Bibliometric Analysis of Game Theory on Energy and Natural Resource
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Methodology and Data
3. Results Analysis
3.1. Five Basic Information Analysis of Literature: Subjects, Journals, Countries, Institutions and Authors Background Analysis
3.2. Analysis of Document Topic Evolution: Document Co-Citation Cluster Analysis
- (1)
- Early stage of development (2010~2014). The most important cluster in the early development is #8 Microgrids, which only developed in this period and soon entered a period of silence. Combining co-citation frequency, strength and centrality, the most important document in this cluster is Montuori L (2014). Montuori L et al. studied the microgrid provided by biomass gasification power plant and compared it with other power generation technologies, obtained different solutions for balancing power generation and consumption through scenario simulation and finally better integrated with demand response renewable energy [9]. Anh SJ (2013) and Aalami HA (2010) were the most intense papers (Degree = 10) and the most co-cited papers (Freq = 3), respectively. Anh et al. focused on the power dispatching problem of distributed generators to realize the optimal operation of microgrid [10]. In order to reduce the electricity price, to solve the problem of transmission line congestion and to improve market liquidity, Aalami HA analyzed the demand response mechanism and conducted a simulation study on the load curve of the Iranian power grid on peak days in 2007. The simulation results confirmed good performance of the model [11]. To sum up, the research process of the leading documents in the cluster #8 Microgrids is similar. The purpose of the research is to maximize the benefits of all parties under limited resource constraints. Combined with the demand price elasticity of economics and the user benefit function, the simulation analysis of different scenarios is carried out, and the optimal mechanism is finally obtained. The second largest cluster is #2 Game Theory, and the two most important papers in the early development stage of this cluster are Soliman HM (2014) and Su WC (2014). The former has a total of 11 citations, degree of 0 and a centrality of 0.03. The latter has a slightly lower citation frequency of 7, but its centrality is as high as 0.09, and its degree is as high as 17. Soliman et al. studied the problem of demand-side management (DSM) when customers are equipped with energy storage equipment and discussed two games: a noncooperative game between residential energy consumers and a Stackelberg game between utility providers and energy consumers, which elucidates the interplay between storage capacity, energy demand, number of users and system performance as measured by the total cost and peak-to-average power ratio (PAR) [12]. Su WC et al. innovatively proposed a game theoretic framework for the next-generation retail electricity market for distributed residential electricity suppliers, formulating a set of mathematical models of retail electricity market participants with many local and global constraints [13]. The literature under the cluster #2 Game Theory explores game theory more and conducts an in-depth analysis of energy supply and demand based on a variety of game theory frameworks. In addition, except for clusters #0 and #6, which did not appear in the early development period, other clusters cited papers in 2013~2014. The vast majority of research topics in the field of game theory research in energy and natural resources have been officially initiated.
- (2)
- Fast growing stage (2015~2017). During this period, cluster #8 Microgrids finally terminated, #2 Game Theory maintained its good momentum from the previous period, #6 GBT kicked off but did not yet enter its peak, and the rest of the clusters finally entered a period of rapid development, and the average publication year of most clusters was concentrated in 2016–2017. First, the two most important papers in cluster #0 Integrated Energy Systems (IES) in this period are Wei F (2017) and Motalleb M (2017), with total citation frequencies of 11 and 10, centralities of 0.01 and 0.04, and degrees of 12 and 8, respectively. Wei F et al. analyzed the multi-energy trading (MET) problem in the integrated energy system (IES) based on a new game model which is derived from the hierarchical Stackelberg game, and proved for the first time that there is a unique Stackelberg equilibrium in the MET problem [14]. Motalleb M et al. constructed a theoretical model of competition among demand response aggregators, which ultimately provided sellers with a game theoretically sound decision procedure that facilitated the prediction and analysis of bids for energy sales in the market [15]. Under cluster #1 Government, the most important document is Madani SR (2017), with a total citation frequency of 10, degree of 22 and centrality of 0.03. In this study, a government-led game model with two competitive green and non-green supply chains as followers was established. For the first time, the pricing policy, green strategy and governance tariff in supply chain competition were clarified, and it was proven that the improvement in the government decision making and the impact of the subsidy rate are significantly greater than the tax rate [16]. Cluster #2 Game Theory has two of the most important papers published in this period, Lo Prete C (2016) and Yu M (2016). Lo Prete C (2016) has a total citation frequency of 13, degree of 19, and a centrality of 0.04. Yu M (2016) has a total of 10 citations, degree = 12 and a centrality of 0.15. Using a cooperative game theory framework, Lo Prete C et al. modeled the economic incentives for market participation in the cooperative development of microgrids in minigrids served by regulated utilities, which explores how to correct for utility pricing market failures [16]. In cluster #3 EGT, the most important article in this period is Wu B (2017) with a co-citation frequency of 10 and degree of 11. Wu B et al. constructed a low-carbon strategy evolution model of the game between the government and enterprises in the context of complex networks, analyzed how enterprises compete and transform in the Newman–Watts small-world network, and proved that enterprises’ expectation on policies such as government subsidies and supervision can set the speed of dissemination of low-carbon strategies [17]. The co-citation frequencies of major papers in clusters the #4 Subsidy and #5 Home Energy Management (HEM) are significantly weaker than important papers of the previous clusters. Among them, the most important literature is Chen ZY (2016) with a co-citation frequency of 6, degree of 18 and centrality of 0.02. The substitution elasticity of energy sector and non-energy sector factors and China’s consumption preferences for energy and non-energy bulk commodities prove that a small carbon tax on production links can help increase total social welfare [18]. In summary, we find that in the rapid development stage, more game theory models are applied in the research field of game theory on energy and natural resource. The topic of microgrid is greatly reduced while topics such as integrated energy systems were greatly enhanced. In addition, the carbon tax incentive mechanism between government and enterprises has begun to be widely discussed, and green strategies have become one of the hot topics of research.
- (3)
- Explosive development stage (2018~2021). Based on the number of published papers, we can see a surge of papers from about 40 per year in the second stage to about 100 per year. On the one hand, clusters #7TEP and #9BSC disappeared in this stage and cluster #2 Game Theory gradually entered into the mature stage. On the other hand, other research topics have maintained their high popularities from the previous stage. Cluster #6 GBT is an emerging theme in the third stage. The most important documents under cluster #0IES were published in this period: Zhang CH (2018) has a co-citation frequency of 13, degree of 16 and centrality of 0.01. This paper studies the P2P energy trading model, proposes a hierarchical system architecture model to identify and classify the key elements and technologies involved in P2P energy trading, and proves that P2P energy trading can promote the local balance of production and consumption [19]. Cluster #3EGT also has a very important document, Chen WT (2018). During this explosive development stage, Chen WT et al. applied evolutionary game theory to examine the strategies of manufacturers in response to various carbon tax policies [7]. Cluster #6GBT is the youngest cluster, and its most important document at this stage is Zhang LP (2019) with a co-citation frequency of 5, degree of 17 and centrality of 0.04. Zhang LP et al. studied the evolutionary game model of technology diffusion within the manufacturer alliance under the background of China’s low-carbon policy and simulated the impact of carbon trading market, environmental tax and innovation subsidies on the green technology diffusion of manufacturing enterprises in China’s Barabasi-Albert model [20]. The third-stage research continues with the precedent subjects of green policy and carbon tax themes, goes much more in-depth and is no longer limited to the Stackelberg model but has introduced more uncommon games. In addition, the third stage is also characterized with new topics, such as P2P transactions.
3.3. Keyword Analysis of Literature
3.3.1. Research Objects
- Electricity market. There are a total of 131 articles under this topic. Microgrids is an important category of electricity markets. With regard to energy sources, wind energy and renewable energy are very hot research topics. As a new energy source with high uncertainty, wind energy and conventional power producers can determine their profits through game theory in the bilateral reserve market. Large-scale grid integration of distributed renewable energy is emerging as a promising solution to reconfigure current grid infrastructure and ensure energy supply reliability. Since distributed renewable energy was incorporated into existing grid infrastructure, the economic operation of new, more complex retail electricity markets has become a research hot spot. The research issues mainly include demand side management (DSM) and cost allocation. The DSM model is the most common solution when energy supply is limited. DSM can be used to coordinate supply and demand and improve system reliability, as well as expand the capacity constraints of existing grid infrastructure. In addition to the Stackelberg model, the commonly used game models also include the Cournot model. When a game theoretic framework is introduced into a DSM model, the usual goal is to study fluctuations in the load curve and reduce the peak-to-average ratio in order to maximize returns for both retail electricity market users and residential electricity suppliers. In this scenario, game theory is often applied to the exploration of dynamic pricing strategies. Dynamic pricing strategies can encourage consumers to participate in peak reduction. In addition, game theoretic models can also be applied to coalition, collaboration, and profit distribution problems in home microgrids. In addition, the profit distribution problem of the participants in the electricity market supply chain can also be solved with game theory. Load demand, transmission expansion and energy storage are also common directions of exploration. Short-term hot topics such as P2P and blockchain technology also affect the research direction of the electricity market.
- Integrated energy system. A total of 50 articles is sorted out under this topic, which can also be seen as a sub-topic of the electricity market topic. Extending the electricity market mechanism to the distribution system, modeling the corresponding energy trading process for different agents such as wind farms, solar power plants and demand aggregators is the main integration mode of an integrated energy system. Research focuses include improving the operational performance of power distribution systems, coordinating the collaborative interactions of energy systems, and designing novel dynamic energy management strategies. We can store energy from multiple sources in one aggregator. The competition model between demand response aggregators uses a lot of game theory model frameworks. The Stackelberg model is the most widely used one, with similar application scenarios described in the above section of the electricity market. In addition, in the context of smart grids, researchers have also explored the concept of smart building clusters, which allows multiple smart buildings to operate jointly for optimization purposes. In addition to electricity supply networks, building distributed heating networks are also within the scope of this topic. Combining energy system optimization with revenue distribution schemes for heating networks is also a common research direction.
- Carbon emissions. There are a total of 97 articles under this topic. This topic is closely related to topics of environmental pollution and resource consumption. In the field of game theory on carbon emissions and energy and natural resources, the mainstream research direction is to use game theory methods to test and predict the behavioral strategies of governments and manufacturers in response to carbon tax and subsidy policies and to simulate carbon emissions trading markets with the purpose to achieve the greatest social benefit on the basis of protecting the environment. In addition to carbon taxes and technology subsidies, other government interventions include direct tariffs and tradable licenses on green and non-green products. Technological innovation and bank-to-business green loans are also often introduced into game models. For example, based on the analysis model of game theory, quantitative simulation of the development of new energy vehicles and green credit is carried out. In addition, other environmental policies and measures have also been explored, such as the establishment of a Stackelberg model to explore the impact of waste battery recycling on energy conservation and emission reduction.
3.3.2. Research tasks
- Demand response and demand side management. There are a total of 72 articles under this topic. This topic is closely related to electricity markets and integrated energy systems. Users adjust their electricity consumption behaviors according to electricity prices and other policies for the purpose of reducing electricity load and ensuring stable power supply, which is demand response. The load management method of the power company is demand side management. Demand response is divided into two categories: price-based and incentive-based. Price-based demand response includes pricing by time, pricing of real-time, and pricing of peaks, while incentive-based demand response includes direct load control, interruptible compliance, demand-side bidding and emergency power demand response. The mainstream research direction is to use the game theory model to study response behaviors of power users to different policies in order to maximize social benefits by means of reducing user costs, reducing peak demand, stabilizing power supply of power grid and reducing environmental pollution while satisfying consumption constraints. In addition to the Stackelberg model, the common game theory methods are evolutionary game theory models. In the study of users, the diversity of users and the feasibility of hierarchical management can also be considered, and the heterogeneity of demand flexibility can also be reflected in the noncooperative game framework. In addition to the traditional power grid, the introduction of distributed energy and renewable energy smart grid is the current research trend. The demand response model of the electricity market has also been extended to the gas market.
- Energy market price model. There are 134 articles under this topic. The energy market price models mainly include electricity and non-electricity price models. Since electricity cannot be stored, it is quite different from the pricing models of gas and oil. Pricing models for energy commodities such as natural gas and oil have little to do with game theory and are therefore not considered further in this section. The electricity pricing model is closely related to the electricity market and demand response topics discussed above. The electricity market has the characteristics of price spikes, mean reversion (prices can quickly return to the mean level from spikes) and strong volatility. The commodity price model of electricity cannot be derived from traditional production, storage, distribution and other links. Therefore, it is the most mainstream research method to simulate the game process from the perspective of market participants.
- Government policies and subsidy mechanisms. There are 118 articles under the policy topic and 82 articles under the subsidy topic. The topics of carbon emissions research and evolutionary games are closely related to the topics of government policies and subsidy mechanisms, and many papers appear repeatedly. Government policies mainly include taxation of carbon emissions, tax relief for energy-efficient companies, subsidies for green technologies and tradable licenses for products. When studying policy effects, researchers often employ evolutionary game models, using multi-stage game models to simulate the behavioral strategies of governments and other market players. In addition to carbon emissions, green technologies such as smart energy-efficient homes and electric vehicles are also popular research directions.
3.3.3. Game Model
- The Stackelberg model. A total of 81 papers used the Stackelberg model. The Stackelberg model, which positions market players as leaders and followers, is widely used in the field of energy and natural resource game theory research. The Stackelberg game framework is suitable for various scenarios in the field of energy economics, such as in the grid-building demand response model, where Stackelberg can successfully cope with demand fluctuations while maximizing the total benefit. In addition to traditional grids, smart grids composed of multiple energy aggregators are also applied to the Stackelberg model with constraints such as transaction prices and scale constraints. In addition, in a multi-layer game model, Stackelberg can also be applied to only one layer. For example, in a multi-level integrated energy system composed of natural gas companies (upper tier), multiple energy hubs that supply electricity or heat (middle tier) and multiple users (lower tier), the Stackelberg game method can study the multi-level integrated energy system energy scheduling and operating strategies for all participants. The two-layer interaction model is also the mainstream model. In the upper layer, the distribution network operator decides the transaction price and quantity of each microgrid according to the solution of the lower layer problem under the premise of considering the constraints; the process is a Stackelberg model.
- Evolutionary games. There are a total of 101 articles under this topic. Evolutionary games no longer assume that the participants are rational, but, similar to biological evolution, under the condition of incomplete information, the game equilibrium is finally reached through continuous trial and error. For example, in carbon tax research, the evolutionary behavior of manufacturers in response to a combination of government taxes and subsidies is a hot research topic. In the study of climate and environmental policy, heterogeneity in the behavior of firms or governments in response to policies can also be simulated by multi-step game models to design incentives, reform regulatory regimes and improve market outcomes. Evolutionary game models can also be used to simulate the process of green technology diffusion. The participants in the model can be two parties, namely the government and the manufacturer, or multiple parties, such as the government, energy companies and downstream energy users. In the study of electricity market and gas market, researchers also proposed some pricing methods based on evolutionary game theory. The electricity market and gas market are a nonlinear complex economic system/multi-agent system with multiple interacting agents (government agent, local gas distribution operator agent and end user agent). Combining the evolutionary game theory model with the demand response model, we can simulate the behavior of participants in different scenarios and obtain optimization results.
- Cooperative game. There are a total of 137 articles under this topic. A cooperative game is one in which the participants cooperate with each other and fight against each other in the form of a group. Cooperative games are also called positive-sum games; that is, the total social benefit increases when the equilibrium is reached. Cooperative games mainly appear in new energy management systems. Multi-agent distributed energy management systems often consist of cooperative games involving multiple agents. In addition, the application of noncooperative games in the framework of energy management is also a hot research direction. In the bidding game on the demand side, the advantages and disadvantages of the cooperative game and the competitive game are also the research focus. Depending on the heterogeneity of end users (residential, commercial, and industrial), hierarchical demand-side management models can also be introduced into cooperative or noncooperative game models. The design of the battery energy storage system can also use the cooperative game model, using a variety of batteries as the participants of the cooperative game model, and the cost and profit are established in the corresponding game strategy space. We summarize our findings in Figure 4.
4. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Rank | Count | Centrality | Year | Category |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 311 | 0.22 | 2003 | Energy & Fuels |
2 | 225 | 0.47 | 1994 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
3 | 204 | 0.36 | 1996 | Engineering |
4 | 173 | 0.09 | 2000 | Environmental Sciences |
5 | 155 | 0.05 | 1995 | Science & Technology—Other Topics |
6 | 140 | 0.02 | 2012 | Green & Sustainable Science & Technology |
7 | 86 | 0.03 | 2001 | Environmental Studies |
8 | 79 | 0.23 | 2000 | Business & Economics |
9 | 67 | 0 | 2009 | Engineering, Chemical |
10 | 61 | 0 | 2010 | Engineering, Environmental |
Rank | Count | Centrality | Year | Cited Journal |
1 | 262 | 0.01 | 2013 | Appl Energ |
2 | 222 | 0.03 | 2003 | Energy |
3 | 198 | 0.08 | 2003 | Energ Policy |
4 | 180 | 0.04 | 2012 | J Clean Prod |
5 | 178 | 0.01 | 2015 | Renew Sust Energ Rev |
6 | 174 | 0.08 | 2006 | Ieee T Power Syst |
7 | 162 | 0.03 | 2012 | Ieee T Smart Grid |
8 | 145 | 0.06 | 2009 | Eur J Oper Res |
9 | 121 | 0.01 | 2013 | Renew Energ |
10 | 118 | 0.01 | 2013 | Int J Elec Power |
Rank | Count | Centrality | Year | Country |
1 | 246 | 0.28 | 1999 | Peoples R China |
2 | 162 | 0.5 | 1992 | Usa |
3 | 61 | 0.21 | 2006 | Iran |
4 | 40 | 0.23 | 1990 | England |
5 | 33 | 0.05 | 2000 | Canada |
6 | 24 | 0.01 | 2003 | Germany |
7 | 23 | 0.09 | 2006 | Australia |
8 | 20 | 0.03 | 2008 | Italy |
9 | 19 | 0.08 | 2007 | Sweden |
10 | 16 | 0.04 | 2003 | India |
Rank | Count | Centrality | Year | Institution |
1 | 31 | 0.02 | 2015 | North China Elect Power Univ |
2 | 14 | 0 | 2015 | Islamic Azad Univ |
3 | 12 | 0 | 2011 | Tarbiat Modares Univ |
4 | 10 | 0 | 2016 | Guangdong Univ Finance & Econ GDUFE |
5 | 10 | 0.05 | 2017 | Tsinghua Univ |
6 | 8 | 0 | 2012 | Xi’lan Jiao Tong Univ |
7 | 8 | 0 | 2016 | Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ |
8 | 7 | 0.01 | 2016 | Hong Kong Polytech Univ |
9 | 7 | 0.01 | 2014 | Beijing Inst Technol |
10 | 7 | 0.02 | 2008 | MIT |
Rank | Count | Centrality | Year | Author |
1 | 10 | 0 | 2016 | Puyan Nie |
2 | 8 | 0 | 2017 | Chan Wang |
3 | 6 | 0 | 2019 | Morteza Rastibarzoki |
4 | 4 | 0 | 2019 | Soroush Safarzadeh |
5 | 4 | 0 | 2017 | Qiong Wu |
6 | 4 | 0 | 2017 | Hongbo Ren |
7 | 3 | 0 | 2008 | Ariel Dinar |
8 | 3 | 0 | 2014 | Guanghui Zhou |
9 | 3 | 0 | 2019 | Nadeem Javaid |
10 | 3 | 0 | 2018 | Andreas Ehrenmann |
# | Name | Size | Mean Year | Top Terms (LSI) |
---|---|---|---|---|
0 | Integrated Energy Systems | 72 | 2017 | game theory; flexibility transaction; p2p transaction mechanism; dynamic flexibility index; nash equilibrium|energy trading; seeking methods; risk assessment; non-linear dynamic system; non-dispatchable energy generation |
1 | Government | 42 | 2016 | game theory; supply-chain management; hazardous waste; closed-loop supply chain; energy-efficiency program|direct tariff; green supply chain; governmental regulation; supply chains competition; intervention schemas |
2 | Game Theory | 40 | 2013 | game theory; renewable energy; energy storage; electricity markets; distribution system|nash equilibrium; palm biomass; supply chain; procurement strategy; networked cournot competition |
3 | Evolutionary Game Theory | 25 | 2017 | evolutionary game theory; electric vehicle; public-private partnership cooperation; solar power; ccs technology adoption|evolutionary game; green transformation; green buildings; governance mechanism; green building material industry |
4 | Subsidy | 24 | 2016 | energy efficiency; green finance; order financing; clean innovation; green insurance|environmental planning; clean innovation; green insurance; countryside development; order financing |
5 | Home Energy Management | 23 | 2016 | photovoltaic installations; game-based pricing strategy; heuristic algorithm; power markets; real-time market|home energy management system; home microgrid; electricity market; profit allocation; coalition formation |
6 | Green Building Technology | 16 | 2017 | evolutionary game; construction industry; green building technology; diffusion model; complex network|diffusion model; complex network; pest analysis; energy substitution; construction industry |
7 | Transmission Expansion Planning | 14 | 2015 | transmission expansion planning; cooperative game theory; cost-benefit allocation; coalitional operation; renewable integration|renewable integration; power system; energy policy; shapley value; offshore grid |
8 | Microgrids | 13 | 2012 | service regulation; electric utility; cooperative game theory; economic efficiency; renewable energy|game theory; demand response; renewable energy; service regulation; electric utility |
9 | Biofuel Supply Chain | 8 | 2015 | biofuel supply chain; government regulations; evolutionary game; strategy selection|evolutionary game; strategy selection; government regulations; biofuel supply chain |
ID | Name | Size | Mean Year | Top Terms (Log Likelihood Ratio, p-Level) |
0 | Integrated Energy Systems | 72 | 2017 | integrated energy systems (5.09, 0.05); prosumer (5.09, 0.05); prosumer participation (5.09, 0.05); evolutionary game theory (4.65, 0.05); evolutionary game (3.98, 0.05) |
1 | Government | 42 | 2016 | government (12.4, 0.001); supply-chain management (8.23, 0.005); social welfare (8.23, 0.005); consumer behavior (8.23, 0.005); closed-loop supply chain (4.1, 0.05) |
2 | Game Theory | 40 | 2013 | game-theory (7.29, 0.01); optimal bidding strategy (7.29, 0.01); benefit allocation (7.29, 0.01); demand response aggregator (dra) (7.29, 0.01); distributed energy network (7.29, 0.01) |
3 | Evolutionary Game Theory | 25 | 2017 | evolutionary game theory (20.75, 0.0001); game theory (9.74, 0.005); simulation (8.71, 0.005); evolutionary game (5.37, 0.05); electric vehicle (5.03, 0.05) |
4 | Subsidy | 24 | 2016 | subsidy (20.19, 0.0001); energy efficiency (12.35, 0.001); green finance (6.13, 0.05); gongcheng (6.13, 0.05); countryside development (6.13, 0.05) |
5 | Home Energy Management | 23 | 2016 | home energy management system (7.64, 0.01); home microgrid (7.64, 0.01); electricity market (4.14, 0.05); stackelberg game (4.14, 0.05); smart grid (4.14, 0.05) |
6 | Green Building Technology | 16 | 2017 | green building technology (14.4, 0.001); construction industry (14.4, 0.001); evolutionary game (13.68, 0.001); government policy (10.63, 0.005); cleaner energy substitution (4.4, 0.05) |
7 | Transmission Expansion Planning | 14 | 2015 | transmission expansion planning (14.08, 0.001); benders decomposition (6.96, 0.01); cost-benefit allocation (6.96, 0.01); north sea offshore grid (6.96, 0.01); coalitional operation (6.96, 0.01) |
8 | Microgrids | 13 | 2012 | microgrids (7.29, 0.01); micro-grid (7.29, 0.01); cost-benefit (7.29, 0.01); elasticity (7.29, 0.01); incentives (7.29, 0.01) |
9 | Biofuel Supply Chain | 8 | 2015 | biofuel supply chain (16.03, 0.0001); strategy selection (7.89, 0.005); rin (7.89, 0.005); government regulations (7.89, 0.005); decentralized decision-making (7.89, 0.005) |
ID | Name | Size | Mean Year | Top Terms (Mutual Information) |
0 | Integrated Energy Systems | 72 | 2017 | risk assessment (1.13); non-linear dynamic system (1.13); technical conversion coefficient (1.13); electricity retailers (1.13); peer-to-peer (p2p) energy trading (1.13) |
1 | Government | 42 | 2016 | closed-loop supply chain (0.41); government subsidy (0.41); energy productivity (0.41); industrial energy efficiency program (0.41); intervention schemas (0.41) |
2 | Game Theory | 40 | 2013 | networked cournot competition (ncc) (0.56); milp (0.56); demand response scheduling (0.56); coordination strategy (0.56); regulation revenue function (0.56) |
3 | Evolutionary Game Theory | 25 | 2017 | new energy vehicles (0.36); fiscal decentralization (0.36); periodical fluctuation (0.36); low-carbon supply chain (0.36); green building material industry (gbmi) (0.36) |
4 | Subsidy | 24 | 2016 | green finance (0.11); gongcheng (0.11); countryside development (0.11); forest (0.11); order financing (0.11) |
5 | Home Energy Management | 23 | 2016 | photovoltaic installations (0.5); distributed game-based pricing strategy (0.5); mgo (0.5); pricing and power-generation strategy (0.5); distributed optimal control (0.5) |
6 | Green Building Technology | 16 | 2017 | photovoltaic installations (0.05); risk assessment (0.05); non-linear dynamic system (0.05); green finance (0.05); closed-loop supply chain (0.05) |
7 | Transmission Expansion Planning | 14 | 2015 | benders decomposition (0.06); cost-benefit allocation (0.06); north sea offshore grid (0.06); coalitional operation (0.06); power system flexibility (0.06) |
8 | Microgrids | 13 | 2012 | microgrids (0.05); micro-grid (0.05); cost-benefit (0.05); elasticity (0.05); incentives (0.05) |
9 | Biofuel Supply Chain | 8 | 2015 | game theory (0.04); strategy selection (0.04); rin (0.04); government regulations (0.04); decentralized decision-making (0.04) |
Count | Centrality | Year | Reference |
---|---|---|---|
14 | 0.05 | 2018 | Chen WT, 2018, J CLEAN PROD, V201, P123, DOI 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.08.007 |
13 | 0.01 | 2018 | Zhang CH, 2018, APPL ENERG, V220, P1, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.03.010 |
13 | 0.04 | 2016 | Lo Prete C, 2016, APPL ENERG, V169, P524, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.01.099 |
11 | 0.01 | 2017 | Wei F, 2017, APPL ENERG, V200, P315, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.05.001 |
11 | 0.03 | 2014 | Soliman HM, 2014, IEEE T SMART GRID, V5, P1475, DOI 10.1109/TSG.2014.2302245 |
10 | 0 | 2017 | Wu B, 2017, J CLEAN PROD, V141, P168, DOI 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.09.053 |
10 | 0.15 | 2016 | Yu M, 2016, APPL ENERG, V164, P702, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.12.039 |
10 | 0.03 | 2017 | Madani SR, 2017, COMPUT IND ENG, V105, P287, DOI 10.1016/j.cie.2017.01.017 |
10 | 0.04 | 2017 | Motalleb M, 2017, APPL ENERG, V202, P581, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.05.186 |
Count | Centrality | Year | Reference |
---|---|---|---|
10 | 0.15 | 2016 | Yu M, 2016, APPL ENERG, V164, P702, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2015.12.039 |
3 | 0.14 | 2018 | Motalleb M, 2018, ENERGY, V143, P424, DOI 10.1016/j.energy.2017.10.129 |
5 | 0.13 | 2015 | Cintuglu MH, 2015, IEEE T SMART GRID, V6, P1064, DOI 10.1109/TSG.2014.2387215 |
2 | 0.1 | 2012 | Samadi P, 2012, IEEE T SMART GRID, V3, P1170, DOI 10.1109/TSG.2012.2203341 |
6 | 0.1 | 2017 | Zhu LJ, 2017, APPL ENERG, V196, P238, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.11.060 |
8 | 0.1 | 2017 | Fan RG, 2017, J CLEAN PROD, V168, P536, DOI 10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.09.044 |
6 | 0.09 | 2012 | Mei SW, 2012, IEEE T SUSTAIN ENERG, V3, P506, DOI 10.1109/TSTE.2012.2192299 |
7 | 0.09 | 2014 | Su WC, 2014, APPL ENERG, V119, P341, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2014.01.003 |
8 | 0.08 | 2018 | Fan SL, 2018, APPL ENERG, V226, P469, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.05.095 |
4 | 0.07 | 2017 | Banez-Chicharro F, 2017, APPL ENERG, V195, P382, DOI 10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.03.061 |
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Dong, Y.; Dong, Z. Bibliometric Analysis of Game Theory on Energy and Natural Resource. Sustainability 2023, 15, 1278. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021278
Dong Y, Dong Z. Bibliometric Analysis of Game Theory on Energy and Natural Resource. Sustainability. 2023; 15(2):1278. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021278
Chicago/Turabian StyleDong, Yiqi, and Zuoji Dong. 2023. "Bibliometric Analysis of Game Theory on Energy and Natural Resource" Sustainability 15, no. 2: 1278. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021278
APA StyleDong, Y., & Dong, Z. (2023). Bibliometric Analysis of Game Theory on Energy and Natural Resource. Sustainability, 15(2), 1278. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15021278