decision on Accelerating Forestry Development in 2003, marking the beginning of a new round of reform of the collective forestland tenure system, and in 2008, a new round of reform of the collective forestland tenure system was fully implemented nationwide. In accordance with the principles of the central government’s implementation of the collective forestland tenure reform, each region cannot simply take the responsibility of the forestry “three” reform period to determine the responsibility of the mountain and self-reserved mountain for the issuance of certificates, but to re-conduct field “four to” survey and registration, the issuance of a unified style, and has the legal effect of the new forestland tenure certificate.

However, influenced by factors such as resource endowment and initial status of tenure, the new round of collective forestland tenure reform has been implemented in different regions of the country with obvious differences, resulting in significant differences in the security of tenure, resulting in the current stage of forestry operation in rural areas still being sloppy and low efficiency, with family contract management as the main body of collective forestland management, long-standing lack of forestland investment and forestland productivity level. The problems of low productivity of forestland are becoming increasingly obvious. In 2016, the Chinese government issued the Opinions on Improving the Collective Forestland Tenure System, proposing to consolidate and expand the results of the new round of collective forestland tenure reform and further improve the registration and certification of collective forestland contracts, with a view to establishing a benign development mechanism that guarantees national ecological security, sustains the growth of forest resources, and stimulates rural households’ enthusiasm for forestry production. However, compared with the period of “three definitions” of forestry, although clear and stable tenure of forestland motivates rural households to engage in forestry production and operation, the environment of rural labor supply and production factor allocation structure faced by the deepening reform in the new period has changed greatly, and the trend of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences has gradually deepened to become a prominent phenomenon in rural society. Nevertheless, compared to the forestry “three definitions” period, although clear and stable tenure of forestland motivates rural households to engage in forestry production and operation, the environment of rural labor supply and production factor allocation structure facing the deepening of reform in the new period has changed significantly, and the trend of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences has become a prominent phenomenon.

On one hand, the proliferation of off-farm employment opportunities for rural households has led to a large amount of surplus rural labor migration to the off-farm sector and the increasing importance of off-farm employment income in total household income [1], which has led to the differentiation of originally homogeneous households and numerous changes in forestry production behavior. On the other hand, there are significant differences between the old and new generations of rural households in terms of material and spiritual expectations, which may lead to gradual differences in their willingness and behavior in forestry management and their perceptions of off-farm employment. Based on this, it is important to understand the impact of forestry reform on the input of forestry production factors from the perspective of rural households’ differentiation and inter-generational differences. In addition, examining the effect of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs from the rational qualities of rural households’ psycho-social level can provide valuable insights into collective forestland tenure reform’s precise operation. Academics in China have continuously paid attention to the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs but have not yet formed a consistent opinion on the relationship between collective forestland tenure reform and rural households’ forestry inputs.

The research has continuously paid attention to the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs, and the available results mainly analyze the impact of secure forestland property tenure on forestry investment from three major effects: security, transaction, and credit in China. First, the security effect. Most studies have found that collective forestland tenure reform makes tenure in forests more stable and reduces the number of disputes over forestland tenure [2]. Long-term stable land tenure ensures that rural households’ land returns are not appropriated by the government or institutions [3], reduces the uncertainty of future returns [4], and stimulates investment by influencing the expected rewards of land [5]. It also reduces the instability of rural households’ potential incomes and boosts their excitement for forest activities [6]. Stable and comprehensive forestland tenure can raise rural households’ awareness of their tenure, thereby reducing long-term investment risks and boosting rural households’ output incentives [7]. Insecure and ambiguous tenure significantly reduced household incentives to invest in forestland, resulting in inefficient forestland use [8]. Yi et al. [9] found that rural households’ security of tenure on forestland influences rural households’ forestry inputs on forestland; Liu et al. [10] argued that collective forestland tenure reform has a positive effect on rural households’ participation in forestry operations, with households more inclined to operate forestland with secure tenure compared to unconfirmed plots. Second, the transaction effect. Forestland transactions had a statistically significant factor equalization effect, which could be used to correct the mismatched labor–land ratio and improve land-use efficiency [11]. Frequent adjustment and expropriation of land increase rural households’ operating costs and transaction risks and affect rural households’ willingness to transfer land [12].

Rural households can decide to lease or sell property in reaction to changes in the external economic environment, particularly changes in the demand and supply of forestland, in order to maximize their forestland tenure and increase the utility and advantages for their households [13]. Secure land tenure can effectively influence rural households’ enthusiasm to operate and prompt tenure transactions through production, transaction costs, and transaction price effects [14], i.e., the tenure incentive is achieved through the transaction route [15]. One study discovered an investment incentive effect by comparing rural household forestry investments before and after the collective forestland tenure reform [16]. In the short run, the principal reform of forestland tenure can increase rural households’ investment intensity [17]. It can be seen that collective forestland tenure reform can effectively reduce the information cost due to transaction information asymmetry and promote the development of forestland tenure flow market, thus affecting the allocation structure of forestry production factors. Third, the credit effect. Secure and stable tenure make it possible for land to become collateral, and rural households obtain credit from the collateral value of land through the credit market and act on land investment [18], i.e., land certificates that increase rural households’ access to credit become one of the factors of land tenure affecting investment [19]. A study demonstrates the importance of home mortgage rights for forestland. Therefore, it is crucial for the government to promote the forestland mortgage market and raise rural households’ understanding of their tenure to use forestland as collateral for loans [20].

Therefore, collective forestland tenure reform has substantially increased the possibility of rural households’ access to forest tenure mortgage loans through the forest tenure mortgage system, which can effectively alleviate the credit constraints faced by rural households in forestry production due to the lack of effective collateral [10], thus improving the situation of liquid capital deficiency faced by rural households in forestry production. In summary, collective forestland tenure reform as an institutional arrangement of the forestland tenure system can effectively increase the area of forestland operated by rural households [21], although it exacerbates the degree of fragmentation and decentralization of households’ forestland to a certain extent [22]. However, clear tenure can motivate rural households to increase capital such as fertilizer and pesticides and labor input in forestry production [23]. Both forestland use and disposal rights can boost forest output by promoting rural household investment and optimizing forestry labor [24]. Therefore, forestland tenure is an important factor influencing rural households’ forestry capital and labor inputs [10]. Some scholars also analyzed the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs from the perspective of rural households’ subjective evaluation. Xie et al. (2013) found that households’ subjective evaluation of the forestland allocation system and collective forestland tenure reform had a significant impact on rural households’ forestry operations, and the higher the households’ subjective evaluation, the higher the intensity of forestry inputs [25]. However, studies with the opposite view have concluded that collective forestland tenure reform does not have a significant effect on rural households’ forestry inputs [26]. For example, Yi et al. (2014) [27] found that although collective forestland tenure reform enhanced the security of forestland tenure, it did not have a significant incentive effect on rural households’ forestry inputs, which may be due to the increase in forestland fragmentation. The imperfect development of the forestland lease market and mortgage market, and the liquidity constraint of rural households due to the difficulty of realizing trading rights and mortgage rights [28], resulted in the inability to achieve a significant increase in forestry inputs [29].

A large body of literature has analyzed the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs in terms of its direct or indirect effects. However, China has undergone significant and profound changes after more than 40 years of development, and an important characteristic difference is the differentiation of rural households due to the difference in the degree of off-farm employment that accompanies the difference in rural socioeconomic development and urbanization level. Off-farm work is an important source of income for many rural households in rural China. As a result, rural households with relatively high off-farm incomes are less motivated than rural households with relatively high forestry incomes to allocate labor to the forestry sector [30]. Off-farm employment is an inevitable trend of employment form and employment structure change of rural labor in the context of current economic transformation. Therefore, the division of rural households caused by labor migration may reduce forestry production labor supply. In order to ensure normal forestry production and operation, it is inevitable to achieve perpetual investment in forestry production and operation by taking into account forestry production while off-farm employment, increasing capital to compensate for labor shortage, or using returned capital to continue to expand forestry inputs. Therefore, the differentiation of rural households may be a micro-explanation for the uneven efficiency of forestland use by rural households at this stage.

Another important characteristic differential impact is the difference between the first generation of rural households born before 1980 and the new generation of rural households born after 1980. There are huge differences between first-generation and new-generation rural households in terms of upbringing, life expectations, literacy level, value orientation, personal pursuits, and behavioral logic [31]. Such inter-generational differences can directly or indirectly affect rural households’ employment choices. Wang Chunguang [32] and Liu Chuanjiang et al. [33] verified this difference, arguing that the purpose of off-farm employment for the first generation is to increase family income, while the new generation of rural households adds additional pursuits such as work environment to their wage income. Such inter-generational differences may cause rural households to have diversified attitudes toward forestry inputs. Therefore, it is necessary to answer the following questions. What is the effect of the deepening of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences on rural households’ forestry inputs? Does forestry reform have the same effect on forestry inputs for different types of rural households and different generations of rural households? This question has not been explored in the literature. Therefore, this research answers this key question from the perspective of rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences, taking into account the characteristics of rural households’ forestland resource endowment, human capital, natural environmental factors, and market characteristics: What is the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on the forestry production input behavior of rural households with different degrees of differentiation and different generations?

The main marginal contribution of this study is that, in exploring the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry investment, this study mainly focuses on the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry investment behavior with different degrees of differentiation and different inter-generational differences. On this basis, it further investigates the impact of the interaction between collective forestland tenure reform and rural households’ differentiation and the interaction between collective forestland tenure reform and inter-generational differences on rural households’ forestry investment behavior. Existing studies mainly focus on the security intensity of forestland tenure [34], forestland tenure structure [10], rural households’ risk perception [35], attitude towards forestland tenure [25], and the optimal allocation effect of labor caused by forestland tenure reform [29,36,37,38,39] to discuss the impact of forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs. The common feature of these studies is that rural households are regarded as homogeneous groups. They have not strictly distinguished the heterogeneous differentiation of rural households caused by different economic development periods and the inter-generational differences caused by different age levels. Moreover, studies have never addressed the issue of the research mainly taking homogeneous households as the objective object, which is also the biggest difference between this study and the existing research.

2. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis

2.1. Theoretical Analysis of Collective Forestland Tenure Reform Affecting Forestry Inputs

The collective forestland tenure reform strengthens the security of forestland by confirming and certifying the tenure, providing rural households with stable tenure expectations, and enabling them to obtain the full investment income of forestland during the investment period, thus effectively motivating rural households to increase their investment in forestry production factors. The following is the specific performance. Firstly, with the forest tenure prior to the collective forestland tenure reform, rural households faced the risk of losing their forestland and not receiving all of the returns from forestry production, which dampened their enthusiasm for investing in forestry. Following the collective forestland tenure reform, the government legalized rural households’ forestland, clarified the spatial geographic location and forest tenure attributes of rural households’ forestland, reduced the cost of protecting rural households’ forestland tenure, improved the internalization of forestry investment returns, and thus directly motivated rural households to invest in forestry. Secondly, a clear property tenure system for forestland improves its tradability and degree of trading liberalization, allowing rural households to realize property tenure trading in a wider trading range, which in turn enhances rural households’ willingness to participate in forestland tenure trading and the expansion of rural households’ forestland operation scale, and motivates rural households to increase forestry inputs. Thirdly, the collective forestland tenure reform has clarified the geospatial location, scale, forest species, and ownership relationship of forestland through measures such as confirmation and issuance of certificates, and further endowed forestland and forest trees with mortgage and guarantee functions, which significantly increase the value of forestland mortgage and improve the possibility for rural households to obtain credit loans from financial institutions, thus enhancing rural households’ forestry investment capacity.

Hypothesis 1.

Controlling for other factors, collective forestland tenure reform has a positive incentive effect on rural households’ forestry inputs.

2.2. A Theoretical Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Rural Household Differentiation on Forestry Inputs of Rural Households Affected by Collective Forestland Tenure Reform

Rural households are differentiated along distinct paths, gradually altering their perceptions of farmland’s value and tenure preferences. It also influences the differentiation of collective forestland tenure reform’s effects on rural households’ forestry inputs to varying degrees. In this research, referring to the study of the China rural fixed observation site of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, rural households are classified into rural households, pluriactivity, and off-farm households, according to the criterion of the proportion of off-farm employment income to total income. (The criteria for classifying rural households into occupations are: pure rural households with off-farm income accounting for less than 20% of total household income, part-time households with off-farm income accounting for 20–80% of total household income, and off-farm households with off-farm income accounting for more than 80% of total household income). The utility of forestland tenure is primarily divided into two categories: security utility and asset utility, and rural households’ willingness to invest in forestry production factors depends on the priority ranking of security utility and asset utility. This division is based on differences in functional preferences of forestland tenure among rural households with different degrees of differentiation.

The low proportion of the off-farm income of less differentiated groups of rural households has weakened the asset utility of forestland; instead, they regard forestland as a constant and “certain income”, and forestland has become an important support for their roots in rural areas, whether for material or spiritual needs, leading them to prefer the security utility of forestland. Therefore, collective forestland tenure reform has the greatest positive incentive effect on rural households’ forestry inputs; pluriactivity households’ off-farm employment behavior is characterized by transience and insufficient labor migration, and this group’s household characteristics are typically characterized by institutionalized “half-work, half-farming” division of labor. The division of labor pattern in pluriactivity households determines how well their preference for forestland tenure balances the needs for asset and security utility. Collective forestland tenure reform enables rural households to simultaneously engage in off-farm production activities and forestry production by matching the security intensity of forestland tenure with the pluriactivity mode [40]. However, the incentive effect of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs may be weaker than that of rural households, while the more distinct groups of rural households, such as off-farm households, are less dependent on forests due to their larger off-farm income, the incentive effect of the collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs may be smaller than that of rural households. In order to acquire the anticipated future income that forestland tenure can provide, off-farm households merely need to continue their original forestry production and operation mode, according to the prospect theory’s point of view. Therefore, compared to pure households and part-timers, the incentive effect of collective forestland tenure reform on off-farm households is smaller.

Hypothesis 2.

Controlling for other factors, rural household differentiation has a negative moderating effect on forestry inputs for rural households under collective forestland tenure reform, i.e., collective forestland tenure reform has a stronger marginal effect on forestry inputs for shallowly differentiated rural households compared to deeply differentiated rural households.

2.3. Theoretical Analysis of Inter-Generational Differences in the Regulating Role of Forestry Inputs of Rural Households Affected by Collective Forestland Tenure Reform

Generational differences result from a combination of generational and age effects [41], resulting in differences in the preference attributes [42] and behavioral decisions [43] of different generational difference groups. In the context of collective forestland tenure reform, there are also differences in the behavior of different generations of households. Due to age disparities, the age impact is a difference in the psychological components of an individual’s growth history. The first-generation of rural households are significantly older, towards the conclusion of their life cycle, and their labor capacity is rapidly diminishing. Therefore, collective forestland tenure reform can increase the security effect and incentive effect for the first generation rural households’ forestry inputs. The generation effect refers to the changes in the social environment brought about by various social events, which result in differences in the cognition and behavior of rural households at different stages of development. Compared to the first generation of rural households, the new generation of rural households is in the early stages of their life cycle, which is better in terms of education, risk preference, willingness to accept new skills training, and willingness to accept new things or ideas; therefore, their preference and choice of work must be considered from the perspective of their entire life cycle. Consequently, new-generation rural households seek off-farm activities with relative pay benefits; yet, the frequent changes in off-farm work expose them to a greater degree of expected income risk than first-generation rural households. Therefore, the guarantee of revenue from forestland remains the final obstacle to their means of subsistence. In addition, some of the younger generation rural households have not actually separated from their parents, and their forestland is still handled by their parents, which to some degree restrains their propensity to forsake forestry and pursue off-farm jobs. Therefore, collective forestland tenure reform can still motivate new-generation rural households to engage in forestry production and management, but the incentive effect is slightly weaker than that of first-generation households.

Hypothesis 3.

Controlling for other factors, inter-generational differences in collective forestland tenure reform have a negative moderating effect on rural households’ forestry inputs. Specifically, collective forestland tenure reform has a stronger marginal effect on forestry inputs for the first-generation of rural households compared to the new generation of rural households.

3. Research Design

3.1. Data Sources

The data in this research come from the Economic Development Research Center of the State Forestry and Grassland Administration on Policy Issues Related to the Reform of China’s Collective Forestland Tenure System, which continuously monitored rural household survey data in 18 counties of 9 provinces nationwide using the stratified random sampling technique, taking into account the regional distribution, the level of socio-economic development, the status of forest resources and the reform of the collective forestland tenure system, and other factors.

Based on the principle of differences in the distribution of forest resources in China, Liaoning was selected as the representative province of the primary forest area in northeast China; Henan and Shandong as the representative provinces of the lesser forest area in China; Sichuan as the representative province of the natural forest area in southwest China; and Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian as the representative provinces of the collective forest area in southern China. Each province was selected based on the differences in economic development levels. Economic development level of higher counties (cities, districts), such as Liaoning Benxi County, Henan Shihe District, Shandong Laizhou City, Sichuan Weiyuan County, Guangxi Pingguo City, Hunan Pingjiang County, Jiangxi Suichuan County, Zhejiang Deqing County, Fujian Sha County, and economic development level of lower counties (cities, districts), such as Liaoning Qingyuan County, Henan Maoyang County, Shandong Mengyin County, Sichuan Danling County, Guangxi Huanjiang County, Hunan Hongjiang City, Jiangxi Tonggu County, Suichang County, Zhejiang Province, and Shunchang County, Fujian Province, the selected study area includes 18 counties (cities) in 9 provinces (districts) in China.

These sample counties did not start collective forestland tenure reform at the same time, even if two sample counties in the same sample province started collective forestland tenure reform at the same time. Thus, each sample province and each sample county showed time variation in initiating reforms. Three townships were randomly selected in each sample county, three administrative villages were randomly selected in each township, and 15 sample rural households were randomly selected in each administrative village. The research team conducted long-term follow-up surveys on the same sample of rural households in 2010, 2012, 2014, and 2016; ensured the basic stability of the quantitative questionnaire and qualitative questionnaire research framework at the county, township, village, and rural household levels in the process of follow-up research; and excluded sample rural households with incomplete observations and inconsistent questionnaire information for the sake of comparability across periods. Following data collection, a final sample size of 1276 rural households was obtained, with each sample rural household having 10 observations (2003, 2007–2015). It should be noted that in 2003, the Chinese government issued the Decision on Accelerating Forestry Development and took the lead in launching pilot projects in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Liaoning provinces; in 2007, these pilot provinces announced the completion of this reform one after another. Therefore, the research team chose two years, 2003 and 2007, to compare and dissect the changes in Chinese rural household forestry production inputs before and after the implementation of the new round of collective forestland tenure reform. Meanwhile, in 2007, the Chinese government issued the Circular on Further Strengthening and Standardizing the Administration of Forest Tenure Registration and Certification, which pointed out that the registration and certification of forestland tenure is the core work of promoting the new round of collective forestland tenure reform and liberating and developing forestry productivity. Based on the experience of implementing the new round of collective forestland tenure reform in the pilot provinces, in 2008, the Chinese government issued the Opinions on Comprehensively Promoting the Reform of Collective Forestland Tenure System, and the reform of collective forestland tenure system was fully launched throughout the country; in 2009, except for Guangxi, which did not carry out the new round of collective forestland tenure reform, provinces such as Henan, Shandong, Hunan, Guangxi, and Sichuan all completed this work. This resulted in the formation of 1276 rural households in 18 counties (cities) of 9 provinces (districts) nationwide for a total of 10 years (2003, 2007–2015) of rural household survey data. Using the price index of rural production materials and the consumer price index of rural residents, the data for the relevant variables were converted to constant 1994 prices.

3.2. Variable Selection and Descriptive Statistics

• Explanatory variable: The inputs of forestry production of rural households. It includes two indicators: average per mu forestry cash outlay and average per mu forestry labor input. Forestry cash outlay is the total amount of funds rural households spend on seedlings, pesticides, fertilizers, machinery, and hired labor in forestry production and operation, and the average mu forestry cash outlay is the ratio of forestry cash outlay and forestland area, the unit is Yuan/mu; forestry labor input is the labor time rural households invest in planting, fertilizing, pest control, and forest nurturing in forestry operation, the unit is human days, and the average mu forestry labor input is the ratio of forestry labor input and forestland area, the unit is human days. Average forestry labor input is the ratio of forestry labor input and forestland area, with man-days/mu as the unit of measure.
• Core explanatory variable: Collective forestland tenure reform. The collective forestland tenure reform achieved the “allocation of forests to rural households” through the issuance of certificates and provided rural households with legal tenure. However, following the “three determinations” era of forestry, the forestlands originally given to rural households have not been fully recovered everywhere. Furthermore, as part of the task of collective forestland tenure reform, new forestland tenure certificates must be issued for confirmed forestlands, but there are still forestland tenure disputes in some areas, making the issuance of new forestland tenure certificates difficult. As a result, this paper uses the dummy variable of whether rural households have obtained forestland tenure certificates as the characterization variable of collective forestland tenure reform, assigning a value of 1 to have obtained and a value of 0 to not have obtained.
• Grouping variables: Rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences. According to the previous section, this paper measures the degree of rural household differentiation by rural household occupational differentiation, classifying rural household occupational types into pure rural households, pluriactivity households, and off-farm households, and assigning values 1–3 as ordered dummy variables, with higher values implying higher off-farm employment, i.e., deeper rural household differentiation. Furthermore, the academic community generally considers 1980 to be the dividing line between the old and new generations of rural households [44]. As a result, this paper uses the 1980 birth year as the boundary and creates a dummy variable to characterize inter-generational differences. If the rural household head was born before 1980, the inter-generational difference is 0; otherwise, it is 1.
• Control variables. Considering other factors that may affect rural households’ forestry inputs, this research categorizes the control variables into five categories. Firstly, forestland characteristics variables, which involve the indicators of forestland area and the number of forestland plots. Secondly, rural household characteristics variables, which involve two indicators of rural household size and total rural household income. Thirdly, the variables of rural household head characteristics. These involve the indicators of age, gender, health status, years of education, and whether the head of the rural household is a cadre. Fourthly, the village level characteristics variables. The three indicators are related to whether the road is hardened, whether the village headquarters is in a mountainous area and the distance from the market. Fifthly, the market characteristics variables.

  Table 1. Definition, assignment, and statistical description of the main variables.

  Variable	Description	Total		2003		2015		Wilcoxon Test
  		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
  Explained variables
  C	Household’s cash outlay in per mu (yuan)a	41.0535	212.7182	32.5108	143.4653	36.7594	203.2295	−2.751 ***
  L	Average mu of forestry labor input: man-days/mu	3.6609	16.7201	2.8762	13.7216	3.3330	14.1395	−10.499 ***
  Core explanatory variables
  FR	Whether or not there was a collective forestland tenure reform (Yes = 1; No = 0)	0.6162	0.4863	0.0658	0.2481	0.7524	0.4318	−35.262 ***
  Grouping variables
  RHD	Rural household differentiation (rural households = 1; pluriactivity = 2; off-farm households = 3)	2.0287	0.7315	1.8174	0.7327	2.2445	0.7072	−14.350 ***
  GD	Generational differences (first generation rural households = 0; new generation rural households = 1)	0.2318	0.4220	0.4655	0.4990	0.1066	0.3087	20.058 ***
  control variable
  LPI	Labor price index (%)	1.0595	0.1689	1.0000	0.0000	1.0160	0.1084	−4.693 ***
  FPI	Forest products price index (%)	1.0619	0.1840	1.0000	0.0000	0.9936	0.0399	−30.537 ***
  FA	Forestland area (mu)	38.3976	73.1380	27.8461	60.7259	41.6651	75.1231	−11.197 ***
  NFL	Number of forestland plots (piece)	5.1112	7.0092	5.1219	7.9425	4.2747	4.5856	−9.589 ***
  A	Age (year)	52.1490	11.0257	45.0603	10.5531	56.4953	10.4096	−24.084 ***
  G	Gender (men = 1; women = 0)	0.9694	0.1721	0.9734	0.1611	0.9647	0.1845	1.257
  H	Health (yes = 1; no = 0)	0.8951	0.3064	0.9357	0.2453	0.7915	0.4064	10.612 ***
  E	Education level (year)	7.3187	2.8496	7.2712	2.6182	7.3009	3.1409	−1.494
  WCA	Whether or not head of household a cadre (yes = 1; no = 0)	0.2428	0.4288	0.2680	0.4431	0.2194	0.4140	2.8580 ***
  HP	Household population (person)	3.9328	1.5076	4.1873	1.4281	3.7719	1.6240	7.1380 ***
  TI	Total income (yuan)	24893.3	34647.51	13800.65	17331.66	33925.78	50859.63	−21.6020 ***
  WPH	Whether or not the pavement is hardened (yes = 1; no = 0)	0.7674	0.4225	0.6230	0.4848	0.9632	0.1884	−21.2040 ***
  WMA	Whether or not mountainous area (yes = 1; no = 0)	0.5580	0.4966	0.5580	0.4968	0.5580	0.4968	0.0000
  DFC	Distance from the county (kilometer)	35.4196	31.3447	35.4196	31.3558	35.4196	31.3558	0.0000

  Note: *** indicates significant at the 1% level; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects, and standard errors are in parentheses.

  displays the definition, assignment, and statistical description of the model’s primary variables.

Table 1 shows that rural households’ average forestry capital input intensity is 41.0535 yuan/mu and their average labor input intensity is 3.6609 man-days/mu, and the annual grouping shows that rural households’ willingness to invest in forestry production factors has increased. The average percentage of rural households with confirmed tenure is 61.62%. Is this the motivation for rural households’ increased willingness to invest in forestry production factors? According to the annual grouping, the rate of rural households’ forestland tenure determination increased significantly after the collective forestland tenure reform. The trend of rural household differentiation is clearly deepened by the annual grouping, and the trend of off-farm employment is clearly strengthened. Furthermore, inter-generational variables show that the aging trend of rural households is deepening and the quality of rural labor is significantly decreasing; does this constrain rural households’ willingness to invest in forestry operations? This must all be confirmed by the subsequent empirical model. The results of Wilcoxon rank sum test showed that most of the explanatory variables changed significantly before and after the collective forestland tenure reform, so it is appropriate to include them in the empirical model.

3.3. Empirical Test Model

Given the long growth cycle of forestry and the obvious time difference characteristics of factor inputs, which means that the observed value of rural households’ operating inputs in some years is zero, with obvious data truncation characteristics, this research adopts the Tobit model more commonly used for the problem of restricted explanatory variables in the baseline regression and subsequent analysis, with the specific settings as in Equation (1).

$$Y_{it}={\beta }_0+{\beta }_{1}D{T}_{it}+{\beta }_2{{Controls}^{\prime }}_{it}+{\mu }_i+{\epsilon }_{it}$$

(1)

In Equation (1), $i$ represents the individual household head, $t$ represents the time variable, $Y$ is the input of forestry production factors for rural households, $Y_{it}$ is the input of forestry capital and forestry labor, $DT$ is the collective forestland tenure reform, ${Controls}^{\prime }$ represents the transpose of the vector composed of control variables, ${\mu }_i$ is the annual fixed effect, and ${\epsilon }_i$ is the random disturbance term.

The interaction term between collective forestland tenure reform and rural household differentiation is introduced to be identified on the basis of Equation (1), and the specific model is set as Equation (2) to test the moderating effect of rural household differentiation on collective forestland tenure reform and rural household forestry inputs (2).

$$Y_{it}={\beta }_0+{\beta }_{1}D{T}_{it}+{\beta }_{2}Occu{p}_{it}+{\beta }_{3}D{T}_{it}\times Occu{p}_{it}+{\beta }_4{{Controls}^{\prime }}_{it}+{\mu }_i+{\epsilon }_{it}$$

(2)

To test the moderating effect of inter-generational differences on collective forestland tenure reform and rural households’ forestry inputs, the interaction term between collective forestland tenure reform and inter-generational differences is introduced on the basis of Equation (1) for identification, and the specific model is set as Equation (3).

$$Y_{it}={\beta }_0+{\beta }_{1}D{T}_{it}+{\beta }_{2}Interge{n}_{it}+{\beta }_{3}D{T}_{it}\times Interge{n}_{it}+{\beta }_4{{Controls}^{\prime }}_{it}+{\mu }_i+{\epsilon }_{it}$$

(3)

In Equations (2) and (3), the moderating variables $Occu{p}_{it}$ and $Interge{n}_{it}$ represent rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences, respectively; $D{T}_{it}\times Occu{p}_{it}$ represents the interaction term between collective forestland tenure reform and rural household differentiation; $D{T}_{it}\times Interge{n}_{it}$ represents the interaction term between collective forestland tenure reform and inter-generational differences, and the rest of variables and parameters are set as in Equation (1).

4. Empirical Results and Analysis

Based on the above analysis, the Tobit model is estimated for rural households’ forestry input decisions. Because the Tobit model, which has a nonlinear structure, cannot directly explain the marginal effects of the variables, the mean bias effects of the variables need to be calculated in order to truly reflect the marginal effects.

4.1. Baseline Model

The model is estimated in this paper using stepwise regression, which means that only the collective forestland tenure reform variables are regressed at first, and then the market characteristics, resource endowment characteristics, individual characteristics, household characteristics, and village characteristics variables are added to test the robustness of the model estimation results.

Table 2. Empirical results of collective forestland tenure reform and rural households’ forestry inputs.

Variable	C				L
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	1.4558 ***	0.3919 ***	0.6646 ***	0.1810 ***	0.3043 ***	0.0838 ***	0.4119 ***	0.1139 ***
	(0.1148)	(0.0309)	(0.1128)	(0.0307)	(0.0518)	(0.0143)	(0.0508)	(0.0140)
LPI			−0.0405 ***	−0.0110 ***			−0.0107 ***	−0.0029 ***
			(0.0027)	(0.0008)			(0.0013)	(0.0003)
FPI			0.0613 ***	0.0167 ***			0.0206 ***	0.0057 ***
			(0.0033)	(0.0009)			(0.0015)	(0.0004)
FA			0.0009	0.0002			0.0200 ***	0.0055 ***
			(0.0007)	(0.0002)			(0.0007)	(0.0002)
NFL			0.0680 ***	0.0185 ***			0.0323 ***	0.0089 ***
			(0.0070)	(0.0019)			(0.0032)	(0.0009)
A			−0.0069	−0.0019			−0.0007	−0.0002
			(0.0055)	(0.0015)			(0.0025)	(0.0007)
G			0.7037 **	0.1916 **			0.2713 *	0.0750 *
			(0.3270)	(0.0890)			(0.1409)	(0.0389)
H			1.2587 ***	0.3427 ***			0.4248 ***	0.1174 ***
			(0.1964)	(0.0535)			(0.0871)	(0.0241)
E			0.0095	0.0026			0.0236 ***	0.0065 ***
			(0.0193)	(0.0053)			(0.0089)	(0.0025)
WCA			0.4858 ***	0.1323 ***			0.0858	0.0237
			(0.1182)	(0.0322)			(0.0550)	(0.0152)
HP			0.0169	0.0046			0.0176	0.0049
			(0.0357)	(0.0097)			(0.0163)	(0.0045)
TI			0.5138 ***	0.1399 ***			0.1882 ***	0.0520 ***
			(0.0499)	(0.0136)			(0.0222)	(0.0061)
WPH			0.3919 ***	0.1067 ***			0.1021 *	0.0282 *
			(0.1272)	(0.0346)			(0.0594)	(0.0164)
WMA			0.8357 ***	0.2276 ***			0.4599 ***	0.1271 ***
			(0.1088)	(0.0296)			(0.0497)	(0.0137)
DFC			−0.0221 ***	−0.0060 ***			−0.0098 ***	−0.0027 ***
			(0.0018)	(0.0005)			(0.0009)	(0.0002)
Cons	−3.3635 ***		−11.4542 ***		−1.2463 ***		−3.5701 ***
	(0.1138)		(0.7075)		(0.0484)		(0.3113)
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
N	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760
Pseudo R2	0.0053		0.0415		0.0013		0.0662

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects, and standard errors are in parentheses.

shows the results of the model estimation of the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural household input of forestry production factors. The findings indicate that collective forestland tenure reform has a positive effect on rural households’ forestry capital and labor inputs at the 1% significant level, with marginal effects of 0.1810 and 0.1139, respectively, indicating that collective forestland tenure reform improves rural households’ perception of ownership and value assessment of forestland tenure in the confirmed group compared to the unconfirmed group. Furthermore, increased forestry land security clarifies rural households’ assessment of the costs and benefits of forestry inputs. Rural households’ expectations of the benefits of forestry inputs have been raised. Therefore, collective forestland tenure reform significantly increases rural households’ forestry inputs, which is consistent with theoretical expectations, and hypothesis 1 is confirmed. This conclusion is broadly consistent with the findings of Besley (1995) [45], Zhang and Pearse (1996) [46], and Qin and Xu (2013) [47]. What is different is that the existing studies do not strictly distinguish between capital input and labor input when analyzing the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry production input, but convert labor into cash and add it to capital input, which cannot reflect the incomplete substitutability of capital input and labor input, or only study the impact of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry capital input or labor input. As far as the conclusion of this study is concerned, the collective forestland tenure reform has a significant positive impact on rural households’ forestry capital investment, which is basically consistent with the research conclusions of Holden et al. (2013) [5] and Ren et al. (2018) [16]. At the same time, the collective forestland tenure reform also has a significant positive impact on rural households’ forestry labor input, which is basically consistent with the research conclusions of Zhang et al. (2017) [11] and Yang et al. (2021) [24]. However, the “crowding out effect” of collective forestland tenure reform on the input of rural households’ forestry labor force has not been found (Zhu and Zhang (2022)) [26]. The possible reason is that strengthening the stability of forestland tenure improves the expected forestry income of rural households. Therefore, the rational decision of rural households is to input more family labor force into the forestry sector, resulting in the “tenure incentive effect” (Besley (1993)) [15].

In addition to collective forestland tenure reform, other factors also affect rural households’ forestry production behavior. Among the market characteristics variables, for example, the price of labor has a significant weakening effect on rural households’ forestry capital and labor inputs, most likely because an increase in the price of off-farm labor increases rural households’ off-farm factor inputs, which may have an “exclusion effect” on rural households’ forestry inputs. Among the forestland characteristics variables, the higher the number of forestland plots, the greater the number of forestland plots, the greater the forestry inputs; among the variables of rural household characteristics, whether the rural household head is male or not and whether the rural household head is healthy or not have a significant positive effect on the forestry inputs, implying that the quality of the rural household’s human capital is an important factor affecting production.

Among the variables of household characteristics, the total number of household members and the yearly income level of households have a positive effect on rural households’ forestry investment, indicating that adequate labor resources and capital stock are required to promote rural households’ forestry investment. Furthermore, road conditions and distance to market influence rural households’ forestry investment, with good road conditions encouraging rural households to invest in forestland and distance to market discouraging rural households from investing in forestland.

4.2. Robustness Tests

First, the objective of defining tenure is to define the boundaries between different actors and to impose constraints on them [48], thereby creating de facto perceived security of tenure and incentives for rural households to produce. Therefore, there may be a certain degree of self-selection in the choice of variables for collective forestland tenure reform at the rural level, and to a certain extent, using the proportion of forestland in the county as a proxy variable for collective forestland tenure reform can effectively avoid the possibility of self-selection when piloting collective forestland tenure reform policies. The results show that the estimated coefficient of the effect of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs is positive and statistically significant (

Table 3. Robustness tests.

Variable	Replace Core Explanatory Variable				Convert to BINARY Variable
	C		L		C		L
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.5984 ***	0.1632 ***	0.1570*	0.0434*	0.2126 ***	0.0686 ***	0.3362 ***	0.1213 ***
	(0.1374)	(0.0375)	(0.0848)	(0.0234)	(0.0267)	(0.0086)	(0.0250)	(0.0088)
LPI	−0.0469 ***	−0.0128 ***	−0.0119 ***	−0.0033 ***	−0.0088 ***	−0.0028 ***	−0.0088 ***	−0.0032 ***
	(0.0029)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0003)	(0.0007)	(0.0002)	(0.0006)	(0.0002)
FPI	0.0622 ***	0.0170 ***	0.0214 ***	0.0059 ***	0.0142 ***	0.0046 ***	0.0091 ***	0.0033 ***
	(0.0033)	(0.0009)	(0.0015)	(0.0004)	(0.0009)	(0.0003)	(0.0009)	(0.0003)
FA	0.0000	0.0000	0.0190 ***	0.0053 ***	0.0016 ***	0.0005 ***	0.0023 ***	0.0008 ***
	(0.0007)	(0.0002)	(0.0007)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)	(0.0002)	(0.0001)
NFL	0.0681 ***	0.0186 ***	0.0325 ***	0.0090 ***	0.0198 ***	0.0064 ***	0.0246 ***	0.0089 ***
	(0.0069)	(0.0019)	(0.0032)	(0.0009)	(0.0018)	(0.0006)	(0.0020)	(0.0007)
A	−0.0005	−0.0001	0.0001	0.0000	0.0008	0.0003	−0.0013	−0.0005
	(0.0055)	(0.0015)	(0.0025)	(0.0007)	(0.0013)	(0.0004)	(0.0012)	(0.0004)
G	0.6256*	0.1706*	0.2504*	0.0693*	0.1421*	0.0458*	0.1337**	0.0482**
	(0.3245)	(0.0885)	(0.1407)	(0.0389)	(0.0765)	(0.0247)	(0.0679)	(0.0245)
H	1.2536 ***	0.3418 ***	0.4083 ***	0.1129 ***	0.2973 ***	0.0959 ***	0.0450	0.0162
	(0.1958)	(0.0534)	(0.0871)	(0.0241)	(0.0459)	(0.0147)	(0.0421)	(0.0152)
E	0.0002	0.0001	0.0226**	0.0062**	0.0012	0.0004	0.0179 ***	0.0064 ***
	(0.0193)	(0.0053)	(0.0089)	(0.0025)	(0.0046)	(0.0015)	(0.0044)	(0.0016)
WCA	0.5040 ***	0.1374 ***	0.1122**	0.0310**	0.0894 ***	0.0288 ***	0.0413	0.0149
	(0.1178)	(0.0321)	(0.0550)	(0.0152)	(0.0285)	(0.0092)	(0.0278)	(0.0100)
HP	0.0326	0.0089	0.0214	0.0059	0.0083	0.0027	0.0023	0.0008
	(0.0357)	(0.0097)	(0.0163)	(0.0045)	(0.0085)	(0.0027)	(0.0081)	(0.0029)
TI	0.5762 ***	0.1571 ***	0.2016 ***	0.0557 ***	0.1139 ***	0.0367 ***	0.1076 ***	0.0388 ***
	(0.0503)	(0.0137)	(0.0226)	(0.0062)	(0.0118)	(0.0038)	(0.0104)	(0.0037)
WPH	0.3423 ***	0.0933 ***	0.1142*	0.0316*	0.1141 ***	0.0368 ***	0.0008	0.0003
	(0.1272)	(0.0347)	(0.0597)	(0.0165)	(0.0303)	(0.0098)	(0.0286)	(0.0103)
WMA	0.8947 ***	0.2440 ***	0.4649 ***	0.1286 ***	0.2360 ***	0.0761 ***	0.3262 ***	0.1177 ***
	(0.1087)	(0.0296)	(0.0498)	(0.0138)	(0.0262)	(0.0084)	(0.0253)	(0.0089)
DFC	−0.0218 ***	−0.0059 ***	−0.0099 ***	−0.0028 ***	−0.0047 ***	−0.0015 ***	−0.0022 ***	−0.0008 ***
	(0.0018)	(0.0005)	(0.0009)	(0.0002)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)	(0.0004)	(0.0001)
Cons	−11.9006 ***		−3.6855 ***		−2.8057 ***		−1.9535 ***
	(0.7088)		(0.3121)		(0.1653)		(0.1498)
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
N	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760	12,760
Pseudo R2	0.0410		0.0639		0.0864		0.0862

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects, and standard errors are in parentheses.

). Second, the paper converts forestry capital and forestry labor inputs into dichotomous variables. If rural households have invested in forestry capital and labor, these variables are set to 1, otherwise, they are 0. In addition, the estimated results of the probit model presented in Table 3 confirm that collective forestland tenure reform has a significant positive impact on the capital and labor inputs of forestry households.

4.3. Heterogeneity Analysis

The previous section confirmed that collective forestland tenure reform has a significant incentive effect on rural households’ forestry inputs. Do the study’s findings differ for different regions with varying levels of economic development and for different groups of rural households with varying income levels? This section carries out sub-sample regression according to the differences between regional economic development levels and rural households’ income levels.

Table 4. Estimated collective forestland tenure reform effects according to economic development level grouping.

Variable	Midwest				East
	C		L		C		L
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.8255 ***	0.2262 ***	0.3451 ***	0.0997 ***	0.7058 ***	0.1929 ***	0.1755 **	0.0461 **
	(0.1788)	(0.0490)	(0.0732)	(0.0211)	(0.1576)	(0.0431)	(0.0796)	(0.0209)
LPI	−0.0667 ***	−0.0183 ***	−0.0146 ***	−0.0042 ***	−0.0214 ***	−0.0058 ***	−0.0249 ***	−0.0065 ***
	(0.0045)	(0.0012)	(0.0028)	(0.0008)	(0.0058)	(0.0016)	(0.0020)	(0.0005)
FPI	0.9109 ***	0.2497 ***	0.0161 ***	0.0047 ***	0.0601 ***	0.0164 ***	0.2419 ***	0.0635 ***
	(0.0758)	(0.0208)	(0.0016)	(0.0005)	(0.0034)	(0.0010)	(0.0356)	(0.0094)
FA	0.0046 ***	0.0013 ***	0.0217 ***	0.0063 ***	0.0013	0.0004	0.0136 ***	0.0036 ***
	(0.0010)	(0.0003)	(0.0010)	(0.0003)	(0.0010)	(0.0003)	(0.0011)	(0.0003)
NFL	0.2601 ***	0.0713 ***	0.0212 ***	0.0061 ***	0.0480 ***	0.0131 ***	0.1269 ***	0.0333 ***
	(0.0226)	(0.0062)	(0.0034)	(0.0010)	(0.0070)	(0.0019)	(0.0101)	(0.0027)
A	0.0049	0.0013	0.0013	0.0004	−0.0132 *	−0.0036 *	−0.0051	−0.0013
	(0.0087)	(0.0024)	(0.0032)	(0.0009)	(0.0069)	(0.0019)	(0.0040)	(0.0010)
G	2.9717 ***	0.8145 ***	0.0970	0.0280	0.1889	0.0516	1.4774 ***	0.3878 ***
	(0.8317)	(0.2278)	(0.1554)	(0.0449)	(0.3444)	(0.0941)	(0.3612)	(0.0948)
H	1.2900 ***	0.3536 ***	0.3906 ***	0.1129 ***	1.1966 ***	0.3271 ***	0.5182 ***	0.1360 ***
	(0.2974)	(0.0815)	(0.1128)	(0.0326)	(0.2549)	(0.0697)	(0.1345)	(0.0353)
E	0.0046	0.0012	0.0357 ***	0.0103 ***	−0.0030	−0.0008	−0.0047	−0.0012
	(0.0296)	(0.0081)	(0.0116)	(0.0034)	(0.0246)	(0.0067)	(0.0134)	(0.0035)
WCA	0.5207 ***	0.1427 ***	0.0477	0.0138	0.2216	0.0606	−0.0427	−0.0112
	(0.1891)	(0.0518)	(0.0698)	(0.0202)	(0.1464)	(0.0400)	(0.0874)	(0.0229)
HP	0.0830	0.0228	0.0955 ***	0.0276 ***	0.1654 ***	0.0452 ***	0.0470 *	0.0123 *
	(0.0588)	(0.0161)	(0.0208)	(0.0060)	(0.0443)	(0.0121)	(0.0267)	(0.0070)
TI	0.5297 ***	0.1452 ***	0.2294 ***	0.0663 ***	0.4928 ***	0.1347 ***	0.1377 ***	0.0361 ***
	(0.0694)	(0.0190)	(0.0348)	(0.0101)	(0.0701)	(0.0192)	(0.0282)	(0.0074)
WPH	0.3301	0.0905	0.1141	0.0330	0.1303	0.0356	0.1636 *	0.0429 *
	(0.2022)	(0.0554)	(0.0792)	(0.0229)	(0.1688)	(0.0461)	(0.0947)	(0.0249)
WMA	1.2009 ***	0.3292 ***	0.1782 ***	0.0515 ***	0.1327	0.0363	0.7015 ***	0.1842 ***
	(0.1718)	(0.0471)	(0.0674)	(0.0195)	(0.1452)	(0.0397)	(0.0761)	(0.0200)
DFC	−0.0198 ***	−0.0054 ***	−0.0049 ***	−0.0014 ***	−0.0152 ***	−0.0042 ***	−0.0135 ***	−0.0036 ***
	(0.0032)	(0.0009)	(0.0011)	(0.0003)	(0.0022)	(0.0006)	(0.0015)	(0.0004)
Cons	−15.4774 ***		−3.2700 ***		−8.5216 ***		−5.1629 ***
			(0.4186)		(0.8894)		(0.5487)
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
N	7220	7220	7220	7220	5540	5540	5540	5540
Pseudo R2	0.0653		0.0695		0.0430		0.0901

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects, and standard errors are in parentheses.

and

Table 5. Estimated collective forestland tenure reform effects by rural household income level group.

Variable	Low-Income Group				Middle- and High-Income Group
	C		L		C		L
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.6635 ***	0.2021 ***	0.3978 ***	0.1194 ***	0.6353 ***	0.1496 ***	0.4560 ***	0.1142 ***
	(0.1450)	(0.0441)	(0.0622)	(0.0187)	(0.1834)	(0.0431)	(0.0871)	(0.0218)
LPI	−0.0357 ***	−0.0109 ***	−0.0092 ***	−0.0027 ***	−0.0474 ***	−0.0112 ***	−0.0165 ***	−0.0041 ***
	(0.0033)	(0.0010)	(0.0014)	(0.0004)	(0.0054)	(0.0013)	(0.0026)	(0.0006)
FPI	0.0701 ***	0.0214 ***	0.0253 ***	0.0076 ***	0.0417 ***	0.0098 ***	0.0078 ***	0.0020 ***
	(0.0039)	(0.0012)	(0.0017)	(0.0005)	(0.0060)	(0.0014)	(0.0030)	(0.0008)
FA	−0.0022 ***	−0.0007 ***	−0.0179 ***	−0.0054 ***	0.0021	0.0005	−0.0238 ***	−0.0060 ***
	(0.0008)	(0.0002)	(0.0008)	(0.0002)	(0.0013)	(0.0003)	(0.0015)	(0.0004)
NFL	0.0483 ***	0.0147 ***	0.0220 ***	0.0066 ***	0.1013 ***	0.0239 ***	0.0508 ***	0.0127 ***
	(0.0085)	(0.0026)	(0.0038)	(0.0011)	(0.0122)	(0.0029)	(0.0058)	(0.0015)
A	−0.0049	−0.0015	0.0038	0.0011	−0.0018	−0.0004	−0.0054	−0.0014
	(0.0071)	(0.0022)	(0.0031)	(0.0009)	(0.0089)	(0.0021)	(0.0042)	(0.0011)
G	1.3030 ***	0.3968 ***	0.5366 ***	0.1611 ***	−0.0671	−0.0158	−0.0504	−0.0126
	(0.4299)	(0.1309)	(0.1756)	(0.0527)	(0.5109)	(0.1203)	(0.2345)	(0.0587)
H	1.1855 ***	0.3610 ***	0.5529 ***	0.1660 ***	1.3883 ***	0.3269 ***	0.2887 **	0.0723 **
	(0.2517)	(0.0766)	(0.1093)	(0.0328)	(0.3179)	(0.0748)	(0.1441)	(0.0361)
E	−0.0535 **	−0.0163 **	−0.0306 ***	−0.0092 ***	0.0684 **	0.0161 **	−0.0056	−0.0014
	(0.0237)	(0.0072)	(0.0104)	(0.0031)	(0.0336)	(0.0079)	(0.0160)	(0.0040)
WCA	0.4502 ***	0.1371 ***	−0.0114	−0.0034	0.6137 ***	0.1445 ***	0.2930 ***	0.0734 ***
	(0.1431)	(0.0436)	(0.0638)	(0.0191)	(0.2069)	(0.0487)	(0.0998)	(0.0250)
HP	−0.0475	−0.0145	−0.0030	−0.0009	−0.0381	−0.0090	−0.0349	−0.0087
	(0.0510)	(0.0155)	(0.0227)	(0.0068)	(0.0597)	(0.0141)	(0.0284)	(0.0071)
TI	0.7666 ***	0.2335 ***	0.1109 **	0.0333 **	0.4036 ***	0.0950 ***	0.2754 ***	0.0690 ***
	(0.1108)	(0.0338)	(0.0496)	(0.0149)	(0.0809)	(0.0190)	(0.0413)	(0.0103)
WPH	−0.5396 ***	−0.1643 ***	−0.1081	−0.0325	−0.0945	−0.0223	−0.0399	−0.0100
	(0.1657)	(0.0505)	(0.0753)	(0.0226)	(0.2022)	(0.0476)	(0.0973)	(0.0244)
WMA	0.6795 ***	0.2069 ***	0.4489 ***	0.1348 ***	1.1022 ***	0.2595 ***	0.4649 ***	0.1165 ***
	(0.1318)	(0.0401)	(0.0579)	(0.0174)	(0.1925)	(0.0453)	(0.0902)	(0.0226)
DFC	−0.0243 ***	−0.0074 ***	−0.0118 ***	−0.0035 ***	−0.0195 ***	−0.0046 ***	−0.0073 ***	−0.0018 ***
	(0.0023)	(0.0007)	(0.0011)	(0.0003)	(0.0030)	(0.0007)	(0.0015)	(0.0004)
Cons	−13.4156 ***		−3.1036 ***		−11.8660 ***		−4.3741 ***
	(1.2474)		(0.5442)		(1.1504)		(0.5444)
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
N	5822	5822	5822	5822	6938	6938	6938	6938
Pseudo R2	0.0394		0.0793		0.0305		0.0521

Note: *** and ** indicate significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects and standard errors are in parentheses

show the results of the Tobit regressions. The empirical results in Table 4 and Table 5 show that the effect of collective forestland tenure reform on the input of forestry inputs is supported further by the more robust results of the sub-sample regressions. However, the effect of collective forestland tenure reform shows new characteristics in the sub-sample of rural households’ groups with varying degrees of economic development and income levels.

Collective forestland tenure reform has a greater impact on forestry capital and labor inputs of rural households in the central and western regions than on rural households in the eastern region. The reasons are that the higher level of economic development in eastern towns and villages, as well as the wider and closer access to off-farm employment, higher off-farm labor prices, and more stable off-farm incomes, mean that rural households face higher labor opportunity costs for engaging in forestry production and operation, making collective forestland tenure reform less likely to affect rural households’ input in forestry production in the eastern region; while rural households’ employment in the central and western regions is characterized by high dependence on forestry and long-distance off-farm transfer of labor. This means that rural households face higher cost curves due to the long-distance transfer of labor, further limiting rural households’ transfer of off-farm employment in the central and western regions. At the same time, the guaranteed income from forestland remains an important source of household income for rural households, and therefore collective forestland tenure reform has a stronger effect on promoting inputs in forestry production for rural households in the central and western regions.

In addition, this paper examines the effect of collective forestland tenure reform in light of the disparity between regional economic development levels and rural households’ income levels. Compared with the middle- and high-income groups, collective forestland tenure reform has a greater impact on the capital and labor input of low-income rural households engaged in forestry. The reason is that the economic activities of rural households in the middle and high-income groups are more diversified than those in the low-income group, and their dependence on forestry income is lower, which makes them more inclined to maintain the original model in forestry production and management. While the economic activities of low-income rural households are relatively single, the income from forestry production and management plays a more important role in the low-income rural households. Therefore, whether it is the difference in economic development level at the regional level or the difference in the rural households’ income level, it means that there are differences in the level of marketization from both an objective and subjective perspective, which makes rural households’ dependence on forestland have obvious heterogeneity, resulting in different effects of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry production behavior.

4.4. Further Study: The Regulatory Mechanism of Rural Households’ Differentiation and Inter-Generational Differences on the Impact of Collective Forestland Tenure Reform on Forestry Inputs

4.4.1. Analysis on the Regulatory Effect of Rural Households’ Differentiation on the Impact of Collective Forestland Tenure Reform on Rural Households’ Forestry Inputs

From the perspective of rural households’ heterogeneity, this paper will analyze the regulatory effect mechanism of rural households’ differentiation on collective forestland tenure reform and forestry inputs in order to more intuitively analyze the reaction degree of different types of rural households’ differentiation to collective forestland tenure reform. Faced with collective forestland tenure reform,

Table 6. Tests for moderating effects of rural household differentiation.

Variable	C
	Total Sample		Rural Households		Pluriactivity		Off-Farm Households
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	1.2000 ***	0.3281 ***	1.0635 ***	0.3179 ***	0.9245 ***	0.2272 ***	0.4183 ***	0.1163 ***
	(0.3010)	(0.0823)	(0.2081)	(0.0621)	(0.2360)	(0.0579)	(0.1558)	(0.0433)
RHD	−1.0723 ***	−0.2932 ***
	(0.1198)	(0.0328)
FR×RHD	−0.2371 *	−0.0648 *
	(0.1411)	(0.0386)
Control variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Cons	−10.8486 ***		−11.9300 ***		−13.7896 ***		−16.9174 ***
	(0.7134)		(1.2963)		(1.6521)		(1.1937)
N	12,760	12,760	3236	3236	5922	5922	3602	3602
Pseudo R2	0.0505		0.0625		0.0349		0.0553
Variable	L
	Total Sample		Rural Households		Pluriactivity		Off-Farm Households
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.5117 ***	0.1417 ***	0.5115 ***	0.1458 ***	0.5072 ***	0.1413 ***	0.3446 ***	0.0971 ***
	(0.1386)	(0.0384)	(0.1105)	(0.0314)	(0.0874)	(0.0244)	(0.0701)	(0.0197)
RHD	−0.3307 ***	−0.0916 ***
	(0.0530)	(0.0147)
FR×RHD	−0.0360 *	−0.0100 *
	(0.0202)	(0.0056)
Control variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Cons	−3.3879 ***		−4.6774 ***		−4.6677 ***		−3.3957 ***
	(0.3167)		(0.6473)		(0.5349)		(0.6484)
N	12,760	12,760	3236	3236	5922	5922	3602	3602
	0.0702		0.0771		0.0738		0.0714

Note: *** and * indicate significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects and standard errors are in parentheses.

intuitively reflects that different types of rural households have different input levels of forestry production. At the 10% statistical significance level, the interactive item (collective forestland tenure reform and rural households’ differentiation has a significant impact on rural households’ forestry inputs, indicating that there is a regulatory effect on rural households’ differentiation variables. The higher the degree of differentiation, the weaker the positive impact of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry inputs, thus verifying hypothesis 2. In addition, in order to understand the effect of collective forestland tenure reform under rural households’ differentiation intuitively, this paper further introduces three virtual variables for regression to characterize rural households’ differentiation.

Virtual variables are pure rural households, part-time rural households, and off-farm households, and the test results are still stable. Collective forestland tenure reform has a positive impact on the capital and labor input of the three types of rural households, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. From the numerical point of view, the marginal effects of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ forestry capital and labor input are 0.3179 and 0.1458, respectively, indicating that pure rural households are the most sensitive to the collective forestland tenure reform, namely the stable forestland tenure brings the highest guarantee effect to pure rural households. The marginal effect of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry capital and labor input of part-time rural households is 0.2272 and 0.1413. As part-time industrialization improves, the marginal effect tends to weaken, and the marginal effect is weaker than that of pure rural households as a whole. The “half industry and half farming” part-time business households have relatively stable off-farm employment income, but they still maintain a certain degree of dependence on forestland.

The security utility and asset utility of forestland are the preferences of the part-time business households, which is also the main reason for the gradual weakening of the marginal effect. Indeed, because of the reliance on forestland, complete tenure to forestland has become a critical factor in increasing the confidence of part-time business households willing to invest in forestry. The marginal effects of collective forestland tenure reform on off-farm households’ forestry capital and labor input are 0.1163 and 0.0971, which are lower than those of the above two types of rural households as a whole. Rather than exhibiting forestland exit behavior, forestland tenure reform can still have a significant positive impact on off-farm households with deep differentiation.

Rural households with deeper differentiation, according to the survey, are more likely to choose to own forestland tenure. For rural households with deeper differentiation, they have more stable non-agricultural employment income. Although they are less dependent on forestry management, if they choose to withdraw from the forestland at one time, there will be limited room for welfare improvement. This is also the main factor for rural households with deeper differentiation to ensure the original forestry management model. At the same time, it is affected by the current increasing value-added of rural land. Rural households currently have a high expectation of future income from holding forestland. As a result, off-farm households are more likely to hold forestland as a long-term value-added asset, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation, and hypothesis 2 has been fully confirmed.

4.4.2. Analysis of the Moderating Effect of Inter-Generational Differences on Collective Forestland Tenure Reform Affecting Rural Households’ Forestry Inputs

Table 7. Tests for moderating effects of inter-generational differences.

Variable	C
	Total Sample		First-Generation Rural Households		New-Generation Rural Households
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.7320 ***	0.1993 ***	0.7261 ***	0.2001 ***	0.3808 *	0.1000 *
	(0.1284)	(0.0349)	(0.1280)	(0.0352)	(0.2092)	(0.0549)
GD	−0.0375 *	−0.0102 *
	(0.0221)	(0.0060)
FR × GD	−0.2759 *	−0.0751 *
	(0.1499)	(0.0408)
Control variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Cons	−11.0458 ***		−11.5068 ***		−9.7470 ***
	(0.8110)		(0.9058)		(1.8969)
N	12760	12760	9802	9802	2958	2958
Pseudo R2	0.0416		0.0427		0.0479
Variable	L
	Total sample		First-generation rural households		New-generation rural households
	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx	Coef.	dy/dx
FR	0.4386 ***	0.1212 ***	0.4579 ***	0.1283 ***	0.1951 *	0.0517 *
	(0.0573)	(0.0158)	(0.0577)	(0.0162)	(0.1063)	(0.0281)
GD	−0.0486 *	−0.0134 *
	(0.0284)	(0.0078)
FR × GD	−0.1155 *	−0.0319 *
	(0.0642)	(0.0177)
Control variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Annual fixed effect	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Cons	−3.3377 ***		−3.5152 ***		−2.0117 **
	(0.3599)		(0.4005)		(0.8159)
N	12,760	12,760	9802	9802	2958	2958
Pseudo R2	0.0663		0.0687		0.0763

Note: ***, **, and * indicate significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; coefficients outside of parentheses in the table are marginal effects and standard errors are in parentheses.

show the results of the tests for moderating effects of inter-generational differences. At the 10% statistical level, the interaction term (collective forestland tenure reform and generational differences) has a significant effect on forestry inputs of rural households, indicating that there is a moderating effect of generational differences variable, namely the higher the degree of generational differences of rural households, the weaker the positive effect of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs of rural households. Hypothesis 3 is verified. In addition, in order to comprehend the effect of collective forestland tenure reform under generational differences, this paper further introduces two dummy variables, new-generation rural households and first-generation rural households, to characterize the generational differences for regression, and the test results are even more reliable. The marginal effects of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry capital and labor inputs of first-generation and new-generation rural households are 0.2001, 0.1283, and 0.1000 and 0.0517, respectively.

As the degree of inter-generational differences increase, the marginal positive effects of collective forestland tenure reform on the forestry inputs of rural households appear to diminish. Due to educational constraints and cultural differences between urban and rural areas, the difficulty of first-generation rural households to leave the land and integrate into the city as well as the difficulty of human capital to meet the requirements of urban off-farm employment make them more dependent on the security function of forestland. At the same time, due to age constraints, first-generation rural households face greater pension pressure and medical needs than new-generation rural households. Therefore, first-generation rural households are more concerned with the security function of “certain income” provided by complete forestland tenure.

New-generation rural households have a stronger sense of tenure than first-generation rural households, and the risk factor of uncertain future income for new-generation rural households is increased by unstable off-farm employment, and the unstable off-farm employment tends to increase the risk factor of uncertain future income of new-generation rural households, while the change of forestland security brought by collective forestland tenure reform can reduce their risk of loss. As a result of the difference in demand preference for forestland, the effect of forestland tenure on forestry capital and labor input of new-generation rural households is weaker than that of first-generation rural households, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation and fully confirms hypothesis 3.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

Under the background of urbanization and population aging, this study focuses on the mechanism of collective forestland tenure reform on forestry inputs under the regulatory effects of rural households’ differentiation and inter-generational differences from the perspective of rural households’ differentiation and inter-generational differences.

The main conclusions are as follows:

• In addition to looking at rural households’ forestry input behavior in the context of the market’s objective environment, this study also considers the subjective impact of income level differences on rural households’ market integration, which results in a variety of changes in rural households’ forestry input in response to the reform of forestland tenure. However, the differences in the objective market environment and the variations in family endowments under subjective ability demonstrate that the collective forestland tenure reform has a certain incentivizing effect on rural households’ investment in forestry production to varying degrees, but that this effect is clearly heterogeneous under various forestland dependences.
• With the deepening of rural households’ differentiation, the promoting effect of collective forestland tenure reform on rural households’ input level of forestry production is gradually weakened, and the incentive effect of forestry inputs is more significant for different types of rural households who have experienced collective forestland tenure reform, especially for rural households with higher differentiation, they are more inclined to continue to hold forestland tenure rather than withdrawing from the option.
• For different generations of rural households who have experienced the collective forestland tenure reform, the incentive effect of forestry inputs is more significant, but the new generation of rural households is less willing to invest in forestry production than the first generation of rural households. Inter-generational differences are the primary influencing factor for the difference in the level of input of forestry production, according to both the actual survey and the empirical tests.

It is worth mentioning that many rural households have relocated to cities due to the rapid urbanization and industrialization of society. The rural households class has clearly differentiated itself. While some rural households continue to work professionally or occasionally in the forestry industry, others are primarily employed in off-farm jobs. However, an obvious fact is that the proportion of pure rural households is gradually decreasing. The proportion of part-time rural households is gradually increasing and will become the mainstream type of rural households. At this time, rural households with a higher degree of differentiation, such as off-farm households, basically no longer rely on forestry production for their source of income. However, the continuous differentiation of rural households in the urbanization process does not improve the willingness of rural households to withdraw from the forestland contract right.

Contrarily, rural households with a higher degree of differentiation are more likely to keep the forestland and continue with the original forestry production and management mode. As a result, when rural households are faced with the option of leaving, they retain a strong attachment to the land, causing them to “leave the farm” but not “leave the land”, and “go to the city” but not “abandon the land”. The main reason is that for rural households with higher differentiation, the welfare improvement brought by the withdrawal of forestland contract tenure is limited, primarily due to the appreciation of urban land, causing them to have higher appreciation expectations for continuing to hold forestland contract right.

At the same time, the continuous improvement of forestland power makes it closer to the complete sense of tenure, and rural households’ access to cities with the land is not limited. The primary source of income for rural households with a low degree of differentiation, such as pure rural households, is forestry production and management. These rural households’ forestland management scale and forestry investment will gradually increase in the future. The main reason is that the comparative income of forestry production and management is relatively lower than that of off-farm employment. Giving full play to the advantages of moderate-scale management is the key to improving forestry operation income. If the operation scale of rural households with a low degree of differentiation does not expand, low forestry operation income will gradually reduce the input of forestry production, and even the abandonment or cessation of forestry operations. Thus, the different preferences of different classes of rural households for forestland tenure are important factors in the current solidification of human-land conflicts and distortion of human-land relations in rural areas.

Furthermore, it was discovered that collective forestland tenure reform had a significant incentive effect on the input of forestry production for both the first-generation and the new generation rural households after further examining the inter-generational structural differences of rural households. However, the first generation of rural households tended to engage in forestry production and management or local off-farm employment in reality. Their living habits, attitudes, and social networks are still deeply embedded in rural society; the new generation of rural households tends to go out for off-farm employment, which is largely embedded in the life, production mode, and concept preference of rural society. At the same time, they are unable to take full advantage of urban social security and public services. They are still barred and marginalized from employment, residence, and social and political participation, resulting in the dilemma of “double embedding”. Therefore, the traditional ties of the first generation of rural households can further increase the incentive effect of forestry reform. However, when the traditional ties of the countryside gradually weaken, the incentive effect of collective forestland tenure reform can play a partial buffer role to a certain extent, so as to resist the negative impact of the urban exclusion system and enable the new generation of rural households to maintain a certain level of forestry investment.

Based on the changes in rural households’ investment in forestry production due to rural household differentiation and inter-generational differences, as well as the actual investigation, the following recommendations are made on how to continuously promote the forestland tenure reform policy. First, deepen the reform of the collective forestland tenure system and vigorously promote the reform of the “separation of three rights” of forestland. In order to achieve large-scale forestry management, it is important to continue promoting the confirmation and certification of forestland tenure, improving the relevant supporting system guarantee, encouraging the development of the forestland, capital, and labor markets, encouraging heterogeneous rural households to reasonably allocate household production factor resources, and boosting the production zeal of small rural households who rely on forestry production. Different classes of rural households have different needs for the rural land system as a result of the gradual differentiation of the rural labor and the escalating degree of inter-generational differences. In order to achieve a diversified institutional supply and ensure structural alignment between institutional supply and institutional demand, the reform of the collective forestland tenure system must take into account the heterogeneous characteristics of rural households and continually adapt and innovate in response to changes in the actual situation.

Second, support rural households and the overall development of both urban and rural areas in order to achieve prosperity for all. For the deeply differentiated rural households, we should establish and improve the forestland transfer market and forestland exit mechanism, promote the effective flow of production factors among industries, vigorously develop rural off-farm industries, increase rural households’ non-agricultural employment opportunities, and improve rural households’ self-development ability and professionalization process. To increase the income level of small rural households with shallow differentiation, we should innovate the rural industrial development model, vigorously cultivate and develop new forestry management subjects such as forestry cooperatives, family forest farms, and forestry leading enterprises, and fully utilize the driving role of new forestry management subjects for small rural households. Additionally, we should fully utilize the financial advantages of sharply differentiating rural households, create a mechanism for industrial development among rural households with different backgrounds, and encourage the development of heterogeneous rural households as a whole.

Third, strengthen skills training and employment guidance for the new generation of rural households, and enrich the employment choices of the new generation of rural households. The government should strengthen guidance, innovate the cooperation mechanism between schools and the development of agriculture, rural areas, and rural households, establish a labor-oriented development or output mechanism, and cultivate the new generation of rural households into modern rural households with specialized and excellent skills. For the first generation of rural households, we should consider their own limitations and empirical forestry management characteristics, strengthen the publicity of forestry subsidies and forestry development policies, encourage rural households to develop diversified forestry management models, and provide them with financial and technical support.