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Article

Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Sustainable Behavior for Their Mitigation: The Example of Montenegro

Faculty of Philosophy, University of Montenegro, 81400 Niksic, Montenegro
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2023, 15(13), 10165; https://doi.org/10.3390/su151310165
Submission received: 8 May 2023 / Revised: 21 June 2023 / Accepted: 25 June 2023 / Published: 27 June 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Food, Insecurity, Consumption and Sustainable Behavior)

Abstract

:
Today, mankind is facing one of the greatest challenges detrimental to its well-being, even its survival—climate change. Given that scientists agree that climate change is caused by humans, efforts are being made to change human behavior in order to avoid any tragic consequences. Research indicates that people are more likely to practice sustainable behavior to act on climate change if they are convinced that it actually exists and that it is predominantly caused by human activity. In this context, we have tried to determine what attitudes toward climate change the citizens of Montenegro (declaratively the first ecological country in the world) have and what is their assessment of the importance of sustainable behavior in terms of limiting energy consumption. In order to answer these questions as accurately as possible, it was necessary to make a comparison with other countries where the indicated phenomenon was the subject of research. For this purpose, we used data from the last round (2021) of the European Social Survey (ESS), in which 25 countries participated. The data were obtained by means of a rigorous and standardized collection strategy, ensuring their validity and reliability. The results show significant differences between the countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, and Montenegro. The citizens of post-socialist countries display significantly more skepticism toward climate change than those in Western Europe. Furthermore, the citizens of Montenegro are even more skeptical than the average resident of post-socialist societies. The results also show that the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens toward climate change are influenced by some demographic and socioeconomic variables (level of education and material standard), as well as certain value patterns, which we obtained by using Schwartz’s value model.

1. Introduction

At the beginning of the 21st century, Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen famously stated that “It seems appropriate to assign the term ‘Anthropocene’ to the present, in many ways human-dominated, geological epoch, supplementing the Holocene—the warm period of the past 10–12 millennia,” [1]. The Anthropocene is a widely used concept devised by Paul Crutzen and Eugen Stoermer [2] that indicates that many critical geological processes have radically changed solely due to the actions of humans on Earth. Among them, climate change is particularly significant in terms of its consequences. In its 2014 report, The International Panel on Climate Change points out that the temperature rise, which it claims is almost entirely the result of human activity, must be limited to 2 °C, as this is the upper limit that humans can withstand and adapt to [3]. Given that the overwhelming majority of scientists agree that climate change is caused by humans [4], efforts are being made to change human behavior to avoid tragic consequences. To this end, the Paris Agreement [5] states that complete changes in how energy is produced and used are necessary to mitigate climate change. Given that most countries have signed the Paris Agreement, they have set themselves the task of acting in the direction of mitigating global climate change. However, the effects of individual countries differ significantly in this area.
When considering the performance of different countries in mitigating climate change, we should look at various aspects. The focus should not be only on the actions of the government and other institutions; it is necessary to take into account the general public’s views on climate change. In order to tackle the problem of climate change, an analysis of the economy, social organization, and collective attitudes and values in a specific society is necessary. In particular, the importance of public support for a shift toward sustainable behavior and supporting measures that will lead to the mitigation of climate change should be examined because the willingness of the general public to take appropriate action is crucial for the effectiveness of measures taken to this end [6,7].
Numerous studies show that an adequate understanding of climate events on Earth affects the attitudes and concerns of citizens [8,9]. Numerous studies indicate that people are more willing to act sustainably, including addressing climate change, if they believe that it actually exists and is predominantly caused by human activity. On the other hand, a lack of understanding of climate change and its causes contributes to the strengthening of skeptical attitudes toward this phenomenon. Such a lack of understanding has been shown to be a significant obstacle to support mitigating climate change [10]. Some researchers point to a widespread decline in public concern for climate change and interest in this type of environmental problem [11]. However, numerous studies have also shown significant variations between different countries regarding understanding and concern for climate change [12,13,14].
For this reason, it is essential to analyze the attitudes that influence environmental behavior, the public’s perceptions of climate change, and how individuals perceive their role in impacting the environment, particularly since there are almost no similar studies in Montenegro. This is the first study that analyzes the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens toward climate change and the causes of its occurrence, relying on ESS research, which provided us the opportunity to compare the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens with those from other European countries. In addition, our goal was to analyze the connection between the respondents’ sociodemographic characteristics, as well as the value patterns obtained by using the Schwartz scale, with their attitudes toward climate change. The obtained results could help decision-makers to more effectively direct their national policies toward those categories of citizens who show the highest level of skepticism toward climate change. This would enable them to achieve the best possible results in terms of mitigating the consequences of climate change.

1.1. Demographic, Socioeconomic, and Value Correlates of Attitudes toward Climate Change

1.1.1. Demographic Factors

Although numerous surveys have been conducted recently on citizens’ attitudes toward climate change, many questions remain unanswered. These include a lack of understanding of the causes of this phenomenon and pronounced cross-national differences in citizens’ perceptions of climate change. For this reason, it is vital to determine which determinants increase beliefs in the existence of climate change and anthropogenic factors that cause it and determinants that support skeptical climate change attitudes. Considering different demographic and socioeconomic determinants and prevailing value patterns, we can identify citizens who believe in climate change and are worried about its negative consequences and those who deny changes in nature or their negative impact on nature.
In numerous studies, gender has been shown to be a variable that significantly influences the attitude toward climate change, primarily in terms of the greater willingness of women to accept the reality of the harmful effects of climate change, as well as the willingness to engage in sustainable behavior [15,16,17]. Women show a higher level of concern for environmental problems, which is often explained by value differences that are characteristic of genders (for example, women tend to display more altruism than men) [18].
Age also plays a significant role in attitudes toward environmental problems. Usually, older respondents are more skeptical and suspicious about this issue [19,20]. Age differences in attitudes toward climate change are mainly explained by different levels of integration into the existing social system [21]. As a result, there are different levels of motivation to maintain the existing social order. Given that older people could lose more due to possible changes undertaken toward environmental conservation, such changes are less acceptable to them [13]. One explanation behind age differences can be values [22] since values are a significant determinant of environmental behavior [13,17]. R. Inglehart emphasizes the connection between age and values, stating that value variations at a particular point in time according to age groups result from generational effects [23]. E. Tjernström and T. Tietenberg cite one practical reason as a possible cause of lower interest in the environmental problems of the elderly. Specifically, a significant time is needed for the consequences of climate change to manifest, so there is a high probability that the elderly will not be able to experience those consequences [24].
Research also shows that the place of residence also affects the attitudes of citizens toward environmental problems; urban residents are more likely to be concerned about climate change than those who live in rural areas [24]. Such results are usually explained by the lower level of education of residents from rural areas and thus by the lower level of knowledge and understanding of environmental problems [25].

1.1.2. Socioeconomic Factors

Education also proved to be a significant variable determining the attitude toward environmental issues. We find this in a large majority of research that examined environmental attitudes at the individual level. For example, Torgler and Garcia-Valinas [26] found that those with higher educational levels expressed a higher level of concern for environmental problems, which could be due to a better knowledge of this issue and, therefore, an increased understanding of scientific explanations of climate change [13]. Those unfamiliar with the dangers of climate change are less concerned about its consequences and thus less prepared for activities aimed at mitigating climate change consequences [24].
Economic status is another variable that affects citizens’ attitudes toward climate change and environmental problems in general. Research shows a positive correlation between income level and the level of engagement in environmental protection [27]. Such results may be interpreted using Inglehart’s theory of post-materialism [28]. Individuals with a higher income level can satisfy their material needs and turn to post-materialist values, including protecting nature [13]. In the context of this theory, Christiane Lübke states that people can only pay attention to a certain number of events that they perceive as a threat. Therefore, those facing economic problems may be unable to pay attention to climate problems [14]. For this reason, the citizens of more economically developed countries are more oriented toward environmental problems than those who prioritize economic issues [29].

1.1.3. Value Orientations

In addition to socioeconomic factors, various value patterns have also shown a strong influence on the perception of climate change [17,19,26,30,31]. Taking into account that values are the central motivators of our beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, it is reasonable to expect that differences in value patterns affect attitudes toward climate change, as well as the willingness to behave in a way that will lead to the mitigation of harmful consequences [17].
In the research on the connection between value patterns and attitudes toward climate change and environmental issues in general, Schwartz’s model of basic human values was mainly used [13,17,32,33,34]. Shalom Schwartz sees values as beliefs related to desirable ultimate goals, states, or behaviors. As such, they are the most significant part of culture because they show us what is more or less desirable in society. These values are further reflected in institutional frameworks, on norms that shape the rules of behavior in everyday life [35]. Schwartz sets off from the assumption that values are goals related to three universal human needs: biological needs, needs of social interaction, and survival and welfare needs in a group. From the 3 basic needs, he draws 10 value types that, when graphically represented, produce a form of a circle: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction [36]. According to Schwartz, this model is valid for all cultures because they are all based on one or more of the three universal requirements of human existence—the primary needs of individuals as biological organisms, established social interactions, and the social needs of the group. However, people have these values expressed to different degrees and thus hierarchically organized differently in different value systems. Value systems reflect differences in the value priorities of individuals, i.e., the importance that individuals attach to certain types of values. Each individual has a characteristic hierarchy of values that determines his or her behavior. In Swartz’s schematic circular representation of values, the values compatible in terms of motivational goals are placed next to each other (e.g., tradition, security, conformism). In contrast, motivationally opposed values are placed opposite (e.g., tradition is opposed to stimulation). It should also be emphasized that with a greater distance among the value positions in the circle, their motivational similarity decreases (e.g., there is a greater similarity between conformism and security than between conformism and independence).
Taking into account the 10 mentioned values, the author assumes a dynamic relationship between them and creates a two-dimensional model whose dimensions are:
  • Self-transcendence (encompasses universalism and benevolence and reflects the acceptance of others and concern for their well-being) versus self-enhancement (which encompasses achievement, power, and hedonism and signifies the attainment of personal success and domination over others);
  • Openness to change (related to the values of independence, stimulation, and hedonism, which implies freedom of thought and action and a tendency to change) as opposed to the conservatism of traditional relations (security, conformity, and tradition) [37].
According to Schwartz, the relationship between conflict and compatibility remains cross-culturally the same; thus, he speaks of a theory of universal character. This proposition is confirmed by numerous cross-cultural studies of various social groups, on over 95% of the sample from more than 40 countries [38].
Generally speaking, in the context of research on attitudes toward climate change, the model of self-transcendence/self-enhancement was the subject of much more scientific attention than the model of openness to change/conservation. The obtained results mainly show that individuals with more pronounced values of self-transcendence tend to be more concerned about climate change, while those with dominant values of self-enhancement are more prone to expressing skeptical attitudes toward environmental issues [13,17,39]. The second model (openness to change-conservation) has not received much scientific attention. However, some studies indicate that the greater presence of openness to change is associated with the greater expression of concern for climate change than is the case with conservation [17]. In addition, other studies indicate a link between traditional values and denial of climate change [40].

1.2. The National Peculiarities of Montenegro as a Post-Socialist Society in the Context of Attitudes toward Climate Change

Montenegro joined the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by succession in 2006, and on 27 January 2007, it became a non-Annex-1 party to the Convention. With the goal of 30% GHG emission reduction by 2030, the Parliament of Montenegro adopted the Law on Ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2017, thus confirming the INDC submitted to the UNFCCC in September 2015. Montenegro is an EU candidate country, and as such, it is obligated to transpose the EU climate and energy policy into its legislation [41].
The national strategy for climate change until 2030 is a crucial instrument on the public policy agenda for climate change management in Montenegro. It renders the government legally obliged to act against climate change in an integrated and multisectoral manner while respecting the international obligations undertaken under the UNFCCC. The strategy sets out the vision that by 2030 Montenegro will be able to adapt to the negative effects and promote low-carbon sustainable development. The strategy is heavily focused on legislative compliance with the framework of the EU in the field of climate change [41]. Furthermore, in 1991, Montenegro adopted a declaration pronouncing the country an ecological state. Thus, declaratively, Montenegro became the world’s first ecological country; it did so normatively by incorporating the mentioned provision into its Constitution. For more than three decades, the term “ecological state of Montenegro” has been an essential phrase in the public discourse in the country. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the issues concerning sustainable behavior and attitudes toward climate change would have particular weight in a state that has defined itself as ecological.
However, the Report of the European Commission (EC) on the progress in Montenegro’s accession to the European Union shows that Montenegro has made little headway in the areas of environment and climate change. One of the critical objections is the lack of political priority and limited awareness of the requirements in the environment and climate [42].
The research study by Rohrschneider and Miles shows that in other post-socialist countries, commitment to the environment has been pushed aside on account of other political priorities. Political parties in these societies treated environmental issues as marginal and provided primacy to economic problems [43]. The high level of unemployment and enormous economic problems experienced by post-socialist countries during the transition can explain why environmental issues were less important to their citizens and political parties [44].
Considering the economic conditions in post-socialist countries, especially in Montenegro, which has one of Europe’s lowest GDP per capita [45] it has been believed that environmental and climate change issues have little influence on voter support. As a result, there was no social basis for establishing an adequate relationship between parties and voters based on solving environmental problems; the link is thus present to a much lesser extent in Montenegro than in the countries of Western Europe [43]. Studies also show that in comparison to Western societies, the public in post-socialist countries has a lower level of understanding and concern about climate change [13,46,47].
These trends in post-socialist societies can be interpreted in the context of Inglehart’s theory of post-materialist values. Namely, Inglehart [48] relying on Maslow’s [49] hierarchy of human needs, distinguishes between material and post-material values. People with satisfied material needs can rise to a higher-needs level, which he defines as post-material values. The care for the environment falls precisely within the post-material value domain. This interpretation suggests that environmental issues can become a priority only in economically affluent societies. Therefore, in developing countries, which are still far from achieving economic security, there are no prerequisites for developing post-material values, including pro-environmental attitudes and behavior [24].

Study Aims

The present study has two fundamental aims. One is to determine the differences in the perception of climate change between Montenegro and other countries covered by the ESS research and the differences in assessing the importance of energy consumption in managing climate change. The second aim of this study is to determine the impact of specific demographic and socioeconomic factors (gender, age, city size, and income), as well as the role of value patterns (established by Schwarz’s value model) in the perception of climate change and assessment of the readiness of Montenegrin citizens to limit their energy consumption. Relying on Poortinga et al. (2019), we will too take that the perception of climate change implies climate change beliefs and concerns.
We set out to test the following hypotheses:
H1. 
Relying on Inglehart’s theory of post-materialist values and studies that analyzed this phenomenon in post-socialist societies [13,45], we assume that the citizens of Montenegro are more skeptical of climate change and the efforts for its mitigation compared to the citizens from Western European countries (we use the term to mark the countries that were not part of the Socialist Block).
H2. 
Building on previous studies [17,24], we expect that in Montenegro, women, younger people, more educated, with higher incomes, and those who live in the urban areas have less skeptical attitudes toward climate change and are more concerned about the consequences of climate change and more convinced in the importance of energy consumption in climate change.
H3. 
Finally, having in mind that Schwarz’s theory has proved universal in numerous cross-cultural studies [38] we assume that its application to the Montenegrin data would confirm the results obtained by the authors who studied the same phenomenon in other countries [13,17]. These studies indicate that the citizens who prominently display self-transcendence values express pro-environmental attitudes toward climate change and its mitigation procedures more than those who predominantly display other value patterns.

2. Methodology

2.1. Sample Characteristics

We used data from the European Social Survey (ESS). ESS is an international survey research implemented every other year since 2001 in over thirty European countries. Its goals are monitoring and interpreting the changing attitudes and values of the European public. Montenegro joined the project in 2018. In 2021, the 10th round of research, besides Montenegro, included 24 countries.
The sample is representative and includes persons over 15 years of age (no upper age limit was set). The participants were selected by strict random choice at each phase. The total sample for the 25 countries we considered in this paper was 52,219, while the number of respondents who participated in the Montenegro research was 1278.

2.2. Measures

2.2.1. Dependent Variables

We assessed the perception of climate change based on the following questions: Do you think that climate change is caused by nature, man, or both? The answers to this question range from Completely due to natural processes (1) to Completely due to human activity (5). This question also contained the response modality I don’t think climate change is happening (55). The answers to the question To what extent do you feel personally responsible to try to reduce climate change? varied from 0 (not at all) to 10 (to a great extent). For the question How concerned are you about climate change?, the answer can range from not at all concerned (1) to extremely concerned (5).
The assessment of the importance of sustainable behavior, in terms of limiting energy consumption in order to mitigate the consequences of climate change, was analyzed based on the question: Now imagine that a large number of people limited their energy consumption. In your opinion, how likely is it that climate change would be reduced in this way?, the answers to this question can range from 0 (not at all likely) to 10 (extremely likely).

2.2.2. Independent Variables

To measure the values, we used the Schwartz scale, which contains 21 statements. Then, by grouping, we came up with ten variables, each composed of two statements (with the exception of universalism, which consists of three statements). The variables were named as follows: universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction.
Finally, we grouped the stated values into four value patterns: self-transcendence (includes universalism and benevolence and reflects the acceptance of others and concern for their well-being) versus self-enhancement (which includes achievement, power, and hedonism and denotes the achievement of personal success and dominance over others); openness to change (related to the values of self-direction, stimulation, and hedonism, which implies freedom of thought and action and a tendency to change) versus conservation (security, conformity, and tradition).
We examined the following socioeconomic variables: gender (50.7% male, 49.3% female), age (the average age of 55.1), education (the highest percentage has completed high school, 63%), place of residence (65.6% lives in a city, 34.4% in the countryside), and monthly income (the highest percentage has monthly income in the range of 300 to 600 euros, 41.8%).

2.2.3. Statistical Analysis

The data from the sample we used were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), version 25. We used the following data analysis procedures: chi-square test, mean, standard deviation, correlation (Spearman’s rho), and ANOVA.

3. Results

3.1. Cross-National Differences in the Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Limiting Energy Consumption

Table 1 provides an overview of perceptions of climate change and its causes. The results indicate a general agreement among the European public on the reality of climate change. This is regardless of the country and part of Europe they live in since less than 1% of citizens claim that climate change does not exist. However, when it comes to the causes of climate change, the results are different. Although scientists agree that human activity causes climate change, there are significant variations in citizens’ answers regarding this issue depending on the country in which the research was conducted. The majority of citizens of Western Europe (57.4%) accept scientific facts and believe that man is the main cause of climate change. This percentage is significantly lower (p < 0.001) (Table A1 in Appendix A) in post-socialist societies and amounts to 40.9%. However, it is noticeable that the percentage of citizens of Montenegro who see human action as the cause of climate change is far below the average in former socialist societies at merely 29%. This percentage is the lowest among all countries analyzed. That man and nature are equally responsible for climate change is claimed by 35.9% of citizens living in Western European countries and 47.9% of those from post-socialist countries. Compared to other national public, Montenegrin citizens are again most likely to choose this answer, with 56.5% believing that humans and nature cause climate change equally.
The percentage of respondents who claim that climate change is caused mainly or entirely by the activity of nature is relatively low (7.8%). However, even here, there are specific between-country differences. The average percentage of respondents from Western countries who are convinced of the natural causes of climate change is 6.1%, while in post-socialist countries, it is slightly higher and amounts to 10.7%. On this issue, Montenegro also deviates from the post-socialist countries, with a percentage of 13.1%. After North Macedonians (18.9%), Montenegrin citizens are the second most likely (13.1%) to deny the impact of anthropogenic factors on climate change.
The differences in the perception of climate change and the causes of their occurrence among the countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, and Montenegro proved to be statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level (Table A1 in Appendix A).
Table 2 shows the distribution of responses related to the assessment of citizens’ personal responsibility for climate change, the level of concern, and the importance of limiting energy use in mitigating climate change. Comparing the assessment of personal responsibility for climate change in the countries of Western Europe and the post-socialist societies, we notice a significant difference in the mean values. Namely, for citizens in Western European countries, this value is 6.57, while it is significantly lower (p < 0.001) for the countries of the former socialist bloc, with a mean of 5.41. In Montenegro, citizens display the lowest level of perception of personal responsibility (M = 4.07) among all countries in the sample. Analysis of variance indicated that all the mentioned differences between the Western countries, post-socialist countries, and Montenegro are statistically significant (Table A2 and Table A3 in Appendix A).
The levels of concern for the consequences arising from climate change also differ between the two mentioned groups of countries. In this case, the mean value is also higher for the Western European countries (3.31) than for the post-socialist societies. Again, Montenegro displayed a level of concern (3.09) lower than the average of former socialist societies. Comparing all countries, we see that only the citizens of Slovakia (2.85) and Estonia (2.99) are less concerned about the consequences of climate change than Montenegrin (the results of the analysis of variance are shown in Table A2 and Table A3 in Appendix A).
In order to assess the extent to which citizens believe in the possibility of mitigating climate change by reducing energy use as a form of sustainable behavior, we analyzed the answers to the question: “Now imagine that a large number of people limited their energy consumption. In your opinion, how likely is it that climate change could be reduced in this way?” We could not analyze this question for all 25 countries that participated in the research, as it was included in the questionnaires of 19 countries. The citizens of Western Europe (6.03) are more convinced that by limiting the use of energy, we can act toward mitigating the consequences of climate change than those from the countries of the former socialist bloc (5.59). Like the other issues we analyzed, Montenegro (4.98) was below the average compared to Western European countries and post-socialist societies. This time again, compared to individual countries, Montenegro came among the last. Only the citizens of North Macedonia (4.65) showed a lower belief that climate change would be reduced if many citizens decided to limit energy consumption. Analysis of variance again indicated statistically significant differences between the countries of Western Europe, the post-socialist countries, and Montenegro (Appendix A). The first hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

3.2. Correlates of Perceptions of Climate Change and the Importance of Energy Restrictions among Citizens of Montenegro

Numerous pieces of literature on the perception of climate change have contributed to obtaining a comprehensive insight into how different individuals see climate change. Considering demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and value orientations, it is possible to obtain the profiles of individuals who express more pro-environmental attitudes and those who are more reserved when it comes to the perception of climate change. We examined to what degree the citizens of Montenegro fit into the already identified profiles of determinants of environmental attitudes and behavior.
In the case of Montenegrin citizens, gender did not prove to be a variable that significantly discriminated the respondents, whether concerning the perceptions of causes of climate change, concern for the consequences, or assessment of personal responsibility and reduction in climate change through limiting energy consumption. We can see that the links in all four questions are nonsignificant, in line with studies where gender did not significantly impact the perception of citizens [13,26].
Age is not linked to perceptions of climate change. However, it is a significant correlate when assessing personal responsibility and concern, although this relationship is relatively weak. As we see in Table 3, the concern for the consequences of climate change increases with age (r = 0.164, p < 0.01); on the other hand, the older respondents are less convinced that they are responsible for the existing climate changes (r = −0.168, p < 0.01).
In previous studies, educational level, in most cases, has proven to be a significant determinant of respondents’ attitudes toward climate change, although not in some studies [26]. In our case, the relationship between the level of education and the perception of climate change causes is not strong (r = 0.034, p > 0.05). In addition, education did not significantly affect the feelings of personal responsibility for reducing climate change (r = 0.044, p > 0.05). However, regarding the climate change concern, the relationship with the level of education was significant and stronger (r = 0.226, p < 0.01). Education also significantly influences the citizens’ beliefs of the importance of limiting energy consumption for mitigating climate change (r = 0.219, p < 0.01).
The available income is a variable that, in most studies, significantly determines citizens’ beliefs concerning climate change [13,17]. Although our research also confirmed this, the correlations were not strong. Namely, the correlation between income and the understanding of the causes of climate change was nonsignificant (r = −0.019, p > 0.05). However, a positive correlation was obtained for all other outcomes we examined. Individuals with higher income accept personal responsibility for climate change to a greater extent (r = 0.237; p < 0.01), are more concerned (r = 0.235; p < 0.01), and to a greater extent acknowledge the importance of limiting energy consumption for climate change mitigation (r = 0.247; p < 0.01).
Some research studies have found the settlement size to be a significant determinant of climate change perception [46]. In our study, perceived causes of climate change and the assessment of the importance of environmentally friendly behavior were nonsignificant, but we did find a significant impact on personal responsibility (r = 0.139; p < 0.05), as well as climate change concern (r = 0.193, p < 0.01).
Considering the obtained results, our second hypothesis is partially confirmed.
Given that numerous interdisciplinary studies have identified a significant influence of human values on climate change attitudes and behavior, we examined to what extent values influence the attitudes of the citizens of Montenegro.
Specifically, individuals who express self-transcendence value are more likely to seek the causes of climate change in humans (r = 0.207, p < 0.01). They are more concerned about the consequences of climate change (r = 0.171; p < 0.01) and are more convinced that limiting energy consumption can contribute to mitigating climate change (r = 0.196; p < 0.01). However, regarding personal responsibility for climate change, a negative correlation with this value pattern was obtained (r = −0.199; p < 0.01). Our results largely align with the findings of numerous other authors [13,17,31].
The value of self-enhancement also follows the trend found in most previous research studies [13,17,31]. We found no significant correlation between this value pattern and attitudes toward climate change. We could single out a negative correlation with anxiety, primarily because of statistical significance and not because of the strength of the correlation (r = 0.088; p < 0.01). Openness to change showed no significant association with the assessment of the causes of climate change and personal responsibility for the consequences of climate change. However, this relationship is significant when it comes to concern about climate change (r = −0.186; p < 0.01), where a negative correlation emerged, and when it comes to beliefs in the importance of energy restrictions (r = 0.164; p < 0.01).
The analysis of the influence of conservation value showed deviations compared to most previous research. Namely, a greater representation of traditional values was previously found to contribute to more skeptical attitudes toward climate change [40]. In our case, it mostly proved to be a correlate of pro-environmental attitudes. Individuals who display more pronounced conservation values tend to see the causes of climate change in human activity (r = 0.215; p < 0.01) and are more convinced of the importance of energy restrictions (r = 0.245; p < 0.01). Conservation does not show a significant link with concern for climate change, but it is negatively linked to personal responsibility (r = −0.107; p < 0.01).
The obtained results suggest that the third hypothesis is also partially confirmed.

4. Discussion

In recent decades, climate change has become one of the most severe problems of the global environmental crisis and one of the biggest threats to our known life. Since the 1980s, there has been increasing evidence that society affects the global environment, so today, scientists agree that humankind is the main cause of climate change. The consequences are increasingly evident and becoming more dangerous in many parts of the world. Montenegro is no exception. In the last 20 years, the adverse effects of climate change have been felt several times in the form of severe droughts, floods, and higher air temperatures [50]. However, regardless of scientific facts and evidence, some individuals are skeptical about climate change, and their numbers vary from country to country. Since the perception of climate change is related to climate change mitigation behavior and to engagement for the environment generally [6,7], it is imperative to determine whether there are significant between and within-country differences in public perceptions.
We first compared perceptions of climate change between post-socialist countries, countries of Western Europe, and Montenegro, a post-socialist society and declaratively the first ecological state in the world. Comparing the views on climate change between the countries of Western Europe and the post-socialist countries, we notice statistically significant differences between these two groups on all the outcomes considered. Namely, the obtained results suggest a significantly greater awareness of the causes, personal responsibility, and concern for climate change among the citizens of the Western European countries than among those from the former socialist bloc. The same differences were detected regarding the belief that limiting energy consumption leads to climate change mitigation. Even though more than three decades have passed since the collapse of the socialist system, the results indicate persistent differences between the two groups of countries. Other researchers have detected similar between-country differences [13,46], where environmental skepticism was significantly more common in the countries of the former socialist bloc than in the countries of Western Europe. However, we should emphasize the paradoxical situation in Montenegro. Although it was the first country in the world to declare itself an ecological state, its citizens express the most skeptical attitudes toward climate change, significantly more likely than the average post-socialist citizen. For example, 57.4% of Western Europeans claim that man is the sole culprit for climate change; in post-socialist societies, 41% agree. In Montenegro, however, only 29% are convinced of climate change’s scientifically proven anthropogenic causes.
The obtained results can be interpreted in the context of Inglehart’s post-materialist theory.
It highlights value change from prioritizing goals such as acquiring material goods, economic growth, consumption, and security toward post-materialist values. These include an emphasis on subjective satisfaction, the satisfaction of intellectual needs, self-expression, quality of life, and pro-ecological attitudes and behavior [51,52]. Therefore, the main determinants of attitudes toward climate change and environmental problems, in general, are related to economic growth, living standards, and the values they condition. Franzen and Meyer [28] similarly interpret the relationship between economic wealth and awareness of climate change. They argue that individuals in economically developed countries are more concerned about climate change because they do not have (such high levels of) “other problems”. However, for citizens in low- and middle-income countries, income improvement is the primary goal. In terms of GDP per capita, Montenegro ranks among the lowest of the European countries included in our sample, with only Serbia and North Macedonia falling behind it. Taking GDP into account, there seems to be a link between the level of economic wealth of a country and the perception of climate change by its inhabitants.
In addition to economic wealth as the basis of different perceptions of climate change from country to country, some authors emphasize the role of political factors. Rohrschneider and Miles [43] state that in post-socialist societies’ political life, environmental topics are significantly less prevalent than in Western European countries. This is because voters in post-socialist societies vote for parties based on their economic, not environmental, orientations. Considering the numerous economic problems (unemployment, low living standard), it is quite clear why parties in these societies do not primarily connect with their voters through environmental issues and therefore do not focus on environmental problems in their bid to win over voters [43]. In its report [42], the European Commission also points out the lack of political priority as one of the main problems Montenegro faces in implementing environmental protection and climate change tasks.
Taking into account the normative acts in the field of climate change adopted in Montenegro so far, the objections of the European Commission, and the results of this research, it may be argued that the state’s strategies on environmental protection are merely a political choice that was solicited by the requirements for joining the EU.
Given that Montenegro belongs to the countries with the highest level of public skepticism toward climate change, we have tried to determine which factors cause such attitudes in the present study. Previous studies have shown that several factors contribute to the different perceptions of climate change, including demographic, socioeconomic, and personal values. The question is whether some of the factors above similarly affect the formation of the attitudes of the citizens of Montenegro toward climate change.
The results suggest that none of the sociodemographic variables impacted the attitudes related to the causes of climate change. Not even education was found to be a prominent variable, despite our expectation that citizens with a higher level of education are more familiar with scientific facts about the causes of climate change. Some variables have shown inconsistencies concerning their impact. Oddly enough, the older respondents expressed greater concern about climate change than the younger ones. Starting from the fact that far-reaching consequences of climate change can be foreseen in the future, we expected that the younger respondents would be more worried, as reported in some previous studies [13,15,53]. Our findings are significant for another reason; in the future, the younger generations are the ones who will play a key role in mitigating the anthropogenic causes of climate change.
We expected that education would contribute to a more extensive knowledge of issues related to climate change and therefore be positively related to pro-environmental attitudes, as many studies have shown [13,17,24]. Such results were also characteristic of the citizens of Montenegro. The more educated are more concerned about climate change and are more convinced that reducing energy consumption can lead to mitigating the consequences of climate change.
Past literature tends to indicate a positive link between higher income and the expression of pro-ecological attitudes [13,17,54]. Similar results were obtained for citizens of Montenegro. Those with higher incomes are more likely to accept personal responsibility for climate change, are more concerned, and perceive to a greater extent the importance of limiting energy consumption to mitigate climate change. In addition to Inglehart’s post-materialist theory, Maslow’s theory of needs [49] can be useful when analyzing the obtained result. When citizens’ basic needs are satisfied, including economic security, people strive to satisfy higher-level needs, such as aesthetic ones. Environmental protection is a higher-order aesthetic need that contributes to people’s greater concern for climate change [26].
In addition to demographic and socioeconomic factors, research has also shown the importance of values for forming attitudes toward climate change [13,17,31]. Using Schwartz’s value model, we examined the influence of values on the environmental attitudes of Montenegrins. Extensive research has shown that self-transcendence values stimulate the adoption of pro-environmental attitudes [55]. Our results show this is also the case among Montenegrins. Values supporting collective interests over individual interests predict pro-ecological attitudes and behavior.
The influence of the values of conservation proved to be particularly interesting. While this value pattern was previously found to be associated with skeptical climate change attitudes [40], it seems to have the opposite effect among the citizens of Montenegro. That is, we found a positive correlation between conservation values and emphasizing the anthropogenic causes of climate change, as well as beliefs that limiting energy consumption will contribute to mitigating the consequences caused by climate change. This surprising finding may be attributed to cultural specificities characteristic of the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe [56]. In Eastern European countries, the value of universalism (one of the values that make up the pattern of self-transcendence) is highly compatible with security (a value that is an integral part of the pattern of conservation). Our results differ from the previous research, which did not find a link between the value types representing universality and security. Given that compatibility between these value patterns was demonstrated only in Eastern European countries, this relation may be caused by specific sociopolitical circumstances. According to Schwartz, this kind of value structure in Eastern European societies is a possible reflection of the lifestyles of socialist regimes that influenced the cultural formation of this type of value structure [56]. This assertion is also supported by the correlation result we obtained for Montenegro; namely, self-transcendence displayed the most positive correlation with conservation (r = 0.842; p < 0.01), confirming the strong connection between these two value types.

5. Limitations

Our research has several limitations. First, we could not compare attitudes in different periods because Montenegro was not part of the previous ESS research that included environmental topics. Therefore, we could not assess whether there was an increase in skeptical attitudes in the last years. The limitation of our study is also the type of instrument used. Namely, attitudes toward climate change could be assessed with a more instrument consisting of complex summation scales. In addition, preliminary regression analysis results indicated that the proportion of variance explained by the predictors in the model was very low (6%), so we did not employ multiple regression to predict individual determinants. Finally, future research on Montenegrins’ attitudes should use longitudinal panel data, as cross-sectional data used in our study precluded identifying causal mechanisms.

6. Conclusions

Climate change and human influence on the climate have intrigued both the specialist and the lay public for a long time. We examined climate change perceptions among citizens in 25 European countries included in the ESS dataset. We mainly aimed to determine the perceptions of climate change by the citizens of Montenegro compared to other European countries. Montenegrin citizens are in last place in terms of expressing pro-environmental attitudes. The results indicate major problems faced by Montenegrin society. They refer to understanding the causes of climate change, perceptions of personal responsibility, and the importance of sustainable behavior. It seems that environmental mindfulness has not taken root in the declaratively ecological country of Montenegro. The country, nonetheless, follows the trends of the EU countries in terms of adopting normative acts related to climate change. It is, therefore, necessary to take steps that would contribute to increasing pro-environmental attitudes among Montenegro’s citizens and would ultimately impact their behaviors and decisions concerning climate change. Our findings on demographic, socioeconomic, and value-based correlates of climate change attitudes could help decision-makers target the skeptic groups through effective national policies in Montenegro.
In order to obtain a more complete picture of the perception of climate change by the citizens of Montenegro, it is necessary to conduct longitudinal research, which would allow us to assess whether there was an increase in skeptical attitudes toward climate change in a certain period or whether their frequency decreased. In addition, further work is needed on the empirical evaluation of the relationship between different indicators and coping strategies as a response to climate change.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, G.Ć.; methodology, N.K.; formal analysis G.Ć. and R.Š.; software R.Š.; writing G.Ć. and N.K.; supervision P.Ž. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

The data was obtained from Euriopean Social Survey; “In accordance with the ESS ERIC Statutes (Article 23.3), the ESS ERIC subscribes to the Declaration on Professional Ethics of the International Statistical Institute”.

Data Availability Statement

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Chi-square: Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both.
Table A1. Chi-square: Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both.
Climate Change Caused by Natural Processes, Human Activity, or BothTotal
Entirely and Mainly by Natural ProcessesAbout Equally by Natural Processes and Human ActivityEntirely and Mainly by Human ActivityI Don’t Think Climate Change Is Happening
CountryCountries of Western Europe196811,49319,72226533,448
6.1%35.9%57.4%0.6%100.0%
Post-socialist countries15997828672822716,382
10.7%47.9%40.9%1.3%100.0%
Montenegro160688353171218
13.1%56.5%29.0%1.4%100.0%
χ2 = 1728.131; p < 0.001
Table A2. One-way ANOVA—countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, Montenegro.
Table A2. One-way ANOVA—countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, Montenegro.
Sum of SquaresdfMean SquareFSig.
To what extent feel personal responsibility to reduce climate changeBetween Groups18,625.81829312.9091365.9510.000
Within Groups344,392.39850,5136.818
Total363,018.21650,515
How worried about climate changeBetween Groups264.3352132.167151.0780.000
Within Groups44,712.44951,1100.875
Total44,976.78451,112
Imagine large numbers of people limit energy use, how likely reduce climate changeBetween Groups650.5002325.25055.7630.000
Within Groups61,604.97110,5625.833
Total62,255.47110,564
Table A3. Multiple comparisons—countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, Montenegro.
Table A3. Multiple comparisons—countries of Western Europe, post-socialist countries, Montenegro.
Dependent Variable(I) Country(J) CountryMean Difference (I–J)Std. ErrorSig.95% Confidence Interval
Lower BoundUpper Bound
To what extent feel personal responsibility to reduce climate changeCountries of Western EuropePost-socialist countries1.116 *0.0250.0001.061.18
Montenegro2.445 *0.0760.0002.272.62
Post-socialist countriesCountries of Western Europe−1.116 *0.0250.000−1.18−1.06
Montenegro1.328 *0.0780.0001.151.51
MontenegroCountries of Western Europe−2.445 *0.0760.000−2.62−2.27
Post-socialist countries−1.328 *0.0780.000−1.51−1.15
How worried about climate changeCountries of Western EuropePost-socialist countries0.135 *0.0090.0000.110.16
Montenegro0.276 *0.0270.0000.210.34
Post-socialist countriesCountries of Western Europe−0.135 *0.0090.000−0.16−0.11
Montenegro0.141 *0.0280.0000.080.21
MontenegroCountries of Western Europe−0.276 *0.0270.000−0.34−0.21
Post-socialist countries−0.141 *0.0280.000−0.21−0.08
Imagine large numbers of people limit energy use, how likely reduce climate changeCountries of Western EuropePost-socialist countries0.395 *0.0490.0000.280.51
Montenegro0.985 *0.1230.0000.701.27
Post-socialist countriesCountries of Western Europe−0.395 *0.0490.000−0.51−0.28
Montenegro0.589 *0.1250.0000.300.88
MontenegroCountries of Western Europe−0.985 *0.1230.000−1.27−0.70
Post-socialist countries−0.589 *0.1250.000−0.88−0.30
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

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Table 1. Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both.
Table 1. Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both.
CountryEntirely and Mainly by Natural ProcessesAbout Equally by Natural Processes and Human ActivityEntirely and Mainly by Human ActivityI Don’t Think Climate Change is Happening
Belgium11.7%45.9%40.8%1.7%
Switzerland6.4%37.6%55.7%0.3%
Finland5.3%38.9%55.7%0.1%
France4.2%40.1%55.6%0.2%
Greece5.4%35.0%58.5%1.1%
Iceland6.1%38.3%55.4%0.1%
Italy8.0%33.2%57.9%0.9%
Netherlands5.1%38.8%56.1%0.0%
Norway7.7%39.9%52.3%0.1%
Portugal5.5%41.9%52.4%0.2%
Austria4.6%29.7%64.3%1.4%
Germany4.6%29.7%64.7%1.0%
Spain4.2%26.5%68.4%0.9%
Sweden6.1%27.4%65.6%0.9%
Countries of Western Europe total6.1%35.9%57.4%0.6%
Czechia11.6%46.9%39.2%2.2%
Estonia9.0%55.4%35.3%0.3%
Croatia6.1%49.0%44.8%0.1%
Hungary6.9%48.8%44.1%0.2%
Lithuania12.7%46.0%39.0%2.3%
North Macedonia18.9%44.7%35.3%1.2%
Slovenia4.7%53.6%41.8%0.0%
Slovakia7.9%44.2%44.3%3.6%
Poland9.4%43.9%45.0%1.7%
Serbia9.9%47.4%41.1%1.6%
Post-socialist countries total10.7%47.9%40.9%1.3%
Montenegro13.1%56.5%29.0%1.4%
Table 2. Perception of personal responsibility and concern for climate change, and assessment of the importance of limiting energy consumption to reduce climate change.
Table 2. Perception of personal responsibility and concern for climate change, and assessment of the importance of limiting energy consumption to reduce climate change.
(Mean Scores and Standard Deviations)
CountrySample SizeTo What Extent Feel Personal Responsibility to Reduce Climate ChangeHow Worried About Climate ChangeImagine Large Numbers of People Limit Energy Use, How Likely Reduce Climate Change
NMSDMSDMSD
Belgium27184.872.8853.110.9305.162.797
Switzerland15237.281.9913.320.8956.282.281
Finland15776.842.3723.190.8386.362.107
France19777.492.0603.280.9176.182.202
Greece27995.542.1153.200.9356.001.861
Iceland9036.752.3933.050.9476.142.450
Italy26405.912.4113.240.8965.682.337
Netherlands14706.662.0423.310.9135.912.173
Norway14116.862.0333.210.8556.082.195
Portugal18386.772.5363.540.8516.532.381
Austria20036.442.4573.570.911
Germany87256.752.3523.610.897
Spain22837.192.4173.580.817
Sweden22876.652.3093.100.920
Countries of Western Europe total33,3516.572.3123.310.8946.032.278
Czechia24764.352.8873.151.1185.092.643
Estonia15425.532.8712.990.9055.182.489
Croatia15925.533.0453.401.0246.162.513
Hungary18495.802.3383.380.7836.012.301
Lithuania16596.092.6563.190.9745.612.512
North Macedonia14294.282.9883.311.0094.652.709
Slovenia12526.422.6273.490.8716.412.444
Slovakia14185.022.5382.850.9405.622.222
Poland20656.512.6503.210.846
Serbia15054.583.4483.390.952
Post-socialist countries total18,8685.412.8043.230.9425.592.477
Montenegro12784.072.6693.090.9424.982.315
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between the relevant variables for Montenegro.
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between the relevant variables for Montenegro.
12345678910111213
1. Climate change caused by natural processes, human activity, or both (1–2 natural, 3 human and natural activity, 4–5 human activity)10.301 **0.384 **0.359 **−0.005−0.0270.0070.034−0.0190.207 **−0.024−0.0260.215 **
2. To what extent feel personal responsibility to reduce climate change (0 not at all to 10 a great deal) 10.328 **0.461 **0.0290.164 **−0.139 *0.0440.137 **−0.199 **−0.022−0.007−0.107 **
3. How worried about climate change
(1 not at all worried to 5 Extremely worried)
10.267 **−0.018−0.168 **−0.193 **0.226 **0.1350.171 **−0.186 **−0.093 **0.037
4. Imagine large numbers of people limit energy use, how likely reduce climate change (0 not at all likely to 10 extremely likely) 10.0140.0450.0230.219 **0.147 **0.196 **0.164 **0.0740.245 **
5. Gender (1 male, 2 female) 10.175 **−0.109 **0.026−0.0220.077 **−0.056 *−0.086 **−0.001
6. Age 10.0010.399 **0.372 **0.084 **0.309 **0.405 **0.047
7. Domicile, respondent’s description
(1 city or town, 2 country village)
1−0.137 **−0.125 **0.103 **0.0470.0400.165 **
8. Highest level of education 10.470 **0.214 **0.220 **0.290 **0.150 **
9. Household’s total net income, all sources 10.213 **0.179 **0.213 **0.178 **
10. Self-transcendence values 10.349 **0.317 **0.842 **
11. Self-enhancement values 10.827 **0.372 **
12. Openness to change values 10.312 **
13. Conservation values 1
Spearman’s rho ** Correlations is significant at the level <0.01, * Correlations is significant at the level <0.0.
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Ćeranić, G.; Krivokapić, N.; Šarović, R.; Živković, P. Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Sustainable Behavior for Their Mitigation: The Example of Montenegro. Sustainability 2023, 15, 10165. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151310165

AMA Style

Ćeranić G, Krivokapić N, Šarović R, Živković P. Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Sustainable Behavior for Their Mitigation: The Example of Montenegro. Sustainability. 2023; 15(13):10165. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151310165

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ćeranić, Goran, Nataša Krivokapić, Rade Šarović, and Predrag Živković. 2023. "Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Sustainable Behavior for Their Mitigation: The Example of Montenegro" Sustainability 15, no. 13: 10165. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151310165

APA Style

Ćeranić, G., Krivokapić, N., Šarović, R., & Živković, P. (2023). Perception of Climate Change and Assessment of the Importance of Sustainable Behavior for Their Mitigation: The Example of Montenegro. Sustainability, 15(13), 10165. https://doi.org/10.3390/su151310165

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