1. Introduction
Since the Chinese economic reform, urbanization and industrialization in China have experienced considerable growth. Because the urban–rural differences in China are substantial, megalopolises in various regions, including the Pearl River Delta, encounter large influxes of migrants. China’s floating population is defined as migrants without local household registration (hukou) status and is one of the largest migrant populations in the world. According to the Seventh National Population Census of the People’s Republic of China, domestic migrants in 2020 totaled 376 million people. Large-scale migration causes both theoretical and practical issues. In particular, researchers have long discussed the problem of migrant settlement under the urban–rural dichotomy [
1,
2]. Structural differences in China’s urban–rural dichotomy comprise two aspects, namely household registration and the land system. Compared with locals, migrants cannot enjoy social welfare benefits, and permanent settlement is difficult. As for land use, although farmland guarantees farmers’ livelihoods, overattachment to one’s farmland renders permanent settlement in other regions more difficult.
Because most migrants in China come from farming villages, researchers have centered on the settlement intentions of rural–urban migrants. Because of agricultural laborers’ identities as farmers and outsiders, permanent urban settlement is rare and many continually migrate from city to city or between cities and their hometowns [
3]. The settlement intention discussed in this paper refers to the willingness of the floating population to settle permanently in the immigration place in order to obtain the welfare of the immigration place. Migrants’ intentions to settle in cities are restricted not only by the household registration system but also by conditions such as their concentration in the secondary labor market, characterized by labor-intensive industry, unstable jobs, and low social security [
4]. The literature centers on rural–urban settlement intention and its determinants, including individual, generational, social, market, and institutional factors. Few studies have compared the settlement intentions of rural–urban and urban–urban migrants, whose household registrations are in farming villages and cities, respectively [
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10]. The upward trend in urban–urban migration in China is expected to continue. According to data from a monitoring survey of floating population dynamics, urban–urban migrants accounted for 13.95% and 16.7% of the total migrant population in 2011 and 2018, respectively. However, due to the long-term impact of China’s urban–rural dual structure, there are differences between China’s rural migrants and urban migrants in many aspects, such as individual characteristics, family background, and migration behavior [
2]. The influences of these differences on settlement intention merit further exploration.
The urban–rural dual classification system is no longer enough to reflect the reality of settlement evolution in many countries, including developing countries. In recent decades, the important feature of the evolution of human settlements is that the boundary between urban and rural areas is becoming increasingly blurred. In developed countries, urban residents’ reliance on convenient transportation networks to work in urban areas and to live in the suburbs has long been common. This phenomenon is the concrete embodiment of the increasingly blurred boundary between urban and rural areas, and the disappearance of the urban–rural dual pattern. At the same time, the differences between urban and rural settlements, and lifestyles in developed countries tend to be blurred, and the traditional urban–rural, dual-division model does not easily reflect the reality. In the context of China’s urbanization, many studies show that China’s urban–rural boundaries are becoming weakened or are even disappearing, and the lifestyle gap between urban and rural areas is becoming smaller and smaller. However, the path dependence of the impact of urban–rural differences in China may still exist.
China’s first-tier and second-tier cities employ a points-based household registration system through which they obtain the skilled individuals they require for development [
11]. The general consensus is that rural–urban migrants wish to settle in cities with their families. This is difficult to achieve because of relevant regulations in the existing household registration system. The elimination of the institutional barriers caused by this system is expected to promote permanent settlement in cities [
12,
13,
14]. Other studies have indicated the opposite—that the percentage of rural–urban migrants who wish to transfer their household registration to cities and permanently settle there is low. The current percentage of migrants who wish to do so with no other conditions is 21.8%. By contrast, only 11.8% of migrants wish to do so, even under the condition that their land ownership contract must be returned to the government. This discrepancy may be related to the deep-seated institutional and cultural differences between cities and countryside [
15]. Therefore, further exploration of the long-term impacts of land property rights, welfare, and culture in China under the urban–rural dichotomy of the household registration system is essential.
In this paper, we use survey data to discuss the following questions: (1) Under the urban–rural dichotomy, how do the demographic characteristics and settlement intentions of rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants differ? (2) Which factors affect the migrants’ settlement intentions? Specifically, how do the new points-based household registration system and land system in the Pearl River Delta megalopolis affect settlement intentions? (3) Which factors affect the settlement intentions of rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants? The findings advance the understanding of floating population dynamics and urban–rural differences under the new policies contributing to the dichotomous structure in China. The effectiveness of the current Chinese household registration system reform and of the related policy are also examined.
2. Economic, Cultural, and Institution Factors Influencing Settlement Intention
Neoclassical economics theory holds that migration is a rational decision. Regardless of whether they decide to settle in cities or return to the countryside, migrants seek to maximize their own interests [
16,
17,
18,
19]. Market factors such as salary, job stability, job opportunities, and occupation types all affect migrants’ settlement intentions. Demand for skilled workers increases faster than does demand for unskilled workers, and that job stability affects the floating population [
20]. In the United States, migrants with university degrees are more likely to return to their countries of birth than are migrants with low education levels. However, economic opportunities increased the possibility that educated people would elect to stay in the United States [
21]. Notably, higher educational attainment grants migrants more favorable opportunities in China than in the United States [
22]. Elderly migrants from Mexico to the Unites States are more likely to return to their home country. The longer migrants stay in their destination countries, the less likely it is for them to return to their countries of origin [
23]. Overall, relatively more studies have addressed the market factor as a fundamental motivation for population settlement. To settle in a city first requires the economic capability to live in one, which makes migrants fully consider the market factor in their decision making [
2,
24].
The neoclassical perspective considers migrants’ material demands in determining factors influencing their settlement intentions but overlooks their psychological needs. Migrants leave their hometown for an unfamiliar one, such as a megapolis, to make a living, seeking to habituate themselves to its rapid tempo, and longing for acknowledgment. Some researchers have begun to study how social culture affects migrants’ settlement intentions. Migrant networks and social relations may also critically affect decision making in this regard. The lack of a migrant network may result in migrants returning to their hometowns [
16,
25,
26]. As migrants stay longer at the inflow areas and adapt to their new environments, their social status improves, and their settlement intentions strengthen. Some studies have taken the social adaptation perspective to discuss indicators, such as living environment, emotional ties, environmental perception, social integration, and city assessment on settlement intention, observing that their reinforcement can increase the settlement intentions of new-generation migrants [
25,
26,
27].
Theoretical research typically emphasizes economic and sociocultural factors, and overlooks systemic factors. In discussing determinants of migrants’ settlement intentions in China, an emerging economy, institutional factors must also be considered [
28,
29]. Since the economic reform, industrialization and urbanization in China have accelerated, gradually revealing regional differences. People began migrating to, and settling in, coastal cities characterized by favorable economic development affording abundant opportunities. In other countries, the typical migration process is that migrants permanently settle in a city after they have lived and worked there for some time. [
30,
31]. In China, however, many migrants are part of the floating population, residing in a certain location for a time before moving to the next, without ever settling. This aspect of migration in China is similar to that of illegal immigrants in the United States and migrant workers in Germany, where immigration and settlement are restricted [
32].
Under Chinese government policy, household registrations are classified as urban and rural. To a certain extent, this prevents people with rural registration status from enjoying the various benefits of urban welfare programs. These benefits are generated from cities’ socioeconomic development, which result in high-quality education, convenient transportation, and plentiful job opportunities. The household registration system maintains a chasm between the opportunities of migrants and locals, which constitutes the fundamental reason migrants choose to go in circles, moving from city to city, rather than settling permanently anywhere. Migrants face various problems, including low incomes, poor quality of life, unstable work, and limited social welfare, which causes them to be easily rejected and marginalized by urban society [
32]. Consequently, many migrants return to their hometowns at times they deem suitable or circle between the city and the countryside [
30,
33,
34].
The background provided thus far explains why Chinese researchers believe that the household registration system is the most pivotal deterrent to migrant settlement in cities. Some studies have asserted that eliminating the household registration system or granting rural migrants urban registration status will lead to settlement in inflow areas [
13,
14,
35,
36,
37]. Some studies have discussed how to use reforms in the household registration system to control population settlement, given that registration restriction can explain settlement intention to a certain extent [
13,
14,
35,
36,
37]. However, as studies became more in depth, some studies indicated that, even if the rules of the household registration system were relaxed or even if the system were eliminated, not as many migrants as expected would choose to settle in cities. Whyte (2010) argued that, as rural–urban migration occurs in China, the urban–rural dichotomy caused by the household registration system would reappear in cities [
1]. Although cities have long obtained resources, such as human capital, land, and agricultural by-products from the countryside, their high-quality public services are not accessible to rural–urban migrants. Since the economic reform, the urban–rural dichotomy has gradually become less stark, and some obstacles to the floating population have been gradually eliminated. However, city-centered reforms have also been executed at a faster pace. The government set higher standards for cities with regard to infrastructure and public involvement, resulting in a substantial rise in the complexity of welfare eligibility requirements for city residents. In the countryside, systems and infrastructure for education, health, medicine, and insurance lagged far behind. This long-established household registration system has created great urban–rural differences that may also correspond to differences in migrant settlement intention. Hypothesis 1 is presented as follows:
Hypothesis H1. Owing to the long-term impacts of the urban–rural dichotomy in China, rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants differ in their socioeconomic and cultural characteristics and, therefore, also in their settlement intentions.
In recent years, China has been actively promoting various household registration policies in an effort to resolve the various problems caused by population migration under the urban–rural dichotomy of the household registration system. In early 2010, Zhongshan, located in Guangdong Province, became the first city to implement the Guidelines to the Points-Based Management of the Floating Population. Migrant workers meeting certain criteria may be given local registration status. In June 2010, the Guangdong Province government established the Guidelines for Admitting Migrant Workers into Urban Cities and Towns through the Points System (Trial), marking the province-wide launch of the points-based household registration system and, thereby, providing tens of thousands of migrants the opportunity to obtain local registration status.
The Chinese State Council’s 2014 publication “Opinions about further promoting hukou reform from the State Council” stated that they would fully lift the restrictions on settlement in towns and small cities, systematically lift the restrictions on settlement in medium-sized cities, reasonably determine the conditions for settlement in large cities, strictly control population size in megacities, and implement a points-based settlement system. However, the reform of the household registration system did not break the systemic barriers that constrain free two-way mobility between cities and the countryside. Specifically, the establishment of the points-based household registration system erected a hidden barrier to urban settlement for farming populations. The system may continue to enlarge the urban–rural divide [
11]. In the long term, the household registration system provides more favorable conditions for urban–urban migrants than for rural–urban migrants, facilitating their fulfillment of the requirements in the points-based system. Therefore, the existing points-based household registration system may generate a new urban–rural dichotomy between urban–urban migrants and rural–urban migrants. Hypothesis 2 is presented as follows.
Hypothesis H2. The points-based household registration system affects migrants’ settlement intentions. Compared with rural–urban migrants, urban–urban migrants more easily meet the criteria and are more likely to settle in their current cities.
Another critical aspect of the urban–rural dichotomy is the land system. Although all land in China is under public ownership, urban land belongs to the country, whereas most land in farming villages is collectively owned. Control of the value and use of urban land differs from that of rural land. The Notice by the General Office of the State Council on the Strict Implementation of Laws and Policies on Collectively Owned Rural Construction Land issued in December 2007 mandated that residential land in a farming village can only be distributed among residents of that village; town residents may not purchase land as building foundations for personal homes (hereinafter referred to as house foundation land), farmers’ houses, or illegally constructed houses without the proper governmental certificate in farming villages. This dichotomized land system guarantees land as farmers’ livelihoods but inevitably results in farmers’ overattachment to their land. This is a possible reason for differences in settlement intentions between rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants.
A major current problem is that migrants from farming villages must give up their farmland in exchange for obtaining urban registration status. Therefore, gradual household registration reform must be based on a certain signal mechanism. Regarding local policy implementation, the points-based system reform implemented in various regions is primarily based on migrants’ income, education, years lived in the city, and social security insurance payments [
2,
11]. Migrants with medium-to-low socioeconomic status are overlooked, as are self-employed individuals with substantial incomes but who do not have social security insurance, and floating migrants willing to relinquish their farmland for urban registration status (which may free up more farmland and house foundation land for farming village residents). Therefore, to study the problem of migrant settlement in cities, whether people are willing to surrender their land for urban registration status should also be considered.
In the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee, a mortgage guarantee scheme conferring rights to contract management and rural housing property was proposed, marking a great step in land system reform in farming villages. Land system reform is related to whether rural–urban migrants can settle in cities by obtaining benefits from their land in their hometowns. It is also related to whether city governments can use migrants’ land in the farming villages (or land indicators) to obtain certain economic resources with which they can provide public services facilitating migrant settlement. However, studies have stated that, owing to factors such as risk avoidance of unemployment in the city, increases in farming village land value, farmland contracting rights, rights of use concerning house foundation land, and the traditional belief that one’s land is one’s life, migrants are often unwilling to surrender their land [
33,
38,
39]. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is presented.
Hypothesis H3. Rural–urban migrants are more inclined to return to, and settle in, their hometowns if they own house foundation land and farmland there. Migrants who are willing to relinquish rights to their farmland in their hometowns in order to settle in the city are more inclined to settle in the destination city.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
Migrants’ settlement intentions are formed by multiple factors [
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10]. Investigating the institutional factors underlying the settlement intentions of migrants in China, an emerging market, serves as a valuable reference for research on international migration theory. The long-established Chinese household registration system may constitute a critical determinant of differences in settlement intentions among rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants. In this study, we discussed the factors influencing these intentions with regard to individual differences in socioeconomic status and skill level, family and social characteristics, and institutional characteristics. One focus was on the impacts of institutional factors on the settlement intentions of the entire sample. We have several findings in our research:
Firstly, the urban–rural dichotomy has exerted long-term impacts on migrants’ settlement intentions. Some studies have argued that migrants in China would choose to settle permanently in cities if the household registration restrictions were lifted [
12,
14,
36,
37]. However, only 30.13% of the interviewees intended to settle in their destination cities. The number of migrants who intended to move back to their hometowns was higher than that reported in relevant studies. Specifically, rural–urban migrants were not strongly inclined to settle in cities. The principal reason was that rural–urban migrants differ substantially from urban–urban migrants in individual, family, and social characteristics because of the urban–rural dichotomy, because the household registration system strictly divides residents into urban and rural residents in China [
2,
35]. These differences may, to a considerable extent, determine whether the floating population can adapt to urban life and be integrated into the urban society by establishing social networks. This study unveiled that migrants’ individual, family, and social characteristics all exhibited significant influence on their settlement intentions, and rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants had different settlement intentions.
Secondly, the points-based system implemented in the new Pearl River Delta megapolis has relaxed restrictions on household registrations and affected migrants’ settlement intentions to a certain extent. However, according to the results on path dependence regarding the impacts of the urban–rural dichotomy, urban–urban migrants had higher educational attainment and incomes than did the rural–urban migrants, and they more easily satisfied the criteria for urban registration status. In addition, since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s city–county relationships have shifted from exploitative to protective. Moreover, cities’ reliance on farming villages decreased. Under the economic radiation effect of the cities, farming villages received large amounts of resources from cities. At around the same time, social insurance for farming village residents was established. Although the benefits this population receives differ greatly from those enjoyed by city residents, the value of rural registration status has increased, reducing the urban–rural divide to a certain extent. Furthermore, the effects of people with rural registration status having urban registration status were reduced.
Thirdly, migrants with farmland were less likely to settle in cities than were their landless counterparts. Land system factors have a certain impact on immigrants’ willingness to settle down. The main reason is that farmers can obtain a basic guarantee of a livelihood through farming. Also, as the country urbanizes, the land of farming villages is being expropriated, for which farmers can receive some compensation. Ownership of house foundation land did not significantly affect settlement intention. This can be explained by the fact that urbanization in China began relatively late, and the country is still in the middle-to-late phase of urbanization; therefore, most rural–urban migrants own house foundation land.
The government should establish policies for settlement, housing, and social security according to migrants’ registration status. A solid higher education system and the availability of high-quality jobs can significantly strengthen the settlement intentions of rural–urban migrants. Therefore, we suggest that the government increase its input in education to increase higher education enrollment rates, specifically in the farming village population. To promote urbanization, policies should include measures that expand migrants’ opportunities to obtain jobs and social security, such as affordable apartment rentals that rural–urban migrants and urban–urban migrants have equal opportunities to obtain. Other measures can center on children’s education and social welfare. Specifically, for the rural–urban migrants with less favorable family conditions and lower socioeconomic status, as well as for those willing to relinquish their farmland and house foundation land in exchange for urban registration status, the government should implement policies supporting urban employment and settlement. This can facilitate the upward mobility of migrants, contributing to social equity and harmony.