An Optimized Decision Model for Electric Vehicle Aggregator Participation in the Electricity Market Based on the Stackelberg Game
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
This paper presents a bilevel optimization model for EVA as a price maker participation in the electricity market based on the Stackelberg game theory. Also, a two-stage optimization model for EVA participation in the day-ahead and intraday electricity markets is constructed in order to formulate dispatch strategies of EVA in the day-ahead and intra-day electricity markets. The paper structure is logical and the contribution is enough. The following corrections are requried as follows:
1. Extend the literature review with more recent publications in section 1
2. Collect the list of abbreviations and symbols at the beginning of introdction section.
3. Mathematical formulas are enough to decribe the problem but the solution methodolgy is not presented in clear way. Add a section to decribe the solution methodolgy.
4. In line 324 , " The matlab+yalmip+gurobi solver software environment is used to solve the problem" discuss.
5. Add more numerical simulation results in Tables associated with figures.
6. Comparison of the simulation results with previous methods in the literature.
7. Add the numerical findings on the conclusion section.
4.
Moderate
Author Response
On behalf of my co-authors, I appreciate the positive and constructive comments on our manuscript. We studied the comments very carefully and tried our best to revise the manuscript accordingly. Response to Reviewer 1 is detailed in the review supporting file.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
The authors present a research on “An Optimized Decision Model for Electric Vehicle Aggregator Participation in Electricity Markets Based on Stackelberg Game” is interesting work and study begin from establishment of bilevel optimization model for EVA participation in the two-stage electricity market as a price maker. In the proposed bilevel model, the upper-level and lower-level model are constructed as an operational problem for EVA and a market clearing problem for ISO, respectively.
Following observation for improvement
1) In the article you have stated theoretical and practical analysis of a bilevel optimization model for EVA but less information with respect to capacity evaluation model of EVA methods.
2) Technical details of Bilevel Stackelberg game model is limited and the model often involves non-linear and non-convex objective functions and constraints at both levels, making it difficult to find closed-form solutions. Refer- Solar tree-based water pumping for assured irrigation in sustainable Indian agriculture environment
3) Challenges involved in combination of mathematical, computational, and analytical techniques. Researchers need to leverage optimization algorithms, simulation methods, and sensitivity analysis to arrive at meaningful insights and strategies within the context of the Bilevel Stackelberg Game Model.
4) The abstract should be structured with background of optimized decision model for electric vehicle aggregator under the uncertain condition, followed by different valuation methods, key factors that influence synchronous stability in these different modes and briefly explained results and conclusion for better clarity.
5) In the introduction section, different input and system operating conditions are not clearly stated. Refer modelling and simulation of object detection in automotive power window.
6) The objective must map with methodology you have used to target the research objective. Refer Investigation on parallel hybrid electric bicycle along with issuer management system for mountainous region.
7) Redraw figure 1 with better illustration and control strategy with decision-making framework.
8) Control methods, algorithm, tools used require additional description.
9) The proposed methodology is too narrow and may be elaborated with comparison with similar work. Refer - Nonlinear dynamics of controlled release mechanism under boundary friction.
10) The conclusion is delivered with limited content. For this manuscript, the conclusion should be provided with more details,
11) Add some quantitative research outcomes in the abstract section.
Moderate English Editing Required
Author Response
On behalf of my co-authors, I appreciate the positive and constructive comments on our manuscript. We studied the comments very carefully and tried our best to revise the manuscript accordingly. Response to Reviewer 2 is detailed in the review supporting file.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 3 Report
This is a paper on a relevant topic: the interaction of EV charging patterns and cost minimization of an electricity system (the Independent System Operator). The authors stylized the problem by treating the interaction of the two entities as a leader-follower game (Stackelberg) where the EV makes a decision first (leader) and then the ISO minimizes cost (follower).
I find however two main points that should be at least mentioned and potentially discussed in further detail in this paper or in future work:
1. The ISO is only concerned with minimizing costs. While this is a reasonable assumption, and in some cases a realistic portrait of actual markets, it leaves aside the possibility of profit maximization. Electricity generators in an ISO look for maximizing profits, even if they own renewables assets. See the discussion in "Market Power and Renewables" (Bahn et al, Energy Journal).
2. What will happen when the ISO also has storage assets? That is, right now the authors' model contains storage capacity only through the EVs but not within the fleet of generators. Some ISOs have a growing share of storage capacity and their markets contain a large number of EVs (for example California ISO, see "Large Scale Battery Storage, Short-term Market Outcomes, and Arbitrage" (Lamp et al, Energy Economics).
Author Response
On behalf of my co-authors, I appreciate the positive and constructive comments on our manuscript. We studied the comments very carefully and tried our best to revise the manuscript accordingly. Response to Reviewer 3 is detailed in the review supporting file.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.docx
Reviewer 4 Report
In this paper, EVA is regarded as a price maker. Based on the Stackelberg game theory, a bilevel optimization model of EVA participation in the electricity market is constructed. The proposed bilevel optimization model can be applied to both day-ahead and intra-day electricity markets to achieve different optimization objectives, respectively. The subject is timely, however the following comments should be taken into consideration in the revised version:
1- Literature review should be improved. More papers on modeling aggregation and game theoretical approach are suggested such as: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2022.108841, https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12007, https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2019.1612%EF%BB%BF
2- More descriptions about Eq (13) and Eq (30) can be brought.
3- Nomenclature could be added.
4- More quantitative results can be brought in Abstract and Conclusion.
5- A discussion about equilibrium can be given in the result analysis.
I hope my comments help the esteemed authors to improve this work.
I suggest to re-review the manuscript to improve readability of the work for the potential readers with minimum background. Thank you.
Author Response
On behalf of my co-authors, I appreciate the positive and constructive comments on our manuscript. We studied the comments very carefully and tried our best to revise the manuscript accordingly. Response to Reviewer 4 is detailed in the review supporting file.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
The paper can be accepted.
fine
Reviewer 2 Report
May be considered in current form.
Reviewer 4 Report
Thank you for addressing the comments. Congratulations for this good revision.
N/A
