Next Article in Journal
Forecasting Chinese Electricity Consumption Based on Grey Seasonal Model with New Information Priority
Next Article in Special Issue
The Effect of Golden Ratio-Based Capital Structure on Firm’s Financial Performance
Previous Article in Journal
Establishing Performance Criteria for Evaluating Pedestrian Environments
Previous Article in Special Issue
Research on the Impact of Mixed Reform of State-Owned Enterprises on Enterprise Performance—Based on PSM-DID Method
 
 
Font Type:
Arial Georgia Verdana
Font Size:
Aa Aa Aa
Line Spacing:
Column Width:
Background:
Article

Impact of Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance on New Venture Resilience: The Mediating Role of Resource Bricolage

1
Business School, Guangdong Ocean University, Yangjiang 529500, China
2
Business School, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou 362031, China
3
MBA Program in Southeast Asia, National Taipei University of Education, Taipei 106, Taiwan
4
Graduate Institute of Global Business and Strategy, National Taiwan Normal University, Taipei 106, Taiwan
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2023, 15(4), 3518; https://doi.org/10.3390/su15043518
Submission received: 31 December 2022 / Revised: 10 February 2023 / Accepted: 13 February 2023 / Published: 14 February 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Corporate Governance, Performance and Sustainable Growth)

Abstract

:
Entrepreneurial teams are seen as pilots with which to steer growth in new ventures. However, there is currently a lack of studies exploring how they work under conditions of uncertainty. Based on the upper echelons theory and institutional theory, this study aims to reveal the role of entrepreneurial teams in new venture resilience through a questionnaire survey. Based on the data of 549 valid respondents, we find that resource bricolage is the key factor in new venture resilience, for which entrepreneurial team autonomy management governance is the most effective means. Specifically, (1) Entrepreneurial team profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance significantly improve new venture resilience, whereas equity governance does not. (2) All the assessed means of entrepreneurial team contractual governance positively stimulate resource bricolage, with management autonomy governance playing the greatest role. (3) Resource bricolage significantly promotes new venture resilience and plays a complete mediating role in the relationship between equity governance and organizational resilience, and also plays a partial mediating role in the relationships of profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance in regard to organizational resilience. These results suggest that entrepreneurial teams should prioritize authorizing further management rights to encourage team members to take on additional responsibilities, which could improve the resource bricolage capacities of new ventures and thus strengthen their resilience in tackling struggles.

1. Introduction

Resources are believed to be one of the most critical factors for firms to achieve sustainable growth [1,2,3]. However, being limited by newborn weaknesses such as narrow social networks, deficiencies of legitimacy, and inexperienced entrepreneurs, new ventures usually do not have a ready-made resource base as mature firms do, and this lack of resources negatively affects their ability to deal with unexpected issues [4,5]. To alleviate the struggles mentioned above, previous studies have suggested forming partnerships, especially since entrepreneurial teams may not only bring new ventures more entrepreneurial skills and experiences, but also help them to strengthen their social connections; this improves the resource base of their firm and widens their channels of resource acquisition. For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven [6] argued that founding team members with various experiences may facilitate a firm’s rapid growth, while Yang and Aldrich [7] found that entrepreneurial team members with diverse educational backgrounds may positively advance a new venture’s survivability.
However, some other scholars have argued that entrepreneurial teams do not always bring benefits to their firms. Team heterogeneity in age, gender, and vocational background is negatively associated with firm performance [8], and only provides positive benefits with respect to factors such as authorized leadership [9] and suitable power sharing [10]. Thus, we believe that it is not only the entrepreneurial team members themselves, but also the integration and organization of the unique capabilities of each entrepreneurial team member that lead to better outcomes. Consequently, from the perspective of institutional theory, this study argues that entrepreneurial team contractual governance is necessary for new ventures to improve firms’ ability to deal with unexpected issues; this is not only because the team institution can enforce the resources and efforts that each team member should bear, but also because it can prevent the potential risks that may be brought by team members due to the limited rationality of humans during the process of entrepreneurship, including risks such as “free riding” behavior, promise breaking, and so on.
Thus, based on upper echelons theory and institutional theory, this study aims to explore how entrepreneurial team contractual governance impacts new venture organizational resilience and to verify the mediating role of resource bricolage in this relationship. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, a literature review of entrepreneurial team contractual governance, resource bricolage, and organizational resilience is carried out, and then hypotheses on the relationship between the variables are proposed, in addition to a research framework being constructed. Next, survey data are collected through a web-based questionnaire investigation. The results show that the two means, named profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance, positively promote organizational resilience in new ventures; meanwhile, equity governance does not, and resource bricolage plays a mediating role between them.
Two key contributions are made by this study. First, from an institutional perspective, this study explores the paths of how new ventures improve their organizational resilience by leveraging an entrepreneurial team’s capabilities through contractual governance; in further comparing the effect of each dimension, the results of this study may enrich the research field of entrepreneurial teams. Second, this study reveals the mediating role that resource bricolage plays in the relationship between entrepreneurial team contractual governance and organizational resilience; this deepens our understanding of the ways new ventures construct resources to respond to crises effectively. These findings provide practical guidance and reference significance for both entrepreneurial team capabilities and new venture resilience building.

2. Theoretical Background and Model Hypothesis

2.1. Theoretical Background

In upper echelons theory, the practical way to understand a company is to investigate its top managers because their values and behaviors determine the quality of the company’s strategies, which may lead to the company being a success or failure. Furthermore, compared with individual entrepreneurs, top management teams perform better in information channel widening, decision-making diversity, and effective strategy implementation [11,12]. In addition to this notion, studies have argued that the demography and collective cognition of entrepreneurial teams [7,13] are positively related to organizational performance. However, some other studies have argued that unlike mature enterprises, which have clear separations of ownership and control in corporate governance, the entrepreneurial teams of new ventures usually bear the two powers and derived responsibilities together because their members include founders, top managers, and shareholders; alternatively, they may even lump all the above responsibilities together [14,15]. Cooney [16] argued that entrepreneurial team members include not only the founders but also the key managers who master the core business tasks, such as investment decisions, financial management, strategy-making, and other major issues of the new venture. Hence, previous studies based on the upper echelons theory have only uncovered the control function of entrepreneurial teams in new venture management, while those based on corporate governance theory have only uncovered the role of ownership in new venture governance; neither type of study has revealed the entire extent of entrepreneurial teams’ power over sustainable growth in new ventures.
Recent studies have argued that team institution represents a new perspective with which to reveal the role of entrepreneurial teams and their impact on new ventures [10,15,17]. According to institutional theory, to limit the opportunistic behavior of entrepreneurial team members, team institution is necessary to encourage behavior consistent with the interests of the team and the organization [18,19]. Furthermore, entrepreneurial teams not only possess management power, but also wield the same power as owners; they are required to contribute to the development of new ventures while simultaneously being able to share in the profits. Hence, entrepreneurial team contractual governance includes three means, namely equity governance, profit-sharing governance, and management autonomy governance, which refer to the formal team norm to clarify an entrepreneurial team’s commitment and obligation to their cooperation process [14,15].
Resource bricolage is believed to represent a critical approach for firms, especially for new ventures that do not have sufficient time and capabilities to source and build optimal resources by acquiring new and expensive resources [20,21]. The word ‘bricolage’ was introduced by Weick [22] in the field of organization management and refers to solving problems by using the limited resources at hand or seizing new opportunities through immediate actions [2,23]. Specifically, there are three dimensions to resource bricolage, namely the resource at hand, making do, and combining resources for new purposes [24], which are not limited to tangible resource construction and may also include intangible resource reuse.
Originally, resilience referred to objects that are not easily broken by external impacts. Meyer [25] first introduced this concept to the field of organization management, suggesting that the essence of organizational resilience is the ability of a firm to cope and adapt to dramatic changes effectively. Previous studies in this field can be divided into two main paths, namely the psychological path and systemic path. Studies taking the former path have suggested that collective cognition, motivation, and synergistic ability are conducive to firms coping with crises [26,27], while the latter studies have claimed that the abilities of resource acquirement and deployment help firms to cope with crises and break through bottlenecks [28]. Combing the two views, Lu Jiangyong and Peirong [29] found that collective efforts are believed to better improve the level of resource construction and thus enhance organizational resilience, and that governance frameworks are believed promote the effectiveness of collective action [30].

2.2. Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance and New Venture Resilience

As the leader and decision maker, the entrepreneurial team is the critical factor related to the quality of decision-making and thus further influences the growth of new ventures [30,31]. For example, the ownership distribution and management power composition of an entrepreneurial team determine the basic form of an organizational structure and influence the developmental logic of new ventures, such as decisions regarding who should prepare resources, the method with which to gain resources, and the initiative to deal with unexpected issues [14,15]; this further determines the abilities of new ventures in crisis prediction and coping [32]. Not only starting a new venture but also determining its required investments for growth through equity governance means that entrepreneurial team members deepen their understating of responsibilities pertaining to resource preparation; this is in order to build the resource base required for firm growth. Moreover, profit-sharing governance aligns entrepreneurial team members’ efforts with the organization’s development direction and motivates them to make the extra effort necessary to determine solutions to alleviate the negative effects brought by crises. Finally, management autonomy governance encourages entrepreneurial team members to be more proactive, allowing them to adopt innovative strategies and take immediate action to cope with changes. To summarize, entrepreneurial team contractual governance illustrates the roles of each entrepreneurial team member, encouraging them to perform their duties more proactively while taking into account the needs of other members to make more efficient decisions, thus enabling new ventures to cope with crises more effectively [15,30].
Hypothesis 1a (H1a).
Entrepreneurial team equity governance is positively associated with new venture resilience.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b).
Entrepreneurial team profit-sharing governance is positively associated with new venture resilience.
Hypothesis 1c (H1c).
Entrepreneurial team management autonomy governance is positively associated with new venture resilience.

2.3. Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance and Resource Bricolage

Partnership entrepreneurship is believed to be an effective way to acquire more sufficient resources than an individual entrepreneur would [6,7]. However, team conflict, resulting from problems such as power struggles, unequal profit sharing, and free riders, is inevitable during the team process and brings negative effects, including a lower entrepreneurial team capacity. In order to reduce the potential risks mentioned above, Zhu, Qi [15] suggested that it is necessary to improve the cooperation quality among entrepreneurial team members to better leverage their resources and capacities through contractual governance. In practice, entrepreneurial team contractual governance enforces the scope of responsibilities that team members should bear so as to gather scattered individual resources into an organizational resource base. Specifically, equity governance defines the materials and human capital that each entrepreneurial team member should invest; profit-sharing governance defines the income proportion of the team members and motivates them to pursue higher performance, and management autonomy governance determines the decision-making and management responsibilities [15]. In other words, contractual governance improves information transparency and, therefore, motivates entrepreneurial team members to invest more resources to achieve entrepreneurial goals [33]. Thus, we believe that the essence of entrepreneurial team contractual governance lies in guaranteeing the resources of entrepreneurial team members in advance through formal contracts and building the resource base required for enterprises to deal with crises.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a).
Entrepreneurial team equity governance is positively associated with resource bricolage.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b).
Entrepreneurial team profit-sharing governance is positively associated with resource bricolage.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c).
Entrepreneurial team management autonomy governance is positively associated with resource bricolage.

2.4. The Mediating Role of Resource Bricolage

Organizational resilience is not innate; it is gradually built up over the course of numerous crisis responses. In the process, organizational members must act organically in order to better leverage collective capabilities and limited resources to develop strategies to cope with adversity [29,34]. As the drivers of new ventures, entrepreneurial teams not only undertake responsibilities of ownership, but also perform the task of top managers; thus, contractual governance is necessary in order to define the resources that they should provide for starting a new venture and to inspire them to work hard for the new venture’s sustainable growth. First, in equity governance, entrepreneurial team members are required to provide the necessary resources to start a new venture, and an initial resource base is formed. Second, profit-sharing governance illustrates a future income blueprint, implying to the entrepreneurial team that the more successful the new ventures are, the more income they will receive, which may motivate them to work harder, invariably improving the human resources of new ventures [35]. Third, crises usually cannot be predicted and require timely responses; if entrepreneurial team members do not have sufficient management autonomy, they will take time to discuss a crisis and ultimately miss the optimum coping period. However, if they have flexible management autonomy, they may increase their coping strategies and take action in due time. In other words, management autonomy makes entrepreneurial teams more proactive in taking action in response to crises. Thus, entrepreneurial team contractual governance constructs a structure that guides consistent collective action, as one that integrates the dispersed resources of entrepreneurial team members, thus helping new ventures to improve their resource base and ultimately enabling them to better cope with crises [30,36].
Hypothesis 3a (H3a).
Resource bricolage ability mediates the relationship between entrepreneurial team equity governance and new venture resilience.
Hypothesis 3b (H3b).
Resource bricolage ability mediates the relationship between entrepreneurial team profit-sharing governance and new venture resilience.
Hypothesis 3c (H3c).
Resource bricolage ability mediates the relationship between entrepreneurial team management autonomy governance and new venture resilience.
Based on the hypotheses mentioned above, the theoretical framework of this study was constructed, as shown in Figure 1.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Questionnaire Design

The official questionnaire was formed and validated in three steps: (1) The first draft was checked by entrepreneurial team members and senior scholars of entrepreneurship in order to ensure its quality. (2) A small-scale pre-survey of a total of 30 entrepreneurial teams was conducted to test the readability, reliability, and stability of the questionnaire. (3) The official questionnaire included two sections: The first section of the questionnaire aimed to collect the demographic characteristics of the participants, including gender, age, education, and position, as well as information about their company, including company age and company size. The second section collected the views of entrepreneurial team members on the equity governance, profit-sharing governance, management autonomy governance, and resource bricolage of their teams, as well as the resilience status of their organizations. Finally, the model included 5 variables and a total of 27 questions, as presented in Appendix A Table A1. A 7-point Likert scale was used for the participants to evaluate their answers, where 1 meant “totally disagree” and 7 meant “totally agree”.
Previous studies have included different criteria, such as company age, development stage, and company size, in order to distinguish new ventures [37,38]. Among these criteria, company age was determined to be the easiest way to distinguish new ventures and has been used the most frequently. In this study, we followed the way in which Zahra and Bogner [38] implemented this factor by limiting the company age of new ventures studied to equal to or less than 8 years. Furthermore, according to the literature review of this study, entrepreneurial team contractual governance includes three dimensions, namely equity governance, profit-sharing governance, and management autonomy governance. The scales used were developed by Zhu, Qi [15]. Specifically, there are 4 items with which to measure equity governance, another 4 items with which to measure profit-sharing governance, and 5 items with which to measure management autonomy governance. In the pre-survey step, the outer loading of 1 item of profit-sharing governance was lower than 0.65 and hence the item was removed [39]. Resource bricolage includes three dimensions, namely the resource at hand, making do, and combining resources for new purposes [40]. This study used the scale proposed by Senyard, Baker [21], which includes 8 items. The items with which to measure organizational resilience were proposed by Kantur and Say [41], including 9 items. Compared with other scales, the unique advantage of this scale is that it considers both team-level and organizational-level factors of organizational resilience, which better suits this study. In the pre-survey step, we found that the outer loading of 2 items was lower than 0.65; hence, these items were removed, leaving 7 items remaining for further analysis.
According to Hambrick and Mason [11], an organization’s social networks, resource base, and routine mature as it grows older; thus, companies that have been established for a longer time may have a superior ability to deal with crises. Furthermore, the larger the organization, the better its resource base and acquisition ability [42]. Thus, in order to improve the reliability of the results, this study selected company age and size as control variables.

3.2. Survey Implementation

The official questionnaire was sent to target participants from July 2021 to January 2022, and 1054 samples were obtained. Two criteria were then used to filter out the valid samples. First, as per the model by Zahra and Bogner [38], only organizations and entrepreneurial teams that were either 8 years old or younger were included, which reduced the sample number to 586. Second, participants who selected a position other than founder, stakeholder, or top manager were excluded, and the sample was further reduced to 549. Survey implementation included 3 steps. First, two sources of participants were contacted: One source comprised entrepreneurs familiar to the authors or who were introduced to the authors through social relations, such as friends, teachers, and family members. Another source of participants was contacted via WeChat groups. Two different WeChat group categories were used to reach the target participants: WeChat groups that included social entrepreneurs, and MBA class groups and alumni groups. Only founders, stakeholders, and top managers of entrepreneurial team members were included. Second, the questionnaire was created via Questionnaire Star. At the beginning of the questionnaire, participants were informed that the investigation was for research purposes, no private information would be collected, and that the collected data would not be used for commercial purposes. During this step, a total of 76 questionnaires for small-scale paired data on founders–top managers were sent, and 58 questionnaires from 29 teams were collected. The results of within-group interrater reliability (Rwg) showed that the median values of equity governance, profit-sharing governance, management autonomy governance, resource bricolage, and organizational resilience were 0.970, 0.91, 0.969, 0.994, and 0.993, respectively, which were higher than the threshold of 0.70 [43]. This indicated that the surveyed data of the entrepreneurial teams satisfied within-group interrater reliability, and it was acceptable to obtain only one response from an entrepreneurial team in the following step.

3.3. Statistical Analysis

The software IBM SPSS 24.0 Statistics was used to verify the common method biases of the collected data. It is difficult to collect the data of a whole entrepreneurial team because the schedules of entrepreneurial team members are very busy and thus members are difficult to reach. In addition, the Rwg results confirmed that investigating one member of an entrepreneurial team was acceptable. Hence, in the official distribution step, all items in one questionnaire were responded to by one entrepreneurial team member, which may lead to common method bias. In this study, Harman’s single-factor detection was used to confirm that the variables of equity governance, profit-sharing governance, management autonomy governance, resource bricolage, and organizational resilience in the model satisfied common method bias results.
Research on entrepreneurial team governance and its impact on organizational resilience is still in its infancy; thus, instead of CB-SEM, PLS-SEM was used for structural equation model construction and hypotheses testing because of its unique advantages in prediction analysis and theory development [44]. Using the PLS algorithm, outer loadings lower than 0.65 were identified and removed; criteria of Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability (CR), and average variance extracted (AVE) were used for model convergent validity testing; the square root of AVE of each latent variable itself and its value compared with other variables was used for discriminant validity testing; R square (R2) was used to measure the prediction ability, while Geisser’s Q2 was used to evaluate the prediction correlation of the model; and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) was used to estimate the fitness of the model [45]. Furthermore, through bootstrapping, the criteria of the standardized path coefficient, confidence intervals (CI), and P value were used to verify the hypotheses.
Finally, in order to gain more theoretical insight and raise more practical suggestions, IPMA was used to extend the results of the structural equation model [45,46]. Instead of solely estimating the path coefficient, IPMA not only evaluates the importance of the predecessor constructs, but also indicates their performance in sharpening the target construct, thus helping scholars to identify the most important variables of a study and raise more effective suggestions [47]. In this study, the most important predecessor to organizational resilience in new ventures was identified as one with unsatisfactory performance, and priority management suggestions were proposed based on the results of IPMA.

4. Results

4.1. Demographic Analysis

The basic part of the questionnaire consisted of the participants’ demographic information and their company information. As shown in Appendix B Table A2, at the individual level, the participants included 335 male entrepreneurs and 214 females, who accounted for 61.02% and 38.98% of participants, respectively. The ages of the participants were mainly concentrated in the range of 31 to 40 years, with 57.92% of participants falling in this range. Only very few entrepreneurial team members had no higher education experience; 95.26% of participants had a diploma degree or above. At the team level, 47.57% of respondents were the founders of an entrepreneurial team, 10.2% were stakeholders, and 42.26% were top managers. At the firm level, 48.82% were social enterprises, while 51.18% were commercial enterprises. The age distribution of the surveyed enterprises was relatively average, with 29.69% having been established for less than 3 years, 36.25% being between 3 and 5 years old, and 34.06% being between 5 and 8 years old. Most of the surveyed new ventures were small in company size, 42.44% of them having 2–20 staff and 24.59% having 21–50 staff. To conclude, the participants of this study satisfied the research requirements.

4.2. Reliability and Validity Analyses

In this study, two steps were carried out to ensure that the quality of the survey data met the requirements of further analysis. First, a Harman univariate test was used to evaluate the common method biases [48], and the result showed that the first principal component without rotation was 38.38%, falling below the critical value of 40%, which meant that the common method biases of this survey data were acceptable. Second, Cronbach’s α values, CR, and AVE were used to evaluate the reliability of the data. Table 1 presents the results of the reliability analyses. The table shows that all the Cronbach’s α values of ET, PS, MA, RB, and OR were higher than 0.70, the values of AVE were higher than 0.50, and CR was higher than 0.80, meaning that the questionnaire had a satisfying reliability [45,49]. Furthermore, the results of the square roots of the AVE show that the value of each variable’s corresponding row and column was better than it was with other variables, which indicated that the results of discriminant validity were satisfied [45]. To summarize, the convergence reliability and discriminant validity of all the variables were satisfied.

4.3. Model Verification

Four criteria were used to verify that the structural model was satisfied, including collinearity, prediction correlation, goodness of fit, and strong explanatory power. First, the VIF value was used to ensure that the structural model was without collinearity issues. The results showed that both the inner and outer VIF values of the data were lower than 3, which satisfied the criteria [49]. Second, the results showed that the R2 values of resource bricolage and organizational resilience were 0.438 and 0.555, respectively, which means that the model had strong explanatory power [50]. Third, the results of Geisser’s Q2 showed that resource bricolage and organizational resilience were 0.259 and 0.325, respectively, which were results higher than 0 [50]. Finally, the results of SRMR showed that the structural model had a good fit of 0.049, far below the critical value of 0.08 [51].
In this study, the software PLS-SEM was used to identify the path coefficients of the structural model, while the criteria of the standardized path coefficient, i.e., confidence intervals, the T value, and P value, were adopted to verify the hypotheses. As shown in Table 2, the standardized path coefficients of all the hypotheses except H1a were greater than 0 and the P values were lower than 0.05, indicating that 9 hypotheses were verified; meanwhile, 1 hypothesis was rejected. Specifically, for the relationship between entrepreneurial team contractual governance and organizational resilience, equity governance (β = −0.003, p > 0.05) was negatively associated with organizational resilience, and therefore hypothesis H1a was rejected; however, profit-sharing governance (β = 0.164, p < 0.001) and management autonomy governance (β = 0.106, p < 0.05) were positively associated with organizational resilience, meaning that hypotheses H1b and H1c were verified. Furthermore, the results showed positive associations for equity governance (β = 0.182, p < 0.001), profit-sharing governance (β = 0.198, p < 0.001), and management autonomy governance (β = 0.403, p < 0.001), which means that entrepreneurial team contractual governance promoted organizational resilience and thus hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c were verified. Finally, resource bricolage played a mediating role in the relationship between entrepreneurial team contractual governance and organizational resilience. Resource bricolage had a strong effect on organizational resilience (β = 0.555, p < 0.001) and a complete mediating effect on the relationship between equity governance and organizational resilience (β = 0.101, p < 0.001); meanwhile, it had partial mediating effects on the relationships of profit-sharing governance (β = 0.110, p < 0.001) and management autonomy governance (β = 0.224, p < 0.001) to organizational resilience. This means that H3a, H3b, and H3c were verified. To summarize, profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance promotes organizational resilience while equity governance does not. Resource bricolage mediates the relationship between entrepreneurial team contractual governance and organizational resilience.

4.4. Importance–Performance Map Analysis

In order to extend the insights from the results of the structural model analysis and offer more practical suggestions to entrepreneurial teams and new ventures, IPMA was used in this study to determine the most important variable to organizational resilience improvement, as well as to evaluate its performance. Before running the IPMA, we tested the outer weight of each predecessor to ensure that they equated to positive values [46]; the results showed that all the relative outcomes were satisfied. As shown in Table 3, the most important variable with which to promote organizational resilience was resource bricolage (0.555), followed by management autonomy governance (0.329), profit-sharing governance (0.274), and equity governance (0.098). The variable with the highest performance was management autonomy governance (79.287), followed by profit-sharing governance (77.069), resource bricolage (77.015), and equity governance (74.397). Thus, considering the importance of each variable to organizational resilience, as well as their performance, resource bricolage was determined to be the most important factor for promoting organizational resilience; however, its performance was unsatisfactory and therefore must be improved in the future. In other words, the first task of new ventures to promote their organizational resilience is to improve the resource bricolage ability of their entrepreneurial teams, and the focus should be on giving entrepreneurial team members sufficient autonomy.

5. Discussion

Resources are believed to represent the foundation of firms’ growth, and previous studies have suggested that entrepreneur teams play a positive role in improving resources in new ventures [3,5], especially under conditions of uncertainty [4,10]. However, recent studies have argued that the impact of limited human rationality cannot be ignored when exploring the capabilities of entrepreneurial teams [15,17]. Thus, based on the upper echelons theory and institutional theory, this study explored the impact of entrepreneurial team contractual governance on new venture resilience and considered the mediating effect of resource bricolage. Specifically, according to the definition of entrepreneurial team contractual governance suggested by Zhu, Qi [15], this study divided aspects of governance based on three dimensions: equity governance, profit-sharing governance, and management autonomy governance. The results showed that the effects of each entrepreneurial team contractual governance approach on resource bricolage are unequal, and their roles in organizational resilience also differ. This study proposed a new direction for the field of entrepreneurial teams and also described the effects of entrepreneurial teams on organizational resilience.
The results of this study show that profit sharing and management autonomy play significant roles in new venture resilience directly, while equity governance does not. Thus, hypothesis H1a was not verified, whereas H1b and H1c were verified. The purpose of equity governance is to define the ownership of each entrepreneurial team member based on their capital contributions, including both financial capital and human resource capital. However, equity governance cannot account for every facet of the unexpected events that could occur in a venture’s future; it usually only imposes what responsibilities entrepreneurial team members should bear in starting a new venture and cannot dictate what they should do additionally if an unexpected event occurs, meaning that the relationship between equity governance and organizational resilience is not significant. Furthermore, the purpose of profit-sharing governance is to define the rights that entrepreneurial team members may attain if their venture succeeds. This means that if unexpected issues cannot be resolved, the yield of the venture will be reduced, and the income of each entrepreneurial team member will consequently worsen. Thus, an entrepreneurial team will make efforts to overcome crises to ensure that their venture is successful, meaning that the relationship between profit sharing and organizational resilience is significant. Finally, unlike mature companies with fixed routines and experienced managers to respond to crises, new ventures usually have no precedent to follow and the entrepreneurial team can only rely on their own understanding to tackle difficulties. Thus, management autonomy allows more flexibility for the entrepreneurial team to carry out coping strategies more innovatively and in a more timely manner. The relationship between management autonomy and organizational resilience is, therefore, significant. The findings of this study on the relationship between profit-sharing governance and organizational resilience are similar to those of Zhu, Qi [15]; profit-sharing governance is positively associated with new venture performance, while the effects of equity governance and management autonomy governance differ. A possible reason for this may be that performance is a static variable, while resilience is more dynamic and requires more entrepreneurial skill. The results also support the ideas of Korsgaard and Müller [5], who propound that organizational structure plays a significant role in top manager behavior guidance and thus prompts companies’ ability to cope with dramatic changes.
This study also found that all the entrepreneurial team contractual governance means were positively relative to resource bricolage, and H2a, H2b, and H2c were verified. This finding supports the viewpoint of Huy and Zott [33], who propound that psychological benefit expectations and stakeholder legitimacy judgments improve the motivation of entrepreneurs to mobilize their own capital. Through contractual governance, entrepreneurial team members not only have a clear illustration of their rights and responsibilities, but are also forced to make extra efforts when coping with crises. Furthermore, the results of the IMPA show that management autonomy governance promotes the best resource bricolage. This supports the suggestion that entrepreneurial skills are the key factors for improving resource utilization [7].
Finally, the results show that resource bricolage is positively associated with organizational resilience It has indirect effects on the relationships of profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance to organizational resilience, while having a direct effect on the role of equity governance in organizational resilience; thus, H3a, H3b, and H3c were verified. The result of the IMPA also reveals that resource bricolage is the most important factor in promoting organizational resilience. These findings support the idea of bricolage as an effective way to help ventures construct a resource base [2]. Further, the findings confirm that entrepreneurial team contractual governance helps new ventures with respect to resource base construction and innovative resource use under unexpected circumstances, thus ensuring that ventures have enough resources for their sustainable growth.

6. Conclusions

From a micro-foundation perspective, this study attempted to determine the best contractual governance means to promote organizational resilience in new ventures. The results showed that entrepreneurial team contractual governance significantly improved resource bricolage in new ventures, in turn prompting organizational resilience. Additionally, the mediating role of resource bricolage was verified. However, not all the entrepreneurial team contractual governance means were found to improve organizational resilience directly. The results showed that entrepreneurial team profit-sharing governance and management autonomy governance have significant direct effects on organizational resilience, while equity governance does not. Furthermore, the results of an IPMA suggested that resource bricolage is the most important factor for improving organizational resilience; however, its performance is not yet good enough and can be improved by increasing the management autonomy of entrepreneurial teams.

6.1. Implications

Theoretically, this study explored the role of new venture resilience from a micro-foundation perspective, and two main contributions were achieved. First, from the perspective of the formal governance of institutional theory and the upper echelons theory, this paper showed that entrepreneurial team contractual governance not only better gathers the resources at the hands of entrepreneurial team members to build an initial firm resource base, but also encourages them to implement these resources more innovatively to deal with crises. Previous studies argued that the top management team is one of the core resources for achieving firm growth [1,7,12], whereas this study strengthens the idea that only with clearly defined rights and responsibilities can the capital and managerial resources of entrepreneurial teams gain better leverage. The results of this study deepen our understanding of how entrepreneurial teams prompt the sustainable development of new ventures. Second, this study further explained the influence of entrepreneurial team member power configuration on firms’ resources. The results showed that equity governance plays a less effective role in resource bricolage, followed by profit-sharing governance and with management autonomy governance demonstrating the best performance; this responded to the suggestion of exploring the influence of entrepreneur power on firms’ competitiveness [10].
Practically, the findings of this study also raise two main suggestions for new ventures to improve their organizational resilience more effectively. First, new ventures should make the most of the resources of entrepreneurial teams via contractual approaches instead of trying to obtain outside resources. Unlike mature companies with fixed routines and wider networks from which to obtain outside resources to deal with crises, new ventures typically exhibit poor performance in outside sourcing because of their weak networks. Thus, new ventures can usually only rely on the resources they have at hand and especially rely on leveraging the resources from their entrepreneurial team. However, resources always have their price; it is necessary to define the rights and responsibilities of each team member by means of entrepreneurial team contractual governance. Second, more flexible management autonomy should be granted to motivate the entrepreneurial team in resource bricolage. The results of the IMPA showed that resource bricolage represents the most positive factor in organizational resilience, but its performance needs to improve. By comparing the scores of equity governance, profit-sharing governance, and management autonomy governance with respect to bricolage resources, it is observed that management autonomy is the key factor. Therefore, we suggest that the more flexible management autonomy of the entrepreneurial team is authorized in order to encourage them to construct resources more innovatively and in a more timely manner as crises are unexpected and leave limited response times.

6.2. Limitations and Future Work

This study is one of the few works to have explored the generation of organizational resilience from the perspective of entrepreneurial team governance, and it deepens our understanding of the role of better activating the potential of an entrepreneurial team in creating sustainable organization growth. However, similar to other empirical studies, this work has two main limitations. First, this paper only considered the impact of entrepreneurial contractual governance approaches on organizational resilience in new ventures; it ignored the effects of relational governance means such as communication, cooperation, shared vision, trust, etc. According to Mai and Wu [17], in the context of social entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial team relational governance plays a positive role in team learning and, in turn, prompts social resilience in new ventures. In the future, studies may compare the effect sizes of entrepreneurial team contractual governance and relational governance, in order to determine the best governance approach for improving entrepreneurial team capacities and organizational resilience. Second, this study regarded entrepreneurial team members as equal individuals and collected survey data from only one core member of each entrepreneurial team. Although the analysis results of the pre-survey stage showed that the data collection method was acceptable, this limited our understanding of asymmetric entrepreneurial team contractual governance on organizational resilience; thus, future research may explore whether the importance of organizational resilience generation changes when entrepreneurial team members perceive the same/different contractual governance pressure.

Author Contributions

Y.M. developed the concept, design, and data analysis and wrote the manuscript. W.Z. improved the design and edited the manuscript. Y.J.W. developed the concept and design and edited the manuscript. T.-P.D. improved the manuscript design. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

National Science and Technology Council, Taiwan (111-2410-H-003-072-MY3); Social Science Foundation of Fujian Province of China (No. FJ2023MGCA017).

Institutional Review Board Statement

Ethical review and approval were waived for this study. By the local legislation and institutional requirement, ethical review is not a must for this kind of study. When distributing the questionnaire to the participants, written informed consent was provided at the beginning of the questionnaire, including the purpose of this investigation, the data will be collected anonymously and would not be used for commercial purposes.

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Table A1. Scale content.
Table A1. Scale content.
ConstructItemContent
Equity
governance
(ET)
ET 1The distribution and change in equity of each team member reflects their resource and ability advantages
ET 2When allocating equity, we not only consider the capital contribution, technology, or patent investment from each team member, but also consider their experience and social capital
ET 3When allocating equity, we not only consider the existing capital and technology investment of each team member but also consider their resource and ability advantages at different stages of the entrepreneurship process
ET 4Considering the development needs of the organization, we left room for future equity adjustment
Profit-sharing
governance
(PS)
PS 1Our income policy reflects the efforts of each team member
PS 2Our income policy considers the different performance and contributions of each team member
PS 3We have short-term incentive policies, such as commission, year-end reward, subsidy, etc.
Management
Autonomy
governance
(MA)
MA 1Team members know the financial and operating conditions of our organization
MA 2Each team member participates in the operation and management activities of our organization based on the division of roles
MA 3Each team member has full decision-making power
MA 4Team members can fully express their opinions if they disagree on a strategic decision of the organization
MA 5Each team member handles the work of the department independently with the authorization of management
Resource
Bricolage
(RB)
RB1We are confident in our ability to find workable solutions to new challenges by using our existing resources
RB 2We gladly take on a broader range of challenges than others with our resources would be able to
RB 3We use any existing resource that seems useful to respond to a new problem or opportunity
RB 4We deal with new challenges by applying a combination of our existing resources and other resources inexpensively available to us
RB 5When dealing with new problems or opportunities, we take action by assuming that we will find a workable solution
RB 6By combining our existing resources, we take on a surprising variety of new challenges
RB 7When we face new challenges, we put together workable solutions from our existing resources
RB 8We combine resources to accomplish new challenges for which the resources were not originally intended
Organizational
resilience
(OR)
OR1My organization stands straight and preserves its position
OR2My organization is successful in generating diverse solutions
OR5My organization is agile in taking required action when needed
OR6My organization is a place where all employees are sufficiently engaged to do what is required from them
OR7My organization is successful in acting as a whole with all of its employees
OR8My organization shows resistance to the end in order to not lose
OR9My organization does not give up and continues on its path
Note: SV = shared vision; CC = communication–cooperation; TR = trust; TL = team learning; OR = organizational resilience.

Appendix B

Table A2. Demographics attributed to the respondents.
Table A2. Demographics attributed to the respondents.
CharacteristicsN = 549Percent (%)
IndividualGenderMale33561.02
Female21438.98
Age21–3013224.04
31–4031857.92
41–508214.94
51 or above173.10
EducationHigh school or below264.74
Diploma40373.41
Undergraduate12222.22
Postgraduate81.46
PositionFounder26147.54
Stakeholder5610.20
Top manager23242.26
Company ageBelow 3 years16329.69
3–519936.25
5–818734.06
Company size2–2023342.44
21–5013524.59
51–20014025.50
Above 201417.47

References

  1. Penrose, E.T. The Theory of the Growth of the Firm; Oxford University Press: New York, NY, USA, 1959. [Google Scholar]
  2. Baker, T.; Nelson, R.E. Creating Something from Nothing: Resource Construction through Entrepreneurial Bricolage. Adm. Sci. Q. 2005, 50, 329–366. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  3. Timmons, J.A.; Spinelli, S.; Tan, Y. New Venture Creation: Entrepreneurship for the 21st Century; McGraw-Hill/Irwin: New York, NY, USA, 2004; Volume 6. [Google Scholar]
  4. Dos Santos, L.L.; Borini, F.M.; Pereira, R.M. Bricolage as a path towards organizational innovativeness in times of market and technological turbulence. J. Entrep. Emerg. Econ. 2021, 13, 282–299. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  5. Korsgaard, S.; Müller, S.; Welter, F. It’s right nearby: How entrepreneurs use spatial bricolage to overcome resource constraints. Entrep. Reg. Dev. 2020, 33, 147–173. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  6. Eisenhardt, K.M.; Schoonhoven, C.B. Organizational Growth: Linking Founding Team, Strategy, Environment, and Growth Among U.S. Semiconductor Ventures, 1978–1988. Adm. Sci. Q. 1990, 35, 504. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  7. Yang, T.; Aldrich, H.E. Who’s the Boss? Explaining Gender Inequality in Entrepreneurial Teams. Am. Sociol. Rev. 2014, 79, 303–327. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  8. Amason, A.C. Distinguishing the effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict on strategic decision making: Resolving a paradox for top management teams. Acad. Manag. J. 1996, 39, 123–148. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  9. Hmieleski, K.M.; Ensley, M.D. A contextual examination of new venture performance: Entrepreneur leadership behavior, top management team heterogeneity, and environmental dynamism. J. Organ. Behav. 2007, 28, 865–889. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  10. Alvarez, S.A.; Barney, J.B. How do entrepreneurs organize firms under conditions of uncertainty? J. Manag. 2005, 31, 776–793. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  11. Hambrick, D.C.; Mason, P.A. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Acad. Manag. Rev. 1984, 9, 193–206. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  12. Finkelstein, S.; Hambrick, D.C. Top-Management-Team Tenure and Organizational Outcomes: The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion. Adm. Sci. Q. 1990, 35, 484. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  13. West, G.P. Collective Cognition: When Entrepreneurial Teams, Not Individuals, Make Decisions. Entrep. Theory Pr. 2007, 31, 77–102. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  14. Zhu, R.; Dai, J.; Zeng, C. A study on the evolution and governance of entrepreneurial team in a human capital perspecive. Acad. Res. J. 2013, 10, 81–86. [Google Scholar]
  15. Hong, Z.R.; Qi, Z.; Xiang, W.Z. Can Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance Really Help the New Venture Performance? A Moderated Mediation Model. Nankai Bus. Rev. 2018, 21, 30–40. [Google Scholar]
  16. Cooney, T.M. What is an entrepreneurial team? Int. Small Bus. J. 2005, 23, 226–235. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  17. Mai, Y.; Wu, Y.J.; Wang, Y.-M. How Does Entrepreneurial Team Relational Governance Promote Social Start-Ups’ Organizational Resilience? Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2022, 19, 6677. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  18. North, D.C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance; Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, NY, USA, 1990. [Google Scholar]
  19. Peng, M.W.; Luo, Y. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. Acad. Manag. J. 2000, 43, 486–501. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  20. Yu, X.; Li, Y.; Su, Z.; Tao, Y.; Nguyen, B.; Xia, F. Entrepreneurial bricolage and its effects on new venture growth and adaptiveness in an emerging economy. Asia Pac. J. Manag. 2019, 37, 1141–1163. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  21. Senyard, J.; Baker, T.; Steffens, P.; Davidsson, P. Bricolage as a Path to Innovativeness for Resource-Constrained New Firms. J. Prod. Innov. Manag. 2013, 31, 211–230. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  22. Weick, K.E. The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster. Adm. Sci. Q. 1993, 38, 628. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  23. Desa, G.; Basu, S. Optimization or Bricolage? Overcoming Resource Constraints in Global Social Entrepreneurship. Strat. Entrep. J. 2013, 7, 26–49. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  24. Baker, T.; Department of Management and Human Resources, School of Business, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, WI, USA; Aldrich, H.E.; Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA. Bricolage and Resource-Seeking: Improvisational Responses to Dependence in Entrepreneurial Firms. Unpublished work. 2000. [Google Scholar]
  25. Meyer, A.D. Adapting to environmental jolts. Adm. Sci. Q. 1982, 27, 515–537. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  26. Kennedy, D.M.; Landon, L.B.; Maynard, M.T. Extending the Conversation: Employee Resilience at the Team Level. Ind. Organ. Psychol. 2016, 9, 466–475. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  27. Morgan, P.B.; Fletcher, D.; Sarkar, M. Recent developments in team resilience research in elite sport. Curr. Opin. Psychol. 2017, 16, 159–164. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  28. Jones, B.A. Benchmarking Organizational Resilience: A Cross-Sectional Comparative Research Study; New Jersey City University: Jersey City, NJ, USA, 2015. [Google Scholar]
  29. Lu, J.; Xiang, P. Crisis process management: How to improve organizational resilience? Foreign Econ. Manag. 2020, 43, 3–24. [Google Scholar]
  30. Naderpajouh, N.; Yu, D.J.; Aldrich, D.P.; Linkov, I.; Matinheikki, J. Engineering meets institutions: An interdisciplinary approach to the management of resilience. Environ. Syst. Decis. 2018, 38, 306–317. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  31. Hambrick, D.C. Upper Echelons Theory: An Update. Acad. Manag. Rev. 2007, 32, 334–343. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  32. Foo, M.-D.; Sin, H.-P.; Yiong, L.-P. Effects of team inputs and intrateam processes on perceptions of team viability and member satisfaction in nascent ventures. Strat. Manag. J. 2006, 27, 389–399. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  33. Huy, Q.; Zott, C. Exploring the affective underpinnings of dynamic managerial capabilities: How managers’ emotion regulation behaviors mobilize resources for their firms. Strat. Manag. J. 2018, 40, 28–54. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  34. Kantur, D.; Iseri-Say, A. Organizational resilience: A conceptual integrative framework. J. Manag. Organ. 2012, 18, 762–773. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  35. Warnick, B.J.; Murnieks, C.Y.; McMullen, J.S.; Brooks, W.T. Passion for entrepreneurship or passion for the product? A conjoint analysis of angel and VC decision-making. J. Bus. Ventur. 2018, 33, 315–332. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  36. Simsek, Z. Organizational Ambidexterity: Towards a Multilevel Understanding. J. Manag. Stud. 2009, 46, 597–624. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  37. Kazanjian, R.K.; Drazin, R. A stage-contingent model of design and growth for technology based new ventures. J. Bus. Ventur. 1990, 5, 137–150. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  38. Zahra, S.A.; Bogner, W.C. Technology strategy and software new ventures’ performance: Exploring the moderating effect of the competitive environment. J. Bus. Ventur. 2000, 15, 135–173. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  39. Hair, J.F., Jr.; Black, W.C.; Anderson, R.E. Multivariate Data Analysis; Pearson Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA, 2010. [Google Scholar]
  40. Di Domenico, M.; Haugh, H.; Tracey, P. Social Bricolage: Theorizing Social Value Creation in Social Enterprises. Entrep. Theory Pr. 2010, 34, 681–703. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  41. Kantur, D.; Say, A.I. Measuring organizational resilience: A scale development. J. Bus. Econ. Financ. 2015, 4, 456–472. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  42. Atuahene-Gima, K.; Murray, J.Y. Exploratory and Exploitative Learning in New Product Development: A Social Capital Perspective on New Technology Ventures in China. J. Int. Mark. 2007, 15, 1–29. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  43. Lebreton, J.M.; Senter, J.L. Answers to 20 questions about interrater reliability and interrater agreement. Organ. Res. Methods 2008, 11, 815–852. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  44. Hair, J.F., Jr.; Hult, G.T.M.; Ringle, C.M.; Sarstedt, M. A Primer on Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM); Sage Publications: London, UK, 2021. [Google Scholar]
  45. Fornell, C.; Johnson, M.D.; Anderson, E.W.; Cha, J.; Bryant, B.E. The American customer satisfaction index: Nature, purpose, and findings. J. Mark. 1996, 60, 7–18. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  46. Ringle, C.M.; Sarstedt, M. Gain more insight from your PLS-SEM results: The importance-performance map analysis. Ind. Manag. Data Syst. 2016, 116, 1865–1886. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  47. Hock, C.; Ringle, C.M.; Sarstedt, M. Management of multi-purpose stadiums: Importance and performance measurement of service interfaces. Int. J. Serv. Technol. Manag. 2010, 14, 188. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]
  48. Podsakoff, P.M.; MacKenzie, S.B.; Lee, J.-Y.; Podsakoff, N.P. Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. J. Appl. Psychol. 2003, 88, 879–903. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed]
  49. Hair, J.F. Multivariate Data Analysis, 6th ed.; Upper Saddle River: Jersey City, NJ, USA, 2006; pp. 49–74. [Google Scholar]
  50. Henseler, J.; Ringle, C.M.; Sinkovics, R.R. The use of partial least squares path modeling in international marketing. In New Challenges to International Marketing; Emerald Group Publishing Limited: Bingley, UK, 2009; Volume 20, pp. 277–319. [Google Scholar]
  51. Henseler, J.; Ringle, C.M.; Sarstedt, M. A new criterion for assessing discriminant validity in variance-based structural equation modeling. J. Acad. Mark. Sci. 2015, 43, 115–135. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version]
Figure 1. Theoretical framework design.
Figure 1. Theoretical framework design.
Sustainability 15 03518 g001
Table 1. Cronbach’s alpha, convergence validity, composite reliability, and discriminant validity of the measurement model.
Table 1. Cronbach’s alpha, convergence validity, composite reliability, and discriminant validity of the measurement model.
ConstructNumber
of Items
Cronbach’s
Alpha
Convergence
Validity AVE
Composite
Reliability CR
Discriminant Validity
ETPSMARBOR
ET40.8580.7010.9040.837
PS30.7570.6760.8610.6160.822
MA50.7910.5440.8560.5100.5490.738
RB80.9050.6000.9230.5090.5310.6040.775
OR70.8840.5910.9100.4430.5290.5300.7130.769
Note: The items on the diagonal represent the square roots of the average of variance extracted (AVE); off-diagonal elements are the Pearson correlation estimates; ET = equity governance; PS = profit-sharing governance; MA = management autonomy governance; RB = resource bricolage; OR = organizational resilience.
Table 2. Standardized path coefficient and mediation effect of structural equation model.
Table 2. Standardized path coefficient and mediation effect of structural equation model.
HypothesesStandardized
Path Coefficient
Sample MeanStandard
Deviation
STDEV
T StatisticConfidence
Interval
CI
p Value
Standardized path coefficient
ET → OR−0.003−0.0030.0410.076[−0.069–0.068]0.470
PS → OR0.1640.1640.0394.195[0.099–0.229]***
MA → OR0.1060.1050.0502.103[0.021–0.188]*
ET → RB0.1820.1830.0503.608[0.099–0.263]***
PS → RB0.1980.2000.0513.859[0.115–0.286]***
MA → RB0.4030.4020.0567.254[0.308–0.493]***
RB → OR0.5550.5550.04512.397[0.480–0.627]***
Mediation effect
ET → RB → OR0.1010.1010.0283.576[0.055–0.147]***
PS → MA → OR0.1100.1110.0293.731[0.063–0.161]***
MA → RB → OR0.2240.2240.0385.823[0.161–0.288]***
Note: ET = equity governance; PS = profit-sharing governance; MA = management autonomy governance; RB = resource bricolage; OR = organizational resilience; * indicates p < 0.05; *** indicates p < 0.001.
Table 3. Importance and performance of each antecedent variable.
Table 3. Importance and performance of each antecedent variable.
Target ConstructResource BricolageOrganizational Resilience
Antecedent Variable ImportancePerformanceImportancePerformance
Equity governance0.18274.3970.09874.397
Profit-sharing governance0.19877.0690.27477.069
Management autonomy governance0.40379.2870.32979.287
Resource bricolage--0.55577.015
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content.

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Mai, Y.; Zheng, W.; Wu, Y.J.; Dong, T.-P. Impact of Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance on New Venture Resilience: The Mediating Role of Resource Bricolage. Sustainability 2023, 15, 3518. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15043518

AMA Style

Mai Y, Zheng W, Wu YJ, Dong T-P. Impact of Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance on New Venture Resilience: The Mediating Role of Resource Bricolage. Sustainability. 2023; 15(4):3518. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15043518

Chicago/Turabian Style

Mai, Yingping, Wenzhi Zheng, Yenchun Jim Wu, and Tse-Ping Dong. 2023. "Impact of Entrepreneurial Team Contractual Governance on New Venture Resilience: The Mediating Role of Resource Bricolage" Sustainability 15, no. 4: 3518. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15043518

Note that from the first issue of 2016, this journal uses article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Metrics

Back to TopTop