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Article

Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment

by
Manela Karunadasa
,
Katri K. Sieberg
* and
Toni Tapani Kristian Jantunen
Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University, Kanslerinrinne 1, 33014 Tampere, Finland
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2023, 14(3), 46; https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046
Submission received: 6 April 2023 / Revised: 23 May 2023 / Accepted: 29 May 2023 / Published: 31 May 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Competition, Coordination, and Cooperation: Theory and Evidence)

Abstract

This experiment examines the relationship between payment systems and the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. By using a real-effort task to stimulate the decision making of service providers, the study finds that payment systems do indeed have an impact on service provision. Specifically, providers in fee-for-service systems over-provide, while those in salary systems under-provide services. Additionally, there is a lack of alignment between the services provided under fee-for-service and the actual needs of customers, resulting in a substantial loss of customer benefits under fee-for-service in comparison to under salary. The study also finds that providers in fee-for-service systems perform more faulty tasks than those in salary, indicating that they may prioritize quantity over quality in their services. As for insurance, the results of this study show no significant effect of insurance on the number of services provided; however, customers without insurance received significantly more faulty tasks. Based on these results, the study concludes that payment systems play an important role in determining the quality and quantity of services provided in credence goods markets. Overall, this study highlights the need for a better alignment between customer needs and services provided under fee-for-service systems.
Keywords: payment systems; credence goods; laboratory experiment; incentives; fee-for-service; salary payment systems; credence goods; laboratory experiment; incentives; fee-for-service; salary

Share and Cite

MDPI and ACS Style

Karunadasa, M.; Sieberg, K.K.; Jantunen, T.T.K. Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment. Games 2023, 14, 46. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046

AMA Style

Karunadasa M, Sieberg KK, Jantunen TTK. Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment. Games. 2023; 14(3):46. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046

Chicago/Turabian Style

Karunadasa, Manela, Katri K. Sieberg, and Toni Tapani Kristian Jantunen. 2023. "Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment" Games 14, no. 3: 46. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046

APA Style

Karunadasa, M., Sieberg, K. K., & Jantunen, T. T. K. (2023). Payment Systems, Supplier-Induced Demand, and Service Quality in Credence Goods: Results from a Laboratory Experiment. Games, 14(3), 46. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14030046

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