Revealing the Impact of Investment Benefits on Marketing Decision in Public Infrastructures Based on Game Theory: Case Study of Large-Scale Exhibition Infrastructures in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Case Study
- (1)
- Analyze the complex interrelations of interests among the main investors involved in the construction of exhibition infrastructures. Utilize evolutionary game theory to construct a decision-making model for local government, exhibition building investors, and supporting service building investors, and analyze stable strategies.
- (2)
- Investigate the mutual influences and evolutionary trends of the three types of investors’ investment decisions, clarifying the extent to which different factors impact their investment choices.
- (3)
- Based on the research findings, propose countermeasures and recommendations to promote more scientific and rational investments in exhibition infrastructures by the three types of investors. These guidelines aim at directing the investment in other similar large-scale public infrastructures.
3. Research Methodology
3.1. Assumptions and Key Variables
3.2. Establishing and Solving the Evolutionary Game Model
3.3. Analysis of Points of Equilibrium under Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
- g(1) = (Bg4 + Bg5 + Bg6 − Bg2 − Bg3 − Bg7)·y·z + (Bg2 − Bg5)·y + (Bg3 − Bg6)·z + Bg1 − Rt·y − Rp·z − Cg
- g(2) = (Bg4 + Bg5 − Bg2 − Bg7)·z + (Bg2 − Bg5) − Rt
- g(3) = (Bg4 + Bg5 + Bg6 − Bg2 − Bg3 − Bg7)·y + (Bg3 − Bg6) − Rp
- g(4)= (Bt4 − Bt3 − Bt2)·z + Bt2 + Rt
- g(5) = (Bt4 − Bt3 − Bt2)·x·z + Bt2·x + Bt3·z + Bt1 + Rt·x − Ct
- g(6) = (Bt4 − Bt3 − Bt2)·x + Bt3
- g(7) = (Bp4 − Bp3 − Bp2 + Bp5 + Bp6 − Bp7)·y + (Bp2 − Bp5)·x + Rp
- g(8) = (Bp4 − Bp3 − Bp2 + Bp5 + Bp6 − Bp7)·x + Bp3 − Bp6
- g(9) = (Bp4 − Bp3 − Bp2 + Bp5 + Bp6 − Bp7)·x·y + (Bp2 − Bp5)·x + (Bp3 − Bp6)·y + Bp1 + Rp·x − Cp
3.3.1. Initiation Phase
3.3.2. Growth Phase
3.3.3. Maturation Phase
4. Simulation Results and Analysis
4.1. Analysis of Initial Strategies
- (1)
- For initial values of 0.6, the scenario is threefold. In the early stage, the local government and exhibition building investors rise steadily, whereas the supporting service building investors decline. In the intermediate stage, the supporting service building investors abruptly rise in a rapid manner. Meanwhile, the local government exhibits a heightened rate of increase, whereas the exhibition building investors modestly increase its rate of increase. In the late stage, the supporting service building investors surpass the exhibition building investors, reaching 1 at the same time as the local government.
- (2)
- For an initial value of 0.7, the local government most rapidly evolves towards 1, while both exhibition building investors and supporting service building investors demonstrate comparable rates of evolving towards to 1.
4.2. Analysis of Upfront Costs
4.3. Analysis of Subsidies
- (a)
- When the subsidy is lower than 0.5 Rt, the exhibition building investors will not be adequately motivated, leading to their non-investment behaviors and, by extension, all three stakeholders’ evolution towards 0.
- (b)
- When the subsidy is 0.5 Rt, the appeal to the exhibition building investors remains limited. Despite their unwillingness in the initial phase, proactive investments from the local government and supporting service building investors drive them to likewise evolve towards committing to investments.
- (c)
- When the subsidy is 1.0 Rt, this represents an ideal condition aligned with the expectations of both the local government and the exhibition building investors. Their proactive investments hence underpin the rapid evolution of the tripartite system towards 1.
- (d)
- When the subsidy exceeds 1.0 Rt, the local government is disinclined to invest since they are unwilling to accept such an excessively high subsidy, driving the evolution of the tripartite decision making towards 0.
4.4. Analysis of Elementary Earnings
4.5. Analysis of Additional Earnings through Clustered Construction
5. Discussion
- (a)
- Establishing a platform for communication
- (b)
- Enhancing the regulatory mechanism for construction scale management
- (c)
- Establishing a dynamic subsidy mechanism
- (d)
- Expanding market-oriented operations
- (e)
- Establishing a mechanism of coordinated investment
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Stakeholder | Notation | Definition |
---|---|---|
Local government | Bg1 | Elementary earnings through investments in basic infrastructures |
Bg2 | Additional earnings when both local government and exhibition building investors invest proactively | |
Bg3 | Additional earnings when both local government and supporting service building investors invest proactively | |
Bg4 | Additional earnings when all three stakeholders invest proactively | |
Bg5 | Additional earnings when only exhibition building investors invest proactively in exhibition building | |
Bg6 | Additional earnings when only supporting service building investors invest proactively in exhibition infrastructures | |
Bg7 | Additional earnings when both exhibition building investors and supporting service building investors invest proactively but not the local government itself | |
Cg | Upfront costs or capitals for investments in basic infrastructures | |
Rt | Subsidies for exhibition building investors | |
Rp | Subsidies for supporting service building investors | |
Exhibition building investors | Bt1 | Elementary earnings through investments in exhibition building |
Bt2 | Additional earnings when both local government and exhibition building investors invest proactively | |
Bt3 | Additional earnings when both exhibition building investors and supporting service building investors invest proactively | |
Bt4 | Additional earnings when all three stakeholders invest proactively | |
Ct | Upfront costs or capitals for construction of exhibition building | |
Supporting service building investors | Bp1 | Elementary earnings through establishing or upgrading service infrastructures |
Bp2 | Additional earnings when both local government and supporting service building investors invest proactively | |
Bp3 | Additional earnings when both exhibition building investors and supporting service building investors invest proactively | |
Bp4 | Additional earnings when all three stakeholders invest proactively | |
Bp5 | Additional earnings for supporting service building investors when only local government invests | |
Bp6 | Additional earnings for supporting service building investors when only exhibition building investors invest | |
Bp7 | Additional earnings when both local government and exhibition building investors invest proactively but not the supporting service building investors themselves | |
Cp | Upfront costs or capitals for construction of service infrastructures |
Exhibition Building Investors | Investment (y) | Non-Investment (1 − y) | |||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Supporting service building investors | Investment (z) | Non-investment (1 − z) | Investment (z) | Non-investment (1 − z) | |
Local government | Investment (x) | Bg1 + Bg4 − Cg − Rt − Rp | Bg1 + Bg2 − Cg − Rt | Bg1 + Bg3 − Cg − Rp | Bg1 − Cg |
Bt1 + Bt4 + Rt − Ct | Bt1 + Bt2 + Rt − Ct | 0 | 0 | ||
Bp1 + Bp4 + Rp − Cp | Bp7 | Bp1 + Bp2 + Rp − Cp | Bp5 | ||
Non-invest-ment (1 − x) | Bg7 | Bg5 | Bg6 | 0 | |
Bt1 + Bt3 − Ct | Bt1 − Ct | 0 | 0 | ||
Bp1 + Bp3 − Cp | Bp6 | Bp1 − Cp | 0 |
Point of Equilibrium | λ1 | λ2 | λ3 |
---|---|---|---|
E1 (1, 1, 1) | Cg + Rt + Rp + Bg7 − Bg1 − Bg4 | Ct − Rt − Bt1 − Bt4 | Cp − Rp − Bp1 − Bp4 + Bp7 |
E2 (1, 1, 0) | Cg + Rt − Bg1 − Bg2 + Bg5 | Ct − Rt − Bt1 − Bt2 | Bp1 + Bp4 − Bp7 + Rp − Cp |
E3 (1, 0, 1) | Cg + Rp − Bg1 − Bg3 + Bg6 | Bt1 + Bt4 + Rt − Ct | Cp − Rp − Bp1 − Bp2 + Bp5 |
E4 (1, 0, 0) | Cg − Bg1 | Bt1 + Bt2 + Rt − Ct | Bp1 + Bp2 − Bp5 + Rp − Cp |
E5 (0, 1, 1) | Bg1 + Bg4 − Bg7 − Cg − Rt − Rp | Ct − Bt1 − Bt3 | Cp − Bp1 − Bp3 + Bp6 |
E6 (0, 1, 0) | Bg1 + Bg2 − Bg5 − Cg − Rt | Ct − Bt1 | Bp1 + Bp3 − Bp6 − Cp |
E7 (0, 0, 1) | Bg1 + Bg3 − Bg6 − Cg − Rp | Bt1 + Bt3 − Ct | Cp − Bp1 |
E8 (0, 0, 0) | Bg1 − Cg | Bt1 − Ct | Bp1 − Cp |
Parameter | Bg1 | Bg2 | Bg3 | Bg4 | Bg5 | Bg6 | Bg7 | Cg | Rt | Rp | Bt1 | Bt2 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Assigned value | 25 | 15 | 25 | 90 | 15 | 5 | 25 | 40 | 9 | 9 | 5 | 3 |
Parameter | Bt3 | Bt4 | Ct | Bp1 | Bp2 | Bp3 | Bp4 | Bp5 | Bp6 | Bp7 | Cp | |
Assigned value | 3 | 10 | 15 | 20 | 15 | 10 | 45 | 8 | 6 | 18 | 40 |
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Chen, Z.; Ma, C.; Lin, C. Revealing the Impact of Investment Benefits on Marketing Decision in Public Infrastructures Based on Game Theory: Case Study of Large-Scale Exhibition Infrastructures in China. Buildings 2024, 14, 715. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14030715
Chen Z, Ma C, Lin C. Revealing the Impact of Investment Benefits on Marketing Decision in Public Infrastructures Based on Game Theory: Case Study of Large-Scale Exhibition Infrastructures in China. Buildings. 2024; 14(3):715. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14030715
Chicago/Turabian StyleChen, Zhibiao, Chenlong Ma, and Chang Lin. 2024. "Revealing the Impact of Investment Benefits on Marketing Decision in Public Infrastructures Based on Game Theory: Case Study of Large-Scale Exhibition Infrastructures in China" Buildings 14, no. 3: 715. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14030715