An Analysis of the Global Applicability of Ostrom’s Design Principles to Diagnose the Functionality of Common-Pool Resource Institutions
Abstract
:1. Introduction
- Clearly defined boundaries: Individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must be the boundaries of the CPR itself.
- Congruence between appropriation/provision rules and local conditions: Appropriation rules restricting the time, place, technology, and/or quantity of resource units are related to local conditions.
- Collective-choice arrangements: Most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules.
- Monitoring: Monitors who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriate behavior are accountable to the appropriators or are appropriators themselves.
- Graduated sanctions: Appropriators who violate operational rules are subject to graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, officials accountable to these appropriators, or both.
- Conflict-resolution mechanisms: Appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials.
- Minimal recognition of rights to organize: The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities.
- Nested enterprises: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises (for CPR that are parts of larger systems).
- Explicitly address the geographical distribution of the case studies that used the DPs, and its effect on the expression of the DPs;
- Explore the relationship between the DPs and the performance of young CPR institutions;
- Examine the relationship between robustness and success of CPR institutions;
- Identify additional factors that contribute to success or failure of a CPR institution;
- How widely are the DPs applied across the world?
- What is the effect of geographical settings on their expression?
- What is the relationship between the DPs and the performance of young CPR institutions?
- Is robustness equivalent to success?
- Could there be additional factors that contribute to the performance of CPRs?
2. Methods
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Geographical Settings
- In line with the argument concerning the relationship between robustness and success, the conclusions to facilitate comparison and analysis are classified as “Successful”, “Weak” or “Failed”: robustness is not included in this classification. The conclusions, unless otherwise indicated, were made by the authors of the respective papers.
- * The case studies marked with asterisks did not explicitly examine the presence/absence of the design principles (DPs). The present authors identified the DPs. The conclusions and interpretations were also made by the present authors.
- In line with the argument that there should be a minimum threshold for years of existence when classifying the Robustness of a CPR, more than 15 years was considered “Robust” and 15 years or less was considered “Young” (adapting Berkes [3]).
- The conclusions “Weak” to “Average” indicate weak to average performance for specific CPR institutions in this study.
- “Young” to “Robust” indicates short to long duration respectively for specific CPR institutions in this study.
3.2. Relationships between the Design Principles and Performance of Young Common-Pool Resource Institutions
3.3. Relationships between Robustness and Success in Relation to the Design Principles
3.4. Causes of Success/Failure of Common-Pool Resource Institutions
3.5. Frequency of the Different Design Principles
3.6. Significance of the Frequency Combinations of the Design Principles
3.7. Work on the Design Principles
3.8. Contribution of the Case Studies to the Commons Management
3.8.1. Social Capital
3.8.2. Group Size and Heterogeneity
3.8.3. External Interventions
4. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Acknowledgments
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Code for DP’s Frequency | Value | Score | Outcome |
---|---|---|---|
Absent (A) | 0 | 0–2.9 | Failed |
Rarely Present (RP) | 0.25 | 3–3.9 | Fragile |
Sometimes Present (SP) | 0.5 | 4–4.9 | Weak |
Mostly Present (MP) | 0.75 | 5–8 | Successful |
Present (P) | 1 |
CPR | Country | Study Site | DP1 | DP2 | DP3 | DP4 | DP5 | DP6 | DP7 | DP8 | Duration (Years) | Remark | Conclusion | Interpretation | Reference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Water Resources (Irrigation & Potable Water) | Nepal | Koshi, Gandaki, Karnali, Mahakali | MP | MP | P | MP | MP | P | P | RP | 10–200 | Young–Robust | Successful | Successful | [6] |
Thailand | Ping, Kok, Namchi, Maeklong, Chao Phraya, Rayong, Songkhla | MP | MP | P | MP | MP | P | RP | MP | 10–300 | Young–Robust | Successful | Successful | [6] | |
Pakistan | Dera Ghazi Khan (Punjab lowland) | A | P | A | A | P | P | P | N/A | Post-colonial period | Robust | Weak–Average | Weak | [7] | |
Dera Ghazi Khan (Punjab highland) | P | P | P | P | A | P | P | N/A | Pre-colonial period | Robust | Robust | Successful | [6] | ||
Japan | Nishikanbara | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | Since 1945 | Robust | Robust | Successful | [8] | |
Bulgaria | Haskovo, Pavel Bania, Veliko, Tarnovo | A | A | A | A | A | A | P | N/A | Since 2000 | Young | Failed | Failed | [9] | |
Australia | Murray–Darling Basin | P | P | MP | P | A | P | P | P | Since 2000 | Young | Successful | Successful | [10] | |
Spain | Campo de Montiel | MP | P | MP | P | RP | P | P | MP | Since 1985 | Robust | Successful | Successful | [10] | |
Western Mancha | RP | MP | RP | MP | A | RP | P | A | Since 1985 | Robust | Weak | Weak | [10] |
CPR | Country | Study Site | DP1 | DP2 | DP3 | DP4 | DP5 | DP6 | DP7 | DP8 | Duration (Years) | Remark | Conclusion | Interpretation | Reference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Forestry | Peru | Palcazu Valley | P | A | A | ND | ND | A | P | A | 1986–1994 | Young | Failed | Failed | [11] |
Honduras | La Campa | P | SP | RP | RP | RP | P | SP | P | Since 16th century | Robust | Weak | Weak | [12] | |
Tanzania | Duru-Hatiemba | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | N/A | Since 1995 | Young | Successful | Successful | [13] | |
Ethiopia | South Gonder | MP | MP | P | MP | MP | P | P | N/A | Since 368 | Robust | Successful | Successful | [14] | |
Nepal | Dhulikhel | SP | SP | A | SP | A | A | SP | N/A | ND | - | Failed | Failed | [15] | |
Jyalachitti | P | P | P | P | SP | P | P | N/A | Since 1992 | Young | Successful | Successful | [15] | ||
Mexico * | San Antonio (Pseudonym), Oaxaca | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | Since 1988 | Young | Successful | Successful | [16] | |
Mexico * | San Martin Ocoltan (Pseudonym), Oaxaca | A | A | A | A | A | A | A | P | Since 1980 | Young | Failed | Failed | [16] | |
Canada * | Ontario | P | P | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | Since 1996 | Young | Successful | Successful | [17] | |
Vietnam * | Ta Bo Cahn | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | P | N/A | 100 | Robust | Successful | Successful | [5] | |
Vietnam * | Na Tong, Bong | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | P | N/A | Since 1960s | Robust | Successful | Successful | [5] | |
Vietnam * | Dong Tien | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | P | N/A | Since 1990s | Young | Successful | Successful | [5] | |
Vietnam * | Mo Tom, Lam | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | P | N/A | ND | - | Successful | Successful | [5] | |
Slovakia * | Non-site-specific | P | P | P | P | P | N/A | P | N/A | 18th century–1940s | Robust | Successful | Successful | [4] |
CPR | Country | Study Site | DP1 | DP2 | DP3 | DP4 | DP5 | DP6 | DP7 | DP8 | Duration (Years) | Remark | Conclusion | Interpretation | Reference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fisheries | New Zealand | Non-site-specific | RP | RP | RP | RP | A | P | P | SP | Since 1990s | Young | Fragile | Fragile | [18] |
Kenya | Non-site-specific | P | P | SP | RP | SP | P | P | SP | Since 1990s | Young | Average | Successful | [19] | |
Madagascar | Non-site-specific | P | P | SP | A | SP | P | P | SP | Since 1996 | Young | Average | Successful | [19] | |
South Korea * | Kagodo Island | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | N/A | Since 1960s | Robust | Successful | Successful | [20] | |
Brazil * | Pranha do Canto Verde (Ceara) | P | P | P | P | P | ND | P | N/A | Since 1990s | Young | Successful | Successful | [21] | |
Canada * | Lennox Island, Abegweit (Prince Edward Island) | P | P | P | A | P | P | P | N/A | Since 1990s | Young | Successful | Successful | [22] | |
Nigeria * | Badagry Creek (Ogun) | P | P | A | RP | RP | A | A | N/A | ND | - | Failed | Failed | [23] |
CPR | Country | Study Site | DP1 | DP2 | DP3 | DP4 | DP5 | DP6 | DP7 | DP8 | Duration (Years) | Remark | Conclusion | Interpretation | Reference |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Forest | Tanzania | 12 villages in semi-arid regions of Tanzania | P | P | MP | MP | RP | P | P | RP | ND | - | Successful | Successful | [24] |
Water Resources | P | P | P | MP | SP | MP | P | SP | ND | - | Successful | Successful | [24] | ||
Pasture | SP | MP | SP | MP | A | MP | P | A | ND | - | Weak | Weak | [24] | ||
Game Reserve | South Africa * | Sabi Sand Game Reserve (Mpumalanga) | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | P | ND | - | Successful | Successful | [25] |
Reason for Success | Example |
---|---|
Non-coercive presence of government (DP8) | Japanese Irrigation CPRs |
Social capital (strong group consciousness, mutual trust and a high moral standard) | |
Small size | Nepalese Irrigation CPRs |
Autonomous community management (DP7) | Pakistani Irrigation CPRs (highland) |
Government community collaboration (DP8) | Lower and Upper Murray–Darling Basin (Australia) |
Democratic settings | |
Lower number of users | Campo de Montiel (Spain) |
Strong leadership | |
No tendency for illegal use | |
Voluntary community participation (DP3) | Duru-Hatiemba’s Forest CPR (Tanzania) |
Livelihood dependence on resources | Vietnamese Forest CPRs |
Religious beliefs | |
Community participation (DP3) | |
High level of organization | Dhulikel’s Forest CPR (Nepal) |
Strong association | San Antonio’s Forest CPR (Mexico) |
Strong leadership | |
Community participation (DP3) | South Korean Fisheries CPRs |
Equity | |
Strong conflict resolution methods (DP6) | |
Reasons for Failure | Example |
Absence of social capital (distrust, envy, opportunism, and corruption) | Bulgarian Irrigation CPRs |
Information asymmetry | |
Large size | Thai Irrigation CPRs |
Government intervention (DP7) | Pakistani Irrigation CPRs (lowland) |
Non-consultations of stakeholders (DP3) | Upper Murray–Darling Basin (before plan revision was performed; Australia) |
Tendency to maximize profit illegally | Western Mancha (Spain) |
Low government resources for controlling | |
Lack of strong political leadership | |
Political change | Urbar Forest CPR Management (Slovakia) |
Government intervention (DP7) | |
Generational gap (lifestyle change, heterogeneity, profit seeking, and economic diversity) | |
Government intervention (DP7) | Several Semi-Arid-Zone CPRs (Tanzania) |
Lack of conflict resolutions method (DP6) | |
Absence of graduated sanctions (DP5) | |
Inability to cope with change | |
Low level of organization | Jyalachiti Forest CPR (Nepal) |
Conflict of interests (DP6) | |
Corruption | San Martin’s Forest CPR (Mexico) |
Mismanagement | |
Ethnic heterogeneity and lack of shared values | |
Exclusion of stakeholders | Fisheries CPR (New Zealand) |
Formative stage of the cooperative | |
Weak graduated sanctions (DP5) |
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Gari, S.R.; Newton, A.; Icely, J.D.; Delgado-Serrano, M.M. An Analysis of the Global Applicability of Ostrom’s Design Principles to Diagnose the Functionality of Common-Pool Resource Institutions. Sustainability 2017, 9, 1287. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9071287
Gari SR, Newton A, Icely JD, Delgado-Serrano MM. An Analysis of the Global Applicability of Ostrom’s Design Principles to Diagnose the Functionality of Common-Pool Resource Institutions. Sustainability. 2017; 9(7):1287. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9071287
Chicago/Turabian StyleGari, Sirak Robele, Alice Newton, John D. Icely, and Maria Mar Delgado-Serrano. 2017. "An Analysis of the Global Applicability of Ostrom’s Design Principles to Diagnose the Functionality of Common-Pool Resource Institutions" Sustainability 9, no. 7: 1287. https://doi.org/10.3390/su9071287