Journal Description
Games
Games
is a scholarly, peer-reviewed, open access journal of studies on game theory and its applications published bimonthly online by MDPI.
- Open Access— free for readers, with article processing charges (APC) paid by authors or their institutions.
- High Visibility: indexed within Scopus, ESCI (Web of Science), MathSciNet, zbMATH, RePEc, EconLit, EconBiz, and other databases.
- Rapid Publication: manuscripts are peer-reviewed and a first decision is provided to authors approximately 32.6 days after submission; acceptance to publication is undertaken in 6.9 days (median values for papers published in this journal in the first half of 2025).
- Recognition of Reviewers: reviewers who provide timely, thorough peer-review reports receive vouchers entitling them to a discount on the APC of their next publication in any MDPI journal, in appreciation of the work done.
Impact Factor:
0.5 (2024)
Latest Articles
Pure Bayesian Nash Equilibria for Bayesian Games with Multidimensional Vector Types and Linear Payoffs
Games 2025, 16(4), 37; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040037 - 14 Jul 2025
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In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a
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In this work, we study n-agent Bayesian games with m-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called linear multidimensional Bayesian games. This class of games is equivalent with n-agent, m-game uniform multigames. We distinguish between games that have a discrete type space and those with a continuous type space. More specifically, we are interested in the existence of pure Bayesian Nash equilibriums for such games and efficient algorithms to find them. For continuous priors, we suggest a methodology to perform Nash equilibrium searches in simple cases. For discrete priors, we present algorithms that can handle two-action and two-player games efficiently. We introduce the core concept of threshold strategy and, under some mild conditions, we show that these games have at least one pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We illustrate our results with several examples like the double-game prisoner’s dilemma (DGPD), the game of chicken, and the sustainable adoption decision problem (SADP).
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Open AccessArticle
“Anything Goes” in an Ultimatum Game?
by
Peter Paul Vanderschraaf
Games 2025, 16(4), 36; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040036 - 9 Jul 2025
Abstract
I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the “surprising” results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games having the
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I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the “surprising” results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game. I present an evolutionary analysis of different games having the same set of allowable Proposer offers and functions that determine Proposer and Recipient payoffs. For Unrestricted Ultimatum Games, where Recipients may choose from among any of the logically possible pure strategies, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers make the lowest allowable offer. However, for Threshold Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among minimum acceptable offer strategies, and for Range Reduced Ultimatum Games, where Recipients must choose from among pure strategies that spurn offers that are “too high” as well as “too low”, populations tend to evolve most often to Nash equilibria where Proposers offer substantially more than the lowest possible offer, a result that is consistent with existing Ultimatum Game experimental results. Finally, I argue that, practically speaking, actual Proposers and Recipients will likely regard some reduction of the Unrestricted Ultimatum Game as their game because, for them, the strategies of this reduction are salient.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Evolution of Cooperation and Evolutionary Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle
Pool Formation with Three Patent Owners
by
Hao Liu, Xuewen Qian, Chen Qu and Jingyi Shen
Games 2025, 16(4), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040035 - 8 Jul 2025
Abstract
We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the
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We analyze the endogenous formation of patent pools among three patent owners and the associated welfare effects. Under a condition of synergistic three-patent combination, either a unique symmetric equilibrium or infinitely many asymmetric equilibria can arise when patents are fragmented. By using the notion of equilibrium binding agreements, we show that (1) when there is a unique symmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is both stable and welfare-maximizing; (2) fragmented patents are stable in the presence of infinitely many asymmetric equilibria; and (3) when considering only a single specific asymmetric equilibrium under fragmented patents, the complete pool is welfare-maximizing if it is stable, while fragmented patents can be both stable and welfare-maximizing under certain conditions. We also discuss an alternative version of synergism and an alternative bargaining protocol for patent pool formation.
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(This article belongs to the Section Cooperative Game Theory and Bargaining)
Open AccessArticle
Hierarchies and Promotions in Political Institutions: Accountability and Selection
by
B. Pablo Montagnes, Stephane Wolton and Junyan Jiang
Games 2025, 16(4), 34; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040034 - 4 Jul 2025
Abstract
Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance: accountability and selection.
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Hierarchies are common in political settings. From judges to elected politicians, as well as from activists to bureaucrats, political agents compete for promotion to higher positions. This paper studies political tournaments and their impact on two aspects of political performance: accountability and selection. While larger tournaments discourage effort, they improve selection. We also discuss the optimal design of tournaments as a function of the principal’s objectives and the features of the environment. We find that tournaments of size two (such as two-candidate elections) are generally suboptimal. Our analysis also highlights that increased desirability of promotion always increases effort but can reduce the optimal tournament size under certain conditions. We also present a range of other comparative statics.
Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Conflict and Communication: Applications of Game Theory to Political Economy)
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Open AccessArticle
Nonmarket Valuation by Contests Under Two American Rules: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
by
Sung-Hoon Park and Jason F. Shogren
Games 2025, 16(4), 33; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040033 - 30 Jun 2025
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Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules—the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract—we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a citizens group
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Herein, we further examine how we can value nonmarket goods and services by considering the costs associated with environmental conflicts. Focusing on two American rules—the asymmetric reimbursement system and the contingent fee contract—we develop a strategic game-theoretic model in which a citizens group engages a delegate through a contingent fee compensation contract, while a polluter engages a delegate through an hourly fee compensation contract. If the citizens group prevails, the polluter is obligated to contribute a portion of the contingent fee. Solving for the subgame perfect equilibrium, two results emerge. First, the 4x-rule can be maintained through the adjustment of the asymmetric reimbursement system. Second, the asymmetric reimbursement system can serve both as a supplementary method to measure nonmarket valuation and to reduce the rent dissipation resulting from environmental conflicts under general circumstances.
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Open AccessArticle
The Impact of Market Mood on a Dynamic Model of Insider Trading
by
Ruohan Wang, Jing Wang and Zhi Yang
Games 2025, 16(4), 32; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16040032 - 20 Jun 2025
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According to the research, the proportions of various types of investors may or may not change in response to different trading strategies or complex trading environments. This paper investigates a single-period trading model for multiple risk-averse and risk-neutral insider traders. The distinction is
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According to the research, the proportions of various types of investors may or may not change in response to different trading strategies or complex trading environments. This paper investigates a single-period trading model for multiple risk-averse and risk-neutral insider traders. The distinction is that we consider the impact of the number of risk-averse traders and different types of insider traders on market liquidity. The model contains four types of trading entities: risk-neutral and risk-adverse insider traders, risk-neutral market makers, and noise traders. Firstly, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the model’s linear Nash equilibrium; secondly, we compare the model with multiple risk-neutral and risk-adverse insider traders in the market to the model with only risk-neutral insider traders and risk-adverse insider traders. It is shown that the market liquidity parameter decreases with the increase in the number of risk-averse persons in a particular range and increases with the increase in the number of risk-averse persons in another range. Markets with risk-neutral and risk-averse insider traders have consistently lower liquidity than markets with only risk-neutral insider traders. Comparing this to markets with only risk-adverse insider traders reveals that the number of risk-adverse traders heavily influences market liquidity.
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Open AccessArticle
Spatial Competition Across Borders: The Role of Patients’ Mobility and Institutional Settings
by
Laura Levaggi and Rosella Levaggi
Games 2025, 16(3), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030031 - 5 Jun 2025
Abstract
Health care systems rely on geographical boundaries that secure financial stability and adequate planning. Quality differences across regions often arise for efficiency reasons, causing patient flows if mobility is free. In this paper, a theoretical spatial competition model is developed to study the
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Health care systems rely on geographical boundaries that secure financial stability and adequate planning. Quality differences across regions often arise for efficiency reasons, causing patient flows if mobility is free. In this paper, a theoretical spatial competition model is developed to study the role of patients’ mobility on quality setting and to draw policy implications on its use as an instrument to reduce disparities, in a setting where regions differ in efficiency, costs, and market structure. From the analysis, it emerges that the institutional setting matters and a trade-off may appear between equity (in terms of quality difference across patients) and welfare (finding an allocation that maximizes social benefits). In a centralized setting, it is optimal to regulate mobility and increase the quality gap, while allowing free mobility calls for a refined quality setting, in which, depending on a balance between costs and benefits, the quality gap may be either increased or decreased. In decentralization the gap is generally lower, compared to centralization: the different consideration of benefits from local quality provision results in higher quality levels where the market structure is vertically integrated.
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(This article belongs to the Section Applied Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle
Equilibrium Coalition Structures in Three-Player Symmetric Games
by
Jingyi Shen and Chen Qu
Games 2025, 16(3), 30; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030030 - 5 Jun 2025
Cited by 1
Abstract
In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: , which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which represent the
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In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: , which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which represent the cooperative blocking approach. We find that the coarsest equilibrium coalition structure (based on the latter notion) is never finer than , and we provide a sufficient and necessary condition for these two solutions to generate the same coalition structure (i.e., the two solutions coincide if and only if the first coalition to form in is not a two-player coalition or a particular condition about average coalitional worths is satisfied). In symmetric games with more than three players, we demonstrate through a series of examples that any relationship between these two solutions is possible. We also discuss symmetric games with positive externalities or equal division in which these two solutions coincide.
Full article
Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
The Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky Solution as a Mechanism for Dividing the Uncertain Future Profit of a Partnership
by
Yigal Gerchak and Eugene Khmelnitsky
Games 2025, 16(3), 29; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030029 - 4 Jun 2025
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Establishing a partnership necessitates agreeing on how to divide future profits or losses. We consider parties who wish to contract on the division of uncertain future profits. We propose to divide profits according to the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (K-S) solution, which is the intersection point
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Establishing a partnership necessitates agreeing on how to divide future profits or losses. We consider parties who wish to contract on the division of uncertain future profits. We propose to divide profits according to the Raiffa–Kalai–Smorodinsky (K-S) solution, which is the intersection point of the feasible region’s boundary and the line connecting the disagreement and ideal points. It is the only function which satisfies invariance to linear transformations, symmetry, strong Pareto optimality, and monotonicity. We formulate the general problem of designing a contract which divides uncertain future profit between the partners and determines shares of each partner. We first focus on linear and, later, non-linear contracts between two partners, providing analytical and numerical solutions for various special cases in terms of the utility functions of the partners, their beliefs, and the disagreement point. We then generalize the analysis to any number of partners. We also consider a contract which is partially based on the parties’ financial contribution to the partnership, which have a positive impact on profit. Finally, we address asymmetric K-S solutions. K-S solutions are seen to be a useful predictor of the outcome of negotiations, similar to Nash’s bargaining solution.
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Open AccessArticle
The Impact of Gifts and Shared Experiences on an Investor-Manager Relationship
by
Maximilian Olaf Hoyer and Frans van Winden
Games 2025, 16(3), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030028 - 4 Jun 2025
Abstract
This paper experimentally investigates the relationship between an investor and a project manager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilities of which are uncertain. Investors can change projects, but also have to change project managers if they want to
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This paper experimentally investigates the relationship between an investor and a project manager. Project managers choose from a pool of projects, the success probabilities of which are uncertain. Investors can change projects, but also have to change project managers if they want to do so. An additional joint project or a voluntary money transfer precedes their interaction. We hypothesize that investors favor projects of managers with whom they share positive experiences at that stage, even though these experiences do not provide any information about the subsequent project’s success probability. Interaction through a voluntary transfer plays a clear and significant role in the investors’ decision-making via bonding, whereas the influence of merely sharing a positive or negative experience proves more complex.
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(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle
Match Stability with a Costly and Flexible Number of Positions
by
James Gilmore and David Porter
Games 2025, 16(3), 27; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030027 - 21 May 2025
Abstract
One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can
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One of the main goals of two-sided matching mechanisms is to pair two groups of agents in a stable manner. Stability means that no pair of agents has an incentive to deviate from their assigned match. The outcome of such a match can have significant consequences for the participants involved. Most existing research in this field assumes that the quotas of organizations are fixed and externally determined, which may not always be realistic. We introduce the concept of slot stability, which considers the possibility that organizations may want to adjust their quotas after the match process. To address this issue, we propose an algorithm that generates both stable and slot-stable matches by using flexible, endogenous quotas.
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Open AccessArticle
A General Model of Bertrand–Edgeworth Duopoly
by
Blake A. Allison and Jason J. Lepore
Games 2025, 16(3), 26; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030026 - 19 May 2025
Abstract
This paper studies a class of two-player all-pay contests with externalities that encompass a general version of duopoly price competition. This all-pay contest formulation puts little restriction on production technologies, demand, and demand rationing. There are two types of possible equilibria: In the
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This paper studies a class of two-player all-pay contests with externalities that encompass a general version of duopoly price competition. This all-pay contest formulation puts little restriction on production technologies, demand, and demand rationing. There are two types of possible equilibria: In the first type of equilibrium, the lower bound to pricing is the same for each firm, and the probability of any pricing tie above this price is zero. Each firm’s equilibrium expected profit is their monopoly profit at the lower bound price. In the second type of equilibrium, one firm prices at the lower bound of the other firm’s average cost and other firm prices according to a non-degenerate mixed strategy. This type of equilibrium can only occur if production technologies are sufficiently different across firms. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium and use these conditions to demonstrate the fragility of deterministic outcomes in pricing games.
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
Procedural Information as a “Game Changer” in School Choice
by
Yoan Hermstrüwer
Games 2025, 16(3), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030025 - 12 May 2025
Abstract
This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale–Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact
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This article explores the impact of procedural information on the behavior of students under two school admission procedures commonly used in the US, the EU, and other jurisdictions: the Gale–Shapley mechanism and the Boston mechanism. In a lab experiment, I compare the impact of information about the mechanism, information about individually optimal application strategies, and information about both. I find that strategic and full information increases truth-telling and stability under the Gale–Shapley mechanism. Under the Boston mechanism, however, the adoption of equilibrium strategies remains unaffected. Contrary to the prevailing assumptions in matching theory, the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the importance of procedural transparency and suggest that eliminating justified envy may not be sufficient to foster fairness and mitigate litigation risks.
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(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
Mobility Comparisons: Theoretical Definitions and People’s Perceptions
by
Michele Bernasconi, Giulio Cinquanta, Valentino Dardanoni and Vincenzo Prete
Games 2025, 16(3), 24; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030024 - 8 May 2025
Abstract
Comparing mobility is an important but controversial issue. In this paper, we argue that in a specific and relevant case, there exists a univocal and non-controversial definition of greater (exchange) mobility that allows for unambiguous comparisons. We conducted a questionnaire experiment to investigate
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Comparing mobility is an important but controversial issue. In this paper, we argue that in a specific and relevant case, there exists a univocal and non-controversial definition of greater (exchange) mobility that allows for unambiguous comparisons. We conducted a questionnaire experiment to investigate whether people’s perceptions of social mobility align with this definition, and we found that people’s choices are broadly in line with the theoretical predictions.
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(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Open AccessArticle
The Role of Reputation in Sequel Production
by
Khac Minh Duc Do and Dmitriy Knyazev
Games 2025, 16(3), 23; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030023 - 8 May 2025
Abstract
This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer’s incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold,
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This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer’s incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold, capturing the idea that consumers base future consumption on past success. Although high-productivity producers create higher-quality originals and sequels, the conditioning on successful originals still makes sequels, on average, worse than their predecessors. This aligns with evidence of sequel underperformance in media markets.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Applications of Game Theory to Industrial Organization)
Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
New Categories of Conditional Contribution Strategies in the Public Goods Game
by
Klaudia Schäffer, Adrienn Král and Ádám Kun
Games 2025, 16(3), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030022 - 6 May 2025
Abstract
Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map
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Human cooperation is ubiquitous and instinctive. We are among the most cooperative species on Earth. Still, research mostly focuses on why we cooperate, instead of understanding why some of us do not do so. The public goods game can be used to map human cooperation as well as to study free riding. We acquired data through an online, unincentivized questionnaire which prompted respondents to choose how much of an initial endowment to contribute to a common pool. The respondents contributed, on average, 54% of their initial endowment to the common pool. The usual categorization scheme of the elicited conditional contribution pattern discerns unconditional free riders who do not contribute irrespective of the contributions of others and calls everyone a conditional cooperator who correlates their contribution with that of the others. However, someone consistently offering less than the others should not be called a cooperator. Consequently, based on the conditional contribution patterns among our respondents, we suggest a recategorization of contribution patterns into the following categories: unconditional cooperator (1.5%), unconditional free rider (10.6%), perfect conditional cooperator (42.6%), hump-shaped contributor (0.7%), V-shaped contributor (0.4%), conditional cooperator (16.6%), conditional free rider (13.6%), conditional contributor (6.4%), negative conditional contributor (0%), and others (7.6%). We only call someone a cooperator if the respondent at least matches others’ contribution, and call everyone consistently offering less a free rider. Furthermore, we found no difference between the contributions of women and men. No correlation of contribution with age, educational attainment, and size of the residential settlement was found. Students’ contributions were not different from non-students’ contributions. We found a significant correlation of the contribution to the common pool with hypercompetitive orientation (negative correlation) and the self-assessed willingness to take risks in general (positive correlation).
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(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Strategic Complementarities in a Model of Commercial Media Bias
by
Anna Kerkhof and Johannes Münster
Games 2025, 16(3), 21; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16030021 - 23 Apr 2025
Abstract
Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a
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Media content is an important privately supplied public good. While it has been shown that contributions to a public good crowd out other contributions in many cases, the issue has not been thoroughly studied for media markets yet. We show that in a standard model of commercial media bias, qualities of media content are strategic complements, whereby investments into quality can crowd in further investments and engage competitors in a race to the top. Therefore, financially strong public service media can mitigate commercial media bias: the content of commercial media can be more in line with the preferences of the audience and less advertiser-friendly in a dual (mixed public and commercial) media system than in a purely commercial media market.
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(This article belongs to the Special Issue Mass Media Industries: The Economic Games)
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Two-Tier Marketplace with Multi-Resource Bidding and Strategic Pricing for Multi-QoS Services
by
Samira Habli, Rachid El-Azouzi, Essaid Sabir, Mandar Datar, Halima Elbiaze and Mohammed Sadik
Games 2025, 16(2), 20; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020020 - 21 Apr 2025
Abstract
Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud resources is crucial,
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Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud resources is crucial, ensuring that Service Providers (SPs) have adequate resources to deliver their services efficiently. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to describe the competition among non-cooperative SPs as they bid for resources from both fog and cloud environments, managed by an Infrastructure Provider (InP), to offer paid services to their end-users. In our game model, each SP bids for the resources it requires, determining its willingness to pay based on its specific service demands and quality requirements. Resource allocation prioritizes the fog environment, which offers local access with lower latency but limited capacity. When fog resources are insufficient, the remaining demand is fulfilled by cloud resources, which provide virtually unlimited capacity. However, this approach has a weakness in that some SPs may struggle to fully utilize the resources allocated in the Nash equilibrium-balanced cloud solution. Specifically, under a nondiscriminatory pricing scheme, the Nash equilibrium may enable certain SPs to acquire more resources, granting them a significant advantage in utilizing fog resources. This leads to unfairness among SPs competing for fog resources. To address this issue, we propose a price differentiation mechanism among SPs to ensure a fair allocation of resources at the Nash equilibrium in the fog environment. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and analyze its key properties. The effectiveness of the proposed model is validated through simulations using Amazon EC2 instances, where we investigate the impact of various parameters on market equilibrium. The results show that SPs may experience profit reductions as they invest to attract end-users and enhance their quality of service QoS. Furthermore, unequal access to resources can lead to an imbalance in competition, negatively affecting the fairness of resource distribution. The results demonstrate that the proposed model is coherent and that it offers valuable information on the allocation of resources, pricing strategies, and QoS management in cloud- and fog-based environments.
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(This article belongs to the Section Non-Cooperative Game Theory)
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Procedurally Fair Co-Determination with Endogeneous Value Uncertainty: An Experiment
by
Werner Güth, Ludivine Martin, Tibor Neugebauer and Sotiria Xanalatou
Games 2025, 16(2), 19; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020019 - 21 Apr 2025
Abstract
We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones accepted. Repeated
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We present an experimental test of a procedurally fair co-determination mechanism where group members reduce their value uncertainty before submitting bids for a joint project. The results suggest a relatively efficient mechanism, with unprofitable projects being largely rejected and profitable ones accepted. Repeated interactions tended to enhance the efficiency, while uncertain information reduced it. The subjects invested surprisingly little search effort to reduce the uncertainty about the costs and benefits, and appeared to trade off search costs against higher bids.
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(This article belongs to the Section Behavioral and Experimental Game Theory)
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Cultural Dissemination on Evolving Networks: A Modified Axelrod Model Based on a Rewiring Process
by
Yuri Perez, Fabio Henrique Pereira and Pedro Henrique Triguis Schimit
Games 2025, 16(2), 18; https://doi.org/10.3390/g16020018 - 17 Apr 2025
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural
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In this paper, we investigate the classical Axelrod model of cultural dissemination under an adaptive network framework. Unlike the original model, we place agents on a complex network, where they cut connections with any agent that does not share at least one cultural trait. This rewiring process alters the network topology, and key parameters—such as the number of traits, the neighborhood search range, and the degree-based preferential attachment exponent—also influence the distribution of cultural traits. Unlike conventional Axelrod models, our approach introduces a dynamic network structure where the rewiring mechanism allows agents to actively modify their social connections based on cultural similarity. This adaptation leads to network fragmentation or consolidation depending on the interaction among model parameters, offering a framework to study cultural homogeneity and diversity. The results show that, while long-range reconnections can promote more homogeneous clusters in certain conditions, variations in the local search radius and preferential attachment can lead to rich and sometimes counterintuitive dynamics. Extensive simulations demonstrate that this adaptive mechanism can either increase or decrease cultural diversity, depending on the interplay of network structure and cultural dissemination parameters. These findings have practical implications for understanding opinion dynamics and cultural polarization in social networks, particularly in digital environments where rewiring mechanisms are analogous to recommendation systems or user-driven connection adjustments.
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(This article belongs to the Section Learning and Evolution in Games)
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