Optimal Pricing Strategy of New Products and Remanufactured Products Considering Consumers’ Switching Purchase Behavior

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report (Previous Reviewer 2)

The paper presents a theoretical analysis of an important practical problem. The paper has been significantly revised, but there are minor comments. 1. There are some typos and punctuation mistakes. 2. The authors note (643-647) that they are using of the Global New Products Database, but it is not shown where and how practical examples are applied. 3. Tables 2 and 3 are based on s = 0.1. However, there is no scientific reason why the other values of s (consumer learning costs) different from 0 and 0.1 cannot be used.

In general, the work can be published after minor revision

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report (New Reviewer)

This manuscript analyzes the factors that affect the equilibrium profit of retailers and discusses the optimal pricing strategy of sellers in the scenario where consumers' switching purchasing behavior often occurs. The content of the manuscript is rich, but there are still some problems, and some suggestions for improvement are put forward:

1. In the abstract section of the manuscript, the authors can appropriately supplement the background of this research and the limitations of the previous research.

2. In the introduction section, it is suggested that the authors appropriately supplement the elaboration of domestic and foreign research or status quo on the current research topic, and at the same time, further clearly reflect the innovation points of this manuscript.

3. In the literature review, the authors use a large amount of space to list and introduce the relevant studies of different scholars, but the lack of more profound and critical, so it is suggested that the authors modify as appropriate. Unfortunately, some of the latest research in game theory is missing.

e.g.,

Abidrabbu, S., Abushattal, A., & Arslan, H. (2023). Stackelberg Game for Secure CR-NOMA Networks Against Internal Eavesdropper. IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking.

Cai, J., Sun, H., Hu, X., & Zhang, W. (2023). How reverse information sharing supports pricing and sales effort decisions: Signaling game-based incentive mechanism design. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 108992.

Han, Y., Zheng, H., Huang, Y., & Li, X. (2022). Considering consumers’ green preferences and government subsidies in the decision making of the construction and demolition waste recycling supply chain: a stackelberg game approach. Buildings, 12(6), 832.

Tan, J., Li, Y., Zhang, X., Pan, W., & Ruan, W. (2023). Operation of a commercial district integrated energy system considering dynamic integrated demand response: A Stackelberg game approach. Energy, 126888.

etc.

4. In the section of methods, there is a lack of necessary research hypotheses for the construction of the model, so it is suggested that the authors add them to make the model more reasonable and reliable.

5. In the section of numerical analysis, the authors do not specify the basis of parameter assignment. Suggest the authors to add.

6. The conclusions obtained from the research in the manuscript are not divided, and it is suggested that the authors revise it to make the logic clearer.

To sum up, it is suggested that the authors carefully revise this paper according to the above suggestions. I sincerely look forward to receiving the revised version.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report (New Reviewer)

The authors carefully revised the manuscript according to my suggestions. The current version is acceptable.

This manuscript is a resubmission of an earlier submission. The following is a list of the peer review reports and author responses from that submission.

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The paper has some contributions in the application areas that could benefit from it. However, there are some urgent problems in this manuscript, as follows;

1. Lack of theories 

2. Lack of research gaps.

3. Lack of research problems that stakeholders face.

4. Lack of explanations of what we have known from previous research.

5. Lack of references.

6. Discussion and conclusions are not properly validated with standalone results.

 

Reviewer 2 Report

The paper presented is on an important topic. The authors at the scientific level consider the problems of marketing and competition. The article implements a game approach to evaluating the strategy of sellers.

 

The following remarks will increase the practical value of the article:

1. Paragraph 3 (177-235): it is necessary to systematize the variables considered in the work. For example, in the form of a separate table.

2. Author Contributions (560-562) must be detailed, taking into account the results of the work.

3. Paragraph 4 (237-415): The article requires economic and/or managerial arguments for the problem and defining of the accepted restrictions.

4. The authors need to formulate practical variables and metrics that can be used in the implementation of the proposed model. For example, what data a manager needs to collect to justify the strategy?

5. It is not recommended to use questionary sentence as a title.

The article can be published after the correction of the comments.