Impact of Industrial Intelligence on Total Factor Productivity
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Industrial Intelligence and Economic Development
2.2. Industrial Intelligence and Labor Skill
- Difference in defining the concepts. Compared with “industrial intelligence” being discussed in this paper, most research is related with “technical advancement” or “artificial intelligence”, covering all sectors in society, with more and more focus on the tertiary industry. There is a lack of overriding standards for choosing the principal variables.
- Current research is mainly about the relationship between industrial intelligence and either economic development or labor skill, rarely about the combination of the three.
- The research could lead to entirely different conclusions due to their different research angles and methods which result in their selection of different variables and empirical models.
3. Research Ideas and Framework
3.1. Research Ideas
3.2. Research Hypothesis
3.3. Creativity and Limitation of This Paper
4. Calculation of Whole-Factor Productivity
4.1. Calculation Methods and Model Selection
4.2. Data Treatment
4.3. Modeling Estimation Results and Testing
4.4. Model Set-Up and Modification
5. Empirical Test
5.1. Mediation Effect
5.2. Principal Variables and Descriptive Statistics
5.3. Regression Results
5.4. Robust and Endogenous Test
5.4.1. Endogenous Test
- In order to control the endogenous omitted variable bias, the following variables are added: the financial input of R&D of each province is used to measure the input of R&D (Rd), and the imported value of industrial equipment is to measure the investment of machines and equipment (Fdi). The first step test is made by combining these two additional variables with the previous explanatory variable. The results given in Table 7 show that the prominence level of different coefficients is under good control, and the coefficient of the industrial intelligence, being consistent with that of Table 5, is positive. The consistency of the conclusions is therefore guaranteed.
- The OLS regression is carried out in the second step to solve the reverse causality of two variables, i.e., industrial intelligence and labor skill, by the methodology of Mao Qilin and Sheng Bin [57], in which the industrial intelligence is an explained variable, and the explanatory variables include trade openness, financial development, industrial structure upgrading, infrastructure, R&D input, equipment investment and labor skill. The results in Table 8 exhibit that the prominence level of the industrial intelligence and other explanatory variables except labor skill is within 10%, and the correlation of the industrial intelligence and the labor skill (high, medium and low) is not prominent. This eliminates, to some extent, the possibility of reverse causality between industrial intelligence and labor skill.
5.4.2. Robust Test
6. Region-by-Region Test
7. Conclusions and Recommendations
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Region | High | TFP | Mid | TFP | Low | TFP | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
East | lnt | 0.002 ** (0.001) | 0.255 *** (0.024) | −0.004 *** (0.001) | 0.271 *** (0.024) | −0.001 (0.001) | 0.232 *** (0.024) |
high | −10.046 *** (2.441) | ||||||
mid | 9.740 *** (2.089) | ||||||
low | −4.342 * (2.222) | ||||||
Df | 0.028 *** (0.009) | −1.720 *** (0.280) | −0.018 * (0.011) | −1.823 *** (0.271) | 0.005 (0.010) | −1.979 *** (0.283) | |
Sr | 0.391 *** (0.114) | 13.212 *** (3.518) | −0.072 (0.131) | 9.989 *** (3.341) | −0.554 *** (0.131) | 6.881 * (3.739) | |
Fra | 0.046 *** (0.013) | 1.745 *** (0.398) | −0.019 (0.015) | 1.464 *** (0.378) | −0.054 *** (0.015) | 1.046 ** (0.416) | |
Trade | −0.056 *** (0.015) | −3.301 *** (0.469) | 0.101 *** (0.017) | −3.719 *** (0.490) | 0.022 (0.017) | −2.633 *** (0.470) | |
Rd | 0.002 ** (0.001) | 0.085 *** (0.028) | −0.003 *** (0.001) | 0.094 *** (0.028) | 0.002 ** (0.001) | 0.075 ** (0.029) | |
Fdi | 0.003 (0.002) | −0.168 *** (0.062) | −0.003 (0.002) | −0.168 *** (0.061) | −0.001 (0.002) | −0.202 *** (0.064) | |
Middle | lnt | 0.008 *** (0.001) | 0.080 *** (0.027) | 0.006 ** (0.003) | 0.192 *** (0.020) | −0.015 *** (0.003) | 0.168 *** (0.023) |
high | 3.342 (2.270) | ||||||
mid | 2.539 *** (0.926) | ||||||
low | −2.489 *** (0.854) | ||||||
Df | 0.027 *** (0.007) | −0.146 (0.136) | 0.035 ** (0.016) | −0.146 (0.121) | −0.076 *** (0.017) | −0.245 * (0.133) | |
Sr | 0.052 (0.080) | 2.696 * (1.449) | −0.828 *** (0.187) | 4.972 *** (1.586) | 0.589 *** (0.202) | 4.335 *** (1.467) | |
Fra | 0.001 (0.014) | 3.160 *** (0.250) | −0.018 (0.032) | 3.210 *** (0.241) | −0.020 *** (0.035) | 3.114 *** (0.240) | |
Trade | −0.110 (0.093) | 2.241 *** (1.702) | −0.466 ** (0.219) | 3.058 * (1.676) | 0.662 *** (0.235) | 3.522 ** (1.704) | |
Rd | −0.004 ** (0.002) | −0.096 *** (0.033) | −0.009 ** (0.004) | −0.087 *** (0.032) | 0.016 *** (0.004) | −0.070 ** (0.033) | |
Fdi | −0.006 ** (0.002) | −0.088 ** (0.046) | −0.016 *** (0.006) | −0.068 (0.044) | 0.017 *** (0.006) | −0.065 (0.044) | |
lnt | 0.008 *** (0.001) | 0.202 *** (0.016) | 0.009 *** (0.002) | 0.155 *** (0.017) | −0.020 (0.002) | 0.186 *** (0.019) | |
high | −6.222 *** (1.170) | ||||||
West | mid | −0.213 (0.841) | |||||
low | 1.696 *** (0.604) | ||||||
Df | 0.005 (0.007) | −0.203 ** (0.096) | −0.072 *** (0.011) | −0.248 ** (0.122) | 0.070 *** (0.015) | ||
Sr | 0.077 (0.103) | 5.883 *** (1.342) | −0.311 * (0.159) | 5.341 *** (1.508) | 0.018 (0.214) | −0.352 *** (0.111) | |
Fra | −0.071 *** (0.013) | −1.433 *** (0.188) | −0.038 * (0.020) | −1.000 *** (0.189) | 0.131 *** (0.027) | −1.214 *** (0.197) | |
Trade | −0.043 (0.058) | 0.539 (0.759) | −0.055 (0.090) | 0.798 (0.841) | 0.145 (0.121) | 0.563 (0.819) | |
Rd | −0.001 (0.002) | 0.039 * (0.023) | 0.008 *** (0.003) | 0.041 (0.026) | −0.008 ** (0.004) | 0.053 ** (0.025) | |
Fdi | −0.008 (0.040) | 0.280 *** (0.068) | −0.030 *** (0.008) | 0.324 ** (0.881) | 0.040 *** (0.011) | 0.262 *** (0.077) |
Appendix B
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Variant | Symbol | Average Value | Standard Deviation | Maximum Value | Minimum Value |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Output | lnY | 8.959 | 0.964 | 6.143 | 10.963 |
Capital input | lnK | 9.881 | 1.164 | 6.821 | 12.101 |
Labor input | lnL | 7.59 | 0.81 | 5.673 | 8.814 |
Time | T | 6.5 | 3.457 | 1 | 12 |
Square of capital input | KK | 98.988 | 22.478 | 46.525 | 146.426 |
Square of labor input | LL | 58.255 | 11.887 | 32.188 | 77.682 |
Square of time | TT | 54.167 | 46.163 | 1 | 144 |
Capital input multiplied by labor input | KL | 75.505 | 14.442 | 39.518 | 106.514 |
Time multiplied by capital input | TK | 66.014 | 38.19 | 6.821 | 145.208 |
Time multiplied by labor input | TL | 49.551 | 27.259 | 5.673 | 105.765 |
Variant | Coefficient | Variant | Coefficient |
---|---|---|---|
C (constant) | 9.567 *** (0.999) | TK (time multi.by capital) | −2.372 (0.620) |
lnK (capital input) | 2.113 ** (0.996) | TL (time multi.by labor) | 2.841 *** (0.714) |
lnL (labor input) | 1.163 (0.997) | σ2 | 0.246 (0.999) |
T (time) | 6.164 *** (0.998) | γ | 0.978 (0.998) |
KK (square of capital) | 8.368 (0.381) | μ | 321.19 *** (0.998) |
LL (square of labor) | 6.05 (0.587) | η | 74.746 *** (0.993) |
TT (square of time) | −14.464 ** (6.896) | log likelihood funct. value | 370.61 |
KL (capital multi. by labor) | −0.151 (0.805) | LR statistical amount | 930.472 |
Test | Hypothesis | LLF | LR | Degree of Freedom K | Conclusion | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Step 1 | H1: not all binomial coefficients are 0. H0: all binomial coefficients are 0. | 370.61 329.099 | 83.022 | 3 | 7.05 | HO rejected |
Step 2 | H1: not all time-varying coefficients are 0. H0: all time-varying coefficients are 0. | 329.099 451.587 | −244.976 | 3 | 7.05 | HO accepted |
Variable | Symbol | Average Value | Standard Deviation | Maximum Value | Minimum Value |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total factor productivity | TFP | 1.261 | 0.731 | 2.661 | −0.130 |
Industrial intelligence | lnt | 15.995 | 9.863 | 76.686 | 2.152 |
Low-skill labor | low | 0.253 | 0.102 | 0.603 | 0.026 |
Medium-skill labor | mid | 0.590 | 0.005 | 0.764 | 0.341 |
High-skill labor | high | 0.141 | 0.005 | 0.559 | 0.030 |
Trade openness | Trade | 0.311 | 0.020 | 1.662 | 0.016 |
Financial development | Df | 2.855 | 0.059 | 8.131 | 1.288 |
Industrial structure upgrade | Sr | 0.430 | 0.005 | 0.802 | 0.283 |
Infrastructure | Fra | 0.858 | 0.025 | 2.438 | 0.066 |
TFP (1) | TFP (2) | TFP (3) | TFP (4) | TFP (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Lnt (industrial intelligence) | 0.077 *** (0.023) | 0.082 *** (0.023) | 0.100 *** (0.022) | 0.098 *** (0.022) | 0.054 ** (0.023) |
Df (financial develp.) | −0.497 *** (0.165) | −1.055 *** (0.181) | −0.991 *** (0.185) | −0.968 *** (0.179) | |
Sr (industrial structure) | 10.489 *** (1.696) | 10.348 *** (1.694) | 10.547 *** (1.646) | ||
Fra (infrastructure) | 1.044 (0.662) | 1.257 * (0.644) | |||
Trade (trade openness) | −2.280 *** (0.511) | ||||
C (constant) | −3.121 *** (0.897) | −0.010 (1.363) | −4.688 *** (1.495) | −6.149 *** (1.756) | −2.067 (1.935) |
Fixed effect of region | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
Fixed effect of time | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control |
R2 | 0.851 | 0.855 | 0.871 | 0.879 | 0.880 |
OBS | 360 | 360 | 360 | 360 | 360 |
F | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** |
High-Skill Labor (1) | TFP (2) | Medium-Skill Labor (3) | TFP (4) | Low-Skill Labor (5) | TFP (6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
lnt (industrial intelligence) | 0.004 *** (0.001) | 0.243 *** (0.017) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.227 *** (0.015) | −0.007 *** (0.001) | 0.223 *** (0.014) |
high (high skill) | −3.826 *** (1.442) | |||||
mid (mid skill) | 1.491 * (0.781) | |||||
low (low skill) | −0.808 (0.660) | |||||
Bootstrap test (indirect effect) | 0.015 ** (0.007) | 0.001 (0.001) | 0.006 (0.005) | |||
Bootstrap test (direct effect) | 0.243 *** (0.027) | 0.227 *** (0.026) | 0.223 *** (0.027) | |||
Df (financial development) | 0.024 *** (0.005) | −1.060 *** (0.136) | 0.050 *** (0.008) | −1.076 *** (0.140) | 0.032 *** (0.009) | −1.125 *** (0.135) |
Sr (ind. str. upgrading) | 0.277 *** (0.064) | 3.849 ** (1.770) | −0.117 (0.103) | 2.962 * (1.737) | −0.327 *** (0.124) | 2.524 (1.755) |
Fra(infrastructure) | −0.003 (0.007) | 0.516 *** (0.186) | −0.020 * (0.011) | 0.497 *** (0.188) | −0.020 (0.013) | 0.510 *** (0.188) |
Trade (trade openness) | −0.004 (0.011) | −2.030 *** (0.285) | 0.080 *** (0.017) | −0.805 *** (0.280) | −0.013 (0.021) | −2.024 *** (0.288) |
C (constant) | −0.103 *** (0.017) | 0.250 (0.474) | −0.728 *** (0.027) | −0.440 (0.792) | 0.434 *** (0.032) | 0.996 * (0.554) |
R2 | 0.746 | 0.563 | 0.312 | 0.559 | 0.403 | 0.668 |
OBS F | 360 0.000 *** | 360 0.000 *** | 360 0.000 *** | 360 0.000 *** | 360 0.000 *** | 360 0.000 *** |
TFP | TFP | ||
---|---|---|---|
lnt (indus. intelligence) | 0.088 *** (0.021) | Rd (R&D input) | 0.324 *** (0.037) |
Df (financial developt) | −0.889 *** (0.159) | Fdi (equipment invest.) | −0.144 *** (0.046) |
Sr (indus.str.upgrading) | 8.799 *** (1.456) | C (constant) | −10.324 *** (1.969) |
Fra (infrastructure) | 0.379 (0.574) | Fixed effect of region | control |
Trade (trade openness) | −1.792 *** (0.461) | Fixed effect of time | control |
OBS | 360 | R2 | 0.906 |
Industrial Intelligence | Industrial Intelligence | ||
---|---|---|---|
Df (financial developmnt) | 1.178 *** (0.412) | high (high-skill labor) | 20.121 (11.638) |
Sr (indus. str. upgrade) | −12.227 *** (4.039) | mid (medium-skill labor) | −5.174 (10.960) |
Fra (infrastructure) | 2.546 * (1.512) | low (low-skill labor) | 0.116 (11.941) |
Trade (trade openness) | −6.860 *** (1.309) | C (constant) | 45.912 *** (11.141) |
Rd (R&D input) | −0.270 *** (0.093) | Fixed effect of region | Control |
Fdi (equip. investment) | 0.179 (0.123) | Fixed effect of time | Control |
OBS | 360 | R2 | 0.974 |
TFP (1) | TFP (2) | TFP (3) | |
---|---|---|---|
lnt (indus. intelligence) | 0.239 *** (0.014) | 0.264 *** (0.013) | 0.217 *** (0.016) |
high (high skill) | −1.742 (1.283) | ||
lh (lnt*high) | −0.417 *** (0.042) | ||
mid (medium skill) | 3.363 *** (0.751) | ||
lm (lnt*mid) | 0.639 *** (0.055) | ||
low (low skill) | 0.532 (0.805) | ||
ll (lnt*low) | 0.271 *** (0.069) | ||
Df (financial development) | −0.806 *** (0.122) | −0.755 *** (0.120) | −1.102 *** (0.131) |
Sr (indus. str. upgrade) | 4.706 *** (1.509) | 2.607 * (1.437) | 4.369 ** (1.722) |
Fra (infrastructure) | 0.344 ** (0.170) | 0.427 *** (0.165) | 0.365 * (0.192) |
Trade (trade openness) | −2.593 *** (0.285) | −3.794 *** (0.308) | −2.007 *** (0.318) |
Rd (R&D input) | 0.110 *** (0.018) | 0.103 *** (0.017 | 0.078 *** (0.020) |
Fdi (equip. investment) | −0.120 *** (0.037) | −0.166 *** (0.035) | −0.186 *** (0.041) |
C (constant) | −0.836 ** (0.425) | −2.647 *** (0.681) | 0.031 (0.625) |
R2 | 0.687 | 0.704 | 0.604 |
OBS | 360 | 360 | 360 |
F | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** |
East | Middle | West | |
---|---|---|---|
Lnt (industrial intelligence) | 0.235 *** (0.024) | 0.206 *** (0.020) | 0.153 *** (0.015) |
Df (financial development) | −2.001 *** (0.286) | −0.056 (0.122) | −0.233 ** (0.105) |
Sr (industrial structure upgrade) | 9.284 *** (3.564) | 2.868 * (1.457) | 5.407 *** (1.479) |
Fra (infrastructure) | 1.280 *** (0.402) | 3.163 *** (0.253) | −0.992 *** (0.186) |
Trade (trade openness) | −2.731 *** (0.472) | 1.875 (1.699) | 0.810 (0.837) |
Rd (R&D input) | 0.066 ** (0.029) | −0.109 *** (0.032) | 0.039 (0.025) |
Fdi (equip. investment) C (constant) | −0.197 *** (0.065) −0.201 (0.892) | −0.108 ** (0.044) −4.180 *** (0.595) | 0.330 *** (0.075) −2.269 *** (0.576) |
R2 | 0.610 | 0.916 | 0.690 |
OBS | 360 | 360 | 360 |
F | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** | 0.000 *** |
Region | High-Skill Labor | TFP | Medium-Skill Labor | TFP | Low-Skill Labor | TFP | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
East | lnt | 0.002 ** (0.001) | 0.255 *** (0.024) | −0.004 *** (0.001) | 0.271 *** (0.024) | −0.001 (0.001) | 0.232 *** (0.024) |
high | −10.046 *** (2.441) | ||||||
mid | 9.740 *** (2.089) | ||||||
low | −4.342 * (2.222) | ||||||
Middle | lnt | 0.008 *** (0.001) | 0.080 *** (0.027) | 0.006 ** (0.003) | 0.192 *** (0.020) | −0.015 *** (0.003) | 0.168 *** (0.023) |
high | 3.342 (2.270) | ||||||
mid | 2.539 *** (0.926) | ||||||
low | −2.489 *** (0.854) | ||||||
West | lnt | 0.008 *** (0.001) | 0.202 *** (0.016) | 0.009 *** (0.002) | 0.155 *** (0.017) | −0.020 (0.002) | 0.186 *** (0.019) |
high | −6.222 *** (1.170) | ||||||
mid | −0.213 (0.841) | ||||||
low | 1.696 *** (0.604) |
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An, K.; Shan, Y.; Shi, S. Impact of Industrial Intelligence on Total Factor Productivity. Sustainability 2022, 14, 14535. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142114535
An K, Shan Y, Shi S. Impact of Industrial Intelligence on Total Factor Productivity. Sustainability. 2022; 14(21):14535. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142114535
Chicago/Turabian StyleAn, Ke, Yike Shan, and Sheng Shi. 2022. "Impact of Industrial Intelligence on Total Factor Productivity" Sustainability 14, no. 21: 14535. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142114535
APA StyleAn, K., Shan, Y., & Shi, S. (2022). Impact of Industrial Intelligence on Total Factor Productivity. Sustainability, 14(21), 14535. https://doi.org/10.3390/su142114535