Does Supervision Down to the Countryside Level Benefit Rural Public Goods Supply? Evidence on the Extent of Households’ Satisfaction with Public Goods from 2005 to 2019
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
This paper focuses on the impact of village-level power supervision reform on the supply effect of rural public goods, and discusses how to achieve effective grass-roots governance and improve the efficiency and level of the supply of rural public goods under the background of resources and administrative power sent to the countryside. This is a very interesting topic. Based on the panel data of 100 villages in five provinces of China, the author analyzes the influence of supervision policy on the supply of public goods. The study found that in order to prevent the government supervision or intervention too much, we should properly relax the pressure of assessment of village cadres, properly rely on the strength of the clan to promote the deepening of supervision to the countryside, selectively expand the pilot areas of supervision to the countryside. At the same time, it provides a strong empirical support for the view of "effective combination of top-down external institutional supervision and bottom-up internal democratic supervision". On the whole, the research and argumentation are solid and convincing, but there are still some small problems to be revised and improved before publication:
1. the part of Policy Background is too long. It is suggested to refine and summarize the reform to supervise rural residents and sort out the corresponding evolutionary context.
2. Research Design and Methods, suggesting to strengthen the demonstration of model selection. The Obs for the variables in Table 2 are not consistent
3 FIG. 3 should be the study areas. Meanwhile, the identification of sample counties in FIG. 3 is not clear.
4. It is suggested that the English expression of this article should be carefully polished. There are still many small mistakes in the article, for example, the spelling of "Public" in the title is incorrect.
Author Response
Dear reviewer，
Thank you for your valuable suggestions for revision.In response to your questions, I have also made corresponding modifications, and the specific reply is as follows:
In response to your suggestion that "the part of policy background is too long", this paper revises Section 2.1 "Policy Background" and simplifies the text content. This paper summarizes the development of supervision in the countryside into three stages, and analyzes the characteristics of each stage, sort out a table. Specific modifications are as follows:
“Villager autonomy is the internal mechanism of village public power supervision. The supervision mode of village public power under this system is shown in Figure 1. Village Party organizations, under the leadership of the grassroots government Party organizations and composed of village Party members, are at the core of leadership in rural grassroots organizations. They coordinate the relationships between various rural organizations, coordinate and deal with the interests and contradictions of various groups, and ensure the steady and rapid development of rural economy and social harmony and stability. The villagers' committee is an autonomous organization elected by the villagers to handle the public affairs and the public welfare tasks of the village and to mediate civil disputes and assist in maintaining the social order. The village affairs supervision committee is a village affairs supervision body established according to the law. It is responsible for the villagers' democratic financial management and for the system of making village affairs public. Its members are elected by villagers at villagers' meetings or at villagers' representative meetings.
This supervision mode brings village public power into the social internal supervision system. Although it is under the leadership of the party organization at the village level, the village committee is bound by the two supervision paths of intra-party supervision and democratic supervision; village cadres still have the opportunity to contact superior cadres. Under the unified village power structure, the administrative target management system can, to a certain extent, lead to the isolation of and even contradictions between the multiple supervision systems of village cadres. Giving village cadres the opportunity to collude with higher-level government officials resulted in damage to villagers' welfare [28].
After the tax reform, a significant amount of funds and resources were poured into rural society, and the phenomenon of village cadres using their power for personal gain emerged. This corruption took various forms, such as people receiving kickbacks in land acquisition or demolition, and lining their own pockets in the process of managing villages’ "three capitals", which led to conflicts between cadres and groups and also to mass incidents, prompting the state to take measures to strengthen supervision over the power of village cadres.
- 2004–2007: The establishment of the village-level internal supervision organization under villagers' self-governance.
The earliest supervisors sent to the countryside tried to supervise power at the village level by mobilizing the internal forces of the village. Under this scheme, the villagers themselves elect highly respected members of the village to be the directors and members of the village supervisory committee, who listen to public opinion and supervise the daily behavior of the village cadres. However, this kind of supervision mainly relies on the internal strength of the village and has not achieved much success. The reason for this is that the village affairs supervision committee is also organized and managed by the two village committees and lacks independence.
- 2008–2012: Village discipline inspection commissioners were set up to send villagers to the countryside on behalf of superior government supervision forces.
In response to the increasingly serious problem of village cadres' corruption and to strengthen the construction of grassroots Party conduct and clean up government in rural areas, the Mayang Miao Autonomous County discipline Commission in Huaihua City, Hunan Province, set up discipline inspection commissioners at the village level and appointed Party conduct supervisors at the township level. Using the deputy secretary of the village branch as a part-time supervisor saves the expense of hiring full-time supervisors [25].
- From 2012 to now: the discipline inspection working mechanism of "town discipline inspection commission + village Supervision Committee" has been established to realize the coupling of external supervision and internal supervision.
Jiangsu, Sichuan, and other local governments issued official documents emphasizing that "the annual assessment of the village discipline inspection commissioners shall be carried out by the town Party committee and the town Discipline Inspection Commission, and the discipline inspection commissioners shall report on the situation of hard work and clean government and accept quantitative assessment", which is equivalent to the power supervision of the township government sinking to the village level, and the village discipline inspection commissioners become the representatives of the township government at the village level. It can be seen that the durations and practices of village-level power supervision reforms differ in different regions.
After the initial results were assessed, the reform was gradually rolled out nationwide. The Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Focusing on Key Work in the fields of Agriculture, Rural Areas and Farmers to Ensure the Realization of a Moderately prosperous Society in an all-round Way on Time, issued in early 2020, pointed out that the communication and cooperation between grassroots discipline inspection and supervision organizations and village affairs supervision committees should be strengthened and effective connections should be formed in order to produce a joint supervision force.
Table 1. Supervise the Reform and Changes in rural areas
|
Time |
Model |
Innovation characteristics |
|
2004-2007 |
“Internal selection of supervisors +government assessment” |
select members from the petitioning villagers; village discipline inspection committee member concurrently serves as the director of the village Supervision Committee, and the annual assessment is directly supervised by the town Party Committee and the Discipline inspection Committee |
|
2008-2012 |
“Posted supervisor” |
late initiation of reform; dispatched "village discipline inspectors" to administrative villages to supervise on behalf of higher discipline commissions |
|
2012-now |
“Internal selection of supervisors +government assessment” |
The members of the supervision committee shall be selected from the village elites and verified by the township Party committee and governmentï¼› a discipline inspection mechanism of "town discipline inspection commission+village Supervision committee" |
Supervision in the countryside is essentially a supplement to villagers' self-governance systems and constitutes a policy reform instigated by the grassroots government to address the prominent problems with villagers' self-governance. This policy does not deny the rationality of villagers' self-governance but tries to solve the existing problems with it.
Village-level power supervision has the following characteristics. First, the focus of village public power falls on the village’s collective affairs, and the strength of both internal and external supervision increases. Its aim is to give full play to the synergistic effect of internal and external supervision and to realize the coupling of external intra-party supervision from the top down and self-supervision from the masses from the bottom up. Second, village rights supervision has gradually changed from a mode of internal and external joint supervision to a mode of internal and external dynamic supervision. The intervention of external forces in rural society represents a supportive institutional change, and its realization requires the benign cooperation and interaction of multiple subjects, such as the internal organizations of rural society, the villages’ two committees, and the villagers, so as to promote the optimization of village governance in cooperation and conflict. This process is required to clarify the functions and responsibilities of internal and external forces and to establish a corresponding system to ensure the coordination of internal and external forces.”
According to your opinion 2, "In Research Design and Methods, suggesting to strengthen the demonstration of model selection. The Obs for the variables in Table 2 are not consistent”. This paper has also been modified to explain and emphasize the reasons for selecting the bidirectional fixed effect model and the moderated effect model, as well as the necessity of selecting the recognition strategy combining DID and PSM. The specific modified text is as follows:
This paper reexamined the descriptive statistical analysis of variables in Table 2 and added the missing part.
You suggest that "FIG. 3 should be the study areas. Meanwhile, the identification of sample counties in FIG. 3 is not clear." So this paper revises figure 3 again, in which the shaded part is the sample area studied in this paper. Figure 3 shows the regional distribution of research samples. The picture is in the "reply to reviewer" file.
As for the error of some expressions in this paper, I have combed and revised the paper again, and also asked a professional institution to polish it.
Thanks for your valuable suggestions.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
The problem of public goods in rural areas is important and current. However, in my opinion, significant changes are required in this paper:
1. In my opinion, the authors of the paper wanted to prove that supervision over the rural self-government (peasants) gives the best results. According to the principle "Supervision is the highest form of trust". This is the subjective feeling of the reviewer, which accompanied me while reading the entire paper.
2. In the theoretical part of the paper, there is no reference to the theory of public goods.
3. The aim of the work was not included in the abstract. In addition, the research hypotheses put forward are difficult to verify (if it is possible at all). In a way, this confirms the lack of reference to hypotheses in part 6 of the paper.
4. Part 3 of the paper lacks explanations for some formulas. In addition, incorrect formatting of the text makes it difficult to read.
5. Part 4 begins with conclusions that confirm my statement from point 1. You must first present the results and draw conclusions on the basis of them, and in this paper it is the other way around.
6. Check the correctness of entries in the bibliography.
In my opinion, the article needs significant changes. It is too broad and sometimes inconsistent. It should be shortened. The approach of the authors, i.e. drawing conclusions from the results obtained, and not adjusting the results in such a way as to be able to confirm the previously drawn conclusions, requires a change in particular. I may be biased here, but that's how I feel about this paper.
Author Response
Dear reviewer，
Thank you for your questions. These are critical suggestions.I have divided your questions into three categories, which are the topic ideas, writing content and format questions, and responded to them one by one.
Let me respond first to your question on the point of view section.
- You found that "the paper wanted to prove that supervision over the rural self-government (peasants) gives the best results or "Supervision is the highest form of trust" ". But that's not the point of my paper.
First of all, in Chapter 3.1, I introduce the reason for the implementation of the "supervision to the countryside" policy, which is the existence of problems in the original villager autonomy system.Although under the leadership of the party organization at the village level, the village committee is bound by the two supervision paths of intra-party supervision and democratic supervision, the village cadres still have the opportunity to get in touch with the superior cadres. Under the role of the unified village power structure, the administrative target management responsibility system leads to the isolation and even contradiction between the multiple supervision systems of village cadres to a certain extent. Giving village cadres the opportunity to collude with higher government officials, resulting in the loss of villagers' welfare.Such as taking kickbacks in land requisition or demolition, lining the pockets of the village "three capital" management process, etc., which leads to the conflict between the cadres and the masses and mass incidents, forcing the state to take measures to strengthen the supervision of the power of village cadres.
Therefore, under this background, the existence of supervision to the countryside is essentially an auxiliary and supplement to the villagers' self-governance system.
Secondly, the members of the village affairs supervision committee are also selected from within the village. The members are highly respected or petitioners of the village, and the director of the supervision committee is the discipline inspection member of the village.Township governments and discipline inspection commissions are directly responsible for this organization. In this way, the village supervision organs can form mutual constraints with the village committee and the village cadres.Therefore, although the top-down supervision power is strengthened after the implementation of the policy, it does not emphasize that the stronger the power of such power supervision, the better.
Moreover, the empirical results of this paper do not prove that "the stronger the supervision power, the better", the positive incentive effect of the supervision power is conditional.In Section 4.2, the empirical study finds that such supervision effectiveness may have a negative impact in economically developed areas. In addition, in the test of the moderating effect in Section 5.2 (Table 11), our research conclusion found that although the policy coefficient did was positive and significant, the coefficient of "policy * the village cadre with the greatest surname" was significantly negative, indicating that when the village cadre came from the clan with the greatest surname in the village, the strengthening of top-down external supervision would lead to the deterioration of village governance and the deterioration of supply effect. This indirectly proves that greater supervision intensity is not better, which just proves hypothesis H3.
In order to explore why this negative effect occurs, this paper also takes "clan power" as the point to distinguish. According to the regression results in Table12, this paper finds that the interaction term coefficient of "did(policy) * village cadres belongs to clan of great surname" is significant only in areas with weak clan power. This indicates that in villages with weak clan power, there is tension between the supervision provided by the clan and the collective action function. At this time, village cadres from big family names often lack incentive and internal supervision, and there are collective inaction and moral hazard problems. Therefore, the internal supervision of the clan in the village does not form a good complementary role with the external supervision. This also lays the foundation for this paper to put forward policy recommendations.
In addition, the paper finds that more top-down oversight is not always better. In the empirical research of Chapter 5.3, this paper makes the evaluation of village cadres and the supervision of the policy of going to the countryside as an intersection. The results show that the coefficient of policy item did is still positive, but the coefficient of "policy * assessment of village cadres" is significantly negative, which indicates that there is mutual substitution (or exclusion) between the supervision forces also from the township government level.
When these two forces are pressed on the village cadres, the supply effect of the village cadres' participation in the supply of village public goods will be reduced. This also provides an empirical basis for "external supervision should not be too strong". This result also supports hypothesis H4.
Finally, all the conclusions of this paper are based on theoretical and empirical derivation. In the first draft, the author made a conclusion before presenting the empirical results. You suggested that this was not reasonable, so I removed this part in this version. Thank you for your advice.
Suggestions for revision of writing content:
- You found that"there is no reference to the theory of public goods"? I added 2.2 framework on the premise of the first draft. The analysis of this paper is based on the "multiple public goods supply theory", and combined with the analysis framework of the relationship between SBP system and performance. Specific analysis is as follows:
“ 2.1 Framework
Ostrom's multicentric governance theory takes the supply of public goods as the core of governance; it aims to improve the supply efficiency of public goods and emphasizes the pluralism of governance subjects. This theory holds that the government is not the only provider of public goods, but it is one of the main providers. It advocates the combination of the government, the market, and non-governmental organizations. The more widely accepted view in academic circles is the "multiple supply" theory, which includes government supply, private sector supply, autonomous sector supply, and the individual supply of farmers. This paper focuses on the "last kilometer" of the supply of rural public goods, which is the key to determining the effectiveness of the supply of rural public goods. The main body of the supply comprises village-level organizations and farmers, who need to complete various projects and establish a proper communication and coordination mechanism.
At present, the general framework for studying the influence of institutions on governance is "system–behavior–performance", that is, the SBP analysis framework. Different public goods suppliers will have different responses to external policy impacts, and this coherent response also affects the final effect of the public goods supply. Therefore, the analytical framework shown in Figure 1 is established in this paper.
Supervision in the countryside has the main characteristics of being procedural, standardized, institutionalized at the county and township levels; it aims to build the inspection system, the supervision system, and the accountability system, bringing power supervision into the village—that is, the township government—to strengthen the vertical power supervision of village institutions.
In a traditional rural society with low mobility and a lack of formal systems, village power supervision is a key aspect of realizing the adjustment of rural relations. Village democratic supervision and villager self-governance systems construct a barrier to state power intervention, but, for certain governance subjects and policy choices, township governments also use administrative power to control village rights and assume the responsibilities of guiding, managing and supervising village cadres (village-level rights subjects). For example, village democratic governance is incorporated into the institutional innovation of supervision by the special office of the Discipline Inspection Commission. This is conducive to the formation of a benign and interactive mode of village administration supervision [29]. As a kind of strategy choice for the township government in the specific system environment, the village-level administration is also an effort to overcome the "last kilometer" dilemma of rural governance [31]. However, with the strengthening of the formal system of supervision, the corresponding functions of this supervision also become differentiated, which may prevent village cadres from exercising their responsibilities and powers and lead them to focus only on dealing with the investigations and tasks of their superiors, or even not to exercise their rights at all [32,33].The subjectivity of villagers and their enthusiasm to participate in the governance of village public affairs has declined [19]. Therefore, this paper focuses on the impact of this policy on the supply behavior of village cadres and villagers.
Domestic and foreign studies have also found that other formal and informal village institutions involved in the supply of public goods play a role in regulation. This article posits that these include village cadre assessments and clan power. Strengthening the construction of grassroots cadres in rural areas is key to solving the problems of agriculture, rural areas, and farmers, which is the top priority of all the Party's work. As the personification of the government, rural grassroots cadres’ performance levels determine the effectiveness of the government's management of national economic, social, and political affairs. As an influential informal system, clans play an important role in promoting the rural labor flow, alleviating the income gap within villages, alleviating rural poverty, and promoting the development of rural enterprises [42-45]. Following the "functionalism" analytical path developed by Freedman (1965) in his classic study of clans in South China, some studies essentially regard the realization of the rural public goods supply as the direct cause of the existence and function of clans [46,47]. Some studies have elucidated this interaction, especially when examining how clans constrain formal authority and thus promote the supply of rural public goods [48]; however, others believe that this influence is negative [49], and some even suggest that there is no obvious correlation between them [50].
ou believe that "The aim of the work was not included in the abstract." In this paper, the first sentence of the abstract is modified as the research objective of this paper, which is as follows:
“
This paper focuses on the effect of village-level power supervision reform on the rural supply of public goods. In this paper, the panel data of 100 villages in 5 Chinese provinces from 2005 to 2019 are used to identify and analyze the impact of the supervision policy on the supply of rural public goods. The study adopted PSM-DID as an identification strategy to alleviate the endogenous problem of the model; it found that the supervision policy significantly improved the supply of public goods in villages and increased villagers’ satisfaction with the village’s economic base and public social services. There is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effects of the policy on public goods supply, which mainly reflects the regions with a weak economic development level. This policy mainly promotes the optimization of the public goods supply by strengthening villagers' public participation and promoting the improvement of the current public goods situation by restraining village cadres' duty behaviors. We also found that the coupling of clan power and village formal authority can inhibit the positive effect brought about by the policy, and only in areas with strong clan power can the negative effect be mitigated. Moreover, there is an alternative relationship between the assessment pressure of village cadres and the supervision force sent to the countryside, which leads to excessive supervision and inhibits the optimization of village public goods. The conclusion of this paper provides empirical support for the view that "top-down external institutional supervision and bottom-up internal democratic supervision should be effectively integrated" into the theory of village power supervision.
”
You think that "Part 3 of the paper lacks explanations for some formulas." This paper supplements the part of the Model exposition in Chapter 3.1 Empirical Model Design. The reasons for choosing bidirectional fixed effect model and regulating effect model are explained in detail. In addition, the selection of each variable and the meaning of the coefficient are introduced in detail to help understand the economic significance of the empirical results in the following paper. The details are in "Reply to reviewer" file.
You argue that "The research hypotheses put forward are difficult to verify and this confirms the lack of reference to hypotheses in part 6 of the paper ". I don't quite agree with this question, but I also made some modifications to the article. This article includes a sentence at the end of the conclusion of each empirical study to emphasize what the hypothesis tested in the empirical section above is, in the hope that this will help readers and you better understand the empirical results. Specific empirical evidence is shown in Chapter 4 to Chapter 5. As there are too many contents, it is not shown in this email. The revised manuscript is attached. Thank you again for your question.
About the format part:
I have revised the reference format and formula of this paper.
Thank you for your suggestions.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 3 Report
This study explores the the effect of village level power supervision reform on the effect of rural supply of public goods in China. There are some additional observations to improve the quality of the paper.
Abstract
The abstract is unusual lengthy and it should be mentioned with used methodology.
Introduction
Incorporating some empirical evidences on supervision, rural public goods supply will signify the study. These empirical evidences in shape of graphical representations will catch the attention of readers.
I would like to suggest to quote some latest studies on the topic which will highlight the importance of the topic in present debate.
Conclusion and Discussion
This section should be equipped with findings of earlier studies.
Author Response
Dear Reviewer,
Thank you for your comments on this Abstract, Introduction and Conclusion and Discussion.
The author has reduced the abstract, mainly retaining five parts: research objectives, research data, research methods, research conclusions and policy recommendations. The details are as follows:
“ This paper focuses on the effect of village-level power supervision reform on the rural supply of public goods. In this paper, the panel data of 100 villages in 5 Chinese provinces from 2005 to 2019 are used to identify and analyze the impact of the supervision policy on the supply of rural public goods. The study adopted PSM-DID as an identification strategy to alleviate the endogenous problem of the model; it found that the supervision policy significantly improved the supply of public goods in villages and increased villagers’ satisfaction with the village’s economic base and public social services. There is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effects of the policy on public goods supply, which mainly reflects the regions with a weak economic development level. This policy mainly promotes the optimization of the public goods supply by strengthening villagers' public participation and promoting the improvement of the current public goods situation by restraining village cadres' duty behaviors. We also found that the coupling of clan power and village formal authority can inhibit the positive effect brought about by the policy, and only in areas with strong clan power can the negative effect be mitigated. Moreover, there is an alternative relationship between the assessment pressure of village cadres and the supervision force sent to the countryside, which leads to excessive supervision and inhibits the optimization of village public goods. The conclusion of this paper provides empirical support for the view that "top-down external institutional supervision and bottom-up internal democratic supervision should be effectively integrated" into the theory of village power supervision.
”
In this paper, the regression table in "4.2 Heterogeneity Analysis" was changed into pictures to better show the differences between different regions. The Figures are in file of "reply to reviewer".
In the second paragraph of "6 Conclusions and Discussion", this paper makes a summary of the previous research content and tells the main research conclusions of this research in sections. The specific contents are as follows:
“ In order to investigate the relationship between village-level power supervision and the supply of public goods in rural areas, and to accurately assess the actual impact of the supervision policy on the supply of public goods, this paper uses the panel data of 100 villages in 5 provinces from 2005 to 2019. We conducted a number of systematic analyses using the PSM-DID differential method and the partial method of tendency matching. The study produced the following findings.
First, the policy of supervision in the countryside has significantly improved the supply of public goods in villages and increased villagers’ satisfaction with the economic basis and social services of public goods. Second, there is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effect of the policy on the supply of public goods, which is mainly reflected in areas with a weak level of economic development. Formerly poor counties are more significantly affected in terms of social service public goods, while non-poor counties are more significantly affected in terms of basic economic public goods. Third, this paper also finds that the policy mainly promotes the optimization of the public goods supply through mechanisms such as strengthening villagers' participation in supervision and by restraining village cadres' behavior. Fourth, regarding the regulating effect of clan power, this paper finds that clan power penetrates the formal authority of villages, and counterbalancing this with formal institutional supervision powers does not necessarily produce an ideal strengthening effect. The influence of clan power in the village must also be kept significant enough that the actual demands of collective action ability are consistent with the demands of most villagers. Additionally, it is found that formal supervision from the same power source has a substitution relationship for village cadres. ”
As for your suggestion on "adding the latest relevant literature", I have also added some literatures published in the past two years, which are related to the supervision of power at the village level and the research on the supply of public goods.
Thank you for all your valuable comments.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 2
Reviewer 2 Report
Thank you for your response to my comments. I don't agree with all of them, but I accept them. The quality of the article after the changes has improved. However, I still suggest keeping the Conclusions and Discussions sections separate.
The paper requires refinement from the editorial side.
Author Response
Dear reviewer，
Thank you for your final approval and new comments on this article. This paper divides "7 and Discussions" into two sections, namely "7 Conclusions" and "8 Discussions". The details of these two sections are as follows:
“
7 Conclusions
In order to investigate the relationship between village-level power supervision and the supply of public goods in rural areas, and to accurately assess the actual impact of the supervision policy on the supply of public goods, this paper adopts the panel data of 100 villages in five provinces from 2005 to 2019, and makes a large number of systematic analyses by using PSM-DID differential method and the partial method of tendency matching. The study found:
First, the supervision of the rural policy has significantly improved the supply of public goods in the village, and increased the satisfaction of villagers on the economic basis and social services of public goods; Second, there is regional heterogeneity in the improvement effect of the policy on the supply of public goods, which is mainly reflected in areas with weak economic development level. Formerly poor counties have more significant effect on social service public goods, while non-poor counties have more significant effect on economic basic public goods. Thirdly, this paper also finds that the policy mainly promotes the optimization of public goods supply through mechanisms such as strengthening villagers' participation in supervision and the restraint effect of village cadres' behavior. Fourthly, regulating effect of clan power, this paper finds that clan power penetrates into the formal authority of the village, and the coupling with the formal institutional supervision power does not necessarily form an ideal strengthening effect. It also needs to keep the influence of clan power in the village large enough so that the actual demand of collective action ability can be consistent with most villagers. Besides, it is found that formal supervision force from the same power source has a substitution relationship for village cadres.
8 Discussions
In terms of the current situation of the implementation of supervision in rural areas and its impact on the development of rural areas, the research findings of this paper have multiple policy implications.
Firstly, the research conclusion of this paper provides an important practical basis for the government to further support the reform of grassroots discipline inspection and procuratorial work. The research results of this paper show that the government delegates grassroots inner-party supervision to the village level, can improve the effect of rural public goods supply to a certain extent, and enhance the satisfaction level of villagers. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the pilot experience of supervision to rural areas on a larger scale, so that the results of the pilot will benefit more farmers and regions.
Secondly, the research conclusions of this paper also provide useful reference for preventing excessive government supervision or intervention from causing village administration and village publicity loss. Under the supervision policy, villages should give full play to the guiding role of the clan with the big surname. Under the premise of ensuring that the interests of the clan with the big surname are consistent with the interests of most villagers, they should play the role of democratic supervision and organizing collective actions, so as to better guarantee the supply level of rural public goods. In addition, the policy supervision force of supervision to the countryside and the restraint brought by the evaluation index of village cadres substitute each other, so the superior government should properly relax the evaluation standards of village cadres when strengthening the supervision at the village level, and reduce the moral hazard behaviors of village cadres due to reverse psychology, which will reduce the efficiency of village governance.
The possible marginal contribution of this paper is to add the research Angle of the influence of village-level power supervision on rural public goods, and find that there is an "inflection point" in the coupling between formal and informal institutions in rural society. It is necessary to improve the efficiency of the interaction between government departments and clan networks, so as to enhance the positive effect of superposition and weaken the possible negative effect. In addition, the exogenous supervisory power will also form a substitute relationship with the original institutional supervision of the village, providing new empirical evidence for the view that the power supervision at the village level is limited.
The deficiency of this paper is that it can not get the actual attitude and view of the village cadres after the implementation of supervision to the countryside, and it can not be analyzed and tested from the specific behavior of the village cadres. Future research expansion lies in: (1) Analyze the influence of different degrees of supervision strength on the actual public goods supply behavior of village committees and village cadres; (2) Analysis of relevant policies that will directly affect the village-level power supervision system.
”
Thank you for your suggestions.
