The Effect of Market-Based Environmental Regulations on Green Technology Innovation—The Regulatory Effect Based on Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Market-Based Environmental Regulation and Green Technological Innovation
2.2. Corporate Social Responsibility, Market-Based Environmental Regulation, and Green Technological Innovation
2.3. Market-Based Environmental Regulation, Financing Constraints, and Corporate Green Technology Innovation
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources
3.2. Variable Definition and Measurement
3.2.1. Explained Variable: Green Technological Innovation (GI)
3.2.2. Explanatory Variables: Market-Based Environmental Regulation (MBER)
3.2.3. Moderating Variable: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
3.2.4. Mediating Variable: Financing Constraints (SA)
3.2.5. Control Variables
3.3. Model Construction
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Correlation Coefficient Analysis and Multicollinearity Test
4.3. Verification of Hypothesis H1
4.4. Endogeneity and Robustness Tests
4.4.1. Substitution of Dependent Variables
4.4.2. Instrumental Variable Method
4.4.3. Substitution of Explanatory Variables
4.4.4. Other Robustness Tests
4.5. Verification of Hypothesis H2
4.6. Verification of Hypothesis H3
4.7. Heterogeneity Analysis
4.7.1. Heterogeneity of Property Rights
4.7.2. Industry Heterogeneity
4.7.3. Heterogeneity in the Degree of Environmental Regulation
5. Conclusions and Implications
5.1. Conclusions and Limitations
5.1.1. Research Conclusions
5.1.2. Limitations
5.2. Policy Recommendations and Management Insights
5.2.1. Policy Recommendations
5.2.2. Management Insights
Author Contributions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | LnGA1 | LnGA2 | RD | LnRd | |
Tpjy1 | 0.027 ** | 0.029 *** | 0.011 | 0.005 *** | 0.228 *** |
(2.06) | (2.58) | (1.10) | (6.31) | (4.24) | |
Constant | −2.200 *** | −1.892 *** | −1.475 *** | 0.098 *** | −3.355 *** |
(−15.48) | (−15.94) | (−13.98) | (10.45) | (−4.73) | |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 33082 | 33082 | 33082 | 12706 | 12706 |
r2 | 0.187 | 0.169 | 0.180 | 0.232 | 0.456 |
chi2 | 2138.382 | 1904.192 | 1615.313 | 1771.452 | 6328.297 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | |
MBER | 0.620 * | 0.587 * | 0.587 * | 0.481 | 0.599 * |
(1.87) | (1.93) | (1.93) | (1.57) | (1.80) | |
MBER*Csr1 | −0.048 | ||||
(−0.43) | |||||
Csr1 | −0.002 | ||||
(−0.68) | |||||
MBER*Csr2 | 0.065 ** | ||||
(2.42) | |||||
Csr2 | 0.002 | ||||
(1.21) | |||||
MBER*Csr3 | 0.091 ** | ||||
(2.23) | |||||
Csr3 | 0.002 | ||||
(0.62) | |||||
MBER*Csr4 | 0.129 *** | ||||
(2.81) | |||||
Csr4 | 0.002 | ||||
(0.55) | |||||
MBER*Csr5 | −0.012 | ||||
(−0.26) | |||||
Csr5 | 0.007 *** | ||||
(2.60) | |||||
Constant | −1.121 ** | −1.022 ** | −1.050 ** | −1.060 ** | −0.998 ** |
(−2.39) | (−2.18) | (−2.24) | (−2.25) | (−2.14) | |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 |
r2 | 0.115 | 0.117 | 0.115 | 0.115 | 0.117 |
chi2 | 164.120 | 172.990 | 169.323 | 172.964 | 171.466 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGA1 | LnGA1 | LnGA1 | LnGA1 | LnGA1 | |
MBER | 0.348 | 0.280 | 0.282 | 0.235 | 0.355 |
(1.32) | (1.16) | (1.17) | (0.97) | (1.34) | |
MBER*Csr1 | −0.059 | ||||
(−0.66) | |||||
Csr1 | −0.000 | ||||
(−0.13) | |||||
MBER*Csr2 | 0.024 | ||||
(1.12) | |||||
Csr2 | 0.000 | ||||
(0.01) | |||||
MBER*Csr3 | 0.032 | ||||
(1.00) | |||||
Csr3 | −0.001 | ||||
(−0.37) | |||||
MBER*Csr4 | 0.051 | ||||
(1.39) | |||||
Csr4 | −0.002 | ||||
(−0.60) | |||||
MBER*Csr5 | −0.027 | ||||
(−0.71) | |||||
Csr5 | 0.006 *** | ||||
(2.77) | |||||
Constant | −1.013 *** | −1.013 *** | −1.026 *** | −1.051 *** | −0.922 ** |
(−2.78) | (−2.77) | (−2.81) | (−2.86) | (−2.54) | |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 |
r2 | 0.118 | 0.118 | 0.117 | 0.116 | 0.122 |
chi2 | 142.607 | 143.549 | 142.906 | 144.229 | 151.380 |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGA2 | LnGA2 | LnGA2 | LnGA2 | LnGA2 | |
MBER | 0.550 ** | 0.601 ** | 0.607 *** | 0.498 ** | 0.555 ** |
(2.15) | (2.57) | (2.59) | (2.12) | (2.16) | |
MBER*Csr1 | 0.027 | ||||
(0.31) | |||||
Csr1 | −0.003 | ||||
(−0.95) | |||||
MBER*Csr2 | 0.075 *** | ||||
(3.58) | |||||
Csr2 | 0.002 | ||||
(1.31) | |||||
MBER*Csr3 | 0.102 *** | ||||
(3.26) | |||||
Csr3 | 0.002 | ||||
(0.87) | |||||
MBER*Csr4 | 0.129 *** | ||||
(3.64) | |||||
Csr4 | 0.002 | ||||
(0.85) | |||||
MBER*Csr5 | 0.009 | ||||
(0.24) | |||||
Csr5 | 0.002 | ||||
(1.13) | |||||
Constant | −0.684 * | −0.581 | −0.600 * | −0.603 * | −0.630 * |
(−1.93) | (−1.64) | (−1.70) | (−1.70) | (−1.79) | |
Controls | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 |
r2 | 0.089 | 0.091 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.087 |
chi2 | 138.880 | 155.912 | 150.685 | 154.098 | 140.077 |
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Variable Type | Variable Name | Variable Symbol | Definition of Variables |
---|---|---|---|
Explained variables | Green innovation outputs | LnGIA | Logarithm of green patent applications |
Green innovation inputs | RD | R&D investment as a percentage of total assets | |
Explanatory variables | Market-based environmental regulation | MBER | Normalized value of sewage charges paid by enterprises in the current year |
Moderating variable | Corporate social responsibility | CSR | CSR ratings and scores published by https://www.hexun.com (accessed on 23 December 2022) |
Mediating variables | Financing constraints | SA | SA index |
Micro-control variables | Enterprise size | Size | Natural logarithm of total assets |
Age of business | FirmAge | Natural logarithm of company years | |
Profitability | ROA | Net profit to total assets | |
Nature of property rights | SOE | State-owned enterprises are assigned a value of 1, otherwise 0 | |
Shareholding concentration | Top1 | Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder | |
Macro-control variables | Tax burden level | Tax | Tax revenue to GDP ratio |
Command environmental regulation | ER | Ratio of investment in environmental pollution control to value-added of industry | |
Overseas foreign direct investment | FDI | Foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP | |
Industrial concentration | IndustryC | Employment as the ratio of the administrative area | |
Energy structure | Energy | Electricity consumption as a percentage of national total | |
Year | Year | Annual dummy variables | |
Sector | Industry | Industry dummy variables |
Variable | Obs | Mean | Std. Dev | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | 3854 | 0.358 | 0.724 | 0.000 | 4.635 |
MBER | 3854 | 0.017 | 0.046 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
FDI | 3854 | 0.020 | 0.012 | 0.000 | 0.082 |
ER | 3854 | 0.028 | 0.028 | 0.000 | 0.310 |
Tax | 3854 | 0.081 | 0.028 | 0.042 | 0.200 |
IndustryC | 3854 | 0.032 | 0.037 | 0.000 | 0.217 |
Energy | 3854 | 0.050 | 0.029 | 0.001 | 0.099 |
Size | 3854 | 22.397 | 1.261 | 9.399 | 27.293 |
SOE | 3854 | 0.490 | 0.500 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
ROA | 3854 | 0.040 | 0.069 | −0.531 | 0.816 |
Top1 | 3854 | 0.361 | 0.146 | 0.041 | 0.900 |
FirmAge | 3854 | 2.848 | 0.354 | 0.693 | 3.829 |
RD | 1343 | 0.018 | 0.015 | 0.000 | 0.159 |
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | LnGIA | RD | RD | |
MBER | 0.652 ** | 0.680 ** | 0.024 *** | 0.021 *** |
(2.29) | (2.40) | (3.14) | (2.73) | |
Size | 0.100 *** | 0.081 *** | −0.003 *** | −0.004 *** |
(6.80) | (5.21) | (−7.66) | (−8.10) | |
SOE | 0.070 * | 0.094 ** | −0.000 | −0.000 |
(1.79) | (2.26) | (−0.43) | (−0.43) | |
ROA | 0.074 | 0.112 | 0.009 *** | 0.008 *** |
(0.52) | (0.77) | (3.13) | (2.84) | |
Top1 | 0.005 | 0.071 | 0.002 | 0.007 ** |
(0.04) | (0.65) | (0.58) | (2.26) | |
Age | 0.038 | −0.125 ** | −0.002 | −0.006 *** |
(0.89) | (−1.96) | (−0.82) | (−2.71) | |
FDI | −1.389 | −2.693 ** | −0.052 | 0.041 |
(−1.20) | (−2.00) | (−1.12) | (0.85) | |
ER | −0.132 | −0.202 | −0.068 *** | −0.032 * |
(−0.33) | (−0.43) | (−4.39) | (−1.88) | |
Tax | −0.234 | −1.401 | −0.027 | 0.035 |
(−0.30) | (−1.13) | (−1.26) | (1.47) | |
IndustryC | 0.381 | −8.333 *** | 0.055 *** | 0.004 |
(0.59) | (−3.27) | (3.19) | (0.20) | |
Energy | 0.738 | 8.552 *** | 0.111 *** | 0.096 *** |
(1.05) | (2.97) | (5.63) | (5.07) | |
Constant | −2.040 *** | −0.582 | 0.095 *** | 0.087 *** |
(−6.64) | (−1.18) | (8.32) | (6.30) | |
Year-FE | NO | YES | NO | YES |
Industry-FE | NO | YES | NO | YES |
N | 3854 | 3854 | 1343 | 1343 |
Adj_R2 | 0.083 | 0.163 | 0.177 | 0.306 |
Replacement of Explained Variables | IV-Two Step | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | |
LnGA1 | LnGIG | LnRD | LnGIA | RD | |
MBER | 0.353 * | 0.891 *** | 1.844 * | 0.691 ** | 0.02 *** |
(1.56) | (3.43) | (1.95) | (2.45) | (2.72) | |
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3854 | 3854 | 1343 | 3854 | 1343 |
Adj_R2 | 0.141 | 0.046 | 0.543 | 0.122 | 0.309 |
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | LnGIA | RD | RD | |
Pwf1 | 12.23 *** | 0.435 *** | ||
(2.60) | (4.06) | |||
Pwf2 | 5.038 * | 0.232 *** | ||
(1.87) | (3.78) | |||
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3854 | 3854 | 1343 | 1343 |
Adj_R2 | 0.104 | 0.104 | 0.105 | 0.105 |
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
LnGIA | LnGA1 | LnGA2 | LnGIA | LnGA1 | LnGA2 | |
MBER | 0.525 * | 0.257 | 0.538 ** | 0.421 | 0.228 | 0.425 * |
(1.73) | (1.06) | (2.29) | (1.35) | (0.92) | (1.77) | |
HI | 0.012 | −0.005 | 0.012 | |||
(0.56) | (−0.32) | (0.75) | ||||
HI*MBER | 0.624 ** | 0.237 | 0.690 *** | |||
(2.56) | (1.22) | (3.66) | ||||
Mark. | −0.006 | −0.010 | −0.003 | |||
(−0.42) | (−0.85) | (−0.30) | ||||
Mark*MBER | 0.577 ** | 0.153 | 0.673 *** | |||
(2.42) | (0.81) | (3.65) | ||||
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3326 | 3326 | 3326 | 3234 | 3234 | 3234 |
Adj_R2 | 0.113 | 0.116 | 0.087 | 0.115 | 0.117 | 0.090 |
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
SA | LnGIA | LnGA1 | LnGA2 | |
MBER | 0.476 *** | 0.566 * | 0.241 | 0.520 ** |
(15.48) | (1.93) | (1.03) | (2.31) | |
SA | 0.213 * | 0.230 ** | 0.149 | |
(1.66) | (2.26) | (1.53) | ||
Sobel Z-value | 3.39 *** | 2.82 *** | 3.70 *** | |
p-value | 0.000 | 0.004 | 0.000 | |
Bootstrap Z-value | 2.52 ** | 2.31 ** | 2.48 ** | |
p-Value | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.013 | |
r(ind_eff) 95% conf. interval | [0.069 0.554] | [0.031 0.379] | [0.053 0.454] | |
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 3854 | 3854 | 3854 | 3854 |
Adj_R2 | 0.759 | 0.126 | 0.111 | 0.102 |
Nature of Property Rights | Industry Attributes | Degree of Supervision | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
State Firm | No-State Firm | Heavily Polluting | Non-Heavily Polluting | Highly Regulated | Low Regulatory | |
M(1) | M(2) | M(3) | M(4) | M(5) | M(6) | |
LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | LnGIA | |
MBER | 0.847 ** | 0.436 | 1.565 *** | 0.215 | 1.514 *** | 0.179 |
(2.40) | (0.88) | (3.41) | (0.61) | (2.97) | (0.50) | |
Control | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Year-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
Industry-FE | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES | YES |
N | 1887 | 1967 | 2114 | 1740 | 2510 | 1344 |
Adj_R2 | 0.132 | 0.172 | 0.223 | 0.088 | 0.218 | 0.106 |
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Wei, T.; Zhu, Q.; Liu, W. The Effect of Market-Based Environmental Regulations on Green Technology Innovation—The Regulatory Effect Based on Corporate Social Responsibility. Sustainability 2024, 16, 4719. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16114719
Wei T, Zhu Q, Liu W. The Effect of Market-Based Environmental Regulations on Green Technology Innovation—The Regulatory Effect Based on Corporate Social Responsibility. Sustainability. 2024; 16(11):4719. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16114719
Chicago/Turabian StyleWei, Tao, Qinlin Zhu, and Wenlan Liu. 2024. "The Effect of Market-Based Environmental Regulations on Green Technology Innovation—The Regulatory Effect Based on Corporate Social Responsibility" Sustainability 16, no. 11: 4719. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16114719
APA StyleWei, T., Zhu, Q., & Liu, W. (2024). The Effect of Market-Based Environmental Regulations on Green Technology Innovation—The Regulatory Effect Based on Corporate Social Responsibility. Sustainability, 16(11), 4719. https://doi.org/10.3390/su16114719