Games

Games, Volume 6, Issue 1 (March 2015) – 3 articles , Pages 1-38

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280 KiB

Open AccessArticle

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

by José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, António Osório and Josep E. Peris

Games 2015, 6(1), 32-38; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6010032 - 05 Mar 2015

Cited by 5 | Viewed by 5295

Abstract

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Bargaining Games)

289 KiB

Open AccessArticle

Selection-Mutation Dynamics of Signaling Games

by Josef Hofbauer and Simon M. Huttegger

Games 2015, 6(1), 2-31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g6010002 - 09 Jan 2015

Cited by 2 | Viewed by 6006

Abstract

We study the structure of the rest points of signaling games and their dynamic behavior under selection-mutation dynamics by taking the case of three signals as our canonical example. Many rest points of the replicator dynamics of signaling games are not isolated and, therefore, not robust under perturbations. However, some of them attract open sets of initial conditions. We prove the existence of certain rest points of the selection-mutation dynamics close to Nash equilibria of the signaling game and show that all but the perturbed rest points close to strict Nash equilibria are dynamically unstable. This is an important result for the evolution of signaling behavior, since it shows that the second-order forces that are governed by mutation can increase the chances of successful signaling. Full article

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