Analysis of Territorial Risks and Protection Factors for the Business Continuity of Data Centers
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Problem Framing
3. Knowledge Base for Assessing Data Centers’ Exposure and Vulnerability to Multiple Hazards
3.1. Literature Review
- A.
- “Risks/threats/hazards” subgroup descriptive of the potential disasters and failures (resulting in huge economic loss) faced by data centers as complex systems. This subgroup was used to analyze the main incidents occurring in data centers as a consequence of natural hazards in Section 3.3.
- B.
- “Availability, security and business continuity” subgroup about efficient measures/standards/methods for maintaining protection and service continuity of data centers during failures. This subgroup was used to support the development of the methodology as described in Section 4.
- C.
- “Geographical distribution/Location selection” subgroup discussing strategies for backup of critical business data across multiple data centers (in different geographical locations), avoiding simultaneous failure of backup and primary servers. This subgroup was used to help fine tune the methodology described in Section 4.
3.2. State of the Art of the Main Standard in the Context of Territorial, Environmental and Climate Change Risk Assessment of Data Centers
- Local site-level risks due to extreme weather events or phenomena (such as sea level rise) that may lead to a prolonged change in site conditions;
- Territorial (regional/provincial) risks that are not directly related to the site, but which may nevertheless have important impacts on the availability of supplies, services and/or personnel.
- (a)
- Geographically located at a distance from the primary data processing site to ensure a distinct risk profile and prevent it from being affected by the same event affecting the primary site;
- (b)
- Capable of ensuring the continuity of critical services in an identical manner to the primary site;
- (c)
- Immediately accessible to the staff to ensure the continuity of critical services if the primary data processing site becomes unavailable.
3.3. Analysis of the Main Incidents Occurring in Data Centers as a Consequence of Natural Hazards
4. Analytical Methodology for the Assessment of Territorial Risks and Protection Factors for the Business Continuity of Data Centers
5. Application in the Metropolitan Area of Milan
- Flood risk—The areas in which the selected data centers are located are not characterized by the same hydraulic risk. Considering the Flood Risk Management Plan (Figure 5), site 1 is close to flood-prone areas within the main hydrographic system of the Olona river, whereas site 2 is located near minor streams (Lura and Guisa). The direct impact on both data centers is low; but, in the case of a flood event impacting highway A4, accessibility to both sites could be similarly compromised. In this case, the search for alternative routes is crucial.
- Forest fire risk—The areas where the selected data centers are located are not characterized by the same forest fire risk; however, both sites may be indirectly affected by possible traffic disruptions (highway A4 and ring road A50), limiting the accessibility to the areas. Considering the Integrated Regional Risk Mitigation Program of Lombardia Region [49], site 1 is located in a medium-/high-forest-fire-risk area and site 2 in a medium-forest-fire-risk area (Figure 6). Furthermore, prolonged periods of drought and the presence of temporary storage of waste in/near the site should not be overlooked as possible causes of fire ignition. Mitigation measures should deal with the monitoring of green areas (mainly in summer) and the management of waste containers near/in data center areas.
- Proximity to hazardous installations—Several hazardous installations are located in the metropolitan area of Milan [50]. With regard to the selected case study (Figure 7), the risk is higher for site 2, which is located close to two chemical plants (~2/3 km). In the case of fires/explosions and as a consequence of the spread of toxic fumes/harmful substances, the location of such installations should be taken into account when assessing the related direct and indirect impacts on both the sites. In fact, highway A4 and ring road A50 may be indirectly affected by a possible traffic disruption, limiting the accessibility to these areas. No installations at major risk of accident are located in the flood risk area (Na-tech risk).
- Transport of dangerous substances risk—In a territory, dangerous substances (flammable liquid material—ADR3) are transported by road and rail networks, as well as through special underground pipelines (oil and gas pipelines). The risk prediction and prevention program of Milan Province [51] describes the related risk level for all of the different transport categories, defining different classes of risk. With regard to the road system, highway A4 (Turin–Trieste) and the A50 ring road are classified as belonging to the R4 class (high risk, 250–1000 daily transits), and highway A8 (Milan-Varese) in the R2 class (moderate risk, 50–100 daily transits). The Milan–Turin railway is classified in R3 (medium risk, 100,000–150,000 tons/year). No pipelines affect the municipalities in which the selected data centers are located. In general, considering the high risk levels defined and the proximity of the data centers to the infrastructural system, potential impacts must be evaluated directly at both the sites, particularly in the case of explosions/fires and the consequent dispersion of harmful substances/fumes and indirectly on territorial networks/personnel as a consequence of the potential disruption of vehicle traffic and the limitation of accessibility to the data center area. The implementation of air circulation systems, alternative road systems, civil protection plans, and cooperation with firefighters are considered to be protective factors.
- Road accident risk—The risk prediction and prevention program of Milan Province [51] describes the accident risk level of all main arterial roads in the metropolitan area, classifying the A4 and A8 highways as belonging to the R4 class (high risk) and the A50 ring road to the R3 class (medium risk). As defined above for the transport of dangerous substances risk, both sites are characterized by the same level of risk responsible for potential direct and indirect impacts. Similarly, the implementation of air circulation systems, alternative road systems, civil protection plans, and cooperation with firefighters are proposed as protective factors.
6. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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Levels of Availability | Specifications of Protection and Redundancy | Business Continuity | Annual Downtown |
---|---|---|---|
Tier I Basic data center | No redundancy in the power supply and mechanical systems (air conditioning and fire protection). Limited protection against physical events. | 99.671% | 28.8 h |
Tier II Data center with limited redundancy | Single redundant components, single distribution path serving equipment. Power supply systems and mechanical systems (air conditioning and fire protection) have their main elements with N + 1 redundancy level. Better protection from physical events. | 99.741% | 22 h |
Tier III Data center with possibility of maintenance without availability interruptions | Multiple independent components and distribution paths to equipment. A part may be subject to maintenance by replacement (removal/overhaul without interruption of plant availability). Protection from most physical events. | 99.982% | 1.6 h |
Tier IV Data center exempt to single failure | Multiple independent components and distribution paths to equipment. Possible simultaneous maintenance without interruption of plant availability. Protection from almost all physical events. | 99.995% | 26 min |
Hazard and Territorial Scale of Event | Climate Change Impact | Multihazard, Multirisk | Impacts -> Mitigation Measures | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Direct Impact on Data Center ( | Indirect Impact on Territorial Networks & Personnel ( | |||
Seismic Regional | - | ⌘→ Landslides Tsunami | Collapse of walls, damage to plants (including generators) and equipment -> Seismic and anchoring structures | Damage to buildings and infrastructure, difficulties of access and personnel, damage to service networks -> Support of personnel outside the area, electric and water autonomy, radio connections |
Volcanic Regional for ash, local for other hazards | - | ⌘→ Landslides Tsunami ⌘ Seismic | High temperature plant damage; ash damage to all plant components -> Avoid locating near active volcanoes | Locally inaccessible area until end of phenomena, for ash relevant on accessibility and networks -> At least temporary relocation |
Hydraulic Regional, local | It could increase/decrease depending on the area | ⌘→ Landslides ⌘ Heavy rainfalls | Damage to plants by water contact or humidity -> Lift the installations with respect to level “0”, humidity control | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks -> Access redundancy, electric/water autonomy, radio connections and mobile devices (switch etc.) |
Tsunami Regional | - | ⌘→ Flooding | Damage to plants by water contact or humidity -> Avoid localization in at risk areas (coastal areas) | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks -> Support of personnel outside the area, access redundancy, electric and water autonomy, radio connections |
Hydro-geological Local and/or multisite | It could increase/decrease depending on the area | - | Damage to structures by direct impact -> Avoid localization in at risk areas (near or under landslide areas) | Interruptions of transport and electricity network (flooding of rooms) -> Redundancy of transport networks and electric autonomy, radio connections |
Avalanche Local and/or multisite | It could increase/decrease depending on the area | - | Damage to structures by direct impact and by water contact or humidity -> Avoid localization in at risk areas | Punctual damage to transport system and control units -> Redundancy or autonomy for a few hours |
Heavy rainfall Regional, wide area | Heavy rainfall events | ⌘→ Flooding Landslides | Damage due to winds and induced events (rainfall, flooding) -> Resistant structures (roofing) and lightning protection | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks -> Access redundancy, electric autonomy for a few hours, telecommunications network support |
Lightening Local | - | Damage to electrical equipment -> Lightning protection | Punctual damage to telecommunications system and electrical control units -> Devices protection | |
Heavy snowfall Regional | Decrease in annual average precipitation but occasional extreme events | - | Structural damages -> Resistant structures (roofing) | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks -> Access network redundancy, electric autonomy for a few hours/days, radio connections |
Wind storm Regional | ⌘ Flooding Heavy rainfalls | Structural damages, equipment damage due to dust -> Resistant structures (roofing), external ventilation shutdown, filter cleaning, server access blocks | Punctual damage to transport system (trees), electrical, transport and telecommunications control units -> Access network redundancy, electric autonomy for a few hours, telecommunications network support | |
Drought Regional | Trend in precipitation reduction on the basis of past data | - | Water availability problems -> Water system autonomy | Water deficit -> Autonomy for a few days/months, closed-loop systems |
Forest fire Regional, local | ⌘→ Landslides | Structural and plants damages -> Avoid localization in at risk areas | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks, air conditioning and filtration systems -> Electric autonomy and radio connections | |
Heat wave Regional | - | Plants damages -> Modernization of air conditioning systems and e use of electrical generators for self-production | Power outages due to overcharging of the public network -> Electric autonomy for a few hours/days by electrical generator | |
Sea level rise Regional | ⌘→ Coastal flooding | Plants damages due to water contact and humidity -> Avoid localization in at risk areas | Damage to transport, electricity and telecommunications networks -> Verification of dependence on coastal networks | |
Epidemic/Pandemic Regional, national | Several studies show a correlation with Climate Change | - | Impact on the availability of staff -> Remote work but need for presence of critical workers on site | Impact on population |
Installations at major accident risk Regional, local | - | ⌘→Na-tech due to: Flooding Earthquakes Landslides Tsunami Storms | Damage to structures if located in damage areas, dust infiltration and/or toxic substances -> Localization of the plants in damage, verification not Seveso plants | Interruption of the transport network -> Shift to air recirculation system |
Transport of dangerous substances Local | - | - | Damage to structures and electrical and telecommunications unit controls in case of proximity of the event -> Avoid location adjacent to high-speed roads | Interruption of the transport network -> On site in case of prolongedstay conditions |
Aquifer pollution Regional and local | - | ⌘← Flooding ⌘→ Installations at major accident risk | Damage to the cooling system -> Monitoring system of aquifer pollutants | Water supply disruption -> Shift to traditional conditioning, closed-loop systems |
Road accident Local | - | - | Damage to structures and electrical and telecommunications unit controls in case of proximity of the event -> Avoid location adjacent to high-speed roads | Interruption of the transport network -> On site in case of prolonged stay conditions |
Excavations/ road works Local | - | - | Power supply loss -> Diversification of access routes to data center | Power supply loss -> Redundancy of the networks |
Sabotage Local, multisite | - | - | Intentional damage to structures and plants -> Data protection measures and staff monitoring | Vandalism and/or terrorism in sensitive targets close to the data center -> Avoid localization near known sensitive targets |
⌘ Multirisk | ||||
⌘→ Multirisk: event that can be triggered by | ||||
⌘← Multirisk: hazard that can trigger another one |
Hazards | Summary of the Assessment for Individual Data Centers | Evaluation of the Direct Impact on the Primary–Recovery Data Center Configuration | Evaluation of Systemic Impacts on the Primary–Recovery Data Center Configuration | Available or Recommended Protection |
---|---|---|---|---|
Natural hazards | Site 1 Site 2 Site n | Comparison between the hazards levels fo the primary–recovery sites and assessment of the possibility of having both affected by the same event | Comparison between the hazards levels fo the primary–recovery sites and assessment of the possibility of having both affected by the same event | Recommended mitigation for the configuration as a whole |
Climate Change impacts | ||||
Hazardous installations | ||||
Health related hazards (epidemics, toxicbcontamination) | ||||
Accidents in the transportation system |
Risk | Hazard | Potential Impact Assessment ( | Protection Factors | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Site 1 | Site 2 | |||
Seismic | Sites are located in seismic zone 4 (low probability) | Seismic resistant buildings, power generators, road system redundancy | ||
Heavy rainfall | Rainy events have been less frequent but more intense in the last 15 years [48] | Resistant structures with sealed roofs, emergency generators, power grid redundancy, alternative traffic | ||
Windstorm | Increasing frequency of wind phenomena daily peaks (v > 100 km/h) [48] | Power supply medium voltage redundancy | ||
Drought | Rainy events have been less frequent in the last 15 years [48] | Redundancy of air conditioning systems | ||
Heat wave | In recent years, temperature peaks (~30/35 °C) have been more frequent [48] | Advanced/redundant air conditioning system, emergency generators | ||
Pandemic | Sites are characterized by the same risk | Emergency plans, infection spread control measures | ||
Hydraulic | Site 1 is close to potentially flood area of the main hydrographic system; site 2 is located near some minor streams | Organization of alternative roads system | ||
Forest fire | Site 1 is located in a medium-/high-forest-fire-risk area and site 2 in a medium-forest-fire-risk area [49] | Vegetation maintenance and on-site fire protection systems, civil protection plans, cooperation with firefighters | ||
Installations at major risk of accident | Site 2 is located close to two chemical plants [50] | Air circulation systems, alternative road system, civil protection plans, cooperation with firefighters | ||
Transport of dangerous substances | Road Proximity to A4 and A50, classified in R4 class (high risk), and A8, in R2 class (moderate risk) [51] | Interruption of the vehicular circulation with difficulty in accessibility of the area | ||
Railway Proximity to railway Milan-Turin classified in R3 (medium risk) [51] | Interruption of the vehicular circulation | |||
Pipelines No proximity [51] | Interruption of the vehicular circulation with difficulty in accessibility of the area | |||
Road accident | A4 and A8 classified in R4 class (high risk), A50 in R3 class (medium risk) [51] | Interruption of the highways or closure of the ring road junctions |
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Gazzola, V.; Menoni, S.; Ghignatti, P.; Marini, A.; Mauri, R.; Oldani, G. Analysis of Territorial Risks and Protection Factors for the Business Continuity of Data Centers. Sustainability 2023, 15, 6005. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15076005
Gazzola V, Menoni S, Ghignatti P, Marini A, Mauri R, Oldani G. Analysis of Territorial Risks and Protection Factors for the Business Continuity of Data Centers. Sustainability. 2023; 15(7):6005. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15076005
Chicago/Turabian StyleGazzola, Veronica, Scira Menoni, Paolo Ghignatti, Andrea Marini, Roberto Mauri, and Giovanni Oldani. 2023. "Analysis of Territorial Risks and Protection Factors for the Business Continuity of Data Centers" Sustainability 15, no. 7: 6005. https://doi.org/10.3390/su15076005