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Open AccessArticle
Competitive Game Model and Evolutionary Strategy Analysis of Green Power and Thermal Power Generation
by
Yongsheng Qiao
Yongsheng Qiao 1,
Risheng Qiao
Risheng Qiao 2,* and
Yongmei Qiao
Yongmei Qiao 3
1
Department of Management, Taiyuan University, Taiyuan 030032, China
2
School of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan University of Technology, Taiyuan 030024, China
3
Foreign Affairs Office, Mentougou District Government of Beijing Municipality, Beijing 102300, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Symmetry 2024, 16(8), 959; https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16080959 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 2 July 2024
/
Revised: 18 July 2024
/
Accepted: 22 July 2024
/
Published: 28 July 2024
(This article belongs to the Section
Computer)
Abstract
In the context of achieving carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals, the power industry has become a key and challenging place to promote the green and low-carbon transformation of the economy and society. We selected green power generation enterprises and thermal power generation enterprises in the power industry as the research objects and applied relevant theories such as game theory and low-carbon economy theory to analyze the low-carbon transformation path of electricity under the “dual carbon” goal. We quantitatively analyzed the competition and cooperation relationship between green power and thermal power. Based on mutual benefit preferences, a competitive game model was constructed, and the optimal competitive equilibrium electricity quantity and price of both parties were discussed in different scenarios. The master–slave game problem was transformed into a double-layer game model and solved using the GA algorithm. We draw the following conclusions: (1) When green power enterprises and thermal power enterprises compete to achieve equilibrium, a high degree of altruistic willingness is a necessary condition for both parties to maximize their own utility. (2) A high-level mutually beneficial relationship is a key factor in effectively improving overall profits. (3) In the long-term mutually beneficial competitive relationship between green power and thermal power, by quantitatively adjusting the internal and external factors that affect system evolution, the quantitative adjustment of the feasible domain boundaries of the evolution of the mutually beneficial competitive relationship can be achieved, thereby influencing the existing transformation of the competitive relationship to evolve toward the desired direction.
Share and Cite
MDPI and ACS Style
Qiao, Y.; Qiao, R.; Qiao, Y.
Competitive Game Model and Evolutionary Strategy Analysis of Green Power and Thermal Power Generation. Symmetry 2024, 16, 959.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16080959
AMA Style
Qiao Y, Qiao R, Qiao Y.
Competitive Game Model and Evolutionary Strategy Analysis of Green Power and Thermal Power Generation. Symmetry. 2024; 16(8):959.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16080959
Chicago/Turabian Style
Qiao, Yongsheng, Risheng Qiao, and Yongmei Qiao.
2024. "Competitive Game Model and Evolutionary Strategy Analysis of Green Power and Thermal Power Generation" Symmetry 16, no. 8: 959.
https://doi.org/10.3390/sym16080959
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