Games, Volume 7, Issue 4

We study the formation of networks where agents choose how much to invest in each relationship. The benefit that an agent can derive from a network depends on the strength of the direct links between agents. We assume that the strength of the direct...

We introduce a model for studying the evolutionary dynamics of Poker. Notably, despite its wide diffusion and the raised scientific interest around it, Poker still represents an open challenge. Recent attempts for uncovering its real nature, based on...

The modeling of awareness and unawareness is a significant topic in the doxastic logic literature, where it is usually tackled in terms of full belief operators. The present paper aims at a treatment in terms of partial belief operators. It draws upo...

We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subse...

This paper develops a game-theoretic and epistemic account of a peculiar mode of practical reasoning that sustains focal points but also more general forms of rule-following behavior which I call community-based reasoning (CBR). It emphasizes the imp...

In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE...

Recently, the emergent dynamics in multiplex networks, composed of layers of multiple networks, has been discussed extensively in network sciences. However, little is still known about whether and how the evolution of strategy for selecting a layer t...

In unrestricted combinatorial auctions, we put forward a mechanism that guarantees a meaningful revenue benchmark based on the possibilistic beliefs that the players have about each other’s valuations. In essence, the mechanism guarantees, within a f...

Who benefits from the ignorance of others? We address this question from the point of view of a policy maker who can induce some ignorance into a system of agents competing for resources. Evolutionary game theory shows that when unconditional coopera...

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of st...

We experimentally investigate the optimal way to handle the uncovering of a noble lie, that is, a lie that supposedly is in the best interest of a given community. For this purpose, we analyze a public good game with feedback to group members on the...

The increasing number of patients affected by chronic kidney disease makes it necessary to rely on living donors. However, a patient often cannot exploit her potential donor, due to blood or tissue incompatibility. Therefore, crossover transplantatio...

Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained...