Determination of Indicators of Implementation of Sea Transportation Safety Management System for Traditional Shipping Based on Delphi Approach

Abstract

The implementation of the safety management system (SMS) in traditional shipping in Indonesia, known as “Pelra”, has not been implemented. The nature of the operation pattern and characteristics of Pelra, which are still traditional (non-convention), means that international maritime rules such as SOLAS, MARPOL, LLC, Collreg, and STCW, as well as Indonesian government regulations related to shipping safety, are not suitable for Pelra. As a result, Pelra ship accidents continue to occur every year in Indonesian waters without any efforts to deal with safety management. The aim of this study is to find indicators to assess the implementation of Pelra’s SMS that adopt the specific characteristics of Pelra sea transportation. The analysis was conducted with a Delphi approach, based on expert opinion in the field of ship safety, which was tested using non-parametric statistics (Kendall’s W test). The consensus results obtained 9 factors described in 44 assessment indicators to implement SMS on Pelra vessels. Several new indicators were found, including indicators related to ship stability, ship construction, and safety and navigation equipment. The level of expert agreement from the concordance W coefficient value is in the range of 0.3 (moderately strong) to 0.7 (very strong), which suggests that these findings are valid and feasible to be used as assessment indicators in order to implement SMS Pelra.

1. Introduction

Traditional shipping (Pelra) positions itself as the backbone of logistics distribution among the islands of Indonesia, part of the national logistics system in the context of national economic growth [1,2]. Pelra is not only a means of transportation, but also able to become a bridge to knit and strengthen the Republic of Indonesia through strengthening the socio-economic character of the community in small islands. Pelra services have become traditional transportation, which still exists today to distribute basic necessities and strategic materials to coastal areas as the centre of local and regional scale logistics activities for the development of inland communities as a means of community interaction in the archipelago that is limited by other transportation. In the past, Pelra was not only a means of transportation but also a means of national defence and security.

As a transportation element that plays an active role in the distribution of goods to remote and inland areas, Pelra’s performance is still considered low and inefficient. Many obstacles are faced both internally and externally. Pelra rejuvenation is already very difficult if it maintains its use of increasingly limited wooden construction. Traditionally managed and family businesses do not bring innovation in order to increase cargo, which is decreasing every year, in addition to limited port infrastructure support due to being eroded by conventional ships [3].

However, Pelra also has an advantage over conventional ships in that it is able to operate in shallow harbour conditions, which are technically unable to be reached by other conventional ships [4]. Its efforts are not capital intensive, causing the cost of transportation to be minimal and the tariff offered to be cheaper [5]. The development of new shipping technology causes Pelra to compete with conventional ships with greater carrying capacity and higher speed. From the safety aspect, Pelra does not have insurance so the risk is higher, as well as the age of the ships which are old and vulnerable to high waves [6,7,8].

However, among the advantages of the Pelra vessels, the safety aspect is a serious concern that has yet to be resolved. Pelra ship accidents still occur frequently, especially in eastern Indonesia. Nationally, 9% of ship accidents at sea are Pelra vessels and are dominated by vessels of 150 GT and below. For example, in the waters of East Nusa Tenggara (ENT), accidents were recorded reaching 34 incidents in 2017, while in 2021 this number was 20 incidents.

The fact is that Pelra ship accidents are caused by several factors simultaneously. Not only human factors but also related technical and non-technical aspects. Accident prevention efforts to achieve zero accidents are only possible through implementing the Pelra sea transportation safety management system (SMS), starting from the initial preparedness of the ship, the support of the company/ship owner, the fulfilments of the competence of marine human resources, and the fulfilments of technical aspects and ship construction.

A safety management system (SMS) is a planned and documented safety program that incorporates management concepts into an organised safety system [9]. SMS includes policy systems, information and reporting systems, operational systems, risk management systems, monitoring systems, maintenance systems, and training systems. In safety level theory (improvement safety), the safety management system is at the fourth level after technical safety, attention to human factors, and management (company and operator), but has not yet entered the highest level, namely, safety culture. This theory has been applied from the 1960s to the present, especially in the field of design and technology related to improving safety in various fields. According to Wang et al. [10], the development of safety levels in 1960 focused on technical safety, in 1970 focused on attention to human factors, the 1990 period focused on management, in 2010 focused on safety management systems, and currently, many studies are paying more attention to safety culture.

Cooper’s [11] safety theory states that safety culture becomes reciprocal between psychological constructs (the person), the environment (the situation), and interrelated behaviours. Likewise, ship accidents are never caused by one factor, but structurally by several factors simultaneously [12]. Research in the oil and gas industry is also conducted based on behaviour to reduce the level of work accidents, which includes identification, observation, intervention, review, and monitoring [13]. The results show that the behaviours-based safety (BBS) approach is able to minimise accidents, change unsafe behaviours, and improve environmental quality and safety in the oil and gas industry. Likewise, in Norway, the safety culture was also built effectively due to improvements in several aspects including worker training, competence, communication, management, documentation, and activity schedules [14].

A zero accident policy has also been developed in the field of construction management. According to Mohamed, S. and T. Chinda [15], zero accident culture can only be implemented if the company is committed to realizing these changes. In line with that, Choudhry et al. [16] argue that perception, psychology, behaviours, and managerial factors play an important role in improving safety behaviours in reducing accident rates.

In developing the determination of Pelra ship safety management system assessment indicators, it is necessary to look at benchmarking and previous studies related to this matter. In the marine transportation sector, ship accidents are caused by two main factors, namely, non-technical aspects and technical aspects. Non-technical aspects include risk management [17], technical, operational, and rule implementation errors [18], leadership models [19,20], crew competence [21], human error [22,23,24], culture, and safety knowledge and behaviours [25,26]. Technical aspects include vessel stability and dynamics [27,28], technology use [29], operations, and environment/weather [30,31].

In addition to the safety indicators previously described, the government of Indonesia has also regulated the technical aspects of the implementation of the safety management system for Indonesian-flagged non-convention vessels. There are technical safety standards for Indonesian-flagged non-convention vessels, including Pelra vessels, in the form of the Minister of Transportation Regulation KM 65/2009 [32] and Director General of Hubla Decree No. Um. 008/9/20/DJPL-12 concerning the Application of Standards and Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of Indonesian-Flagged Non-Convention Ships [33], but in fact, it has not been implemented because it is considered unsuitable for Pelra conditions. Until now, a special safety management system for Pelra ships has not been implemented. Standardised indicators in the implementation of Pelra SMK do not yet exist.

Based on the problems and facts in the field, it is important to develop a Pelra sea transportation safety management system, especially in Indonesian waters. However, before going to that stage it is necessary to study what indicators have an influence so that they become the basis for policy formulation. Therefore, this paper aims to find indicators that can be used to implement SMS Pelra towards zero accidents. The indicators found in this study form the basis for the development of the Pelra safety management system.

2. Methods

2.1. Delphi Process

This study uses the Delphi technique to analyse the indicators that will be used to assess the implementation of the safety management system (SMS) in the Pelra vessels. This technique was developed in the 1950s by the RAND company [34], but now it has been developed in various science families such as technology, social, forecasting, etc. [35]. Delphi can overcome the uncertainty space that often occurs due to the subjectivity of choice, and incorporate statistical elements to guarantee the process test [36].

The Delphi method procedure is divided into 3 levels, among others;

(a)

Level 1: a literature review from various sources, brainstorming on each indicator found, and consulting with experts on various possibilities for the indicators used. Furthermore, the importance ranking was carried out with a range of 1 to 5 (Likert scale) through a survey questionnaire, where 1 and 5 on the questionnaire indicated unimportant and most important.

(b)

Level 2: a reliability test was conducted on the questionnaire. The standard used is Cronbach’s alpha. If the Cronbach’s alpha value is below 0.35 then it cannot be used, while if it is above 0.35 then it is acceptable and used for further analysis [37].

(c)

Level 3: carrying out surveys by selecting experts who are considered to understand shipping safety conditions

(d)

Level 4: perform Kendall’s W Test, which is a non-parametric statistic that can be used to assess agreement among participants.

(e)

Level 5: geometric mean assessment is carried out to determine the level of importance based on the determinant value. In this study, the geometric mean value used is if r ≥ 4 it is accepted, if r < 4 then it is rejected.

(f)

Level 6: determine research findings and summarise conclusions based on the results of Kendall’s W test and the mean ranking.

The stages of the Delphi process on determining the indicators of SMS implementation can be seen in Figure 1.

2.2. Kendall’s Test

To test the validation of the level of agreement of experts in assessing indicators, non-parametric statistical testing is carried out, namely, Kendall’s W test. Agreement is measured by Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (W), which is a measure of agreement between experts (m) who assess a certain set of objects (n) [38].

Hypothesis H0.

Experts produce the same independent ratings.

Hypothesis H1.

Experts do not produce the same independent ratings.

If the significance value (Kendall’s coefficient) is high, it can be interpreted that the experts apply the same standards in assessing the object under study [39]. This test is the basis for whether expert consensus is achieved or not, because making a realistic determination increases the strength of consensus [40]. The determination of Kendall’s W coefficient is calculated based on the squared deviation, with the sum of the deviations, S, based on the following formula:

$$S=\sum _{i=1}^n(Ri-{R)}^2$$

(1)

where Ri is the row marginal sum of the ranks received by the object, and R is the average value:

$$Rj=\sum _{j=1}^m{r}_{i,j}$$

(2)

$$R=\frac{1}{2}.m.(n+1)$$

(3)

$$W=\frac{12.S}{m^2.\left(n^3-n\right).m.{\sum }_{j=1}^{m}Tj}$$

(4)

Tj is the correction factor for the tied rating:

$$Tj=\sum _{i=1}^{g_j}{(t_i^3-t}_i)$$

(5)

where t_i is the number of tied ranks in the i-th group (where a group is a set of values with constant (tied) ranks), and g_j is the number of tied groups in the set of ranks (ranging from 1 to n) for expert j. Thus, Tj is the required correction factor for the set of expert j’s ranks. Note that if there are no equal ranks for expert j, then Tj is equal to 0. If there is equal data, it should be modified to avoid bias in the statistics. The results of Kendall’s W test are then interpreted as W ≤ 0.3 = weak agreement, 0.3 < W ≤ 0.5 = moderate agreement, 0.5 < W ≤ 0.7 = strong agreement, W > 0.7 = very strong agreement.

2.3. Selection of Informants (Experts)

Judge mental or purposive sampling was used in this study, namely, determining the sample based on certain selections/criteria. The number of experts is still considered relevant to be used as respondents, with the assumption that the respondents have high qualifications/experience [41]. The experts consist of various professionals working in the field of shipping safety including academics, shipping companies, syahbandar, and marine inspectors. In round 1, 34 experts provided online assessments, while in round 2, 9 experts were eliminated. The expert profile shows a diversity of around 76.5% practitioners and 23.5% academics, with varying technical knowledge and domicile distribution. The characteristics of the experts who became research informants are shown in

Table 1. Expert characteristics (N = 34).

No.	Characteristics	Percentage (%)
1	Gender - Male - Female
		88.2
		11.8
2	Age - 30–40 years old - 41–50 years old - >50 years old
		20.6
		29.4
		50.0
3	Work experience - 5–10 years - 11–15 years - >15 years
		14.7
		41.2
		44.1
4	Occupation - Academician - Syahbandar - Entrepreneur - Marine inspector
		23.5
		26.5
		17.6
		32.4
5	Education - High school - Bachelor’s degree - Master’s/Doctorate
		5.9
		14.7
		79.4
6	Domicile - Jabodetabek, Semarang, and Surabaya - Balikpapan and West Waringin - Makassar and Manado - Kupang - Singapore
		50.0
		8.8
		20.6
		14.7
		5.9

.

3. Results

3.1. Round 1: Brainstorming

(a)

Indicators

The process of identifying indicators was carried out through a literature review and brainstorming with experts. The results of the tabulated identification are divided into several factors, shown in

Table 2. Identification of Pelra safety management system assessment indicators.

Factors	Indicators (Code)		Reference
Corporate responsibility and authority (X1)	X1.1	Establish rules and procedures for ship safety and environmental protection.	[5,42,43,44,45]
	X1.2	Regularly monitor crew compliance with vessel safety requirements.
	X1.3	Ensure safety rules are implemented by all crew members.
	X1.4	Ensure the availability of crew resources in accordance with manning rules.
	X1.5	Prepare operation checklists for vessel operations related to safety and personnel.
	X1.6	Consistent implementation of safety management system regulations.
	X1.7	Implementation of ongoing safety management training for crew members.
	X1.8	Consistently conduct regular meetings to find solutions to safety management issues.
	X1.9	Appoint crew members who understand ship safety aspects.
	X1.10	Program and internally evaluate safety activities.
	X1.11	Evaluate SMS effectiveness and review in accordance with established procedures.
Crew responsibilities and authorities (X2)	X2.1	Routinely check the completeness requirements of safety systems on board.	[20,21,22,23,24,42,43,46,47]
	X2.2	Understand the duties and responsibilities related to ship safety management system.
	X2.3	Obtaining clarity of precise, clear, and easy instructions in the implementation of safety systems.
	X2.4	The skipper motivates the crew to implement the safety policy.
	X2.5	Routine strengthening of leadership to captains.
	X2.6	Able to operate shipping navigation equipment.
Resources and personnel (X3)	X3.1	Receive regular ship safety training.	[19,20,42]
	X3.2	Psychological examination of crew members before sailing.
	X3.3	Physical condition check for crew before sailing.
	X3.4	Health checks for crew members before sailing.
Emergency readiness (X4)	X4.1	Identify potential emergency situations on board.	[5,22,23,42,43]
	X4.2	Establish procedures for responding to emergency situations.
	X4.3	The crew must be able to respond quickly when conditions occur that jeopardise safety.
Ship maintenance (X5)	X5.1	The ship owner establishes regular ship maintenance procedures.	[5,42,43]
	X5.2	The crew understands the maintenance operation manual and routine maintenance system.
	X5.3	The crew performs routine ship maintenance.
Administration and Documentation (X6)	X6.1	Establish document and data control procedures related to the safety management system.	[42,48,49,50]
	X6.2	Organizing document and data control procedures related to the safety management system.
	X6.3	Establish and document authority, responsibility, and coordination patterns among crew members in the implementation of the safety management system.

.

(b)

Initial questionnaire

The initial questionnaire was conducted to collect expert opinions through a questionnaire in the form of closed questions and open questions. In the closed questions, indicators obtained from the literature were presented and the expert answered whether they agreed or disagreed with the indicator. In the open-ended questions, experts were asked to assume other indicators that might affect the Pelra Ship safety management system and impact on its implementation. There was no limit to the number of indicators that could be suggested. The expert’s answer in round 1 was subjective and would bring up a new indicator. Therefore, it was necessary to agree on whether the new indicator would be included or not by consensus in round 2.

(c)

Validity and reliability test

As a measuring tool, validity and reliability tests were carried out on the indicators. The results of the validity test with 49 indicators with a confidence level of 95% (2-tailed) obtained the value of r count = 0.232, which means that all of the indicators were valid. While the reliability test showed a Cronbach alpha value of 0.785 (good enough) which is greater than the criterion of 0.6. So it can be explained that the questionnaire instrument used was reliable or good enough as a measuring tool.

(d)

Initial response analysis and feedback

Expert responses to the initial questionnaire showed mixed results. In the closed questionnaire, most experts agreed that the indicators in Table 2 can be used to assess the safety management system on Pelra ships. In indicators X1.1, X1.2, X1.5, X2.1, X2.2, X3.3, X3.4, and X5.3 all (100%) experts agreed to be included in the next stage of analysis (round 2). Indicators X1.7, X1.9, X1.11, X2.4, X2.6, and X6.2 were approved by 96% of the experts. Indicators X1.3, X1.4, X1.6, X2.5, X3.1, X3.2, X4.1, X4.3, X6.1, and X6.3 were approved by 92% of the experts. Indicators X2.3, X4.2, X5.1, and X5.2 were approved by 88% of the experts. Indicator X1.8 was approved by 80% of the experts, and indicator X1.10 was approved by 76% of the experts. Although the approval values vary, the overall value is still above 70%, so all indicators in Table 2 will be analysed further in round 2.

Furthermore, in the open-ended questionnaire, feedback was obtained from experts on other factors that could be included as indicators of SMS assessment on Pelra vessels. The consensus showed that 5% of experts mentioned the need to add indicators related to recording daily activities by crew members in the administration and documentation factor. In addition to these factors, there are still other technical factors that need to be included, including ship construction factors, mentioned by 24% of experts, ship stability factors, mentioned by 62% of experts, and safety and navigation equipment factors, mentioned by 19% of experts. To accommodate these additional factors, they are described in the derived indicators shown in

Table 3. New indicator feedback (round 1).

Factors (Code)	Mention by Expert	Indicators (Code)
Administration and Documentation (X6)	5%	X6.4	Provide a logbook of daily ship records
Ship Construction (X7)	24%	X7.1	Connection system
		X7.2	Ship body impermeability
		X7.3	Transverse watertight bulkhead
		X7.4	Reinforcement of machine foundation
		X7.5	Reinforcement of deck and deck house construction
		X7.6	Reinforcement of hatch area
		X7.7	Sail masts and equipment
Ship Stability (X8)	62%	X8.1	Cargo layout
		X8.2	Type of cargo transported
		X8.3	Ship shape and size
		X8.4	Wind, waves, currents, and storms
Safety and Navigation Equipment (X9)	19%	X9.1	Check list of condition and number of safety and navigation equipment
		X9.2	Guidelines for the use of safety and navigation equipment
		X9.3	Placement of safety equipment in an easily accessible location
		X9.4	Crew skills using safety and navigation equipment

.

3.2. Round 2: Advanced Assessment

(a)

Advanced questionnaire

To standardise the experts’ answers in round 1, the questionnaire was re-distributed to the experts to select indicators, as in round 1, consisting of the initial 30 indicators (Table 2) plus 16 feedback indicators (Table 3) for a total of 46 indicators. The names of each indicator were consistent with the previous round. The number of experts used in this round 2 questionnaire changed to 25 experts. A total of nine people were eliminated because they gave inconsistent answers in round 1 and round 2.

(b)

Response analysis and follow-up feedback

The experts’ further responses to the assessed indicators also resulted in a variety of answers. The expert agreement value is in the range of 64–100%. To select the final indicators, a lower threshold value was formulated. The consensus was that indicators with an agreement value below 70% were not selected as indicators that affect the assessment of the Pelra transportation safety management system.

Of the 46 indicators in round 2, there were 2 indicators that did not meet the requirements, namely, X6.4 (providing a logbook of daily ship records) and X7.7 (sail masts and equipment). Indicator X.6.4 was deemed unrepresentative because providing a daily logbook would place an additional burden on the crew, causing them to overlook other more important activities. In addition, this activity has also been accommodated in indicator X2.1, namely, the crew must routinely check the requirements for the completeness of the safety system on the ship. Meanwhile, indicator X7.7 is considered unrepresentative because in the field conditions the sail mast equipment on Pelra ships is no longer used because the ship has utilised engine power as the main power. Details of the percentage of expert agreement on each indicator that can be used in assessing the Pelra transportation safety management system can be seen in Figure 2.

3.3. Kendall’s W Test and Average Ranking of Indicators

Based on the consensus in round 2, 44 indicators were obtained based on the level of expert agreement. Furthermore, each indicator was tested by Kendall’s W to see the relationship or agreement value, which was interpreted by the concordance coefficient value W ≤ 0.3 = weak, 0.3 < W ≤ 0.5 = moderate, 0.5 < W ≤ 0.7 = strong, W > 0.7 = very strong [38]. In addition, the average ranking value of the range of values of each indicator was also calculated.

In the responsibility and authority factor of the company (X1), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X.1.2, with 0.82 (very strong category), and the lowest is indicator X1.10, with 0.36 (moderate category). In the crew responsibility and authority factor (X2), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X2.1, with 0.82 (very strong), and the lowest is indicator X2.3, with 0.44 (moderate). In the resources and personnel factor (X3), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X3.1, with 0.67 (strong), and the lowest is indicator X3.4, with 0.48 (moderate). In the emergency preparedness factor (X4), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X4.1, with 0.51 (moderate), and the lowest is indicator X4.2, with 0.46 (moderate). In the ship maintenance factor (X5), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X5.3, with 0.72 (very strong), and the lowest is indicator X5.1, with 0.56 (strong). In the administration and documentation factor (X6), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X6.2, with 0.59 (moderate), and the lowest is indicator X6.3, with 0.43 (moderate). In the ship construction factor (X7), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X.7.5, with 0.61 (strong) and the lowest indicator X7.1, with 0.36 (moderate). In the ship stability factor (X8), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X.8.1, with 0.68 (strong), and the lowest indicator X8.3, with 0.55 (strong). In the safety and navigation equipment factor (X9), the highest W coefficient value is indicator X9.4, with 0.71 (very strong), and the lowest indicator X9.3, with 0.46 (strong).

The test results in Figure 3 show that the value of expert agreement on the indicators analysed is at a moderate-to-very-strong value, so it can be concluded that each indicator found in this study can be used as a measuring tool for the implementation of the SMS on Pelra vessels. Details of the concordance W coefficient value of each indicator can be seen in Figure 3.

3.4. Indicators of Findings

This research is the first part of the research on the development of a safety management system (SMS) for Pelra transportation. Pelra plays an important role in logistics distribution and the development of the small islands in the remote, underdeveloped, outermost, and border areas of Indonesia, but has not been able to fully implement SMS so that it often has accidents.

The results of this paper confirm and strengthen the findings of previous studies. Among others, research by Jinca [5], Malisan [43], Widarbowo, D. [44], and Nurwahida [45] has indicated several important factors and indicators such as shipping company factors, crew factors, maintenance and loading systems, and crew competence. Likewise, conventional ship research includes Antão, P., and Soares, C. G. [22], Pan, Y., and Hildre, H. P. [51], Bowo, L. P., and Furusho, M. [47] and Akhtar, M. J., and Utne, I. B. [52], who focus on human aspects, Ventikos, N. P et al. [53] focus on weather aspects, Zhou, X., et al. [54] on spatial risk aspects, and Bačkalov, I., et al. [28] on ship stability aspects. In fact, the ISM Code regulations and the Minister of Transportation Regulation No. PM 45 of 2012 have regulated ship safety, especially convention ships. However, the application of these rules has experienced obstacles because the characteristics of Pelra are not the same as those of conventional ships.

The findings of this paper not only adopt indicators from previous research and ISM Code rules and Minister of Transportation Regulation No. PM 45 of 2012, but also bring up several new indicators that, according to experts, can be used in the assessment of Pelra sea transportation vocational training. There are 44 indicators consisting of 9 factors, including the company’s responsibility and authority factor (X1), which includes 11 indicators, the crew’s responsibility and authority factor (X2), which includes 6 indicators, the human resources and personnel factor (X3), which includes 4 indicators, the emergency preparedness factor (X4), which includes 3 indicators, the ship maintenance factor (X5), which includes 3 indicators, the administration and documentation factor (X6), which includes 3 indicators, the ship construction factor (X7), which includes 6 indicators, the ship stability factor (X8), which includes 4 indicators, and the safety and navigation equipment factor (X9), which includes 4 indicators. Based on statistical tests, all of these indicators have a mutual influence on Pelra sea transportation, with an agreement value from expert consensus between moderate (good enough) to very good. The naming of each indicator can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3.

4. Conclusions

The safety aspect in the sea transportation system is a non-negotiable obligation, including traditional shipping such as Pelra. The traditional management of Pelra management is one of the reasons why the Pelra safety management system (SMS) has not been implemented, in addition to the absence of specific regulations on SMS on Pelra vessels. This research contributes to the finding of indicators that can be used to assess the implementation of SMS on Pelra ships. The consensus results from experts in the field of shipping safety found 9 factors described in 44 assessment indicators. The distinguishing factor of this research from previous research is the existence of new indicators used, especially related to technical aspects in the form of ship construction, ship stability, and safety and navigation equipment. The research gap in the Pelra vessel safety management system can be minimised by accommodating the findings and indicators in this study, which are expected to have implications for reducing the incidence of Pelra vessel accidents in Indonesia.

The current safety management system, especially in Indonesia, is still limited to the organization and documentation system that enables the crew to implement the safety management policy. However, ideally SMS should include policy systems, information and reporting systems, operational systems, risk management systems, monitoring systems, maintenance systems, and training systems. Therefore, with the inclusion of several technical factors found in this study as indicators of SMS assessment of Pelra vessels, it is expected to produce a more comprehensive SMS towards safety culture in the maritime sector.

This research has limitations from the subjectivity of experts who provide the answers. However, each answer has been tested with non-parametric statistics, so it can be used as a basis that the indicators found are valid. Furthermore, the results of this study will be the basis for the development of Pelra marine transportation SMS policies in Indonesian waters, with further research conducted on how much these factors affect SMS on Pelra so that policies can be prepared based on priority handling.