Antecedent Configurations of ESG Disclosure: Evidence from the Banking Sector in China
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
I want to congratulate the authors on an interesting paper, easy to read and well documented and properly designed from a methodological point of view.
A few small observations, which do not essentially affect the quality of the work:
-I understand that formulating some research hypotheses is more difficult in such type of analysis, but at least some research questions could be asked (?).
- The ESG disclosure score of 41,205 is not commented on at all. How is it? I believe that a deeper analysis of this variable is necessary to put the obtained results in a certain context. Maybe it could be applicable to other variables as well.
-How many banks were in the initial sample? The paragraph on the sample rather skips the steps taken to reach the 33 banks in the final sample.
- Why is the year 2021 (or even 2022) not included in the analysis? There is no data available or what is the explanation? A question arises here: could the results be significantly different with a larger sample?
- A minor mistake on line 376: the mean BSO in table 3 is different than in the text!
I think that the main drawback of the paper is the impossibility of generalizing the results (also discussed as a limit of the paper), a fact that reduces the usefulness of the results. Another setting could possibly give very different results. Also, a larger sample could significantly change the results. Unless it is realistically impossible, I advise you take 2021 and 2022 into consideration in your analysis.
Good luck!
Author Response
Dear Reviewer 1,
Thank you very much for your time involved in reviewing the manuscript and your very encouraging comments on the merits.
Comments:
I want to congratulate the authors on an interesting paper, easy to read and well documented and properly designed from a methodological point of view.
General response:
We also appreciate your thoughtful and comprehensive feedback. These comments are valuable and helpful for improving our study. We have tried our best to address the issues raised by you. Below we provide detailed responses corresponding to your original comments in italic font and then present our responses to the comments. The revised places are marked in red font.
Comments 1:
-I understand that formulating some research hypotheses is more difficult in such type of analysis, but at least some research questions could be asked (?).
Response 1:
Thank you for the suggestion. We now make our research question more explicit (see details in line 91-94 of the revised manuscript).
Therefore, our study attempts to explore the combined effect of firm attributes and board characteristics on ESG disclosure in Chinese listed banks. Namely, our research question is set up as follows: which configurations of firm attributes and board characteristics can equally lead to high ESG disclosure levels?
Comments 2:
-The ESG disclosure score of 41,205 is not commented on at all. How is it? I believe that a deeper analysis of this variable is necessary to put the obtained results in a certain context. Maybe it could be applicable to other variables as well.
Response 2:
Thanks for pointing this out. We have included some explanations and discussion on the ESG disclosure of 41,205 and other variables as follows (see details in line 854-929 of the revised manuscript), and the same for other variables as follows:
Our analysis focused on a sample of data from 2020 on 33 Chinese listed banks. An overview of the relevant variables is provided in Table 3. The mean score for ESG disclosure was 41.205 out of 100, which suggests the average level of ESG disclosure for A-share listed banks is relatively high in China and that most of these banks are willing to disclose higher levels of ESG information. According to Bloomberg database, the mean value of ESG disclosure for all the A-share listed companies with data (i.e., 1371) in 2020 is 33.850. This indicates that the ESG disclosure practices in the banking sector are better than average. The highest ESG disclosure score (59.320) was achieved by China Merchants’ Bank, while the lowest score was that of the Qingdao Rural Commercial Bank, at 21.698. The mean values of bank size (BAS) and state ownership (BSO), as shown in Table 3, were 12.352 and 0.182, respectively. There were 6 large state-owned commercial banks and 14 cross-listed banks (BCL). The summary statistics of board characteristics display that the average board size (BOS) was 13 directors, of which about 38.8% were independent board members (BID), although only 15.9% of members were female (BGD). Finally, six of our sample banks established a board CSR committee (CSRC). We can see that the average board independence score is much higher than that of gender diversity. To be specific, nearly half of members of the sample banks’ boards are independent directors, while there are only several female directors or even no female director in most boards. This indicates that the board compositions of these banks have not focused on gender diversity and that gender inequality in the workplace still exists in China.
Comments 3:
-How many banks were in the initial sample? The paragraph on the sample rather skips the steps taken to reach the 33 banks in the final sample.
Response 3:
Sorry for the confusion. We add the specific number of initial sample (see details in line 632-636 of the revised manuscript).
Our initial sample included all the 42 commercial banks listed on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange due to data availability. Currently, only listed banks issue separate ESG reports regularly, thus the ESG disclosure data of these A-share listed banks are relatively available. After eliminating the cases with missing data, the final sample contained 33 listed banks with data from the year 2020.
Comments 4:
- Why is the year 2021 (or even 2022) not included in the analysis? There is no data available or what is the explanation? A question arises here: could the results be significantly different with a larger sample?
Response 4:
Thank you for the suggestion. It’s mainly because of the data availability. We wanted to include 2021 even 2022 in the analysis, but the data for 2022 is unavailable and relevant data for 2021 have several missing values. Especially, considering that 33 listed banks are already not a big sample, we think it is better not to reduce more. Data availability is actually a big challenge, maybe it can be a future direction to replicate this study and explore the results with a larger sample when the data is available. Because of limited number, we tried to go deeper checking the detailed reports to explore “why” these results, our study thus can provide some preliminary results and insights for further research.
Comments 5:
-A minor mistake on line 376: the mean BSO in table 3 is different than in the text!
Response 5:
We apologize for the mistake in the text and thank you for your careful review. We have corrected the mean value of BSO in the text as the right number in table 3. (i.e., 0.182).
(see details in line 920 of the revised manuscript)
Thanks again for your review efforts and valuable suggestions. We hope you will find this revised version satisfactory.
Best regards,
The Authors
Reviewer 2 Report
Article title: Antecedent Configurations of ESG Disclosure: Evidence from the Banking Sector in China
After reviewing this paper, I find that this paper has some interesting ideas, but it needs to be corrected as follows:
In the introduction, the authors presented quite well. However, the authors should clarify more clearly what the research objectives are and why they are important. In addition, this section should also introduce the research context in China.
In the literature review, authors need to examine relevant theories before reviewing empirical evidence from previous studies. In addition, the authors need to update new studies related to this topic such as Nguyen and Dang (2023); Birindelli et al. (2018); Nguyen (2020)…
The authors need to clearly explain the data collection and processing procedure. Why focus only on listed banks? With only 33 banks, I think this data is too little.
Variables need to be explained more clearly. Example A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is state-owned. How to know a bank is state-owned (owning how much %?)
Table 3 needs to add the number of observations for each variable.
The analysis of the results is too sketchy, the authors seem to read the results from the tables without in-depth analysis. This section should show how the research objectives are addressed.
The conclusion is unnecessarily long. This section should summarize the research results, and suggest implications, limitations, and future research directions. The current version contains a lot of content that overlaps with the above sections.
There are many spelling and grammatical errors, the authors should review.
References
-Nguyen, Q. K. (2020). Ownership structure and bank risk-taking in ASEAN countries: A quantile regression approach. Cogent Economics & Finance, 8(1), 1809789.
-Birindelli, G., Dell’Atti, S., Iannuzzi, A. P., & Savioli, M. (2018). Composition and activity of the board of directors: Impact on ESG performance in the banking system. Sustainability, 10(12), 4699.
-Nguyen, Q. K., & Dang, V. C. (2023). The impact of FinTech development on stock price crash risk and the role of corporate social responsibility: Evidence from Vietnam. Business Strategy & Development.
English is not good enough
Author Response
Dear Reviewer,
Thank you very much for your time involved in the reviewing the manuscript and your kind comments.
Comments:
After reviewing this paper, I find that this paper has some interesting ideas, but it needs to be corrected as follows.
General response:
We appreciate your thoughtful and comprehensive feedback. These comments are very valuable and helpful for improving our study. In the revision, we have tried our best to address all the issues raised by you. Below we provide detailed responses corresponding to your original comments in italic font and then present our responses to the comments. The revised places are marked in red font.
Comments 1:
In the introduction, the authors presented quite well. However, the authors should clarify more clearly what the research objectives are and why they are important. In addition, this section should also introduce the research context in China.
Response 1:
We have tried to clarify more clearly about the research objective and its importance, and also introduce the research context in China. The revised version is as follows (see details in lines 27-176 of the revised manuscript):
ESG responsibilities have emerged as crucial concerns in recent decades. Increasingly, various stakeholders are eager to find out about companies’ ESG practices through public ESG disclosure [1]. With respect to this matter, relevant policies and legislations have been implemented to guarantee stakeholders’ access to vital information for evaluating companies’ ESG practices. For instance, the European Union Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (2022/2464/EU) came into effect on 5 January 2023, requiring around 50,000 companies in the EU to disclose information on ESG practices.1 However, ESG disclosure remains voluntary in some developing countries. In spite of this, many companies actively publish ESG reports and use disclosure as a business strategy in order to gain organizational legitimacy and fulfill the expectations of various stakeholders [2].
Still, ESG disclosure varies across different firms. Previous empirical research has investigated various determinants of ESG disclosure [3,4,5,6], with firm-level characteristics emerging as the primary variables responsible for discrepancies in ESG disclosure [7,8]. The body of research on corporate governance (CG), especially board characteristics and ESG disclosure, has grown rapidly in recent years [9,10,11,12,13]. Among the characteristics scrutinized by these studies, board size, independence, gender diversity and a firm’s other visible attributes (e.g., firm size, state ownership, and cross-listing) are widely discussed as determinants of ESG disclosure, but findings remain inconsistent. According to Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. [14], the contrasting results could be caused by the symmetric methods that only examine the net impact of either a single firm or board characteristic on ESG disclosure. To resolve such linear correlations, it is advised to utilize fsQCA as this novel methodology considers the intricate interplay among antecedents and asymmetrical relationships [15,16]. In accordance with Cucari [17], more and more scholars are endorsing the application of fsQCA in CG and ESG research. For instance, some research applies fsQCA to explore different corporate governance configurations that lead firms to produce better ESG practices [14,18]. Nevertheless, the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees does not receive much attention. Additionally, the samples used are concentrated in developed countries and non-financial industries. However, the financial sector plays a vital role in driving ESG practices through financing sustainable projects and engaging with companies on ESG issues. This is especially true for developing countries, where banks are the primary source of financing [19]. For example, banks can promote the ESG practices of their supply chain enterprises through ESG-related capital bonds and loans. Given China’s ascent as the world’s second-largest economy and the substantial environmental pollution it generates, combined with social and governance problems that usually characterize emerging markets, investigating ESG disclosure within a Chinese context is thus both crucial and urgent. This is particularly relevant as the Chinese government has placed considerable emphasis on advancing ESG improvements in the banking sector over the preceding decade. For instance, the China Banking Regulatory Commission has released documents requiring banks to incorporate elements of ESG into their management systems and strengthen their communication with stakeholders through ESG disclosure [19]. Additionally, regulators place great importance on the role of board members and mandate their active involvement in ESG disclosure. However, ESG practice remains at its nascent stage in China and little is known about the effect of these regulations. In addition, the mechanisms by which bank attributes and board characteristics influence ESG practices are not yet well understood in the Chinese context. Therefore, analyzing the ESG disclosure practices of the banking sector in China can provide some insights in order to help managers perform better and ultimately contribute to achieving the SDGs.
Therefore, our study attempts to explore the combined effect of firm attributes and board characteristics on ESG disclosure in Chinese listed banks. Namely, our research question is set up as follows: which configurations of firm attributes and board characteristics can equally lead to high ESG disclosure levels? Based on the premise that various combinations of causal factors can bring about a specific result [15], we assert that several possible combinations of firm attributes (e.g., firm size and state ownership) and board characteristics (e.g., board size and independence) can lead to high ESG disclosure levels. In order to realize the research goal, we analyze a sample of 33 Chinese listed banks in the year 2020, utilizing data from the Bloomberg and China Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases. Our fsQCA results illustrate that the level of ESG disclosure is determined by the interactions of firm and board characteristics. We identify four specific configurations of these characteristics that are constantly associated with high ESG disclosure levels. These configurations illustrate various conditions in which bank attributes such as size and cross-listing are most salient to high ESG disclosure levels, whereas board independence (BID) only exerts a weak positive or negative influence on ESG disclosure. Moreover, corporate social responsibility committees (CSRCs) contribute positively to high ESG disclosure levels in large state-owned banks, while board gender diversity (BGD) plays a negative role in most configurations.
Our study therefore makes valuable contributions to the existing literature in multiple aspects. First, although the literature concerning the determinants of ESG disclosure is not scarce, our research synthesizes and extends theory in this field by using fsQCA to examine four distinct configurations of bank attributes and board characteristics that have an equal likelihood of resulting in high levels of ESG disclosure. In this regard, we shift focus from the net effect of firm-level determinants on ESG disclosure to the combinations of firm and board characteristics in order to advance the comprehension of the complex relationship between CG and ESG disclosure. Second, we highlight the strategic role of the board in promoting ESG disclosure of different kind of banks. For instance, while state-owned banks may have significant advantages in various resources for achieving high ESG disclosure scores, non-state-owned banks can also attain similar outcomes by adding more directors to their boards. Additionally, we emphasize the increasingly important role of CSR committees in consulting on and supervising ESG issues, and examine their effectiveness versus other characteristics in enhancing ESG disclosure in large Chinese state-owned banks. Finally, our study also addresses the gaps identified in the literature due to a focus on the ESG practices of banks in developed countries. As ESG is still at an early stage in China, these findings provide valuable insights for researchers and regulators in guiding different kind of banks to strengthen their ESG disclosure practices through varying board compositions.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the pertinent literature, while Section 3 describes the methodology employed. Section 4 outlines the analysis of the results obtained. Finally, Sections 5 provides a comprehensive discussion, and Section 6 draws conclusions, proposes suggestions for potential future topics, and evaluates the limitations our research.
Comments 2:
In the literature review, authors need to examine relevant theories before reviewing empirical evidence from previous studies. In addition, the authors need to update new studies related to this topic such as Nguyen and Dang (2023); Birindelli et al. (2018); Nguyen (2020)…
Response 2:
Thanks for pointing this out. We have included the relevant theories and updated new studies to this topic as you suggest. The revised version is as follows (see details in lines 183-194, 222-223, 230-231 and 538-540 of the revised manuscript):
A considerable amount of the literature has been focused on strengthening our comprehension of the factors impacting ESG disclosure [3,4,5,6]. However, the conclusions of these studies remain inconsistent. Considering that firm-level attributes are the primary factors accounting for variations in ESG disclosure [7,8], we discuss the visible attributes and board characteristics of firms below. In order to better comprehend the relationship between these firm-level characteristics and ESG disclosure, it is beneficial to investigate relevant theories such as legitimacy theory, the resource-based view and agency theory. Generally speaking, legitimacy theory illustrates that ESG disclosure is published by firms in order to gain social acceptance and establish legitimacy [2]. Specifically, the resource-based view believes that firms own diverse resources that can be transformed into distinct capabilities and competitive advantages [20]. Accordingly, firm heterogeneity may result in different levels of ESG disclosure. Additionally, agency theory suggests that effective corporate governance can better supervise and motivate managers to maximize the interests of shareholders and mitigate agency problems [21]. For instance, boards with features such as independent directors and supervision committees can decrease information asymmetries and agency costs by monitoring ESG practices effectively.
Additionally, Nguyen and Dang [24] find that the role of ESG disclosure is getting more significant in small firms.
Furthermore, risk-taking may be increased in these institutions due to higher proportions of state ownership [27].
Birindelli et al. [51] shows an inverted U-shape relationship between female directors and banks’ ESG performance.
Comments 3:
The authors need to clearly explain the data collection and processing procedure. Why focus only on listed banks? With only 33 banks, I think this data is too little.
Response 3:
Sorry for the confusion. We have tried to explain more clearly about the data collection and processing procedure. The reason for focusing only on listed banks is mainly due to data availability. In current situation, not all firms publish ESG reports regularly in China. Besides, even all the listed banks in China published their ESG reports, some of the ESG disclosure data in Bloomberg are missing. We agree with you that 33 banks are not big samples, but it is just right to use fsQCA (fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis) to conduct the research as this method is suitable for small and medium-sized samples. According to Ragin [55], in QCA, having a number of conditional variables within the range of 4–7 is appropriate for medium-scale samples (10-40).
The revised version is as follows (see details in lines 632-636 of the revised manuscript):
Our initial sample included all the 42 commercial banks listed on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange due to data availability. Currently, only listed banks issue separate ESG reports regularly, thus the ESG disclosure data of these A-share listed banks are relatively available. After eliminating the cases with missing data, the final sample contained 33 listed banks with data from the year 2020.
Comments 4:
Variables need to be explained more clearly. Example A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is state-owned. How to know a bank is state-owned (owning how much %?)
Response 4:
Sorry for the confusion. We have tried to explain the variables more clearly. We define state-owned banks as commercial banks that are directly controlled by the state (i.e., Ministry of Finance and Central Huijin Investment Ltd). Generally, the state holds more than 50% share.
The revised version is as follows (see details in table 2 and line 756-763 of the revised manuscript):
Table 2 Measurements of the conditional variables
|
Conditional variables |
Label |
Operational definition |
|
Bank Size |
BAS |
The natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank [58] |
|
Bank State Ownership |
BSO |
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is directly controlled by the state, or 0 otherwise [59] |
|
Bank Cross-listing |
BCL |
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank simultaneously listed on the other stock exchange, or 0 otherwise [60] |
|
Board Size |
BOS |
The total number of directors on the company’s board [18] |
|
Board Independence |
BID |
The percentage of independent directors on the board [11] |
|
Board Gender Diversity |
BGD |
The percentage of female directors on the board [30] |
|
CSR Committee |
CSRC |
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank has a board CSR committee, or 0 otherwise [56] |
We used ESG disclosure scores from the Bloomberg database that focus on the disclosure level or transparency of companies’ ESG information based on their ESG reports and public official websites. The Bloomberg database gives equal weight to each pillar of ESG and provides an in-depth exploration of ESG issues and sub-issues, covering more than 900 data points on various ESG metrics. For example, the environmental pillar includes issues like air quality, climate change, GHG emissions management, ecological impact, water management, etc. These issues consist of several sub-issues that aggregate associated ESG data fields. Additionally, Bloomberg transforms the practical and industry-specific context into ESG scores. The scoring scale spans from 0.1 for companies with limited ESG data disclosure to 100 for those disclosing all data points collected by Bloomberg, encompassing a broad range of scores. Thus, it has found extensive usage in the research [4,11,56].
Comments 5:
Table 3 needs to add the number of observations for each variable
Response 5:
Thank you for the suggestion. We have added the number of observations for each variable. The revised version is as follows (see details in table 3 of the revised manuscript):
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
|
Variables |
Obs |
Mean |
SD |
Min |
Max |
|
ESG disclosure |
33 |
41.205 |
9.400 |
21.698 |
59.320 |
|
BAS |
33 |
12.352 |
0.681 |
11.158 |
13.523 |
|
BSO |
33 |
0.182 |
0.392 |
0 |
1 |
|
BCL |
33 |
0.424 |
0.502 |
0 |
1 |
|
BOS |
33 |
13.333 |
1.963 |
9 |
18 |
|
BID |
33 |
0.388 |
0.052 |
0.313 |
0.556 |
|
BGD |
33 |
0.159 |
0.101 |
0 |
0.400 |
|
CSRC |
33 |
0.182 |
0.392 |
0 |
1 |
Comments 6:
The analysis of the results is too sketchy, the authors seem to read the results from the tables without in-depth analysis. This section should show how the research objectives are addressed.
Response 6:
Thank you for the suggestion. We have tried to analyze the results more deeply and show how the research objectives are addressed. Maybe some of the analyses are in the Discussions section.
The revised version is as follows (see details in lines 1006-1103 of the revised manuscript):
Various combinations were produced based on the truth table so that we could further conduct a sufficiency analysis in order to generate sufficient configurations for each outcome. Table 5 presents four different configurations of firm and board characteristics that lead to high levels of ESG disclosure. According to Fiss [55], core conditions are supported by robust evidence for their association with a desired outcome, while peripheral conditions are connected to an outcome based on relatively weaker evidence. For example, BAS, BSO and BCL are core conditions in configurations 1 and 2 because they have stronger positive impacts on high ESG disclosure levels, while BID is a peripheral condition in all the configurations because it has weaker positive or negative influences on high ESG disclosure levels.
In general, our results show that four configurations of firm and board characteristics are linked to high ESG disclosure levels, with overall solution coverage and consistency at 0.556 and 0.880 respectively. In line with the work of Woodside [61], the acceptable range of overall solution coverage is between 0.25 and 0.65, while the consistency is efficient when it is above 0.74. Contrasted with the generalized results of previous studies, the results indicate that one particular board or firm attribute may have positive, negative or neutral on ESG disclosure levels. For instance, BID appears in three of four configurations predicting high ESG levels, with positive effects in configuration 2 and 4, negative effects in configuration 3, and no effect in configuration 1, respectively. Similarly, the presence of BSO (i.e., configuration 1 and 2) and absence of BSO (i.e., configuration 3 and 4) can both contribute positively to high ESG levels. CSRC has the similar effect to BSO as it was only established by large state-owned banks in 2020. In this respect, the governance role of CSRC has been proven to be effective in promoting ESG disclosure practice within large state-owned banks. However, bank size (BAS) and cross-listing (BCL) consistently contribute positively to high ESG disclosure levels, whereas board gender diversity (BGD) seems to impact ESG disclosure negatively in most configurations. Finally, no core condition exists in configuration 4, indicating that high levels of ESG disclosure can also be achieved using a combination of peripheral conditions.
Configuration 1 suggests that large, state-owned and cross-listed banks with smaller board sizes, fewer female board members and a CSR committee will have high ESG disclosure levels. Cases corresponding to configuration 1 include Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Postal Savings Bank of China (PSBC) and China Construction Bank (CCB). Similar to configuration 1, configuration 2 includes large, state-owned and cross-listed banks, albeit with larger board sizes, a relatively high percentage of independent directors and the presence of a CSR committee. The Bank of Communications (BCM) and Bank of China (BOC) are included in this configuration. Conversely, state-owned banks are not included in configurations 3 and 4, indicating that non-state-owned banks can also achieve high ESG disclosure levels through certain combinations of other characteristics. In configuration 3, BAS, BCL and BOS are core conditions that have strong positive influences on ESG disclosure levels, while other board characteristics, especially board gender diversity (BGD), impact ESG disclosure negatively. The China Minsheng Banking and China Merchants Bank fit this configuration. This means that banks with large size and cross-listing attribute are necessary to achieve high levels of ESG disclosure for they own greater capabilities and have to meet higher supervision requirement in ESG practices. Additionally, non-state-owned banks may enhance their governance in ESG disclosure by augmenting their board with additional directors in order to achieve a comparable level of ESG disclosure to that observed in state-owned banks. Nonetheless, attributes alone do not generate results since they interacted with each other, relying on a combination of other characteristics. Interestingly, all conditions in configuration 4 are peripheral, meaning that they are only linked to high ESG disclosure levels by comparatively weak evidence. Only China Everbright Bank is included in configuration 4.
Comments 7:
The conclusion is unnecessarily long. This section should summarize the research results, and suggest implications, limitations, and future research directions. The current version contains a lot of content that overlaps with the above sections.
Response 7:
Thank you for pointing this out. We have deleted some overlapped contents and revised as follows (see details in lines 1227-1540 of the revised manuscript):
Our study examines the combined effect of seven widely-discussed but controversial or newly-introduced firm and board characteristics (i.e., bank size, state ownership, cross-listing, board size, independence, gender diversity and CSR committee) on ESG disclosure within the Chinese banking sector, utilizing a configurational perspective. The results suggest that four configurations of firm and board characteristics can equally contribute to high levels of ESG disclosure. We also find that bank attributes such as size and cross-listing are the most salient factors in these configurations, but that their final impact relies on other crucial bank and board characteristics. In contrast, BID exerts only a weak positive or negative influence on ESG disclosure. Finally, CSRC contributes positively to high ESG disclosure levels, while BGD always exerts a negative effect in most configurations.
These findings have several theoretical and practical implications, as outlined below. Firstly, our research synthesizes and extends theory in this field by identifying the combined effect of firm attributes and board characteristics on ESG disclosure level from a configurational perspective. The application of fsQCA in this study addresses inconsistent conclusions in the existing literature caused by symmetrical approaches like regression analysis, which only considers linear relationships between independent variables and outcomes [14,18,54]. Secondly, this study indicates the increasingly important role of a novel type of board committee (i.e., CSRCs) in consulting and super-vising ESG issues. Aligned with previous investigations that emphasize the importance of establishing CSRCs to promote ESG performance [42,56], we observe a beneficial influence of CSRCs on ESG disclosure by Chinese large state-owned banks. Future avenues of research could examine the effectiveness and composition of CSRCs in emerging markets and could also assess the influence of complex configurations of CSRC attributes. Thirdly, unlike existing research, which focuses on the ESG disclosure practices of non-financial firms operating in developed countries, our study sheds light on ESG disclosure in the Chinese banking sector, an issue that is assuming a significant role in moving society towards a greener and more sustainable future. Given that banks have more influence on ESG disclosure in the Chinese context, regulators and policymakers in China can implement specialized policies aimed at encouraging banks to drive ESG development, not just in the banking sector but also in other industries. In this regard, model banks can formulate their own ESG assessment systems aimed at the enterprises on the capital chain in order to accelerate the speed and efficiency of ESG practices in China. Additionally, although Chinese banks are capable of attaining high ESG disclosure levels with a low level or even no representation of female directors in the configurations, it is crucial to draw attention to the fact that gender diversity is not effectively integrated within the majority of Chinese firms. Regulators and policymakers in China should reflect on gender quota acts implemented in developed countries to promote gender equality in a compulsory way.
However, like most studies, this research also has certain limitations. These offer potential avenues for future research. The fsQCA method itself has been disputed on the grounds of issues related to its calibration. When using fsQCA, the number of optional variables is limited due to the exponential growth of combinations, which may negatively impact reasoning. Future studies performed using this novel method could explore more sophisticated modes of calibration and variable selection so as to broaden the understanding of this methodology. Finally, since Chinese ESG practice is in its infancy, the availability of data on ESG disclosure is also limited. This decreases the number of cases available for study and thus limits the generalizability of our findings. Future studies can test these findings using larger samples. It would therefore be beneficial to make ESG disclosure data more comprehensively available through various institutional frameworks in order to expand the number of potential samples received from different countries. Future research could also consider different ESG disclosure measures, such as building evaluation systems.
Comments 8:
There are many spelling and grammatical errors, the authors should review.
Response 8:
We apologize for the spelling and grammatical errors. We have subscribed the MDPI English editing service to help us solve the spelling and grammatical errors. We also review after the English editing. Therefore, the English language in the revised manuscript has been carefully corrected to improve grammar and readability.
We would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all your time involved, your constructive comments, and the opportunity you provide us to improve the manuscript. We hope you will find this revised version satisfactory.
Best regards,
The Authors
Reviewer 3 Report
Thank you,
for reviewing the article. The article is written in a correct and clear way.
The considerations made in the article are important.
In the introduction, the authors clearly indicated the purpose. The literature review is correct. Research results and discussion are correctly written.
Kind regards
-
Author Response
Dear Reviewer,
Comments:
Thank you for reviewing the article. The article is written in a correct and clear way. The considerations made in the article are important.
Thank you very much for your time involved in reviewing the manuscript and your very encouraging comments.
Best regards,
The Authors
Reviewer 4 Report
The topic is relevant, the manuscript has originality, Scopus database searches are also considered, which makes it relevant and most are recent publications, and the results indicate that board characteristics linked to high levels of ESG disclosure vary by bank attributes.
Author Response
Dear Reviewer,
Comments:
The topic is relevant, the manuscript has originality, Scopus database searches are also considered, which makes it relevant and most are recent publications, and the results indicate that board characteristics linked to high levels of ESG disclosure vary by bank attributes.
Response:
Thank you very much for your time involved in reviewing the manuscript and your recognition of our manuscript.
Best regards,
The Authors
Round 2
Reviewer 2 Report
This version is good and can be published.
English is ok
