Application of Shia Islamic Law in Contemporary Legal Systems

Abstract

Despite the growing interest among comparative legal scholars in Islamic law, the application of Shia Islamic law remains an overlooked area within the field of comparative law. This article addresses this gap by offering a classification of contemporary national legal systems according to their incorporation of Shia Islamic law. The analysis begins with secular legal systems in countries with significant Shia populations and progresses to those jurisdictions where Shia Islamic law is officially recognised. Through this examination, I define the historical, cultural, and political contexts influencing the application of Shia Islamic law and assess how and to what extent these states implement Shia Islamic rulings, incorporating case studies to illustrate varying degrees of application.

1. Introduction

Studying Shia Islamic law is essential for a comprehensive understanding of Islamic legal traditions and their impact on contemporary legal systems. It is also significant for comparative legal analysis and its implications for international human rights discussions. Shia jurisprudence provides a distinct perspective on legal issues compared to Sunni Islamic law, particularly in areas such as marriage, inheritance, and criminal justice. This comparative approach enriches the broader discourse on Islamic legal traditions and enhances the capacity to address legal and human rights issues within diverse cultural contexts. Furthermore, understanding Shia Islamic law is crucial for international relations and diplomacy, where nuanced knowledge of different legal traditions can facilitate the development of effective policies and foster dialogue between nations with varying legal and religious landscapes. Thus, the relevance of studying Shia Islamic law extends beyond academic inquiry to practical applications in legal practice, international diplomacy, and human rights advocacy.

Elements of Shia legal doctrine have been incorporated into the legal systems of over ten contemporary states, predominantly those with either majority Shia populations or significant Shia minorities. The Historical Atlas of Islam highlights that Shia communities are concentrated in Iran, southern Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain, with substantial minorities in Afghanistan (3.1 million, or 15%), India (30 million, or 3%), Lebanon (1.2 million, or 34%), Pakistan (28 million, or 20%), Syria (2 million, or 12%), Turkey (3 million, or 20%), the United Arab Emirates (approximately half a million, or 16%), and Yemen (7 million, or 40%) (Ruthven et al. 2004, p. 181). Additionally, Shia Muslims constitute the majority of the population in Azerbaijan (approximately 6.5 million, or 67% of the total population) (Yunusov 2019). In Saudi Arabia, the Shia population is estimated to range between 10 and 15% of the total population (Kirichenko 2014, p. 134).

Despite the increasing frequency of studies on Shia Islam and Islamic law, a comprehensive comparative analysis of Shia Islamic law’s application across contemporary legal systems remains notably absent. Scholars predominantly focus on case studies specific to individual countries or explore the methodologies employed by Shia Islamic scholars (See, e.g., Mehdi Ali (2022); Mir-Hosseini (2012)). While these studies offer valuable insights into Shia legal thought and practices within distinct national contexts, they often lack a broader comparative framework that could elucidate the variations and commonalities in the application of Shia Islamic law across different jurisdictions. Although there have been some attempts at systematic research on the application of Islamic law in different countries (Otto 2012), most studies have focused on different legal systems without conducting a comparative analysis of its application. Furthermore, they have paid little attention to Shia Islamic law or other minority schools of thought.

In this study, I present a classification of national legal systems based on their incorporation of Shia Islamic law, analysing its application within contemporary states. Before proceeding with this classification, it is important to outline the framework of the study. Currently, no state possesses a legal system constructed exclusively upon the rulings of Islamic law. An analysis of Shia religious literature reveals that the ‘ideal Islamic state,’ characterised by an Islamic form of governance and legal system, is anticipated to emerge with the advent of the promised Imam Mahdī. Presently, Islamic law functions in conjunction with other national legal systems, which predominantly derive from civil or common law traditions. In discussing Shia law, this study primarily refers to the Twelver (Jaʿfarī) madhhab, as it constitutes the majority of Shias and is most frequently implemented in national legal systems. The findings will indicate that the legal rulings of the other two main Shia denominations are scarcely recognised by current states. The Zaydī madhhab is officially recognised under personal status law in Iran (even though, in practice, there are no separate Zaydī courts in Iran’s judicial system), while the Ismāʿīlī is officially recognised in India, Pakistan, Tanzania and Kenya. In these countries, personal status matters are usually governed by Ismāʿīlī councils which mediate disputes within the community but do not function as official courts. Also, since Ismāʿīlī Muslims do not have separate state-recognised courts, in most countries, they follow Twelver law or national law. So overall, several million Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs adhere to the Constitution of the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims authored by their previous leader, Aga Khan IV, which enshrines the core principles of their doctrine and advises them to remain law-abiding and active citizens of their resident countries, provided that their governments permit the Nizārīs to practice their religious principles. Article 15.4 of this Constitution states that, ‘To the extent that the territory of domicile or residence of any Ismaili does not recognise and apply or allow the application of the personal law of Ismāʿīlīs, he shall be governed in that territory by such personal law as is applicable to him under the law of that territory.’1

Before proceeding to the classification, a brief overview of the fundamental principles of Shia Islamic law will be provided to offer readers a comprehensive understanding of this legal system.

2. Brief Introduction to Shia Islamic Law

One of the most fundamental teachings of Islamic law concerns the ‘four sources of law’: the Qur’ān, Sunna, ijmāʿ (consensus), and qiāṣ (analogical reasoning) (e.g, (Hallaq 2009, p. 173)). This framework is characteristic of Sunni Islamic law and is not inherently applicable to Shia Islamic law. While the Qur’ān and Sunna are universally recognised as sources of law, variations in legal rulings emerge because scholars from different schools of thought evaluate certain ḥadīth (narrations) differently in terms of their authenticity. These discrepancies lead to diverse legal decisions based on these ḥadīth or the ‘derivative’ sources formulated from them. Furthermore, Shia law interprets the Sunna more expansively, also including the Sunna of the Imams. This broader interpretation is due to the Sunna’s role in encompassing the emulation of specific behaviours or rules established earlier in the history of Islamic practice, with the understanding that only an infallible figure, such as Prophets and/or Imams, can set such precedents. In Shia Islam, Imams are considered infallible, which obligates Shias to follow both the Prophet and the Imams as his successors (Tahiiev and Lukianov 2022, p. 72).

In Islamic legal tradition, all subsequent sources of law must not contradict the Qur’ān and the Sunna, and in most schools, they must even be derived from them. In the Zaydī madhhab, such sources include the rulings of Imam ʿAlī, ijmāʿ, qiāṣ, and ʿaql (reason, intellect) (e.g, (Tahiiev 2023a, p. 166)). The Jaʿfarī madhhab, on the other hand, consists of two main branches, Usūlīs and Akhbārīs, each with its own approach to legal sources. The Akhbārīs wholly reject the notion of ‘derivative’ sources of law, asserting that only Allah, through His representatives (Prophets and Imams), can be the sole legislator. The Usūlīs, while acknowledging the Akhbārī stance, believe that derivative sources of law can include ijmāʿ and ʿaql. ʿAql refers to rational methods, principles, and techniques for deriving legal rulings from the primary sources of the Qur’ān and the Sunna.2 Ijmāʿ, primarily a Sunni source of law, plays a secondary role in the Jaʿfarī madhhab compared to ʿaql. In Shia legal doctrine, ijmāʿ is seen as a means to reveal the opinions of the Imams, rather than as an independent source of law. The authoritative element is the opinion of the Imam, as conveyed through ijmāʿ. Consequently, M. A. Shomali identifies two types of sources:

• Qur’ān and Sunna, which are considered revealed or transmitted sources (al-ādillah al-naqliyyah).
• Reason or intellect, which is regarded as a rational source (al-dalīl al-‘aqlī) (Shomali 2009, p. 3).

Currently, Islamic law is predominantly implemented through the fatwās issued by mujtahids. N. Calder has described ‘question–answer’ fatwās as fundamental, basic fatwās. He emphasised that the author of a fatwā should not merely reference existing opinions but must ensure that the response provides practical guidance (Calder 2010, pp. 168–69). The authority to issue fatwās is vested in mujtahids of the highest calibre, known as marjaʿ al-taqlīd (source of emulation), which corresponds nowadays to the title of Grand Ayatollah. Today, leading Grand Ayatollahs maintain collections of fatwās that guide their followers in understanding the practical aspects of Islamic law. The obligation to adhere to a fatwā is not enforced through state coercion, and the fatwās issued by most ayatollahs are not integrated into national legal systems. Instead, these fatwās serve primarily as interpretative guidance for the primary sources of Islamic law for believers. In some countries, however, fatwās may influence legal interpretations and, under certain circumstances, may be incorporated into state laws by legislatures or courts. Thus, Shia law encompasses its own interpretations of the Qur’ān, ḥadīth collections, and methodologies for deriving legal rulings from these sources (see more Takim (2022); Sachedina (1998); Tahiiev (2024)).

3. Classification of Legal Systems

Based on the level of integration of Shia law within national legal systems, three categories can be identified:

• Secular states with Shia populations (e.g., Azerbaijan, Turkey, European countries)
• States where Shia Islamic law primarily serves as personal status law (Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Pakistan, Afghanistan)
• States with legal systems based mainly on Shia Islamic law (Iran)

The first category includes states with significant Shia populations that formally declare the separation of religion from the state in their legislation. It includes secular states in the Americas, Europe, and Africa with prominent Shia populations, such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and others. But most notable examples are Turkey and Azerbaijan as both are Muslim-majority countries and have long been characterised by their strong secular legal traditions, a legacy shaped by historical, political, and social factors. Both nations have pursued state policies that emphasise the separation of religion and law, distinguishing them from many other Muslim-majority countries. In Turkey, the foundation of secularism was laid by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the early 20th century through a series of radical reforms that dismantled the Ottoman caliphate and replaced Islamic legal structures with European-style legislation (Powell 2012, p. 468). Similarly, following its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Azerbaijan reinforced its secular legal system, influenced by its previous experience under Soviet rule, where religion was largely marginalised in governance and public life (Tahiiev 2023b, p. 2).

The constitutional frameworks of both countries enshrine secularism as a fundamental principle, ensuring that religious doctrines do not dictate legislation, which make Azerbaijan the only secular country with a Shia majority population. Article 18, Section 1, of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan states: ‘In the Republic of Azerbaijan, religion is separate from the state. All religions are equal before the law.’3 Similarly, Article 5 of the Azerbaijani law On Freedom of Religion asserts: ‘In the Republic of Azerbaijan, religion and religious education are separate from the state.’4 Turkey, despite having a significant population of Twelver Shias and an even larger population of Alevis (whether Alevis are Shia is a topic of separate discussion that will not be covered in this paper (e.g., Shankland (2012))), also maintains secularism. Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey affirms: ‘The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular, and social state governed by the rule of law.’5 In these countries, laws concerning marriage, inheritance, and family life are based on civil codes rather than Islamic law, reinforcing the non-religious character of their legal systems.

Public attitudes towards the role of religion in law also reflect this strong secular orientation. According to a report by the Pew Research Centre, Turkey and Azerbaijan exhibit the very low levels of public support for implementing sharia as state law among Muslim-majority nations. The study found that only 12% of respondents in Turkey and a mere 8% in Azerbaijan (the lowest number among Muslim countries) endorsed the idea, underscoring the deeply embedded secular ethos in both societies (Pew Research Center 2013). These data represent a significant contrast with other Muslim-majority countries (as shown in the same survey) and illustrate how historical and political secularisation efforts have shaped public perceptions, leading to a legal landscape where state law remains firmly distinct from religious jurisprudence, including Shia Islamic law. Here, adherence to religion tends to be more traditional and ethnic in nature, as evidenced by large mourning ceremonies on the Day of Ashura, which even Muslims who do not observe Islamic rituals in their daily lives participate in.

The second group comprises Muslim-majority countries that incorporate elements of Shia Islamic law for Shia minorities, with exceptions like Bahrain and Iraq. In Bahrain, although Shias constitute the majority of the population, actual power resides with the Sunni royal dynasty, resulting in rights for Shias that are akin to those of minorities. In Iraq, where Shias also form the majority, the legal system differs significantly from that of Iran due to the pluralism of political views among leading Shia scholars. Some of the countries from this group will be discussed in detail in the next section of this paper. Additionally, elements of Sharia are partially implemented in the legal systems of other Muslim countries and in states with religious legal systems recognising Islamic law (such as India), where the percentage of Shias is small. In these countries, personal status matters for Shias are often regulated according to either Sunni law or national (state secular) law. In these and other previously mentioned countries, Shia clergy may serve as arbitrators (e.g., in matters of spousal reconciliation during divorce proceedings) or perform certain notarial functions (such as officiating marriages or certifying agreements prescribed by Sharia).

The final category includes the Islamic Republic of Iran, the only country where Shia Islamic law is applied across most branches of law, which will be discussed in the last section. It is worth noting that there are transitional countries where a shift from the ’second group’ to the ’third’ may occur in the near future. Given current political situations, Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen could be classified as such countries. These nations exhibit trends towards establishing Shia Islamic forms of governance. Southern Lebanon is already partially controlled by Hezbollah6, a political party and organisation often described by political scientists as a ‘state within a state.’ (Chikrizova 2015, p. 123) Similarly, the events of the last decade in Yemen, along with the Houthi movement in Northern Yemen, have created a situation akin to that in Lebanon (Chikrizova 2015, p. 125). In Iraq, the political developments of the past twenty years have resulted in the Shia majority, previously excluded from political life, now effectively governing the south and east of the country. As some scholars note, the United States succeeded in ‘quickly alienating not only the Sunnis, who were ousted from power, but also the Shias, who for the first time in their history were given the chance by the U.S. intervention to occupy a prominent position in the country’ (Mirsky 2012, p. 87). The Iraqi case is particularly interesting because it includes actors who are not committed to building a state and legal system similar to Iran’s. The majority of Iraq’s most powerful Shia scholars belong to the traditionalist, quietist school of Shiʿism, which asserts that during the occultation of the twelfth Imam, no one can hold his powers, and Shia scholars may only provide advice on legal issues and become involved in political matters when necessary. This is why the spiritual leader of Iraqi Shias, Ayatullah Sistani, is often viewed as apolitical; despite his considerable authority in Iraq, he has only intervened in politics on a few occasions (See more: Al-Qarawee (2018); Hamoudi (2009)). However, there are other Shia scholars who advocate for the necessity of building a religious legal system, though not always one akin to the Iranian model. Should any of these movements in the aforementioned states succeed, it is likely they will model their states on establishing a leading role for the Shia interpretation of Sharia, thereby expanding the application of Shia law.

4. Shia Islamic Law as Personal Status Law

All countries in this group have predominantly Muslim populations, and as such, their constitutions often declare Islam and Sharia as the primary sources of legislation. For example, Article 2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain states that, ‘The religion of the state is Islam. Islamic Sharia is a principal source of legislation.’7 Similarly, Article 2 of the Constitution of Kuwait declares: ‘The religion of the state is Islam, and Islamic law shall be a main source of legislation.’8 The leading role of Sharia is very clearly defined in Article 2, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution of Iraq:

Islam is the official religion of the state and a fundamental source of legislation:

• No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.
• No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.
• No law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this Constitution.9

At the same time, not all branches of law in these countries are governed by Islamic law. More often, Islamic law primarily governs private legal relationships, especially those related to family and inheritance law, and occasionally certain aspects of criminal law. The first category of legal relations is often grouped under the concept of personal status law, and in most countries, a specific law governs these matters, which typically covers ‘relationships between parents and children, between spouses, and addresses issues related to birth, marriage, divorce, and death’ (Hamoudi 2014).

4.1. Lebanon

Lebanon is home to eighteen officially recognised religious communities, including Christian, Jewish, and Muslim groups (Clarke 2018, p. 15). Among these, the Shia community is one of several, coexisting within a complex confessional system that has shaped Lebanon’s legal and political landscape. Lebanon’s legal system reflects its dual inheritance from both Ottoman and French influences. Under the late Ottoman period, legal reforms such as the Ottoman Law of Family Rights of 1917 sought to regulate personal status matters for Muslims, Christians, and Jews within a unified framework. However, the law faced opposition from religious leaders, and under French Mandate rule (1923–1946), Christians and Jews were granted exemptions from it. So, the enduring presence of sharia courts within Lebanon’s legal system can thus be traced to this Ottoman legacy, even as their role has been shaped by subsequent developments. This historical trajectory has created a hybrid legal framework, in which elements of Ottoman-era religious pluralism coexist with legal principles introduced during French rule (Clarke 2018, pp. 37–38).

The judiciary is generally organised into two separate branches: civil courts and Sharia courts. The civil courts include two divisions (criminal and civil) that handle all civil and commercial cases, criminal cases, and personal status cases involving non-Muslims. Sharia courts have jurisdiction over personal status cases involving Muslim citizens and stateless Muslims (Bergner [1895] 2008, p. 1895).

The Shia population in Lebanon has its own official representative body, the Supreme Islamic Shia Council, established in 1967 by Ayatollah Musa Sadr, and its own judicial institutions, Jaʿfarī Sharia courts, where personal status cases for Shias are adjudicated according to Shia laws. The Council consists of three committees: the General Assembly, which includes representatives of various Shia groups; the Legislative Committee, composed of twelve Lebanese religious scholars elected for six years by the Lebanese clergy; and the Executive Committee, which includes Shia members of the Lebanese Parliament, as well as members elected by the General Assembly. In Lebanon, there are 20 Jaʿfarī Sharia courts of first instance and a Supreme Jaʿfarī Court (Hyndman-Rizk 2020, p. 46). Under the Council’s supervision, the Jaʿfarī courts apply the rulings of the Jaʿfarī school of jurisprudence. Initially, judges were guided by the Ottoman Family Rights Law of 1917, aligned with the rulings of the Jaʿfarī school and fatwās from both Lebanese and foreign maraji al-taqlīd. After complaints from lawyers about the lack of codification, in 1994, the President of the Supreme Jaʿfarī Court developed the Ja’afari Judiciary Directory, which compiles and interprets materials related to marriage, divorce, child custody, and other personal status issues. However, the guide is not binding for judges, who may refer to various interpretations at their discretion.10

The complex nature of multiple personal statuses is most evident in cases of mixed marriages and religious conversions. Interreligious marriages present significant legal and social challenges, revealing the intricate interplay between religious doctrine, communal identity, and legal recognition. For example, Islamic law allows a Muslim man to marry a Christian or Jewish woman. However, a Muslim woman is not permitted to marry a non-Muslim man unless he converts to Islam. This restriction results in legal ambiguities regarding the recognition of such marriages. If a Christian man and a Muslim woman marry in a Christian ceremony, the marriage may not be recognised by Muslim courts, and in the event of divorce, the Muslim woman may find herself at a legal disadvantage in Christian courts, where her rights may be limited compared to those of a Christian wife. Also, in some instances, individuals seeking familial acceptance for an intra-Islamic marriage convert from Shi’ism to Sunnism, or vice versa (Clarke 2018, p. 56). On another side, there is also the Druze community which presents additional legal barriers to interfaith marriages. Under Druze personal status law, members are only permitted to marry within the Druze faith. A Druze individual seeking to marry outside their community would not be able to do so through Druze courts. If the non-Druze partner is a Sunni or Shia Muslim and the couple seeks to marry in a sharia court, further complications arise. Although the Lebanese confessional system officially recognises the Druze as one of the country’s five Muslim communities, many Sunni and Shia authorities do not consider Druze to be Muslims. In such cases, a Sunni or Shia judge might require a Druze woman seeking to marry a Sunni or Shia man to convert to Islam (Clarke 2018, pp. 56–57). Conversion is also utilised as a means of overcoming other restrictions imposed by personal status laws. For example, Catholics, whose religious law does not permit divorce, sometimes convert to other religions to obtain a legal divorce (Clarke 2018, p. 58).

These legal manoeuvres underscore the fluid and often strategic nature of religious identity in Lebanon’s sectarian system. While conversion and interreligious marriage reflect individuals’ agency in navigating legal and social constraints, they also reveal the limitations of a personal status system that remains deeply entangled with religious doctrine and communal boundaries. As examples show, conversion for the purpose of marriage may not always be freely chosen, but rather compelled by legal or social pressures, highlighting the restrictive nature of these systems. The coexistence of religious and secular personal status laws might be possible within a framework of legal pluralism, but it requires mechanisms to ensure fundamental rights and equality. Legal pluralism allows for multiple legal systems to operate simultaneously, but challenges arise when religious laws conflict with universal human rights standards or when state enforcement of religious rulings undermines individual autonomy.

4.2. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The situation for Shias in Saudi Arabia is particularly challenging, as they endure continuous discrimination. According to Human Rights Watch, the Shia minority faces systematic discrimination from the Saudi government in various sectors, including education, justice, and, most notably, religious freedoms. Public celebrations of Shia festivals, such as Ashura, are subject to restrictions, and Shias participating in public worship often encounter discrimination within the judicial system. This includes the denial of access to justice, arbitrary arrests, and the imposition of discriminatory sentences (Caruso 2021; Human Rights Watch 2009, pp. 2, 11). Shias have frequently been targeted by slander campaigns and acts of violence, including those perpetrated by state actors (van Eijk 2012, pp. 155, 171). Moreover, Shias in Saudi Arabia face a significant shortage of their own Sharia courts. While Jaʿfarī courts do exist in the Eastern Province, other regions with substantial Shia populations are left to have their personal status matters adjudicated by Sunni courts. Even the three existing Jaʿfarī courts—two local courts in Qatif and Al Ahsa and one appellate court in Qatif—lack true independence. In August 2005, a new royal decree further diminished their already limited jurisdiction by granting Sunni courts supervisory authority over Shia courts (Human Rights Watch 2009, p. 12). However, in response to the successes of the Shias in Iraq, certain measures were taken to ‘appease’ the Shias of Saudi Arabia. One such measure was the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, composed of 24 members, only two of whom were Shias, to review complaints regarding judicial decisions that could be perceived as biassed. Nonetheless, this body did not address cases related to religion or interfaith tolerance. In 2008, Shia representatives submitted the Shia Integration Project into Political and National Structures: An Action Plan to Address Sectarian Discrimination to then-Crown Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz. This plan included initiatives aimed at ensuring equal treatment for Shias based on citizenship and at ending state policies that divide the population along sectarian lines, thereby positioning Shias in opposition to the state. These initiatives were ultimately ignored by the authorities (Kirichenko 2014, pp. 143–44). The government’s stance on Shia pilgrimages to the shrines in Iraq and Iran is also noteworthy from a legal perspective. These pilgrimages are openly deemed undesirable, and Saudi Shias suspected of visiting Iran may face punitive measures, including the revocation of their passports for up to two years (Kirichenko 2014, p. 144).

The situation for Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia deteriorated following the anti-government protests that erupted in the country during the Arab Spring of 2011–2012. One of the most prominent Saudi Shia clerics, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, was arrested in 2012 for his role in organising and participating in these protests. He was charged with inciting sectarianism, sentenced to death, and executed in 2016. His execution further worsened conditions for Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia and led to the severance of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran (BBC News 2016). As of February 2025, Saudi Arabia is planning to execute five young Saudi Shia citizens and one Shia businessman on charges deemed arbitrary by the United Nations (United Nations Human Rights Council 2024). The five young Shia men were minors at the time of their participation in peaceful demonstrations in al-Qatif in 2011 and 2012. Campaigners and legal experts argue that these charges are racially motivated (Rickett 2025).

4.3. Bahrain

In Bahrain, as in Iraq, the Shia population constitutes the majority, yet political power remains concentrated in the hands of a Sunni royal dynasty. Shias in Bahrain, similar to those in Saudi Arabia, face systemic discrimination across various sectors of society. While Sunni religious institutions receive state funding, Shia mosques and centres rely solely on private donations. Shias are systematically excluded from leadership roles and are barred from serving in the Armed Forces. Additionally, certain Shia political parties are banned, and activists who protest against discrimination often face severe repercussions, including exile, restrictions on freedom of movement, and the revocation of citizenship.11

The judiciary in Bahrain is bifurcated into two branches: civil courts and Sharia courts. Civil courts hold jurisdiction over commercial, civil, and criminal cases, as well as matters related to the personal status of non-Muslims. Sharia courts, on the other hand, are divided into Sunni and Jaʿfarī courts. In Bahrain, personal status law primarily pertains to family law. The principal legal framework in this domain was established by the codified Family Law (19/2009), which applied exclusively to the Sunni minority, while the family matters of the Shia majority were adjudicated by the Jaʿfarī Sharia courts, which administered justice according to the rulings of the Jaʿfarī school. Currently, marriage and family relations for Bahrain’s predominantly Muslim population are governed by Family Law No. 19 of 2017, which applies to all Bahraini Muslims. This law introduced some unified provisions applicable to all Muslims, irrespective of their denomination, alongside specific provisions for Sunni and Shia followers. Consequently, this law abolished the dual system established by the 2009 legislation.12

The application of this law may vary depending on the denomination of the parties involved. For example, one of the primary means of dissolving a marriage is through unilateral divorce. A man can initiate this without providing a specific reason unless he has delegated this right to his wife, either in the marriage contract or through subsequent agreement. In the case of a Sunni man, if a divorce is declared outside of court, it can be validated by evidence or his acknowledgment. For a Shia divorce, however, the wife’s presence is required, and two witnesses must be present. In all instances, divorce proceedings must commence before a judge, who is mandated to attempt reconciliation.13

4.4. Kuwait

As in most Gulf countries, in Kuwait, Islamic law governs mainly matters of personal status. The primary legislative framework regulating marriage and family relations for the majority of the Muslim population, irrespective of denomination, is the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law No. 51/1984. In instances where this act does not adequately address a specific issue of personal status, judges are required to resolve the case according to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) adhered to by the husband or father. For the Sunni majority, family courts apply the provisions of Mālikī or Ḥanafī schools, while for the Shia minority, Jaʿfarī rulings are observed.14

The Personal Status Law of 1984 is comprehensive, encompassing provisions for both Sunnis and Shias, with specific stipulations tailored to each group. Some provisions within this law bear similarities to those found in the legal frameworks of Bahrain and Lebanon. For instance, as in Bahrain, the Kuwaiti law permits a man to unilaterally terminate a marriage with minimal restrictions or conditions. However, procedural differences exist between Sunnis and Shias: a Sunni man can divorce without any formal requirements, whereas a Shia man must have two witnesses present. Additionally, other distinctions are evident. For example, in a Sunni marriage contract, the bride’s signature is not required, whereas in a Shia marriage, the bride’s signature is necessary to ensure her genuine consent to the union (Ibid, p. 10).

The regulation of personal status issues in interfaith marriages also warrants consideration. According to the Kuwaiti Personal Status Law, marital relations are generally governed by the legal school of the father or husband. However, exceptions do occur in practice. For example, in case No. 139/98, where the mother was Sunni and the father Shia, the father’s right to custody was asserted based on the earlier termination of the mother’s custody rights under Shia law. The court of first instance awarded guardianship of the youngest child to the father while allowing the two older children to remain with their mother, as it was their preference. However, on appeal, the mother regained custody of all three children, with the court determining that family law should favour the mother in such circumstances. Appellate court decisions have also frequently ruled in favour of the mother, even when both parents were Shia (Ibid, pp. 18–19, 20–21).

4.5. Islamic Republic of Pakistan

In Pakistan, Shias often face persecution despite constituting approximately one-fifth of the population. The introduction of Sharia norms in Pakistan, initiated during the reforms of Zia-ul-Haq following his military coup, significantly heightened tensions between the Sunni majority and the Shia minority. While Shias expressed their support for the implementation of Sharia, they opposed the imposition of laws derived exclusively from the Ḥanafī school, which is predominant among Pakistani Sunnis. Shias emphasised key differences between Sunni and Shia interpretations of Islamic criminal laws, such as the amputation of hands for theft—where Sunni law prescribes amputating the hand up to the wrist, while Shia law prescribes removing only four fingers. In response to these concerns, the Shia community organised the Movement for the Implementation of Jaʿfarī Norms (or the Movement for the Defence of Jaʿfarī Fiqh), led by the prominent Shia cleric Mufti Jafar Husain (Esposito and Voll 1996, p. 111). In early July 1980, Shia leaders convened a major conference in Islamabad, attended by over 100,000 Shias. Their demands included:

• Judicial decisions concerning Shias should be made in accordance with the Jaʿfarī school of thought.
• Revenues from Shia trusts should be exclusively allocated to Shias.
• The government should lift all restrictions on mourning ceremonies for Imam Husayn and facilitate Shia pilgrimages to holy sites in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
• Shia scholars and jurists should be granted representation in Sharia courts.
• Shias should be allowed to broadcast their religious programmes on state radio and television.
• Distinguished mujtahids and other Shia scholars from Iran should be invited to Pakistan, as Sunni scholars from Saudi Arabia were.
• Theological courses for Shia students should reflect Shia perspectives (Kennedy 2019, pp. 124–25).

Following this, on 5 July, a protest demonstration by approximately 25,000 Shias was held against the compulsory zakāt (charity tax; obligatory and collected by the state in Sunni countries, while Shias typically pay zakāt voluntarily) (Esposito and Voll 1996, p. 111). On 6 July 1980, the government issued a statement jointly signed by the Minister for Religious Affairs and Mufti Jafar Husain, known as the Islamabad Agreement. According to this agreement, Zia agreed not to impose the laws of one fiqh on followers of another. Shias were also granted an exemption from paying zakāt and ʿushr (similar to tithes) with a formal decree issued on 29 October 1983. According to the provisions of this decree, a Shia must submit a signed and notarised declaration that they are a Muslim and follower of the Jaʿfarī school, stating that according to their fiqh, they cannot pay zakāt or ʿushr in the manner prescribed by the government. This procedure must be carried out at least thirty days before Ramadan each year. The declaration remains valid until revoked. Thus, it can be concluded that the government capitulated and adopted legislation allowing Shias to follow their own school of thought. However, this led to discontent among the Sunni population, which resulted in increased Shia aggression from radical Sunni elements. Zia-ul-Haq’s administration did not implement all the promised provisions (in fact, the tax exemption decree was the only act fully enforced), thus turning a blind eye to Sunni radical persecution of Shias (e.g., the massacre in Gilgit). Consequently, since the era of Zia-ul-Haq, there has been a significant number of terrorist attacks and politically motivated killings and abductions of Shias in Pakistan (including by law enforcement and military personnel) (Kermani 2018).

Personal status issues are aimed at regulating not only relationships between followers of the same or different schools but also questions of legal status. There may be instances where adherents of one school have more rights than those of others, and vice versa (for example, regarding varying periods of maternal custody in divorce or even the right to have divorce in general). In this context, attention should be paid to abuses of law, where individuals exploit sectarian affiliation for personal gain. Ahmad Shahbaz Cheema studied cases in Pakistani courts where heirs, seeking their share of inheritance, declared a deceased person to be a Sunni or Shia to maximise their benefit under personal status law. In most cases, the court used the presumption that all Muslims residing in Pakistan are considered Sunnis unless proven otherwise (Ghulam Shabbir v. Mst. Bakhat Khatoon case 2009) (Cheema 2014, p. 284). In the case of Mst. Latifa Bibi v. Muhammad Bashir (2006), the deceased person left a widow, a sister, and collateral relatives. According to Shia law, collateral relatives and the widow have no inheritance rights, so the deceased person’s real estate was given to his sister. Collateral relatives disputed that the deceased was a Shia Muslim and presented witnesses in court to support their claim. They also noted that the deceased’s family was Sunni, and the population of his birthplace was predominantly Sunni. The deceased had worked as a servant for twenty-five years in a village where Shia Muslims resided. The primary argument for recognition of the deceased being a Shia was the widow’s statement that the deceased was a Shia and participated in Shia religious rites (Cheema 2014, p. 285).

5. Shia Islamic Law in Iran

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the only country in the world where Shia Islam is officially proclaimed as the state religion, specifically the Imami, Twelver, or Jaʿfarī branch—terms that all refer to the same group. Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution states: ‘The official religion of Iran is Jaʿfarī Islam, which acknowledges the existence of the 12 Imams, and this principle will remain unchanged forever. Other Islamic beliefs, including the Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, Ḥanbalī, and Zaydī schools, are to be fully respected.’ Adherents of these beliefs have the right to regulate personal status matters according to the norms of their respective schools.15 Thus, Iran uniquely stands as the only country where the constitutional status of adherents of the Zaydī school is explicitly defined.

Article 4 of the Iranian Constitution proclaims the supremacy of Islamic laws over all other laws and mandates the existence of the Guardian Council, a body similar to a constitutional court, to ensure the supremacy of Sharia. Article 91 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Guardian Council to protect the principles of Islam and the Constitution from conflicting legislation passed by the Majlis ((Iran’s national legislative body/parliament). This body consists of 12 members, appointed as follows:

• Six distinguished theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader of the country;
• Six leading jurists appointed by the Majlis on the recommendation of the head of the judiciary (Ibid).

All members of the Guardian Council are specialists in Shia Islamic law. Given that the doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh (Guardianship of the Jurist) is constitutionally enshrined in Iran, nearly all senior positions and judicial roles are occupied by fuqahāʾ (Islamic legal scholars). Candidates for the most significant positions are required to be mujtahids (qualified to perform ijtihād and issue fatwās). For instance, Article 162 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘The Head of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General must be just and experienced mujtahids,’ and Clause 1 of Article 109 outlines the necessary scientific ‘competence for issuing fatwās on various issues of Muslim law’ as one of the qualifications for the country’s leader (Rāhbār) (Ibid). Additionally, a Specialised Court for Clergy exists for fuqahāʾ, established by Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1987 decree On the Establishment of Special Courts to Investigate Violations and Crimes Committed by Clergy. This court operates outside the general judicial system and adjudicates based exclusively on theological provisions and rulings. It was created to prevent corruption within religious seminaries, protect the dignity of the clergy, and punish criminal clerics (Gusenova 2016, p. 92).

Elements of Shia Islamic law are present in most branches of the law, including contract (Pirhaji et al. 2015), criminal law (Tavana 2014), property law, constitutional (Künkler and Law 2022) and administrative law. Overall, Shia legal doctrine is deeply embedded across all areas of Iran’s legal and judicial system, reflecting a complex interplay between national legislative acts and international legal obligations. Despite these facts, Iran’s legal system represents a blend of Jaʿfarī Islamic law and national law based on elements of the civil law. The Iranian legal system is highly codified, with most branches of law being codified even prior to the 1979 Revolution. For example, in the realm of private law, the Iranian Civil Code is heavily influenced by the French Civil Code. Although elements of Belgian and Swiss law were also incorporated, particularly in the second and third volumes, the primary source of the Iranian Civil Code—especially in its first volume—is Islamic jurisprudence (Pirhaji et al. 2015, p. 49). This influence is particularly evident in the provisions governing marriage law, which are codified in Book 7: On Marriage and Divorce of the Civil Code.16 For instance, under Article 1043, a woman requires the permission of her father or guardian to enter into marriage. The Code recognises two forms of marriage: permanent marriage and temporary marriage (articles 1075–1077). The latter is a practice unique to Shia Islam and is considered prohibited by Sunni jurisprudence (See more Yaghoobi (2020)). Thus, while the Iranian Civil Code may outwardly resemble Western civil codes in form and structure, its substantive content is deeply rooted in Islamic legal principles.

Iran is also a member of numerous international organisations and has ratified most United Nations conventions. In this context, the relationship between Islamic law and international treaties is significant (See more examples (Mir-Hosseini 2012)). Article 9 of the Iranian Civil Code regulates the status of international treaties in the national legal system, stating that treaties concluded by Iran, which comply with the country’s Constitution, have the force of parliamentary law and can be applied in Iranian courts. The requirement for compliance with international treaties is broader than it might initially appear. Since Iran’s Constitution mandates that national legislation must comply with Sharia law, international treaties must, de facto, comply not only with the Iranian Constitution, but also with Sharia norms (Rarogova 2015, p. 137). A comprehensive analysis of this issue can be illustrated through the concept of attaining adulthood. According to Jaʿfarī jurisprudence, individuals reach full legal capacity at the ages of 15 for males and 9 for females. At this stage, they are deemed legally responsible for criminal offences, including those punishable by death. This practice, however, conflicts with certain international conventions. The United Nations Human Rights Council’s report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran highlights the discrepancies between Iranian laws based on Islamic principles and international treaties ratified by Iran. In 1994, Iran ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which, in Article 37(a), stipulates: ‘Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age.’17 Upon ratifying this Convention, Iran made a reservation asserting its right not to apply provisions of the Convention that are incompatible with existing Islamic laws and international legislation. In 2016, the Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that Iran withdraw this reservation, in accordance with Article 51(2) of the Convention, which states: ‘reservations incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention shall not be permitted.’ In response, the Iranian government affirmed that the Convention’s provisions have ‘binding legal force in the country’ and stated that Iran does not execute minors. In practice, this often meant that individuals convicted while underage are kept on death row until they reach the age of 18, at which point the death sentence is carried out.18

Similar conflicts between Sharia norms and international law are evident in other countries where Sharia is practiced. Tensions exist regarding child marriages, particularly in countries such as Iran and Iraq. As mentioned above, in Iran, the age of majority is set at 9 for girls and 15 for boys (according to Article 1210 of the Civil Code),19 while the legal minimum age for marriage is 13 for girls and 15 for boys. During its 2014 Universal Periodic Review, Iran agreed to examine recommendations to abolish laws permitting the marriage of girls as young as nine and to amend the Civil Code to establish 18 as the minimum legal age for marriage. In 2018, the Women’s Fraction of the Majlis proposed a motion to raise the minimum marriage age to 16 for girls and 18 for boys. However, the proposal was referred to the Majlis Legal and Judicial Committee, which ultimately rejected it, citing contradictions with Islamic jurisprudence, existing laws, and prevailing social norms. During its 2019 Universal Periodic Review, Iran once again committed to reviewing recommendations to establish 18 as the legal minimum age of marriage for both boys and girls, without exception, and to eliminate the practice of early and forced marriage. Additionally, Iran has pledged to end child, early, and forced marriage by 2030, in accordance with Target 5.3 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.20

The issue of child marriage has also sparked significant debate in Iraq, particularly following the passage of a controversial law on 21 January 2025. Under this new legislation, religious authorities have been granted the power to regulate family affairs, including marriage, divorce, and child custody. The law effectively abolishes the previous ban on the marriage of children under the age of 18, which had been in place since the 1950s. Under the new provisions, the minimum legal marriage age now differs based on sectarian affiliation. For Shia Muslims, who constitute the majority in Iraq, the lowest permissible age for marriage has been set at nine years for girls, whereas for Sunni Muslims, the official legal minimum remains 15 years old (Talal and Abdullah 2025). This development has generated widespread criticism both domestically and internationally, with concerns that it undermines child rights and contradicts global efforts to combat child marriage.

6. Conclusions

Mallat highlights that any approach to law in the Middle East is inherently selective, as the historical depth of the region’s legal traditions reflects the diversity of cultures active in the contemporary world (Mallat 2003, p. 699). This complexity is further compounded by certain biases present in academic disciplines, including Islamic studies, where a prevailing approach often portrays Muslim minorities as mere ‘sects’ or overlooks them entirely. Sahner provides a notable example of this referring to The New Cambridge History of Islam (2010), a six-volume, state-of-the-art compendium of Islamic history featuring contributions from leading scholars, where the chapter on Islamic law makes no mention of non-Sunni traditions, ‘as if Sunnis were the only ones concerned with this domain of intellectual and religious endeavour’ (Sahner 2023, p. 21). A similar omission can be found in many other sources, including the chapter on Saudi Arabia in Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present. While the author acknowledges Shia Muslims as an oppressed community, they are entirely overlooked in the section on “Personal Status and Family Law” (van Eijk 2012, p. 163). It highlights the importance of examining various minority perspectives to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Islamic legal traditions.

This study underscores the multifaceted role of Shia Islamic law within contemporary legal systems, revealing both its adaptability and its challenges in diverse national contexts. By classifying these systems into secular states with Shia populations, states where Shia law primarily governs personal status matters, and systems predominantly based on Shia jurisprudence, the research provides a structured framework to analyse the extent of Shia law’s integration. So, while Iran exemplifies the most comprehensive integration of Shia jurisprudence, other states adopt Shia legal doctrines selectively, often confining their application to personal status issues. Moreover, in states with secular legal frameworks, Shia communities navigate a delicate balance between adherence to religious principles and compliance with national laws.

The research also illuminates the tensions and disparities arising from the coexistence of Shia and Sunni jurisprudence, particularly in pluralistic societies. These tensions manifest in legal adjudications, societal practices, and international human rights discourse. This exploration not only bridges a significant gap in comparative legal scholarship but also emphasises the importance of understanding Shia Islamic law’s evolving role in shaping national and international legal landscapes. Future research could further investigate the interplay between Shia legal doctrines and global human rights standards, as well as the potential for harmonising these frameworks in increasingly interconnected societies.

A survey of Shia Islamic law demonstrates that it is distinct from most Sunni schools of thought, primarily due to the historical position of Shia communities as a minority. This status has fostered a heightened awareness of the importance of engagement with broader legal and social frameworks to avoid isolation. Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri has emphasised that no laws within an Islamic state should contradict the fundamental principles of Islam. However, to prevent the formation of a globally isolated system, he has also advocated for cooperation with international organisations, provided that such collaboration does not conflict with explicit Qur’ānic injunctions (Golbarg 2006). The justification for reform in order not to be isolated/to avoid isolation is sometimes used by Shia scholars, and this perspective reflects a broader trend in Shia legal thought, which tends to be more flexible in adapting to contemporary challenges (Tahiiev 2024, p. 3). The historical developments underscored the necessity of modernising religious thought within Twelver Shia Islam. Consequently, contemporary Shia scholars actively seek to refine and reinterpret religious laws, making them more accessible to their followers and appealing to potential adherents. This process often involves revising certain dogmatic rulings to align more closely with evolving social and legal realities (Takim 2022; Tahiiev 2024, p. 4). The integration of newly formulated rulings into formal legal systems takes time. While these interpretations may not yet be fully incorporated into positive law in some countries, they may influence attempts to reconcile Shia legal principles with international legal standards. This can be observed in ongoing efforts to address contradictions between Islamic law and global human rights norms, particularly concerning issues such as child marriage. These developments illustrate that Shia jurisprudence continues to evolve in response to both internal doctrinal considerations and external legal and societal pressures.

Overall, the application of Shia law in contemporary legal systems is shaped by a complex set of historical, cultural, and political factors. The geographical distribution of Shia populations, the dominance of Twelver jurisprudence, cultural heritage, and legal scholarship all play critical roles in determining how Shia law is applied. Additionally, political dynamics—including state policies, discrimination, and international relations—further influence the extent to which Shia legal traditions are recognised and implemented.

A key factor in the application of Shia law is the historical and contemporary distribution of Shia Muslim populations. Shia Islam has historically been concentrated in the Persianate world (modern-day Iran and Afghanistan), Iraq, parts of the Levant (Lebanon and Syria), the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. In recent centuries, migration patterns have also contributed to the presence of Shia communities in regions beyond their traditional strongholds. Twelver Shia Islam, the largest Shia denomination, has been particularly influential due to its numerical superiority among Shia groups. As a result, Twelver jurisprudence has formed the basis for legal systems where Shia law is applied, especially in Iran and parts of Iraq and Lebanon. Other Shia groups have had less influence in shaping contemporary legal frameworks, except in specific regions like Yemen, where Zaydī Islam has historically played a role. Also, should be noted that this paper did not cover the current Yemeni legal system in detail, as it is difficult to assess the extent to which the Houthis apply Zaydī or any other Islamic law in their controlled territories. For much of the time they have governed these areas, they have been engaged in military conflicts and have primarily implemented martial law, with a substantial reliance on customary law. So due to the war, a consistent legal framework has yet to be established, making it unclear to what extent Zaydī jurisprudence is systematically applied in controlled territories.

The historical and political trajectories of Shia-majority and Shia-minority states have significantly influenced the extent to which Shia law is applied. In countries such as Turkey and Azerbaijan, historical secular legal traditions have minimised the role of any Islamic law in official legal frameworks. The cultural and legal heritage of Shia communities is deeply intertwined with their historical presence in specific regions. For example, despite being minority in the state context, in Lebanon, where Shia Muslims constitute approximately 50% of the Muslim population and only around 25% of the total population, their long-standing scholarly and historical traditions have granted them significant influence in shaping local jurisprudence. Lebanese law allows for the application of Shia personal status laws, reflecting this deep-rooted heritage. Similarly, in Iraq, Iran, and parts of the Gulf, Shia legal scholarship has historically contributed to the development of religious and personal status laws. This cultural legacy continues to play a role in the recognition of Shia jurisprudence within broader legal systems.

The role of international relations, particularly following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, has been crucial in shaping the status of Shia law in the Middle East. The revolution led to the establishment of Iran’s current political and legal system, which integrates Shia Islamic jurisprudence with civil, criminal, and constitutional laws. However, the Iranian Revolution also intensified sectarian tensions across the region. Many Sunni-majority monarchies, particularly in the Gulf, began to perceive their domestic Shia populations as politically suspect or aligned with Iran. This perception has led to increased repression of Shia communities, and even when they demand equal rights or fair treatment in their home countries, they are often severely punished, as seen in the protests in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 2011. So, in many countries, Shias have been ‘victimised minorities’ (and, in the case of Bahrain, ‘a victimised majority’) as they are not treated the same as their Sunni counterparts, facing not only political and social persecution but also ‘legal’ limitations prescribed by local legislations. For example, in almost all Gulf countries, Shias face legal restrictions regarding political participation, public funding, and the holding of specific positions. However, due to their demographic significance, Shia Muslims in some of these countries have secured the right to apply Shia personal status laws. Also, barriers to justice persist and, for example, in Saudi Arabia, Shia Muslims face difficulties in accessing courts that adhere to their legal traditions, as the number of Shia-specific courts remains inadequate. This limited access undermines the practical implementation of Shia jurisprudence, even where it is officially recognised.

Analysis shows that each country is unique regarding its (non)application of Shia Islamic law and its own set of influencing factors, including historical context, political dynamics, sectarian relations, and the degree of state involvement in religious affairs. While broad classifications can help identify general trends in how Shia law interacts with national legal frameworks, each case still remains distinct. The extent to which Shia jurisprudence is recognised, implemented, or restricted varies not only between countries, but also within each classification category, as legal, political, and social factors shape its application in diverse ways. The classification presented in this study is therefore intended to highlight overarching patterns rather than impose rigid categorizations, acknowledging that significant variations persist even among countries with seemingly similar approaches to Shia law. Given these complexities, future developments in regional politics and legal reforms will continue to shape the status of Shia law in the years to come, potentially influencing both its doctrinal evolution and its role within national legal systems.