An Empirical Study of New Rural Collective Economic Organization in Alleviating Relative Poverty among Farmers

Abstract

In the context of achieving common prosperity, this article explores the implementation path of the new rural collective economic organization designed to alleviate relative poverty by improving the livelihood strategies of farmers from the perspectives of the development level, operational capability, and governance ability of collective economic organizations. The article provides empirical evidence for how the new rural collective economic organizations can optimize governance and connect with the livelihood strategies of farmers to alleviate relative poverty. The data in this article are from the “China Family Database” of Zhejiang University and the “China Family Finance Survey” of Southwest University of Finance and Economics in 2017. Based on theoretical hypotheses, the HLM model is used to empirically test the mechanism of the new rural collective economic organization in alleviating relative poverty among farmers. The results indicate that, from the perspective of the direct action path, the development level, operational capability, and governance ability of the new rural collective economic organization have a significant direct impact on alleviating relative poverty. In addition, from the perspective of cross-layer interaction paths, the development level of new rural collective economic organizations can significantly strengthen the role of family operational income in suppressing relative poverty. Operational and governance capabilities can significantly enhance the role of household transfer income in inhibiting relative poverty. Therefore, the new rural collective economic organizations should adapt to local conditions, vigorously develop advantageous industries that can provide more non-agricultural employment opportunities to increase the operational income of farmers, introduce highly educated managers, and establish a sound financial management system to ensure the expected benefits for farmers as well as increase their long-term benefits.

1. Introduction

By 2020, China had attained great achievements in building a moderately prosperous society in all aspects, and had solved the historical problem of absolute poverty. This means China’s relative poverty problem will become even more acute in the future [1]. The report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) made a significant statement that socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era, stating that the main contradiction in China has been transformed into a contradiction between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life, and established the second centenary goal of, in essence, achieving common prosperity for all the people by the middle of this century. President Xi Jinping proposed that the most arduous and burdensome task in promoting common prosperity still lies in the countryside. Therefore, an objective understanding of the current situation of agricultural development and the effective analysis of the main barriers to promoting rural prosperity among farmers is an urgent task for the achievement of rural revitalization and common prosperity [2]. In 2017, the 19th National Congress of the CPC first proposed the rural revitalization strategy, which has made “strengthening the collective economy” an important part of the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy. In 2023, the No. 1 central document of the Central Committee of the CPC also pointed out that it is necessary to

Consolidate and improve the achievements of the reform of the rural collective property rights system, build an operating mechanism with clear property rights relations, scientific governance structure, stable business operation mode, and reasonable income distribution, and explore diversified ways to develop the new rural collective economy, such as resource contract-out, property rental, intermediary service, and asset equity participation [3].

The above statement, made by the CPC, fully reflects the Party’s commitment and determination to develop the collective economy and achieve rural revitalization and common prosperity.

Since the reform and opening up, the implementation of the household contract responsibility system has liberated and developed rural productivity, achieved leapfrog development in rural areas, and helped farmers to move towards a moderately prosperous society [4]. Existing research has analyzed the marketization process of Wangjiabian Village, as an example, and found that individual farmers in underdeveloped areas lack the ability to independently enter the market, while the collective economy has the conditions to bear the costs of rural marketization in underdeveloped areas and to achieve economies of scale in underdeveloped areas. Hence, the combination of the collective economy and the individual economy is a new and effective model for rural marketization in underdeveloped areas [5]. Research on the development of rural collective economy and rural revitalization in the new era has found that the development of rural collective economy promotes urbanization and rural revitalization through large-scale production, the release of labor force, and the realization of labor capital relations [6]. Only by innovating in terms of form, management, mode, leadership, and system can we promote the new development of a rural collective economy and fully allow it to play its due role in comprehensively promoting rural revitalization [7]. In the context of achieving rural revitalization and common prosperity, the development of new rural collective economic organizations to improve the income structure of farmers has become an effective way to enhance farmers’ happiness, increase economic income, reduce relative poverty, and achieve common prosperity.

2. Literature Review

Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the development process of rural collective economic organizations has mainly gone through four stages of development: firstly, from 1949 to 1958, the initial development of rural collective economy was created in the form of rural mutual aid cooperatives; the second stage is the organizational form of the People’s Commune from 1958 to 1983, which was based on “three levels of ownership and teams”; thirdly, from 1983 to 2004, the rural collective economy entered the stage of joint production and contracting; and fourthly, since 2004, “land transfer” has led to the new development of rural collective economic organizations [8]. “Collective” is a broad concept that can be used to describe various organizations or groups, while “collective economic organization” is more specific, referring to a common economic entity whose members have common economic interests. According to the “Opinions on Steadily Promoting the Reform of Rural Collective Property Rights System”, issued by the CPC and the State Council in December 2016, the rural collective economy is defined as an economic form in which collective members utilize collectively owned resource elements to achieve common development through cooperation [9]. At present, the development of the new rural collective economy promotes urbanization and rural revitalization through large-scale production, the release of labor force, and the realization of labor capital relations [6]. Although certain achievements have been made in rural poverty alleviation, the grand goal of achieving common prosperity and rural revitalization has not yet been achieved. Empirical research on the role of new rural collective economic organizations in addressing relative poverty among farmers has practical significance.

In the process of reducing relative poverty and achieving common prosperity, the capacity of the new rural collective economic organization deeply affects a series of economic behaviors, such as village collective resource allocation, industrial development, and capital flow, directly or indirectly, causing changes in the income structure of farmers directly or indirectly. Therefore, this article mainly combines the existing literature to study the impact of the mechanism of the development level, operational capacity, and governance capacity of new rural collective economic organizations on the changes in farmers’ income structure. Firstly, the development level of income and expenditure scale of the new rural collective economic organization effectively enhances human capital, promotes industrial development and resource allocation effects, and increases the operational income of farmers. The collective economy in developed areas is more effective in connecting resources, reducing transaction costs, introducing development concepts, promoting high-quality industrial development, activating surplus labor, driving employment for impoverished people, increasing farmers’ operational income, and directly promoting farmers’ income growth [10]. The new rural collective economic organization improves the production and operation environment, enhances the high-quality development of human capital, and promotes the long-term income of farmers by increasing expenditure on public services, education, and production construction [11]. The large-scale rural collective economy is conducive to implementing labor division and specialized cooperation, improving labor productivity, better utilizing the different characteristics and advantages of natural resources, such as land, implementing the integration of the three major industries, diversifying industrial management, extending the agricultural industry chain, improving rural economic efficiency, and increasing income sources through multiple channels [12].

Secondly, the operational capabilities of new rural collective economic organizations, such as talent introduction and collective investment, provide guarantees for the long-term growth and development of the collective economy, gradually promoting the stable development of new rural collective economic organizations, and achieving long-term economic income growth for farmers. Village committee managers are the core force in the process of rural revitalization. Their political consciousness, cultural literacy, and work ability have a profound impact on collective economic governance ability and the cohesion of village-level party organizations. It is an effective way to promote rural revitalization through activating the enthusiasm of high-level village managers and improving their skills and qualities [13]. At the same time, in the process of participating in the market economy, the new rural collective economic organizations need to enhance their ability to resist risks and strengthen the collective economy, which requires more investment support from collective economic organizations and more industrial service support such as funds, technology, and resources [14]. Based on the case study of the L District in Shaanxi Province, it was found that methods, like integrating various financial support projects, giving priority to investment to collective economic organizations, and actively exploring and testing new models of agricultural financial services, improve the ability of collective economic organizations to lower natural risks and ensure the long-term effectiveness of collective economic organizations [15].

Thirdly, the governance capacity of the new rural collective economic organization, such as the dividend system and financial management, significantly affect the sense of belonging of farmers, stimulate their endogenous motivation, and enhance their transfer income. Based on the development process of the collective economy in Aojiaoshi Village and its practical exploration of promoting common prosperity among villagers, it has been found that improving the governance mechanism of the collective economy, enhancing the role of the collective economy in the field of village construction, condensing the collective centripetal force of villagers, and stimulating the endogenous driving force for comprehensive development, are important ways of achieving common prosperity for farmers and improving the well-being of villagers [16]. Establishing mechanisms for equity income distribution, dividends, interest linkage, and benefit sharing, can awaken the villagers’ sense of collective identity and belonging as well as enhance the sense of gain and happiness of the masses [17]. The new type of rural collective economy should strengthen the mechanism of interest connection between the main bodies, formulate a dividend distribution system that is in line with its own situation, and guide all villagers towards co-construction, sharing, and co-prosperity [18].

In summary, many scholars have conducted empirical research on the relationship between the new type of rural collective economic organization and rural revitalization and common prosperity using relevant theoretical analysis, micro research data, and macro statistical data. However, the following problems still remain. Firstly, when analyzing the role of the new type of rural collective economic organization in reducing relative poverty and promoting common prosperity, some scholars usually use individual cases [16,19,20] or macro statistical data [6,7]. This results in some conclusions that lack a quantitative evaluation of the poverty reduction effect of the collective economy. Moreover, the development status and external environment of each collective economic organization are influenced by multiple factors. The household conditions of farmers and the relative poverty of different villages also vary. It is difficult to accurately understand the impact of different new rural collective economic organizations on the relative poverty of farmers from a macro level alone [21]. Secondly, most of the literature focuses on the impact on relative poverty only based on the aspect of collective economic organizations on relative poverty at the level of collective economic organizations. There are a few studies that construct farmer–village domain HLM models based on nested structural relationships to test the cross layer impact of collective economic organizations on individual relative poverty [22,23,24]. The economic development of individuals and families is not only constrained by their own abilities, but also by the environment of their villages, such as village geographical environment, collective economic development, and public resources, among others. By 2020, China had fully built a moderately prosperous society, with people’s income levels continuously improving and the types of household economic income increasing. It is important to understand how the new rural collective economic organization affects individual relative poverty through household income composition. Based on the above information, it is of practical significance to deeply explore the direct and indirect impact mechanisms of the new rural collective economic organization elements on the relative poverty.

The marginal contribution of this article lies in proposing the theoretical hypothesis of a new rural collective economy to alleviate relative poverty among farmers. This article uses micro survey data from Chinese households for empirical research, which cover a wide range and are representative. We conducted model testing on micro data to quantitatively analyze the impact of collective economic organization variables on relative poverty among farmers. Based on the nested relationship of the data, the HLM model was used to study the cross-layer impact of new rural collective economic organizations on relative poverty, revealing the mechanism of rural collective economy in alleviating relative poverty among farmers, and supplementing the research methods and theoretical basis. From the perspectives of the development level, operational capacity, and governance capacity of collective economic organizations, this study examines the implementation path of new rural collective economic organizations in alleviating relative poverty by improving the farmers’ livelihood strategies. The conclusion of this research can provide empirical evidence on how new rural collective economic organizations can optimize governance and improve and alleviate relative poverty by connecting with farmers’ livelihood strategies.

3. Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypotheses

3.1. The Direct Alleviation Effect of New Rural Collective Economic Organizations on Relative Poverty

The new collective economy is a modern economic organizational form that promotes the modernization of agriculture and achieves common prosperity for farmers and rural areas [25]. The function of new rural collective economic organizations in alleviating relative poverty among farmers is mainly reflected in the combination of ways to increase farmers’ income. This article proposes to analyze the impact of rural collective economic organizations on relative poverty from three perspectives: development level, operational capacity, and governance capacity. Firstly, the development level of new rural collective economic organizations is mainly reflected in the strength of their economic development, such as total income and total expenditure scale of the collective economy. Rural collective economic organizations provide non-agricultural employment opportunities and increase villagers’ wage income through industrial integration. Under the model of “company + impoverished farmers”, farmers are often only in the lower production links of the industrial chain and have limited profits. The development of new rural collective economic organizations with good development strength forms a “community of interests” through industrial integration, creating non-agricultural employment positions through the industrial poverty alleviation model, driving impoverished households to increase income and lifting themselves out of poverty [26]. A new type of rural collective economic organization with a strong development level can effectively revitalize collective assets, promote industrial integration, and accelerate marketization, thereby increasing collective income, having the ability to assist relatively poor families, and ensuring the realization of common prosperity [20]. Secondly, the operational capabilities of new rural collective economic organizations are mainly reflected in economic decision-making abilities such as collective investment and collective debt ratio. High-level managers directly affect the operational decisions of collective economic organizations, ensuring their long-term development. The positive development state can stimulate the enthusiasm of villagers and increase their transfer income. High-quality village cadres increase farmers’ income and alleviate relative poverty by introducing external investment, providing agricultural support services, and communicating closely with government departments to improve political connections [27]. Finally, the governance capacity of the new rural collective economic organization is mainly reflected in the balance of villagers’ interests and collective interests through resident dividends and financial management, among others, which increase villagers’ transfer income effectively, improve their life quality as well as enhance their sense of belonging. With the development of the collective economy, the ways to effectively manage the relationship between farmers and other stakeholders become particularly important. The income distribution of rural collective economic organizations is the key link to realize the beneficial right and collective ownership of the collective members [28]. A reasonable equity distribution system can reduce dividend disputes and let farmers receive due benefits fairly, which is conducive to stimulating their motivation to become rich. The development of the collective economy increases the villagers’ income as well as the collective dividends of the village. Collective economic organizations should adjust land equity based on the increase or decrease in the village population to ensure the stable growth of economic income for farmers [29]. Based on the above-mentioned condition, this article proposes the first hypothesis below.

H1. 

The new rural collective economic organization can directly alleviate the relative poverty of farmers.

The economic income scale and development level of the new rural collective economic organization greatly affect its future prospects and the income structure of farmers. Large-scale collective economic organizations have stronger resource integration ability, larger business scales, and stronger risk-resistance ability. As a result, they can effectively activate idle resources, expand the development space of the collective economy, increase the operational income of farmers, and optimize their income structure [22]. Large-scale collective economic organizations are more conducive to improving the level of farmer organization, better integrating with the market, and effectively lifting famers out of poverty [23]. When rural collective economic organizations have a certain scale of industrial foundation, they can provide collective industrial employment opportunities for villagers and increase their operational income [30]. Moreover, with the increase in the village collective economic income, the disposable funds of the village collective also increase accordingly, which can provide high-quality public goods and services and improve villagers’ quality of life. However, due to weak economic strength, limited resource utilization, and small industrial scale, small-scale new rural collective economic organizations are temporarily unable to form industrial linkage to drive more low-income farmers out of relative poverty. Based on case studies, it is proposed that traditional agriculture still occupies a dominant position in some backward collective economic organizations, and the development of new business forms lags behind. Due to a shortage of funds, it is difficult to develop industries. Meanwhile, with the rise in agricultural operating costs and the fluctuations of agricultural product prices, it is difficult to ensure the continuous increase in farmers’ income [31]. Therefore, this article proposes the second hypothesis.

H2. 

There is heterogeneity in the effect of alleviating relative poverty among rural collective economic organizations of different scales.

3.2. The Cross-Level Interaction Effect of New Rural Collective Economic Organizations on the Impact of Farmers’ Income Variables on the Relative Poverty of Farmers

Developing the rural collective economy vigorously is an important basis for comprehensively promoting rural revitalization, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, and leading farmers towards common prosperity. It is also an indispensable component of China’s rural economy and a key direction for the country to succeed in “agriculture, rural areas, and farmers” [32]. The cross-level interaction of the new rural collective economic organizations on the farmers’ relative poverty is mainly reflected in two aspects: the first one is to restrain the relative poverty by influencing the operational income of peasant households and the second one is by influencing their transfer income.

The development level of new rural collective economic organizations will significantly promote the role of family operational income in suppressing relative poverty. It is difficult for individual peasant households to achieve economies of scale. Collective economic organizations achieve high efficiency, high income, and the expansion of the rural middle class through the scale and intensive operation of the collective economy [33]. The reform of the rural collective economy has a significant impact on its income structure, and indirectly promotes the operational income of rural households by improving the efficiency of scale operation and promoting non-agricultural employment [24]. Due to survival pressure and technical limitations, migrant workers in urban areas find it difficult to settle down. The new rural collective economy optimizes the allocation of labor resources, increases the employment channels for farmers at home, enhances their sense of happiness, and increases their family’s operational income [34].

The operational and governance capabilities of new rural collective economic organizations will significantly strengthen the role of household transfer income in suppressing relative poverty. The development level and governance capacity of rural collective economy largely affect its operational efficiency. Efficient operational management requires joint efforts from managers and villagers. Managers need to innovate the governance structure and operational mechanism of the new rural collective economy, maximize the enthusiasm of villagers, improve operational performance, increase collective economic income, and thus increase their income [35]. With the advancement of the collective economy, the new rural collective economic organizations have achieved high profitability. In addition to the reasonable distribution of share dividends, some surplus funds have been used for targeted poverty alleviation to increase the transfer income of impoverished households [33]. A study with the theme of “resources become assets, funds become equity, and farmers become shareholders” in Liupanshui City, Guizhou Province, found that the development of the new rural collective economy is conducive to activate limited resources, which will bring the sustainable growth of farmers’ income and increase their income channels [36]. The research group of the Economic Management Department and the Economic Management Station of the Ministry of Agriculture has found that the dividend income of farmers is growing rapidly and has become an important component of their property income [37]. Hence, this article proposes a third hypothesis.

H3. 

The new rural collective economic organization realizes the cross-level interaction influence of alleviating the relative poverty among farmers by optimizing the livelihood strategy of farmers.

4. Materials and Methods

4.1. Model Setting

4.1.1. HLM Model

In 1992, Bryk and Raudenbush proposed the Hierarchical Linear Models (HLMs). Based on ordinary linear regression analysis models, the HLM is a regression method which can simultaneously process individual- and population-level data [38]. In this study, household size, average years of education, labor burden coefficient, and per capita income at the household level belong to the first layer of data. On the other hand, the rural collective economic indicators, such as collective total income scale, collective operating income scale, whether there are dividends, and collective debt ratio, belong to the second layer of data. We aim to find the cross-level impact mechanism of the new rural collective economy at the community level on relative poverty among farmers. Due to the nested relationship between individual data and community data, the HLM model can overcome the limitations of single-layer research and solve the problem of deviation in estimating standard errors.

4.1.2. Model Settings

This article discusses the direct and indirect impact mechanisms of the new rural collective economic organization on farmers’ relative poverty. The model design includes four steps: the first step is to conduct a diagnostic test of the cross-layer impact of the new rural collective economy on farmers’ relative poverty. The second step involves examining the direct alleviation effect of the new rural collective economic organization on relative poverty among farmers, considering the constant horizontal conditions. The third step focuses on examining the cross-level interaction effect of the multivariate impact of the new rural collective economic organization on the relative poverty of farmers’ income variables, to explore the indirect impact mechanism and transmission pathway of the multivariate impact of the new rural collective economic organization on the relative poverty of farmers. The last step is to conduct a robustness test on the empirical results, this involved the use of different models, as indicated below [39].

The Zero model: this model does not include any feature variables at the community and individual levels; it only includes random intercept effects at the community level to test whether the HLM is needed.

$$\mathrm{Level}1\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$$

(1)

$$\mathrm{Level}2\text{:} {\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}$$

(2)

$$\mathrm{Overall}\mathrm{model}\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$$

(3)

where ${\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$ represents the relative poverty level of the i-th farmer in the j-th community; β_0j represents the first layer intercept, and its subscript j represents the respective intercept owned by each village collective; ${\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$ is the random variable of farmers in the first layer; ${\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}$ is the total average of all two-layer units and is a fixed parameter; and ${\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}$ is a random variable of the village collective in the second layer.

The Random intercept model: this model adds explanatory variables on the basis of the zero model, and the intercept terms of farmers’ characteristic variables vary with different communities, but the regression slope is fixed within each community.

$$\mathrm{Level}1\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}0}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$$

(4)

$$\mathrm{Level}2\text{:} {\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{0\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}$$

(5)

$$\mathrm{Overall}\mathrm{model}\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{0\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}0}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$$

(6)

where ${\mathsf{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}0}$ is the coefficient of the independent variable at the household level; ${\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$ is the variable set of household characteristics of farmers; ${\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$ is the coefficient of the variable of the new rural collective economic organization; ${\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}$ is the characteristic variable set of the new rural collective economic organization; and the variance of the new rural collective economic organization and farmers’ households is Var (μ_0j) = τ²_0j and Var ($\mathsf{\epsilon }$_ij) = σ²_ij, respectively.

The Random intercept model and random slope model: the random intercept model ignores the impact of household characteristic variables on the relative poverty of farmers, which will change with different new rural economic organizations. In order to obtain more accurate results, this article constructs a random intercept and random slope model.

$$\mathrm{Level}1\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}0}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}$$

(7)

$$\begin{gathered} \mathrm{Level}2\text{:} {\mathsf{\beta }}_{0\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{0\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}} \\ {\mathsf{\beta }}_{\mathrm{k}0}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{\mathrm{k}0}{+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}+\mathsf{\mu }}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{j}} \end{gathered}$$

(8)

$$\mathrm{Overall}\mathrm{model}\text{:} {\mathrm{Y}}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}={\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}+{{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{0\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{\mathrm{k}0}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\gamma }}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}}{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{j}}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+{(\mathsf{\mu }}_{0\mathrm{j}}+{\mathsf{\mu }}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{j}}{\mathrm{X}}_{\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}}+\mathsf{\epsilon }}_{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{j}})$$

(9)

4.2. Variable Selection

The dependent variable: the dependent variable in this article is relative poverty. In 2010, the European Commission set 60% of the median income as the relative poverty standard for European countries, and recommended using 40% and 50% of the median as reference indicators [40]. Wang Sangui [41], Li Ying [42], and others used 40% of the median disposable income of rural residents as the standard for relative poverty in rural areas. This article sets three relative poverty lines according to 40%, 50%, and 60% of the median household income per capita to explore the impact of collective economic organizations on relative poverty among farmers under different relative poverty lines [43,44]. Three relative poverty lines are also set to examine the robustness of the model. When the per capita household income is below the poverty line, the value is 1, otherwise it is 0.

Explanatory variables: (1) The core explanatory variables at the community level. The core explanatory variables at the community level are examined from three aspects: development level, operational capability, and governance level. This article selects indicators such as collective income scale, collective expenditure scale, collective debt ratio, collective investment proportion, collective organization dividends, and whether financial management is reasonable as the core explanatory variable at the community level. The classification of different types of collective economic income ranges is as follows: a community with a collective income of 0 is called a shell community, with a value of 0; a community with a collective income of CNY 0–200,000 is called a weak community, with a value of 1; and a community with a collective income of over CNY 200,000 is called a wealthy community, with a value of 2 [45]. In the questionnaire survey, the sources of community collective income are mainly from collective assets, financial subsidies or refunds from higher-level governments, donations from individuals, enterprises or other organizations, and collective operating institutions. (2) The core explanatory variables at a household level. Referring to the selection methods of existing income indicators, this article selects three income indicators from different sources as the core explanatory variables at the household level, namely household operational income, household other income, and household transfer income [46,47]. Household operational income refers to the income generated by farmers’ own production and labor capacity, mainly including gross income from agricultural product sales, income from industrial and commercial production and operation, and income from entrepreneurial projects [48]. Household transfer income refers to the income brought about by the social relation activities of farmers, mainly including cash provided by parents, parents-in-law, other relatives, non-relatives, and family income due to holidays, weddings and funerals, education, and inheritance, among others. Other household income includes income other than the above two types of income, which is mainly derived from the state, social subsidies, and other non-daily activities, including severance pay, pension, government subsidies, income from selling fixed assets, etc.

Control variables consider other factors that may affect the relative poverty of farmers and the new rural collective economic organization. Four control variables were selected at the household level, including family size, average education years, family labor burden coefficient, and improvement in living conditions. The definition of variables and descriptive statistics are shown in

Table 1. Variable definition and descriptive statistics.

Variable	Symbol	Meaning and Assignment of Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
Relative poverty line 40%	Y1	40% of the median per capita household income. Below which = 1, otherwise 0	0.2437	0.4293
Relative poverty line 50%	Y2	50% of the median per capita household income. Below which = 1, otherwise 0	0.2916	0.4545
Relative poverty line 60%	Y3	60% of the median per capita household income. Below which = 1, otherwise 0	0.3380	0.4730
Farmers’ level variables
Family size (person)	X1	Total household population	4.4329	1.9069
Average education years (year/person)	X2	Converted based on years of schooling. Never attended school = 0, primary school = 6, junior high school = 9, high school = 12, technical secondary school/vocational high school = 12, college/vocational college = 15, undergraduate = 16, master’s degree = 19, doctoral degree = 23	7.3181	2.8726
Family labor burden coefficient	X3	(Total Household Population-Number of Laborers)/Number of Laborers (15 years old ≤ Laborers ≤ 65 years old)	0.5031	0.5587
The logarithm of per capita household operational income	X4	The logarithm of per capita total operational income of households	7.8601	1.3853
The logarithm of per capita household other income	X5	Logarithm of per capita household other income	7.1843	1.2091
The logarithm of per capita household transfer income	X6	The logarithm of per capita total transferable income of households	6.8971	1.3641
Improvement in living conditions	X7	In the past two years, the overall family situation has not improved or is worse than before = 1; The overall family situation has improved compared to before = 2;	1.5754	0.4943
Community level variables
Collective operating income	V1	No collective operating income = 0; Collective operating income = 1	0.0801	0.2714
Total Collective Income Scale	V2	Collective total income = 0, with a value of 0; 0 < collective total income CNY ≤ 200,000, with a value of 1; CNY 200,000 < collective total income, with a value of 2	0.9088	0.6728
Collective debt ratio	V3	Total collective liabilities/total collective assets	0.8943	3.1179
Proportion of collective investment	V4	Collective economic investment expenditure/total community collective expenditure	0.0746	0.2102
Dividend distribution for community residents	V5	No community resident dividend distribution = 0; Dividend distribution for community residents = 1	0.2765	0.4473
Total collective expenditure scale	V6	Collective total expenditure = 0, with a value of 0; 0 < total collective expenditure CNY ≤ 200,000, with a value of 1; CNY 200,000 < total collective expenditure, with a value of 2	1.1644	0.5215
Highly educated managers	V7	No highly educated managers = 0; Highly educated manager = 1	0.3306	0.4704
Resident dividend distribution amount	V8	Amount of resident dividends distributed by collective economy	32,475.3	319,863
The logarithmic distribution of community residents’ dividends	LnV5	The logarithm of the amount of dividends distributed to residents in the collective economy	10.5981	1.9003
Reasonable financial management	V9	Respondents believe that community financial management is unreasonable = 0; Respondents believe that community financial management is reasonable = 1;	0.9131	0.2817

.

4.3. Data Source

The data in this research are mainly from the Chinese Family Database (CFD) of Zhejiang University and the China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics. This research is based on the China Family Survey. In 2017, the China Family Survey tracked approximately 40,000 households in 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions across China, except for Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The data collected in this survey, including the age structure of the sample population, urban–rural population structure, and gender structure, are consistent with the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, and its data are representative at the national, urban, and rural levels [49]. This article uses household and community survey data from a database. The household level survey data mainly include basic information on household population, assets and liabilities, expenditure and income, as well as grassroots governance and subjective evaluation. The community-level survey data mainly include respondent information, community economy, and community governance information. This article processes the samples as follows: (1) matching household and community samples for subsequent testing of the farmer–village domain HLM constructed based on the nested structural relationships; (2) excluding missing samples of core related variables [50]; and (3) excluding non-rural household registration samples and retaining rural household registration samples. Finally, 40,185 samples from 607 communities were retained.

5. Results

5.1. Diagnostic Test of the Cross-Layer Impact of the New Rural Collective Economy on Relative Poverty among Farmers

The regression results of the zero model are shown in

Table 2. Zero model estimation results.

	Y1	Y2	Y3
Fixed Effect
Constant (${\mathsf{\gamma }}_{00}$)	−1.3827 *** (0.0444)	−1.0818 *** (0.0429)	−0.8172 *** (0.0412)
Random Effect
Community Level (τ20)	1.0537	1.0034	0.9332
ICC	0.2426	0.2337	0.2210

Note: () represents standard error, while ***, respectively, represent significance levels of 1%.

. In the fixed effect, the coefficients of the three relative poverty lines are −1.38, −1.08, and −0.82, respectively, and are obvious at the 1% level, indicating that the occurrence of relative poverty is significantly negative. In the random effect, the Y1 model estimates that the variance at the household level is 3.31, and the variance at the community level is 1.05 (p < 0.001), which means that there are significant differences in the relative poverty of farmers among different communities, and this difference is caused by the differences in farmers’ characteristics and the factors in their communities. Further calculation shows that the intra-group correlation coefficient ICC_Y1 is 24.3% (ICC = τ²_0j/(τ²_0j + δ²_ij)), indicating that the relative poverty level of farmers varies according to the community in which they live. When the relative poverty line is 40%, 24.3% of the overall variation in farmers’ relative poverty level is caused by differences between communities. Similarly, when the relative poverty line is 50%, 23.4% is caused by differences between communities. When the relative poverty line is 60%, 22.1% is caused by differences between communities. With the increase in the relative poverty line, the values of the intra-group correlation coefficients continue to decrease, but are still greater than 0.059. Existing research criteria suggest that, when ICC > 0.059, the inter-group variation of the dependent variable cannot be ignored. Therefore, we should use a hierarchical linear model to further study the mechanism of collective economic organizations affecting the relative poverty level of farmers.

5.2. The Direct Alleviation Effect of New Rural Collective Economic Organizations on Relative Poverty among Farmers

The random intercept model cannot only include variables at the household level and the new rural collective economic organization level in the model, but also focus on analyzing the direct impact effects of the new rural collective economic organization variables. The model assumes that the differences in the household income of farmers come from the new rural collective economic organization in which they are living. In

Table 3. Regression results of random intercept model.

	Model A			Model B
	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3
Farmers’ Level
X1	−0.0987 ***	−0.1013 ***	−0.0876 ***	−0.0988 ***	−0.1012 ***	−0.0916 ***
	(0.0088)	(0.0083)	(0.0080)	(0.0107)	(0.0101)	(0.0096)
X2	−0.1673 ***	−0.1620 ***	−0.1669 ***	−0.1622 ***	−0.1590 ***	−0.1604 ***
	(0.0061)	(0.0057)	(0.0055)	(0.0073)	(0.0069)	(0.0066)
X3	0.4375 ***	0.4404 ***	0.4306 ***	0.4163 ***	0.4306 ***	0.4157 ***
	(0.0256)	(0.0249)	(0.0245)	(0.0308)	(0.0298)	(0.0292)
X4	−0.1735 ***	−0.19992 ***	−0.2141 ***	−0.1684 ***	−0.2061 ***	−0.2162 ***
	(0.0110)	(0.0105)	(0.0101)	(0.0132)	(0.0125)	(0.0120)
X5	−0.1992 ***	−0.1793 ***	−0.1675 ***	−0.1944 ***	−0.1825 ***	−0.1568 ***
	(0.0126)	(0.0119)	(0.0114)	(0.0153)	(0.0145)	(0.0137)
X6	−0.0804 ***	−0.0756 ***	−0.0597 ***	−0.0991 ***	−0.0843 ***	−0.0842 ***
	(0.0105)	(0.0010)	(0.0095)	(0.0128)	(0.0121)	(0.0115)
2.X7	−0.4380 ***	−0.4412 ***	−0.4264 ***	−0.3695 ***	−0.3600 ***	−0.3409 ***
	(0.0291)	(0.0275)	(0.0263)	(0.0349)	(0.0330)	(0.0314)
Community Level
1.V1				−0.4062 *	−0.2954	−0.2173
				(0.2232)	(0.2144)	(0.1973)
1.V2				0.1468	0.1410	0.1168
				(0.1222)	(0.1192)	(0.1104)
2.V2				−0.3203 **	−0.2909 **	−0.3048 **
				(0.1533)	(0.1492)	(0.1380)
V3				−0.02488	−0.0192	−0.0122
				(0.0153)	(0.0147)	(0.0135)
V4				−0.5193 **	−0.3834	−0.2521
				(0.2353)	(0.2269)	(0.2091)
1.V7				−0.2167 **	−0.2491 **	−0.2183 **
				(0.1043)	(0.1016)	(0.0939)
V8				−3.91 × 10−7 **	−4.76 × 10−7 ***	−5.08 × 10−7 ***
				(1.71 × 10−7)	(1.69 × 10−7)	(1.58 × 10−7)
Constant	3.4483 ***	3.7748 ***	3.9580 ***	3.5581 ***	3.9383 ***	4.0767 ***
	(0.1613)	(0.1534)	(0.1471)	(0.2159)	(0.2066)	(0.1956)
Random Effect
τ20j	1.0877	0.9957	0.8787	0.8889	0.8602	0.7388
ICC	0.2485	0.2323	0.2108	0.2127	0.2073	0.1834

Note: () represents standard error, while *, **, and ***, respectively, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.

, model B is a random intercept model incorporating independent variables at the community collective economic level. The model results show that wealthy villages with large-scale economic income have a significant inhibitory effect on relative poverty among farmers, while villages with small-scale economic income do not have a significant impact, which verifies hypothesis 2. The economic scale, the proportion of collective investment and highly educated managers, and the dividend distribution of new rural collective economic organizations can effectively alleviate relative poverty among farmers, which confirms hypothesis 1. Wealthy village collective economic organizations, with a collective economic income scale (V2) of over CNY 200,000, have a significant impact on the relative poverty of farmers, and are significant at the level of 5% and 10%, respectively. When the explanatory variable is the 40% relative poverty line, for every 1% increase in the total income of large-scale collective economy, the relative poverty situation decreases by an average of 0.32% units. China’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping, once pointed out that the small-scale peasant economy cannot become rich and small agriculture has little future while the collective economy is the foundation of common prosperity and the material guarantee for farmers to move towards common prosperity [51]. Collective economic organizations with large-scale income can exert the institutional advantage of concentrating their efforts to achieve more and to a greater extent, have more funds for public services to resist risks, and overcome the disadvantages of small and scattered individual strength of farmers and their low ability to resist risks.

Investment in the collective economy is conducive to improving the production and operation conditions of collective economic organizations, and is conducive to promoting the development of the collective economy [11]. Table 3 shows that the ratio of collective investment to total community expenditure (V4) has a significant effect of 5% when the relative poverty line is 40%. When the relative poverty line is 50%, it has a significant effect of 10%. When the relative poverty line is 60%, there is no significant effect. In the case of mild poverty, communities spend more funds on the construction of collective economic organizations, and combine their own advantageous resources to develop the industrial economy, which contributes to helping farmers escape relative poverty. Highly educated managers (V7) have a significant inhibitory effect of 5% on different relative poverty, and the coefficient is about −0.22, showing a strong robustness. Highly educated managers have strong market thinking and knowledge reserves, and are more likely to allocate resources to promote the development of rural industries. This shows that the direct inhibitory effect of the operational capacity of new rural collective economic organizations has a direct inhibitory effect on relative poverty. The distribution amount of resident dividends (V8) also has a significant inhibitory effect on the relative poverty of farmers, and is significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. The dividend distribution of collective economic organizations is the most direct way to increase farmers’ income, which can effectively alleviate the occurrence of relative poverty among farmers and households. In the questionnaire survey, the debt of community collective economic organizations mainly comes from public expenditures generated for community construction, such as “advance payment of community taxes”, “implementation of community large-scale projects”, “community official expenses”, and “salary payment of community staff”.

In Table 3, model A is a random intercept model that only includes independent variables at the household level. The results show that there is a strong linear relationship between the relative poverty of rural households and their family conditions. At the household level, households with higher average years of education (X2) have a lower incidence of poverty, and the three different poverty line divisions are all significant at 1%, showing strong robustness. Education cannot only improve the level of individual economies, but also stimulate their endogenous drive to lift themselves out of poverty and become rich. Poverty alleviation through education is also an essential means to overcome relative poverty in our country [52,53]. The higher the family labor burden coefficient (X3), the higher the poverty incidence rate, and all of them are significant at 1%. The larger the family labor burden coefficient, the greater the burden of raising children and supporting the elderly in the family. They cannot bring income to the family and need the care of the main labor force of the family, which will inevitably increase the economic burden on the family and increase the probability of family poverty [54]. Families with improved living conditions (X7) have a significant inhibitory effect on the occurrence of relative poverty at the 1% level. The improvement in living conditions mainly depends on the subjective evaluation of the respondents’ sense of happiness in the past two years. When the respondents subjectively feel that their life is getting better, it will enhance their confidence in having a better life in the future. A positive and optimistic attitude towards life can promote the respondents’ motivation to improve their lives, which can inhibit the occurrence of relative poverty in their families effectively. Therefore, vigorously developing infrastructure, such as healthcare and education, can effectively address the relative poverty of rural households.

5.3. Cross-Level Interaction of New Rural Collective Economic Organizations in Alleviating Relative Poverty among Farmers: Based on Income Promotion Effect

The development level of new rural collective economic organizations will significantly promote the role of family operational income in suppressing relative poverty. The model in

Table 4. Household per capita operational income: the transmission mechanism of indirect impact of community income and expenditure variables on relative poverty.

	Model C			Model D
	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Farmers’ Level
X4	−0.1793 ***	−0.1769 ***	−0.2017 ***	−0.3372 ***	−0.4064 ***	−0.4437 ***
	(0.0277)	(0.0263)	(0.0249)	(0.0493)	(0.0489)	(0.0467)
X5	−0.2199 ***	−0.2062 ***	−0.1772 ***	−0.1975 ***	−0.1805 ***	−0.1540 ***
	(0.0149)	(0.0140)	(0.0133)	(0.0154)	(0.0146)	(0.0138)
X6	−0.0969 ***	−0.0797 ***	−0.0759 ***	−0.0976 ***	−0.0838 ***	−0.0821 ***
	(0.0123)	(0.0116)	(0.0110)	(0.0129)	(0.0122)	(0.0115)
Control Variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Community Level
1.V1	−0.7890	−0.7547	−0.8546 *
	(0.5607)	(0.5127)	(0.4783)
1.V2	0.0115	0.3768	0.1683
	(0.2608)	(0.2500)	(0.2382)
2.V2	−1.2677 ***	−0.9694 ***	−1.0467 ***
	(0.3602)	(0.3428)	(0.3231)
V3	0.0835 *	0.1013 ***	0.0952 ***
	(0.0434)	(0.0384)	(0.0357)
V4				0.8860	−0.4063	−0.0170
				(0.6046)	(0.5547)	(0.5094)
1.V5	1.4260 ***	1.6819 ***	1.6277***	1.5758 ***	1.7839 ***	1.9116 ***
	(0.4088)	(0.3945)	(0.3722)	(0.4386)	(0.4252)	(0.3986)
2.V6				−2.2233 ***	−1.6862 ***	−1.4031 ***
				(0.2707)	(0.2588)	(0.2401)
1.V9				−1.3127 ***	−1.6448 ***	−1.9525 ***
				(0.4019)	(0.4006)	(0.3847)
Interaction Term
1.V1#c.X4	0.0448	0.0576	0.0829
	(0.0700)	(0.0636)	(0.0588)
1.V2#c.X4	0.0039	−0.0392	−0.0187
	(0.0332)	(0.0316)	(0.0299)
2.V2#c.X4	0.0922 **	0.0617	0.0698 *
	(0.0454)	(0.0431)	(0.0403)
c.V3#c.X4	−0.0133 **	−0.0148 ***	−0.0134 ***
	(0.0054)	(0.0048)	(0.0044)
c.V4#c.X4				−0.1686 **	0.0196	−0.0101
				(0.0765)	(0.0690)	(0.0631)
1.V5#c.X4	−0.2240 ***	−0.2683 ***	−0.2541 ***	−0.2360 ***	−0.2680 ***	−0.2812 ***
	(0.0524)	(0.0504)	(0.0471)	(0.0555)	(0.0537)	(0.0501)
2.V6#c.X4				0.2153 ***	0.1409 ***	0.1104 ***
				(0.0341)	(0.0325)	(0.0301)
1.V9#c.X4				0.1180 **	0.1605 ***	0.2095 ***
				(0.0510)	(0.0506)	(0.0482)
Constant	3.8207 ***	3.8850 ***	4.1328 ***	5.2690 ***	5.8722 ***	6.1316 ***
	(0.2650)	(0.2525)	(0.2409)	(0.4193)	(0.4156)	(0.3988)
Random Effect
τ20j	0.9827	0.9633	0.8311	0.9085	0.9704	0.7568
ICC	0.2300	0.2265	0.2017	0.2164	0.2278	0.1870

Note: () represents standard error, while *, **, and ***, respectively, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.

measures the moderating effect of the development level, operational capacity, and governance capacity of the new rural collective economic organization on the relationship between the per capita operational income of rural households and relative poverty of households. The results indicate that the impact of per capita operational income of households on their relative poverty will enhance with the increase in the total income scale, the total expenditure scale of the new rural collective economic organization, and the satisfaction of villagers with the financial management of the collective economic organization. This reflects that the development level of a large-scale collective economy will provide more non-agricultural employment opportunities and increase the proportion of household operational income in the household income structure. With the continuous development of the rural collective economy, the financial management requirements of village collectives have significantly increased. Dealing with financial management issues is also the key to resolving various conflicts in villages. Effective financial management will promote the development of the rural economy and increase farmers’ income.

Columns (1) to (6) indicate that the impact of per capita operational income of households on their relative poverty will weaken with the increase in the proportion of collective investment, collective debt ratio, and resident dividend distribution, and the interaction term of collective operating income has no significant impact. This indicates that the development level, operational capacity, and governance capacity of the new rural collective economic organization are important transmission factors that indirectly affect the relative poverty of farmers. However, currently, the proportion of collective operating income in the total community income of most new collective economic organizations is relatively low, and even many collective economic organizations do not have operational income. The development of village collective economic organizations is not sufficient, and collective operating income is not significant in the transmission process of the indirect impact of new rural collective economic organizations on the relative poverty of farmers. Village collective economic organizations must develop their internal driving force by leveraging the economies of scale, the resource advantages, and the human resources of its collective economy to expand business scope, enrich industrial modes, improve industrial chains, and achieve the sustainable development of collective operating income.

The operational capacity of new rural collective economic organizations and the distribution of dividends to residents can significantly promote the role of family transfer income in suppressing relative poverty. The results of the interaction items in

Table 5. Household per capita transferred income: the transmission mechanism of indirect impact of community income and expenditure variables on relative poverty.

	Model E			Model D
	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3
	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Farmers’ Level
X4	−0.1572 ***	−0.1946 ***	−0.2130 ***	−0.1780 ***	−0.2218 ***	−0.2317 ***
	(0.0128)	(0.0123)	(0.0118)	(0.0133)	(0.0127)	(0.0121)
X5	−0.2268 ***	−0.2094 ***	−0.1790 ***	−0.2000 ***	−0.1811 ***	−0.1528 ***
	(0.0149)	(0.0141)	(0.0134)	(0.0154)	(0.0146)	(0.0138)
X6	−0.1832 ***	−0.1625 ***	−0.1527 ***	−0.0888 *	−0.0382	−0.0029
	(0.0276)	(0.0272)	(0.0254)	(0.0474)	(0.0472)	(0.0433)
Control Variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Community Level
1.V1	−0.8461 *	−1.5015 ***	−0.7279
	(0.5047)	(0.4793)	(0.4427)
1.V2	−0.4483 *	−0.4034 *	−0.4905 **
	(0.2302)	(0.2277)	(0.2130)
2.V2	−0.4102	−0.5702*	−0.6561 **
	(0.3269)	(0.3187)	(0.2945)
V3	−0.1121 ***	−0.0403	−0.0316
	(0.0374)	(0.0319)	(0.0281)
V8	−1.35 × 10−6 ***	−1.33 × 10−6 ***	−1.51 × 10−6 ***	−1.20 × 10−6 **	−1.22 × 10−6 **	−1.22 × 10−6 **
	(5.00 × 10−7)	(5.02 × 10−7)	(4.96 × 10−7)	(4.91 × 10−7)	(4.96 × 10−7)	(4.77 × 10−7)
V4				−1.4987 ***	−1.6381 ***	−1.0725 **
				(0.5078)	(0.4810)	(0.4335)
2.V6				−0.4758 *	−0.4409 *	−0.4031 *
				(0.2436)	(0.2383)	(0.2174)
1.V9				0.0455	0.2758	0.5066
				(0.3417)	(0.3426)	(0.3163)
Interaction Term
1.V1#c.X6	0.0603	0.1699 **	0.0726
	(0.0724)	(0.0680)	(0.0632)
1.V2#c.X6	0.0709 **	0.0700 **	0.0767**
	(0.0332)	(0.0328)	(0.0307)
2.V2#c.X6	−0.0250	0.0041	0.0185
	(0.0474)	(0.0460)	(0.0424)
c.V3#c.X6	0.0123 **	0.0030	0.0024
	(0.0052)	(0.0046)	(0.0040)
c.V8#c.X6	1.19 × 10−7 *	9.85 × 10−8	1.22 × 10−7 *	1.14 × 10−7 *	1.02 × 10−7 **	9.93 × 10−8
	(6.63 × 10−8)	(6.70 × 10−8)	(6.54 × 10−8)	(6.51 × 10−8)	(6.60 × 10−8)	(6.32 × 10−8)
c.V4#c.X6				0.1531 **	0.1954 ***	0.1360 **
				(0.0726)	(0.0685)	(0.0616)
2.V6#c.X6				−0.0130	−0.0246	−0.0212
				(0.0354)	(0.0345)	(0.0313)
1.V9#c.X6				−0.0629	−0.0990 **	−0.1212 ***
				(0.0495)	(0.0493)	(0.0452)
Constant	4.2549 ***	4.5544 ***	4.7027 ***	3.9599 ***	4.1012 ***	3.9039 ***
	(0.2497)	(0.2434)	(0.2297)	(0.3661)	(0.3640)	(0.3377)
Random Effect
τ20j	0.9782	1.1847	0.9499	0.8806	1.1010	0.7995
ICC	0.2292	0.2648	0.2240	0.2112	0.2507	0.1955

Note: () represents standard error, while *, **, and ***, respectively, represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.

indicate that the impact of the per capita transfer income of households on their relative poverty will be enhanced with the increase in dividend distribution, small-scale collective income, and the proportion of collective investment among residents of the new rural collective economic organization. The total expenditure scale of collective economic organizations does not have an indirect impact on it. The previous study proposed that the total expenditure scale of collective economic organizations reduces the relative poverty by affecting the household operating income. Specifically, dividend distribution in collective economic organizations is an important means to enhance members’ sense of gain and happiness, and it is also an important way to stimulate members’ participation in collective economic development and build a community of shared interests [55]. Community dividend distribution is also a means of adjusting the income distribution relationship among different collective members. Although most villages are still in the exploration stage of developing the collective economy and the amount of dividend funds is not large, the distribution of community residents’ dividends can reflect its strong promoting effect on household transfer expenditures, providing impetus for the subsequent expansion of the development of collective economic organizations. Weak communities with small-scale income may not be able to effectively enhance the operational income of farmers. However, with the increase in collective income, more resources are put into the construction of public services, which increases the well-being of community farmers. It can also suppress the occurrence of relative poverty among farmers by enhancing family transfer income.

5.4. Robust Analysis of the Cross-Layer role of New Rural Collective Economic Organizations in Alleviating Relative Poverty among Farmers

The comparison of the regression results between the Logit model and the HLM shows that the coefficient directions of their key variables are basically consistent. Through Table 4 and

Table A1. Logit estimation of the impact of new rural collective economic organizations regulating household operating income and transfer income on relative poverty among farmers.

	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3	Y1	Y2	Y3
	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)
Farmers’ Level
X4	−0.1349 ***	−0.1375 ***	−0.1651 ***	−0.3888 ***	−0.4353 ***	−0.4522 ***	−0.1513 ***	−0.1751 ***	−0.1898 ***	−0.1807 ***	−0.2096 ***	−0.2196 ***
	(0.0206)	(0.0191)	(0.0182)	(0.0384)	(0.0382)	(0.0371)	(0.0108)	(0.0100)	(0.0096)	(0.0111)	(0.0105)	(0.0101)
X5	−0.2149 ***	−0.2018 ***	−0.1753 ***	−0.1979 ***	−0.1834 ***	−0.1589 ***	−0.2156 ***	−0.2019 ***	−0.1759 ***	−0.1980 ***	−0.1839 ***	−0.1594 ***
	(0.0122)	(0.0114)	(0.0109)	(0.0127)	(0.0119)	(0.0113)	(0.0121)	(0.0114)	(0.0109)	(0.0127)	(0.0119)	(0.0114)
X6	−0.1068 ***	−0.0969 ***	−0.0893 ***	−0.1111 ***	−0.1035 ***	−0.0985 ***	−0.1250 ***	−0.1191 ***	−0.1102 ***	−0.1023 ***	−0.0614 *	−0.0224
	(0.0108)	(0.0102)	(0.0098)	(0.0114)	(0.0108)	(0.0103)	(0.0195)	(0.0188)	(0.0181)	(0.0348)	(0.0341)	(0.0326)
Control Variable	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control	Control
Community Level
1.V1	−0.9587 **	−0.8410 **	−0.6347 *				−0.9674 **	−1.5625 ***	−0.8129 **
	(0.4397)	(0.3889)	(0.3589)				(0.4001)	(0.3685)	(0.3500)
1.V2	0.2430	0.4481 **	0.2691				−0.0385	−0.0362	−0.1036
	(0.1915)	(0.1798)	(0.1728)				(0.1671)	(0.1606)	(0.1548)
2.V2	−0.7947 ***	−0.7270 ***	−0.8276 ***				0.0860	−0.0462	−0.1134
	(0.2716)	(0.2493)	(0.2361)				(0.2517)	(0.2338)	(0.2240)
V3	0.0516	0.1030 ***	0.0856 ***				−0.1335 ***	−0.0715 **	−0.0645 **
	(0.0459)	(0.0362)	(0.0289)				(0.0294)	(0.0292)	(0.0266)
1.V5	0.6301 **	0.8653 ***	0.6896 ***	1.3439 ***	1.3846 ***	1.2743 ***
	(0.2741)	(0.2647)	(0.2537)	(0.3091)	(0.2996)	(0.2847)
V4				−0.2749	−0.9405 **	−0.3819				−1.0045 ***	−1.3363 ***	−0.8580 **
				(0.4507)	(0.4048)	(0.3784)				(0.3847)	(0.3500)	(0.3366)
2.V6				−1.8673 ***	−1.4367 ***	−1.1462 ***				−0.4787 **	−0.3945 **	−0.3330 **
				(0.2091)	(0.1966)	(0.1856)				(0.1922)	(0.1775)	(0.1680)
V8							−1.35 × 10−6 ***	−1.37 × 10−6 ***	−1.47 × 10−6 ***	−9.83 × 10−7 ***	−1.05 × 10−6 ***	−1.06 × 10−6 ***
							(3.01 × 10−8)	(2.60 × 10−7)	(2.77 × 10−7)	(2.27 × 10−7)	(2.32 × 10−7)	(2.34 × 10−7)
1.V9				−1.7667 ***	−1.9770 ***	−2.0831 ***				−0.0908	0.1671	0.4336 *
				(0.3105)	(0.3105)	(0.3030)				(0.2521)	(0.2477)	(0.2376)
Interaction Term
1.V1#c.X4(X6)	0.0665	0.0617	0.0487				0.0766	0.1734 ***	0.0802
	(0.0552)	(0.0486)	(0.0447)				(0.0569)	(0.0517)	(0.0496)
1.V2#c.X4(X6)	−0.0185	−0.0437 *	−0.0268				0.0206	0.0228	0.0257
	(0.0245)	(0.0229)	(0.0219)				(0.0241)	(0.0231)	(0.0222)
2.V2#c.X4(X6)	0.0632 *	0.0602 *	0.0671**				−0.0590	−0.0317	−0.0282
	(0.0341)	(0.0313)	(0.0295)				(0.0366)	(0.0337)	(0.0321)
c.V3#c.X4(X6)	−0.0108 *	−0.0161 ***	−0.0128 ***				0.0141 ***	0.0065 *	0.0068 *
	(0.0056)	(0.0047)	(0.0036)				(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0036)
1.V5#c.X4	−0.1048 ***	−0.1398 ***	−0.1174 ***	−0.1819 ***	−0.1908 ***	−0.1801 ***
	(0.0346)	(0.0335)	(0.0320)	(0.0388)	(0.0376)	(0.0356)
c.V4#c.X4(X6)				−0.0216	0.0795	0.0193				0.0811	0.1451 ***	0.0876 *
				(0.0574)	(0.0510)	(0.0476)				(0.0550)	(0.0500)	(0.0480)
2.V6#c.X4(X6)				0.1855 ***	0.1313 ***	0.0977 ***				0.0077	−0.0021	−0.0061
				(0.0265)	(0.0251)	(0.0236)				(0.0279)	(0.0258)	(0.0243)
c.V8#c.X6							1.47 × 10−7 ***	1.38 × 10−7 ***	1.47 × 10−7 ***	1.08 × 10−7 ***	1.08 × 10−7 ***	1.03 × 10−7 ***
							(3.01 × 10−8)	(3.06 × 10−8)	(3.30 × 10−8)	(2.73 × 10−8)	(2.78 × 10−8)	(2.87 × 10−8)
1.V9#c.X4(X6)				0.2019 ***	0.2267 ***	−1.1462 ***				−0.0178	−0.0579	−0.0903 ***
				(0.0397)	(0.0394)	(0.1856)				(0.0367)	(0.0357)	(0.0342)
Constant	3.6269 ***	3.7237 ***	3.9598 ***	5.6455 ***	6.0933 ***	6.1955 ***	3.8555 ***	4.1247 ***	4.2538 ***	3.9743 ***	4.0557 ***	3.8624 ***
	(0.2068)	(0.1925)	(0.1835)	(0.3262)	(0.3251)	(0.3172)	(0.1885)	(0.1806)	(0.1740)	(0.2765)	(0.2701)	(0.2590)

Note: () represents standard error, while *, **, and *** respectively represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%.

(refer to Appendix A), it can be found that the interaction terms of the total income scale of the collective economy, debt ratio, and resident dividend distribution have a highly consistent impact on the per capita operational income of households. It is proved once again that the impact of per capita operational income of households on the relative poverty of farmers will be effectively strengthened with the development of the large-scale collective income of new rural collective economic organizations, and will be weakened with the increase in the debt ratio of new rural collective economic organizations and the dividend payment of residents. The increase in resident dividend payments has weakened. Similarly, by comparing Table 5 and Table A1, it can be found that the mathematical conclusions of the HLM and the Logit model are consistent. It is believed that the impact of per capita transfer income on relative poverty in households will significantly increase with the increase in resident dividends and the proportion of collective investment. The total expenditure scale of collective economic organizations does not have an indirect impact on it. By changing the estimation method, we found that the conclusion of the HLM is still valid.

6. Discussion and Conclusions

By 2020, China had achieved the grand goal of comprehensively eliminating absolute poverty. In the future, relative poverty issues, such as large income gap, the growing income gap, and unbalanced development between urban and rural areas might become more prominent [56]. This study used 40,185 samples from 607 communities across the country. Based on the direct effect of collective economic organizations on the relative poverty of farmers, the results show that the development level, operational capability, and governance ability of new rural collective economic organizations can effectively alleviate the relative poverty of farmers. Collective economic organizations learn advanced experiences and development models, manage various production factors in an orderly manner, and provide greater economic benefits for the collective. As a result, this improves the income level of farmers and help to alleviate relative poverty. This validates the theoretical hypothesis 1 proposed in this article, and this result is consistent with existing research [57].

The HLM was used to study the cross-layer impact of new rural collective economic organizations on relative poverty. Logit models can usually only handle effects at one level, while HLMs can simultaneously consider effects at different levels, including fixed and random effects. This allows us to analyze the impact of variables at different levels on the dependent variable and the relationship between them. Through analyzing the cross-layer interaction effect of the new rural collective economic organization on the income structure of farmers, it is found that the development level and reasonable financial management of the new rural collective economic organization will enhance the impact of per capita operational income of households on their relative poverty. The operational capacity and villagers’ dividends will enhance the impact of per capita transfer income on the relative poverty of households. In particular, vigorously developing new collective economic organizations to achieve the grand goal of rural revitalization and common prosperity cannot solely rely on external assistance, government subsidies, and other economic sources. Wealthy communities with strong collective economic income have strong financial strength to promote the integrated development of primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. They can explore new business forms suitable for their own development, achieve intensive and mechanized business modes, release rural surplus labor, provide more non-agricultural employment positions to increase farmers’ wage income [58], and succeed in public service security. Moreover, non-agricultural employment experiences can enhance their ability to acquire and integrate personal resources, thereby affecting their family’s operational income [59]. The country vigorously promotes the integration of rural areas’ three industries, providing policy and financial support for the introduction of talent and infrastructure investment in collective economic organizations. This provides good conditions for rural economic development. The improvement in overall living standards and the distribution of residents’ dividends is conducive to narrowing the income gap between urban and rural areas. This also alleviates the occurrence of relative poverty through family transfer income growth. These findings verified the theoretical hypothesis 3 proposed in this article, which is consistent with existing research viewpoints [60,61]. However, this article uses a cross-layer interaction model to reveal the mechanism of the rural collective economy in alleviating relative poverty among farmers, supplementing research methods and theoretical foundations.

In the above research process, we found that there is heterogeneity in the alleviation effect of rural collective economic organizations of different scales on relative poverty among farmers, and wealthy villages with large-scale economic income have a significant inhibitory effect on relative poverty among farmers. The results verified theoretical hypothesis 2—that most villages with a better development of the new rural collective economy have strong comprehensive capabilities, presenting characteristics such as rich capital reserves, strong organizational leadership, and sound financial management systems. Therefore, it has strong resilience to sudden risk events, providing basic guarantees for collective economic organizations to cope with risks and prevent poverty return [62], which is consistent with the empirical results of this article.

Based on the above conclusions, this article proposes the following policy recommendations: firstly, the new rural collective economic organizations should focus on transforming “property rights” into “industries”, strengthen cooperation with local leading enterprises or research institutions, enhance marketization, and provide more non-agricultural employment opportunities for farmers to increase their operational income. Secondly, new rural collective economic organizations should adapt to local conditions, develop their advantageous industries, increase operating expenses and collective operating income, and ensure the sustainable development of collective economic organizations. Thirdly, it is recommended to introduce highly educated managers, utilize technology, funds, and manpower rationally, promote the long-term and high-quality development of new rural collective economic organizations, establish a sound financial management system and equity distribution system, clearly regulate the distribution shares and methods, and ensure farmers’ due profits and long-term benefits.