How Does Differential Public Participation Influence Outcome Justice in Energy Transitions? Evidence from a Waste-to-Energy (WTE) Project in China

Abstract

A comprehensive understanding of public participation is critical for delivering justice in the energy transition. Waste-to-energy (WTE) is a practical approach toward sustainable energy transitions, which may threaten the realization of justice. Previous studies on WTE facilities have mostly discussed the siting stage under the environmental impact assessment (EIA) framework, and few have focused on whether public participation differs when different types of pollution occur. In this paper, we take a WTE project in Kunming, China as an example and, based on semi-structured interviews and questionnaires, explore the influence of differential public participation. The findings indicate that residents were more sensitive when faced with obvious pollution, which became the dominant factor in participation; meanwhile, they were inactively engaged in hidden pollution. Lower levels of health participation partly affect the realization of outcome justice. The shift from procedural justice to outcome justice is not inevitable and is subject to many factors. From an activism perspective, different perceptions of pollution risks and constraints on activities contribute to this state. We call for the government to complete the relevant engagement design in WTE projects and improve citizens’ awareness to achieve better environmental justice.

1. Introduction

Since the first Industrial Revolution, fossil fuels have dominated the utilization of energy, and current energy systems are simply unsustainable by environmental, social and economic criteria [1]. In 2015, the historic Paris Agreement set a long-term goal to substantially reduce greenhouse gas emissions to cope with global climate change. The transition of electricity generation sectors toward renewable energy is broadly understood to be an urgent and necessary element of climate change mitigation [2]. Waste-to-energy (WTE), a waste disposal technology that can generate electricity, is an important pathway to sustainable energy use.

China is now the world’s most significant contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, and WTE is one of the effective paths to mitigate them. WTE also has two advantages over traditional landfills. First, municipal solid waste (MSW) used as an energy source fuel cuts down on the use of fossil fuels. Second, it reduces the methane emitted by landfills [3,4]. Against such a backdrop, steady promotion in the development of WTE has also been included in the “14th Five-Year Plan on Renewable Energy Development (2021–2025)” by the Chinese government [5].

WTE projects are a type of “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) facility, and this inherent NIMBY syndrome is an influential cause of public opposition [6], which also poses a significant challenge to government public policy making. Typically, NIMBY facilities are built under the principle of “the path of least resistance” [7] in peripheral regions populated by less powerful groups [8]. When the externalities of these public services accumulate to a certain level or local people’s awareness increases [9], such projects are prone to conflicts. Some scholars characterized the heart of negative externalities as “localized costs and widely distributed benefits” [10]. At present, WTE is a more desirable option for solid waste disposal in China. However, the public are increasingly protesting against WTE projects in many provinces, some of which have turned into violent resistance [11]. Due to the lack of an open and transparent decision-making process, some projects were not known to residents when they were nearly completed. Therefore, the siting or operation of WTE facilities may threaten the realization of justice. Some scholars argue that public participation is more likely to facilitate achieving environmental justice [12]. Therefore, exploring this topic will provide some references for China or other authoritarian regimes where public participation is weaker.

Most studies on the social impact of NIMBY facilities have focused on the siting phase under the environmental impact assessment (EIA) framework. However, the reality is that NIMBY risks run through the entire life cycle of the facilities [13]. Unlike the perceived hazard in the siting stage, risks are realistic in the operation phase, such as direct losses or indirect damage to the surrounding residents. If mishandled, these projects can further exacerbate public opposition, leading residents to avoid any similar facilities [14]. Some studies have paid attention to the operational stage; these are mainly undertaken from a technical perspective, exploring the reduction of pollutant emissions [15,16], risk management [17,18], technical assessment [19], etc. In contrast, less attention has been paid to public participation during the operational phase, which is essential to the realization of environmental justice. Especially in the context of China’s current EIA framework, which lacks effective public participation and monitoring of operational facilities [20,21], public outcry is the only outlet for seeking redress when pollution occurs [22].

The motivations behind participatory actions when pollution occurs are also worth examining. Some scholars argue that public worries about both environmental and health threats are reflected in China’s WTE projects [23,24,25]. However, relatively few studies have examined how participatory actions differ when different pollution threats are separated from each other. To improve EIA design and promote environmental justice, it is thus important to focus in a more nuanced manner on public involvement in the operational phase. What differences in participation can result from different sources of pollution? What are the implications for the realization of outcome justice? What are the reasons behind it? To answer these questions and bridge the knowledge gaps, we draw upon a single, embedded case study to explore the characteristics and impacts of public participation during the operation stage of WTE plants and explain the reasons for this phenomenon.

This article is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief analytical framework. Section 3 describes the study area and data collection process. We then clarify three essential findings in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the findings. Conclusions are provided in the final section.

2. Analytical Framework

The idea of public participation originated from the New Social Movement in Western countries, and it was recognized as a political principle and has been considered a practical mechanism in environmental governance [26,27]. Even in some young democratic states, the influence of traditional models of public administration has been diminishing while citizen awareness has been developing. Participative tools and techniques have become the core of local governance [28]. In authoritarian states, however, the situation is not quite the same. Public participation was introduced to China by the Asian Development Bank in 1991 [29]. However, many scholars have criticized the effectiveness of environmental participation in China because of certain obstacles, such as the narrow channels for participation [30] and the lack of a meaningful institutional framework to ensure the effectiveness of engagement [21,29]. Questionnaire surveys and public meetings are the two most popularly adopted means in EIA, and these have been criticized as token participation [31]. Despite the reforms in environmental governance, authoritarian countries still largely follow the established tradition of command-and-control governance modalities [32,33]. This raises concerns that these countries are more likely to embrace unjust energy transitions [34].

The energy justice transition as an environmental ethic attempts to address the inequalities created by the energy transition [35,36]. Consequently, the energy transition also places new demands on the transformation of environmental governance [34]. Typically, the traditional environmental governance pattern is dominated by the government from top to bottom in China or other countries where public participation is weaker. The effectiveness of environmental participation will inevitably be compromised in such unarguable top-down orders. Effective public participation can have a bottom-up influence on the decision making and operation of energy facilities, ensuring that the voices of stakeholders are heard. Furthermore, as a form of procedural right, public participation is imperative for achieving an ideal just outcome [37].

The above paragraphs explain the logical relationship between public participation and energy justice. In order to answer the research questions, it is important to choose the proper instrument to measure the different levels of participation. The “ladder of citizen participation” [38] has been proven effective in measuring the dimensions of civic participation. The theory is presented as a metaphorical “ladder”, with each ascending rung illustrating increasing levels of citizen agency, control, and power. In addition to the eight “rungs” of participation, Arnstein includes a descriptive continuum of participatory power that moves from non-participation (no power) to degrees of tokenism (counterfeit power) to degrees of citizen participation (actual power). Based on the “ladder of citizen participation”, we established a conceptual framework, as shown in Figure 1.

As shown in Figure 1, the logic is to determine the participation level by measuring residents’ engagement behaviors in respect of different types of contamination, thus achieving inferences about the attainment of justice. Even though procedural justice and distributive justice are logically independent, they have a relationship of means and goals. The more emphasis placed on procedural fairness, the more tendency there is to improve outcome justice [39]. Notably, the participation level and the degree of justice attainment do not represent a positive correlation, but a causal relationship. For the sake of simplicity and visualization in graphing, the two axes reflect more of a comparative relationship rather than an exact correlation.

Additionally, the scope of this paper is limited to two communities around the WTE plant, mainly for the following reasons. First, in the practice of environmental governance, the communities near the NIMBY facilities are known as the “circle of victims” [40]; these should be the top priority of civil engagement. Second, residents of neighborhoods are more likely to be a high-risk group for environmental conflicts. In disputes, they have a strong sense of cohesion and collective action, making it easier for them to act effectively through established social networks.

3. Methodology

3.1. Case Study Background

Owing to rapid urbanization and growing consumption, China’s development has generated an unprecedented increase in solid waste. No other country has ever experienced as large and as fast an increase in waste quantities as China is now facing (Su et al., 2014). Meanwhile, incineration is gradually becoming the preferred treatment method promoted by the Chinese government. However, the persistent organic pollutants (POPs) produced during waste incineration are hazardous to human health.

To fulfill the Stockholm Convention on POPs, the Ministry of Environmental Protection of China (MEP), in cooperation with the World Bank, applied for a GEF grant to implement a project for municipal waste. Kunming was selected as one of the demonstration cities, and the implementation of public participation has become necessary under the World Bank’s policy. Located in southwestern China, Kunming is the capital city of Yunnan Province, with a population of about 8.6 million as of the end of 2022. The project involved four WTE facilities in Kunming, with nine communities within a 3 km radius of the incinerators being the main target of participation. There are two communities around the Sufeng plant: the Qinyun community (1388 residents) and the Ruiyun community (1635 residents). They are relatively wealthy and belong to the transitional community from rural to urban. First, they are located in the development zone, and the residents benefit from land acquisition. Secondly, there are more job opportunities near the main urban area of Kunming. Although residents still have a small amount of land, the source of income is not dependent on this, and these residents are mainly engaged in business, transportation, service, etc.

We chose the Sufeng plant as the study object for two reasons. First, Sufeng was the city’s environmental education base before the project began and was responsible for some publicity and education. Its citizen participation was said to be the best among the four plants. This could benefit our data collection. Second, different types of pollution were separated and coexisted in this case and more environmental appeals occurred. This is in line with the purpose of our study. To better grasp the technical presentation and social concern characteristics of environmental pollution, it can be categorized as “obvious pollution” and “hidden pollution” [41]. In Chen’s view, the former refers to pollution that has visible forms, which can be intuitively and easily perceived by people’s senses, such as industrial sewage, sulfur dioxide and other air pollution. The latter refers to those types of pollution that are decentralized, hidden, not easy to monitor and difficult to quantify, such as POPs, soil heavy-metal pollution, pesticide and fertilizer pollution, etc. In the context of this article, we use these definitions to refer to environmental pollution and health pollution, respectively. The location map of the case study area is shown in Figure 2.

One of the targets of the project design was to reduce the emission of dioxins, furans and other pollutants, which fall under the category of hidden pollution. According to the “Guidelines on Best Available Technique (BAT)”, combustion process control is one of the techniques for reducing dioxins. Due to inadequate sorting and separating of wet and dry waste, incineration plants in China have difficulty burning waste with high moisture content while maintaining a desirable temperature for safe operations and power generation [24]. However, emissions can be reduced as much as possible by employing government and public supervision and technical upgrading, which is what the project was initially designed for. In addition, the operation of the plant resulted in a visual impact on the nearby communities in the form of “obvious pollution”, such as odor and road pollution. The pollution was more akin to the manifestations of landfills and was caused by leakage during transportation. Due to the poor sealing of some trucks, waste leachate accumulated on the Yunqi road and caused a foul smell. It is necessary to underscore that the leachate is mainly generated from kitchen waste due to inadequate wet and dry separation of garbage. This does not mean that the leachate only causes environmental aesthetic and odor impacts without any health hazard. However, it is somewhat different from landfill leachate and does not cause contamination of water sources, so it is far less of a health hazard than toxic compounds.

3.2. Material Collection and Processing

This research is a qualitative analysis based on semi-structured interviews and questionnaire surveys conducted in 2016 and 2019. The opportunity to conduct the survey was presented by our involvement in the external monitoring of the project. As an external monitoring agency hired by the project management office (PMO), our main task was to monitor the outcome of public participation as well as to discover any problems. We established a trusting relationship with the locals, which ensured our access to the interviewees. Our fieldwork was conducted at the PMO, local government agencies and the WTE plant to collect first-hand information and visit two communities. Each survey lasted approximately one week. These communities were selected because of their proximity to the Sufeng plant and were targeted for public participation in the project.

The main purpose of our semi-structured interviews was to grasp the current status of residents’ participation, their knowledge of WTE and their complaints and grievances. To ensure the authenticity and reliability of field data, we interviewed several different groups to perform tripartite verification. First, a number of interviews with officials were conducted. The interviewees consisted of two staff members of the city’s Urban Management Agency (UMA) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), two staff members of the town government and six community cadres from the two communities. Second, 20 residents from the community were randomly selected as respondents through the snowball sampling method. In 2016, we selected 20 respondents from two communities. In 2019, we conducted a return visit to the respondents. Since only 16 respondents in the original sample were found, 8 respondents were supplemented. The questions were the same for all community respondents. In addition, we interviewed three staff members who are responsible for public participation from the WTE plant. The interview time for all respondents was about 20–60 min, and we used Mandarin Chinese, recorded with the respondents’ consent. The records were subsequently transcribed to produce survey notes of approximately 30,000 words. In the following interview presentation, real names have been anonymized for protection.

In conjunction with a semi-structured interview, a questionnaire survey was implemented, which was mainly based on the project’s external monitoring mission. During this process, we possessed a dual role as both researchers and monitoring teams. We randomly selected 30 people per community for the questionnaire in 2016 and 2019, which also included some informants in semi-structured interviews. Although the questionnaire was mainly intended to meet the requirements of external monitoring, it could also provide some useful information for this study. Therefore, we extracted a proportion of the data from the external monitoring report to serve as an illustration in Section 4.

4. Findings

Through our survey, interviews, and our desktop research, three key findings emerged. This section is organized around these findings.

4.1. Equal Participation Channels of Hidden and Obvious Pollution

In China, pollution caused by MSWI during the operating stage is usually treated as a common environmental problem. The main remedy approaches generally include the environmental protection hotline, the mayor’s hotline, internet complaints, media pleas, environmental litigation, etc. This project included the World Bank’s safeguard policy to implement public participation, and the channels were broadened and diversified. The first approach was to carry out information publicity to ensure the citizens’ right to know, and the second was to open up channels to ensure the right to participate.

4.1.1. Diversified Access to Environmental Information

Firstly, the government publicized the content and progress of the project. As the liability subject of information release, the PMO disclosed information about the project on a particular website. In addition, the project information, environmental audit reports and environmental management plans were posted on the two communities’ bulletin boards from time to time.

Secondly, environmental data from the WTE plant were published daily on the open website of the environmental department, as required. This channel was created based on China’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS), which was introduced in 2004 by the MEP. It was used to collect hourly emissions data for major polluting plants in China. These plants are responsible for more than 75% of the country’s industrial emissions, and the monitoring indicators mainly include gaseous pollutants and particulate matter. Despite this, about one-third of the CEMS plants committed pollution violations in 2019 [42].

In addition, the plant displayed the furnace temperature and pollutants on an LED screen outside the plant in real time, including nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrogen chloride, sulfur dioxide, soot and other significant emissions. The primary purpose was to enable the public and residents to monitor the environmental requirements of waste incineration. If the public had any doubts about this, they could conduct inquiries and issue complaints.

Finally, dioxin monitoring data were also publicized on the official website of the EPA. This information was unavailable on the communities’ bulletin boards or other websites. The incineration plants did not yet have the technical capability to continuously monitor dioxin emissions. Sampling and analysis of dioxin emissions were carried out once a year by an institute contracted by the incinerator operator. Only the previous year’s data were available for the current year. A summary of the above is shown in

Table 1. Summary of environmental information disclosure.

Information Categories	Description	Frequency
The project’s progress and publicity	Publicity on the communities’ bulletin boards, official websites	Occasional releases
Real-time operating data of plant	Real-time display of furnace temperatures and pollutants on LED screens, official websites	Real-time release
Dioxin monitoring data (objectively speaking, this channel did not make much sense. When dioxin sampling was conducted once a year, there was no assurance that the waste incinerator was always being operated under typical operating conditions. However, this underscored the need for public monitoring of plant operations)	Disclosed on the official websites	Annual update

.

4.1.2. Complete Channels of Participation

The consulting team organized engagement activities and designed relatively smooth involvement channels for the nearby residents. First, the WTE plant should enter the community for publicity. These activities mainly involved promoting residents’ knowledge of waste incineration, dioxins and health risks, as well as distributing brochures and gifts to them, etc.

The government also established a full complaint and grievance mechanism. In addition to the usual complaint channels, the UMA and the EPA set up separate platforms on their official websites and mobile apps. WeChat, the most widely used social networking app in China today, was also an available access tool. All complaints, whether recorded from the hotline, the internet or letters, were given the same importance. Each complaint needed to be concluded within seven working days. If not, the complainant would also be informed of the reasons in written documents, phone calls, etc.

The plant was open to nearby residents, who could visit at any time under the premise of safety. This was uncommon in other parts of China, as incineration operators feared it might cause unnecessary trouble. In this project, the aim was to make residents more intuitively understand the working mechanism of the WTE, reduce residents’ misunderstanding and realize the supervision of the incineration plant. A summary of the above is shown in

Table 2. Summary of public participation activities.

Activity Categories	Description	Frequency
Publicity of MSWI	The plant staff entered the community for publicity, or gave out some small gifts to residents, including notebooks, aprons and umbrellas	Once a year
Community residents visited the plant	Community leaders or representatives entered the plant to learn about MSWI; random visits by residents were also accepted	Occasional
Establishment of a grievance mechanism	Hotline complaints, internet complaints. Other mechanisms for complaints	Long-term mechanism

.

4.2. Actual Obvious Pollution: A Dominant Factor in Action

4.2.1. Road Pollution Became a Trigger of NIMBY Dispute

Any action must be derived from one or more motives. In this section, we explore the motives behind the engagement of the residents; specifically, what kind of negative externalities affect the residents and trigger public actions. We found that the road pollution caused by the waste transfer vehicle triggered a dispute. The nearby residents showed more vigorous enthusiasm for the dispute, and their behavior was more spontaneous.

Residents believed that the plant should be fully responsible for road pollution, and there were fierce conflicts between the community and waste truck drivers. Many waste vehicles ran red lights, which affected pedestrian safety, fueling the community’s disgust with the plant. Most residents were indignant when this was mentioned. Despite discontent with the incineration plant, they did not use violent or impulsive resistance methods or organize protests such as sit-in demonstrations. Some residents also resorted to community cadres for help. As the interviewee L.Y. complained in an agitated tone, “The road is so smelly, as you must have seen. It is covered in a black layer of filth (leachate). Our windows face the road, and I usually do not dare open them in summer. The gate (area) of the plant stinks even worse, and you have to walk around it because it makes you vomit. We don’t dare to block the gate (of the plant). No one organizes us; what if we get arrested? I want it to move out quickly and stop affecting our life. I also heard that some local people who worked in the factory got cancer and died” (L.Y., 20161008).

One community cadre told us about a conflict that occurred on the road: “People in our Qinyun community are very concerned about the road safety because there is a primary school in the Ruiyun community, and our children need to cross the road to go to school accompanied by the elderly. Those waste trucks drive fast and run red lights. A stranger was hit and killed on that road a few years ago. In our community, an older man passed away the year before last, and the funeral procession happened on that road. A waste truck driver thought the crowd was in his way, honked his horn madly. The residents have long been dissatisfied with them (the plant and the drivers of transfer vehicles), so a group of people grabbed him off the truck and beat him up badly. Fortunately, I arrived in time to deal with the situation before it worsened” (S.Y.N., 20161015).

What needs to be explained here is why road pollution problems have existed for a long time and are difficult to solve. First, the moisture in MSW is inherently high in the south of China, reaching about 40–60%, due to soup-rich eating habits, humid weather, etc. [43]. Combined with inadequate waste separation and poor sealing of transfer trucks, leachate was produced. Second, the incineration plant had no right to decide what kind of trucks could enter the plant. Following the unified plan of Kunming City, the UMA signed agreements with WTE plants to determine the distribution of municipal waste. We learned that the Sufeng plant did not receive a sufficient amount under the contract to achieve power generation capacity.

4.2.2. Active Participation Gained a Satisfactory Outcome

In respect of the above obvious pollution, the residents were actively involved. The main channels for their appeals included the environmental protection hotline, the mayor’s hotline, etc. Community cadres also appealed to the government. This drew the attention of the consulting team. The consulting expert, who was also one of the Municipal People’s Congress (MPC) representatives, built a bridge between the government and the public. In July 2017, the expert suggested improving the quality of waste transfer vehicles in Kunming at the MPC meeting. In June 2018, she proposed changing the transportation route of waste vehicles in the Sufeng plant. Finally, the UMA carried out rectification.

As the consulting expert said, “Community residents are very sensitive to the operation of incineration plants, and leachate is highly likely to lead to conflicts. This situation existed in all four incineration plants and was more acute in the Sufeng plant. Residents had also been complaining through public channels, as well as addressing our consulting team, but complaints had not been well resolved. I wondered if there could be a different way to be able to solve this problem as soon as possible. In 2017, I put forward a proposal to improve the quality of waste transfer vehicles in Kunming at the MPC meeting. The result was very good, and the government completed the rectification at the end of that year. In 2018, I proposed changing the waste transfer routes for the Sufeng plant, and these were rectified in the same month. The UMA banned all transfer vehicles from entering Yunqi Road, and those who violate the ban or cause road pollution will be fined. Until that time, the problem was completely resolved” (C.K., 20190928).

That is not to say that the pollution would not have been resolved through other channels, and as one official from the UMA told us, this type of political participation can lead to a quicker resolution of the problem. “At that time, there were a total of 1744 garbage collection vehicles, of which a considerable number were poorly sealed, resulting in leachate leakage. We had received a large number of complaints from different groups in society and had been making efforts to solve the problem, but the progress was a bit slow. There were two main difficulties: firstly, there was not sufficient budget to upgrade vehicles. Secondly, the waste collection entities in Kunming were diverse and complex, and we were unable to manage them in a centralized and unified manner. The proposal put forward by Professor C.K. had attracted the attention of higher government departments so that the problem could be dealt with more quickly. Firstly, we contracted with a company to take charge of some parts of urban management, which included trash collection and transfer. Secondly, we purchased new garbage transfer vehicles and upgraded the existing vehicles to enhance the airtightness. Finally, we strengthened daily supervision and management” (H.J., 20190927).

As can be seen from the above, the public’s opinions are communicated from the bottom up, and when they are taken into account by higher levels of government, the top-down administrative logic speeds up the resolution of the problem. Some scholars propose that communication is crucial when helping to create networks connecting various stakeholders both vertically and horizontally [44,45]. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as a type of social development agency, have an advantage in communicating ideas. For example, environmental NGOs play a significant role in the communication and strengthening of a society’s power in a bottom-up way [46,47]. However, NGOs still face many political constraints in China [48,49]. The consultant team served as a bridge between the residents and the government in the absence of environmental NGOs. This participatory approach worked and facilitated consensus reaching.

4.3. Perceived Hidden Pollution: A Weapon to Dramatize Grievance

4.3.1. Residents Were Not Indifferent to Health Hazards

Regarding the issue of employee cancer, we learned that such a case does exist, but no direct evidence could prove the employee’s cancer was related to the WTE plant. In practice, many barriers remain in proving the causal link between disease and health. The awareness process is one of the key factors, and it will also be discussed in Section 5. Lora-Wainwright has argued that citizens’ awareness of pollution’s effects on health can gain strength when it is consonant with locals’ experience and moral values, and when it is it can create support, attention, etc. [50]. Hence, perceptions of pollution’s effects on health are somewhat subjective.

In the dispute, linking the incineration plant with cancer was more like a “culture toolkit” for residents. They constructed an alternative narrative about incineration from a public health perspective. The linkage was mainly utilized as a strategic weapon to dramatize grievances and gain identity for consistent actions.

However, the concern about cancer also reflected that the residents were not totally indifferent to health hazards. Some research shows that health hazards play an essential role in the lives of Chinese people [51]. Therefore, will residents also have active participation in respect of hidden pollution?

4.3.2. Ambiguous Cognition and Inactive Action in Respect of Health Hazards

To measure the cognition and action of residents in respect of health hazards, we extracted a proportion of the data from the external monitoring report to serve as an illustration. For the external monitoring mission, the team employed a random sampling method and selected 30 people per community for the questionnaire. We extracted the relevant five questions and their statistics in the report, as shown in

Table 3. Statistics of the questionnaire.

Questions	Options	Percentage (2016)	Percentage (2019)
Knowledge of dioxins	Yes	23.33%	33.33%
	No	76.67%	66.67%
Attitude towards waste incineration	Support	23.33%	30%
	Neutrality	40%	46.67%
	Opposition	36.67%	23.33%
Awareness of the environmental information	Yes	26.67%	40%
	No	73.33%	60%
Participation in activities	Yes	6.67%	36.67%
	No	93.33%	63.33%
Satisfaction with public participation	Yes	16.67%	63.33%
	Indifference	26.67%	16.67%
	No	56.67%	20%

Source: Monitoring and Evaluation Report on Information Disclosure and Public Awareness Promotion by Sichuan Fontal Strategic Consulting Co. Note: Consent has been given for the use of these data by the external monitoring agency.

.

The above table shows that organized public engagement is still somewhat practical. However, the deficiency here is that residents did not know enough about dioxins. Although the participation rate increased, most residents only engaged in one or two publicity activities. Through the interviews, we found that residents were inactively involved in health hazards. Residents barely understood the meaning of MSWI or dioxins due to their limited capability to obtain and assimilate information. Taking the LED screens as an example, the residents hardly comprehended the chemical pollutants on the screen and had no desire to learn more about them. As for the dioxin monitoring information, no one went to the website to check the public report. It is also implied that even though the information is technically available, collecting it and processing it may be difficult. Notably, residents’ satisfaction with participation efforts changed dramatically. The main reason was the satisfactory solution to road pollution.

5. Discussion

5.1. Differential Participation Degree Affects Outcome Justice

5.1.1. A “Ladder” Feature Is Manifested in Participation

From the above findings, it is clear that residents were involved in both obvious and hidden pollution. Where these two existed independently, residents were more concerned about obvious environmental pollution. As for the hidden pollution, residents had a vague cognition and inactively engaged in it.

We determined the stage of the two types of engagement based on Arnstein’s participation ladder. We first categorized all engagement activities according to their external performances, and then determined where these performances were located on the participation ladder. Details are described in

Table 4. External performances on participation.

Performances Categories	Description	Stakeholders
Achieve consensus	The problem of road pollution was solved	Residents; consultants, government
Seek consensus	Residents complained about road pollution and conflicted with the waste transfer driver; consultant put forward proposal at the MPC meeting	Residents; consultants
Sociological surveys	Consulting team conducted community surveys for participation designs	Consultants; residents
Publicity	Information was disclosed on bulletin boards, internet, etc.	The plant; residents; government
Interactive events	The plant staff entered the community for promotion of WTE education, or gave out some small gifts; residents visited the plant	The plant; residents

and Figure 3.

As we can see from Figure 3, the involvement in the environment eventually reaches the primary degree of citizen power. In the case of health, the engagement of residents is realized through community survey propaganda and posting announcements, which still represents a degree of tokenism. Therefore, in conjunction with Section 3, we can conclude that residents’ participation in the obvious pollution outstrips participation in hidden pollution, showing a ladder shape.

5.1.2. The Realization of Outcome Justice Is Compromised

This case study also validates the view that active public appeals are effective in reducing environmental pollution in China [42]. As to the reasons, some scholars argue that the frequency, scale and impact of public complaints are crucial. Governments are more likely to respond to appeals that are likely to attract the attention of the upper-level government [52]. The above points can be reflected in the solution of obvious pollution. Furthermore, we reveal that differences in the level of public participation do exist when the public faces different types of pollution. Then, the differential engagement degree partially affects the attainment of outcome justice.

Citizen participation is a manifestation of procedural justice, and the access channel is a precondition for engagement. In this case study, there are equally broad channels for obvious and hidden pollution, which offer greater possibilities for achieving procedural justice. However, this suggests that making engagement channels available is not necessarily sufficient to prompt action and lead to good outcomes. The involvement in environmental issues is practical and attains outcome justice. However, the low level of health participation leads to a deviation from the project’s initial target. In addition, the outcome justice is only partially completed in respect of health issues. Therefore, in environmental engagement, the public has different perceptions of different types of pollution, and perceptions lead to various actions, which ultimately affect the realization of outcome justice. The shift from procedural justice to outcome justice is not inevitable and is subject to many factors.

5.2. Reasons for Partial Realization of Outcome Justice

Not all pollution leads to disputes, and not all engagement actions yield desirable outcomes. The engagement process virtually reflects a transformation from awareness to action. We will explore the forming mechanism from an activism perspective.

5.2.1. From Pollution to Grievance: Differences in Cognition

Van Rooji argues that naming and blaming are two conditions for generating complaints [53]. As a cognitive process, naming sometimes involves a quick judgment, and sometimes it takes a long time for residents to know or be sure of the adverse effects of pollution. The key to this process is whether the cognitive agent has sufficient knowledge. When generating complaints, knowledge itself is unimportant, but it is a prerequisite for action. With enough knowledge to grasp the seriousness of pollution and its harmful effects (naming), people find the causal link between pollution and responsible entities (blaming).

The social perception of the same environmental fact varies greatly, meaning that some environmental facts are clear to professionals but not to the general public. Some pollution feels very serious to residents, but it is only slightly harmful to experts, and vice versa. In this study, dioxins, as a toxic pollution compound, were pretty clear to professionals but not the general public. Residents did not have enough knowledge to comprehend dioxin hazards fully, which were cast as an ambiguous image. Conversely, the cognitive process of road pollution was relatively simple due to the external intuitiveness. Therefore, it can be seen that obvious and hidden pollution differ in the cognitive process, affecting the basis of the public’s subsequent engagement in the later stage.

5.2.2. From Grievance to Action: Constraints in Action

Not all complaints will generate action. In the present study, we believe that the most critical constraints are residents’ limitations and organizational capabilities.

First, insufficient ability of the public may hinder their participation [52], including social class, income, education, etc. Johnson revealed that China’s urban middle class actively learned about dioxins and waste disposal to challenge experts’ technical defenses [25]. Some also possessed foreign language skills that enabled them to introduce knowledge from overseas. This self-study process can be termed “expertification of lay experts” [54], which did not happen in this case. Johnson’s study is based in Beijing and Guangzhou, two metropolises in China, and many elite representatives were involved. As noted, our study area is in the city suburbs, where the population is incomparable to the educated middle class in urban areas.

Secondly, organizational capacity and social resource support are also constraints. Social movements require mobilization to coordinate resources and actions, and elite leaders play a decisive role. In Johnson’s case, elite representatives organized themselves to form a consistent movement. Their social resources enabled them to connect with sympathetic waste experts and ENGOs to construct legitimacy for actions. In this case, there were neither elite representatives nor ENGOs. However, the consultant team provided external assistance to address the road pollution. If residents also have a strong willingness to engage in health issues, with the help of consulting experts, it is expected that a higher participation level can be achieved. However, in the last process, hidden pollution was partially ignored, constraining the next steps.

From an activism perspective, participatory action is a multi-faceted and complex process that is influenced by many factors [53]. There are difficulties in sufficiently demonstrating which forms of public participation are most effective to deliver a higher degree of outcome justice. However, this case study does provide some reference. The implementation of public participation during the operational phase provides residents with access to redress and achieves a degree of justice distribution.

6. Conclusions

According to the above considerations and the empirical findings, conclusions have been drawn. Active public participation has been effective in resolving environmental conflicts, achieving a certain degree of environmental justice. However, the level of citizen participation varies for different pollution types, with participation in the obvious pollution outstripping that in the hidden pollution. A ladder feature was manifested, which suggested a particular impact on the realization of outcome justice. The different perceptions of the pollution risks and the constraints on actions contribute to this state.

We acknowledge a number of study limitations. Firstly, the development of public participation in China is still in its infancy, and there are some constraints on the data collection. Secondly, the relationships between public participation and justice realization are multiple and complex, so the logical framework needs to be further revised, and the measurement indicators need to be more detailed. Finally, the study focused on a WTE plant in Kunming City, so our findings may not be representative of public participation in other regions of China. Thus, future studies should focus on regional comparison and use quantitative or empirical research methods to obtain more objective and generalizable conclusions.

The main contribution of this paper is to reveal the relationship between public participation and energy justice. The authors call for a more nuanced focus on the processes and outcomes of public participation in energy transitions, especially in authoritarian countries. Currently, governments face more uncertainty in their decision-making processes [55,56]. To reduce environmental risks and maintain environmental justice, we hereby propose the following policy recommendations. First, the government is required to expand the scope of participation and integrate practical engagement throughout the whole life of energy transition projects. Second, it is necessary to strengthen the communication between different stakeholders in environmental governance and realize the role of non-governmental organizations as a bridge in environmental problem solving. Third, improving citizens’ awareness of public affairs and environmental responsibility is urgently needed to achieve better environmental justice.