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Article

Social License to Operate for NIMBY Infrastructures: The Mechanism of the Four Components of Procedural Justice

1
School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Hangzhou 310018, China
2
School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, Shaoxing 312369, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Buildings 2024, 14(8), 2465; https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14082465
Submission received: 7 June 2024 / Revised: 27 July 2024 / Accepted: 7 August 2024 / Published: 9 August 2024
(This article belongs to the Section Architectural Design, Urban Science, and Real Estate)

Abstract

:
The key to obtaining the Social License to Operate (SLO) for businesses in the not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) infrastructure projects is the justice of the process. The study constructs a model to analyze the effect of the four components of procedural justice (procedural regulations and the behavior and attitudes of the government and construction enterprises) on the SLO. A large-scale questionnaire survey is conducted to assess the role and the extent of the influence of these four components in obtaining the SLO for NIMBY infrastructures. The results of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and mediation effects tests show that procedural justice significantly influences the SLO for NIMBY infrastructure projects. All four components significantly improve community trust and social acceptance of the project. The construction enterprise’s informal treatment of the public’s behavior and attitudes has the largest influence, whereas the government’s formal treatment of the public’s behavior and attitudes has the least influence. The findings provide theoretical and practical guidance for improving the SLO for NIMBY infrastructure projects and promoting the sustainable development of these projects.

1. Introduction

As economic and social development has rapidly progressed, infrastructure construction has become a critical pillar supporting and ensuring national growth [1]. However, certain infrastructure projects, such as waste incineration plants and nuclear power stations, may have negative impacts on the surrounding environment and communities, resulting in residents’ concerns and resistance [2]. The Social License to Operate (SLO) is a key indicator of residents’ acceptance of local business projects and signifies substantial social endorsement for enterprises [3]. Obtaining a social license is pivotal in engineering management because it bolsters the perceived trustworthiness of a project as seen by residents [4].
Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the role of social trust and permission in the context of Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) infrastructure projects [5]. Research pinpoints the significant impact of transparency in government and corporate decision-making, the depth of public participation, and the combination of formal and informal behaviors and attitudes on gaining the public’s trust and social consent for such projects [6,7,8,9]. Devine-Wright and Howes demonstrated that a wind energy project in the UK diminished its adverse impacts on the local populace by bolstering public participation and streamlining communication [9].
Nevertheless, although research has revealed the substantial role of procedural justice in enhancing community acceptance of corporate decision-making, there remains a notable gap in understanding the internal mechanisms of SLO within the specific cultural and societal context of China [10,11]. Most studies to date have centered on practical experiences in Western countries, with insufficient focus on the unique conditions of China [12]. Given the stark contrasts in political systems, cultural spheres, and public psychology, insights gleaned from Western frameworks might not be seamlessly applicable. Hence, exploring the mechanisms of SLO within the Chinese milieu is crucially needed.
This study aims to bridge this gap by employing Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) to dissect the influence of the four attributes of procedural justice—formal and informal procedural regulations (FOD and IOD) during decision-making by government and construction enterprises, as well as their formal and informal interaction behaviors and attitudes with the public—on the mechanisms of SLO. The insights provided here seek to enhance the SLO framework, thereby enabling governments and businesses to more effectively meet public needs in project decision-making and implementation, enhancing public trust and the degree of social license granted. Our findings offer a theoretical and empirical basis for policy development and practical management, with global implications for projects grappling with SLO challenges.

2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses

2.1. Literature Review

2.1.1. NIMBY

The term “NIMBY” (Not In My Backyard) is commonly used to describe the opposition of local residents to infrastructure developments that, while serving public welfare, are perceived to have potentially detrimental effects on their living environment, such as waste incineration plants, sewage treatment stations, nuclear power stations, among others [13]. These facilities are key to services supporting socio-economic growth; however, public dissent often arises from concerns regarding environmental pollution, health hazards, and potential decreases in property values triggered by proximate facility operations [14]. This opposition underscores the complexity of facility siting and demonstrates the significance of public perception and engagement during the planning and development phases [15]. For example, the Panyu waste incineration plant in Guangzhou, China, encountered resistance due primarily to apprehensions concerning health impacts and a lack of transparency in the procedural decisions that were made [12]. Reflecting on a broader scale, the eventual discontinuation of nuclear power projects in Germany was driven by overarching safety concerns, underpinning the powerful influence public opinion can exert on national policy discourse [16,17].
Consequently, increasing societal acceptance of such infrastructure projects requires an in-depth exploration of the public’s trust and the governance dynamics involved [18]. Strategies fostering effective communication, specifically encouraging public participation and equitable practices in decision-making processes, have been shown to positively impact social endorsement of potentially controversial developments [19,20,21]. In particular, the participation of all stakeholders and the pursuit of inclusive and transparent governance contribute to enhanced confidence and reduced community resistance, thereby facilitating broader project acceptance. Within this context, the concept of a Social License to Operate (SLO) has emerged as a critical framework for addressing the social dynamics associated with infrastructure development. It calls attention to the need for distributive justice, procedural involvement, and credibility in governance practices to secure community backing [22,23,24,25].

2.1.2. Social License to Operate

The SLO is a broad concept that originated in the mining and energy industries and later expanded to other sectors [26]. An SLO is not a formal legal authorization but a symbol of acceptance, recognition, and support from a local community and its members for a company’s project development in that community. This license is based on principles of mutual trust and reciprocity and serves as an important standard for measuring the success of corporate social responsibility and community engagement. The essence of an SLO is “social governance” and “community involvement”, involving the establishment of trust, the pursuit of legitimacy, and the affirmation of corporate social responsibilities during the enterprise’s local operations [27]. A successful SLO ensures that business actions comply with legal requirements and community expectations and values, thereby establishing legitimacy among community members. This can help reduce social conflict and potentially support the long-term sustainable development of a company because it fosters broader stakeholder support for corporate projects.
Research and practical application of SLOs have extended from the energy and mining sectors to other projects, such as infrastructure and NIMBY facilities. The SLO is particularly critical in NIMBY facility projects since they often involve a wide range of public interests and potential social opposition [23]. By adopting the SLO framework, project developers can identify and address community concerns, enhance public trust, and increase social acceptance of the project. Research has confirmed that this approach to addressing NIMBY issues (especially for facilities related to planning communication stations, landfills, and energy distribution) can significantly reduce the risks of project obstruction, lessen NIMBY conflicts, and aid in understanding the social complexities of project development [28,29]. The SLO also highlights the importance of communication among different stakeholders, particularly during the early project planning stages, where public participation is crucial for obtaining an SLO [30,31,32]. The SLO provides a guiding framework for how a business interacts with the community and strengthens its social responsibilities, which is essential for preempting and resolving conflicts arising from NIMBY phenomena. As societal demands for corporate social responsibility increase, the SLO will continue to be a fundamental component of business practices globally [33].

2.1.3. Procedural Justice

The concept of procedural justice originates from social psychology and rule of law theory. Its core idea is the justice involved in decision-making rather than solely the justice of the decision outcomes. This principle received widespread attention in sociology, management, and other fields following the pioneering work of Thibaut and Walker [34]. Procedural justice emphasizes the fairness of decision-making regarding transparency, opportunities for participation, and the extent to which individuals feel respected [35,36].
Academic research on procedural justice has increased in recent years. Procedural justice in NIMBY facility projects, such as the social license to operate in energy and mining projects, focuses on the smooth progression of a project and considers the public’s acceptance. Studies by Colquitt and Gross have shown that procedural justice can indirectly enhance public support for projects by strengthening trust in decision-making bodies [37,38]. Its mechanism of influence goes beyond the direct impact of decision outcomes to include indirect effects through psychological experiences, such as trust and respect [39,40,41]. This influence is particularly significant in NIMBY facility projects, where procedural justice can enhance an individual sense of belonging to a group. A stronger sense of belonging means that individuals are more likely to exhibit cooperative behavior within the team, favoring an enhancement of the social acceptability of the project [42].
Procedural justice significantly influences the SOL and has become a hot research topic in academic and practical realms. Blader and Tyler extended the theory of procedural justice, proposing that it comprises four components: formal procedures and regulations during decision-making, how decision-makers treat the public, the informal behaviors and attitudes of decision-makers during decision-making, and the informal behaviors and attitudes of decision-makers toward the public [43]. In China, the government has a central position in decision-making, being responsible for formulating, implementing and supervising policies. Therefore, this study considers the behavior and attitude of the government as the formal component of procedural justice, emphasizing the government’s key role in ensuring the execution of formal regulatory procedures. Correspondingly, construction enterprises have an auxiliary and executive role during decision-making and are regarded as the informal component of procedural justice. Thus, the four components of procedural justice identified in this study are the official procedures and regulations of the government during decision-making, the procedures and regulations of construction enterprises during decision-making, the formal behavior and attitude of the government toward the public, and the informal behavior and attitude of construction enterprises toward the public. The four components are illustrated in Figure 1.

2.2. Research Hypotheses

The formal procedures and regulations adopted by the government are crucial in shaping community members’ trust when decisions are made regarding NIMBY facilities. Formal procedures enhance public trust in government decision-making by increasing transparency and fairness [44,45]. Transparent processes allow community members to track government decisions, and fairness ensures that community members’ rights are reasonably considered during decision-making. Tyler and Huo found that the public was more likely to trust the outcome when it perceived that the decision-making process was fair [46]. Based on this, we propose Hypothesis H1:
H1. 
The formal procedures and regulations of the government during decision-making have a positive impact on trust in NIMBY facilities.
According to the theory of procedural justice, the procedures and regulations followed by enterprises in project decision-making are key factors in building public trust [35]. Although corporate procedures may be more focused on operational practices, their influence lies in whether they can provide clear, consistent, and fair information, as well as opportunities for participation in decision-making [46]. If companies implement fair procedures and regulations in project decisions, they build trust relationships with community members [41,47]. Hence, Hypothesis H2 is proposed:
H2. 
The procedures and regulations of construction enterprises during decision-making have a positive impact on trust in NIMBY facilities.
Research indicates that the formal behavior and attitudes of the government in interactions with the public affect the level of public trust [41,48,49]. The recognition of government work is improved, and trust is generated when government officials exhibit respect, integrity, and openness during communication and negotiation [50,51]. Hence, Hypothesis H3 is proposed:
H3. 
The formal behavior and attitudes of the government toward the public have a positive impact on trust in NIMBY facilities.
The informal behavior and attitudes of construction enterprises in public interactions may also be crucial in building public trust. Informal communication and behavior by enterprises, such as interpersonal relations of staff and responses to public concerns, are likely to enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of the business significantly [41,52]. Hence, Hypothesis H4 is proposed:
H4. 
The informal behavior and attitudes of construction enterprises toward the public have a positive impact on trust in NIMBY facilities.
Informal behavior and attitudes shape public acceptance, particularly the performance of enterprises during project execution [53,54]. Community members often pay more attention to interpersonal relationships and communication, so the informal treatment by construction enterprises can directly and positively affect the social acceptability of the project [55]. Hence, Hypothesis H5 is proposed:
H5. 
The informal behavior and attitudes of construction enterprises toward the public have a positive impact on acceptance.
The formal behavior and attitudes of the government, including the fulfillment of commitments to public service and consideration of community opinions, also affect the societal acceptance of projects [47]. Formal, respectful interactions can enhance community members’ satisfaction with government decisions, thereby promoting project acceptability [56]. Hence, Hypothesis H6 is proposed:
H6. 
The formal behavior and attitudes of the government toward the public have a positive impact on acceptance.
The informal behavior of construction enterprises during the decision-making process, such as their transparency, fairness, and manner of interacting with the public, all influence the level of public acceptance of the project. These informal elements help facilitate better communication, increasing project support [48]. Hence, Hypothesis H7 is proposed:
H7. 
The informal behavior and attitudes of construction enterprises during the decision-making process have a positive impact on acceptance.
The formal procedures of the government are essential for ensuring decision-making effectiveness and fairness, enhancing public acceptance [46]. Therefore, we expect that standardized and transparent government decision-making procedures increase the social acceptance of NIMBY facilities. Hence, Hypothesis H8 is proposed:
H8. 
The formal procedures and regulations of the government during decision-making have a positive impact on acceptance.
Public trust in NIMBY facility projects may be decisive in their acceptance [57]. When community members trust decision-makers and the process, they are more inclined to accept and support proposed projects or policies [48,49,58]. Hence, Hypothesis H9 is proposed:
H9. 
Public trust has a positive impact on public acceptance.
This study integrates the research hypothesis and establishes a four-component model of procedural justice to assess the impact mechanism (see Figure 2):

3. Research Design

3.1. Overall Research

This study employs hypothesis testing. Based on the four-component model of procedural justice, a conceptual model is established, the hypotheses are created, and measurement variables are used after conducting an extensive literature review and content analysis. Three types of NIMBY facilities—waste incineration power stations, nuclear power plants, and psychiatric hospitals—are selected. Residents within 3 kilometers of the facilities are surveyed in the Quzhou, Wenzhou, and Hangzhou regions of Zhejiang Province to gather data on the perceptions of procedural justice, trust, and acceptance.

3.2. Questionnaire Design

The questionnaire has two parts. The first part includes questions related to basic demographic information, such as the participant’s gender, age, education level, salary level, and other background information. This section of the questionnaire is designed according to standard demographic questionnaire recommendations [59]. The second measures the six dimensions defined in the research model, including FOD, formal behavior and attitudes of the government, informal behavior and attitudes of construction enterprises, trust, and acceptance. The items used to measure procedural justice are based on the four-component model proposed by Blader and Tyler [39], who defined the meaning of a fair process and constructed suitable scales. This scale was widely validated and is considered an effective tool for measuring procedural justice in academia. A scale designed by Moffat et al. was used to measure the SLO. It was developed for comparative research on the SLO of mining projects at the national level in Australia, China, and Chile [22]. Its applicability and stability across different cultural and national contexts have been verified by empirical research. All questions are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, which requires respondents to assess the degree of agreement with the stated questions. This scale format allows respondents to express the extent of their agreement from “strongly disagree” (rated as 1) to “strongly agree” (rated as 5), providing a standardized way to interpret the views and attitudes of respondents.

3.3. Sample and Data Collection

The questionnaire survey was carried out from 15 July 2023 to 1 August 2023. Based on geographical location and demographic criteria, Quzhou, Wenzhou, and Hangzhou in Zhejiang Province were meticulously selected as survey sites. We utilized a stratified random sampling technique to conduct in-person surveys and interviews, targeting residents within a 3-kilometer radius of the predetermined NIMBY facilities in each of these cities. For detailed information on the survey questionnaire, please refer to Appendix A. A total of 600 questionnaires were distributed, from which we received and verified 544, indicating a strong response rate of 90.6%. Within this, 177 valid questionnaires pertained to the waste incineration power plant project in Quzhou (accounting for 32.5%), 188 to the San’ao nuclear power plant project in Wenzhou (34.6%), and 179 to the Seventh People’s Hospital in Hangzhou (32.9%). The validity rate, markedly higher than that observed in comparable surveys, resonates with the literature by Groves et al. and De Leeuw [60,61], which suggests that face-to-face survey methodologies significantly enhance the reliability of response data. Therefore, we conducted thorough door-to-door surveys, wherein surveyors individually explained the questionnaire items to respondents, ensuring this high data recovery percentage.
Table 1 lists a more detailed portrayal of respondents’ demographics, such as gender, age groups, educational levels, and monthly income brackets. While there are small discrepancies when compared to the demographics in the ‘Zhejiang Province Statistical Yearbook 2022’, our sampled distribution generally aligns with the provincial population’s demographic structure, ensuring the representativeness of our study findings.

3.4. Data Analysis

The data analysis consisted of three steps. First, descriptive statistical analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS 26.0 to evaluate the residents’ attitudes in the three locations toward the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in their areas. Second, SEM was performed using AMOS 24.0 to test the research hypotheses empirically. Third, a bootstrap mediation effect test was carried out to assess the mediating effects on trust in NIMBY facility projects.

4. Research Results

4.1. Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the questionnaire survey data. The FOD and IOD range from 3.21 to 3.45 and from 2.62 to 2.94, respectively. This result indicates that participants perceive that governments and construction enterprises maintain procedural justice in formal and informal decision-making regarding NIMBY infrastructure projects, positively influencing the public. The mean values for the formal treatment of the public (FOT) and the informal treatment of the public (IOT) range from 2.49 to 3.37, indicating a wide range and reflecting an accurate perception of the government’s and enterprises’ attitudes and behaviors during decision-making. The trust dimension (TR) has a mean value of 3.15 to 3.33, suggesting a moderate level of public trust in the government and enterprises. The acceptance dimension (AC), with mean values from 2.19 to 3.55, reveals considerable variation in the public’s level of acceptance of projects, with median values indicating relatively low acceptance.
All kurtosis and skewness coefficients are within ±1, indicating minor asymmetry in the data distribution. Following Wu’s recommendations, the data are normally distributed if the skewness and kurtosis coefficients are less than 2 [62]. These results indicate that the maximum likelihood (ML) method can be used for model parameter estimation, and SEM is appropriate.

4.2. Structural Equation Modeling

The fitting results of the structural equation model are depicted in Table 3. The fitting indices meet the requirements for model adequacy except that the chi-square significance does not exceed the threshold of 0.05 and R M R = 0.139 does not fall below the threshold of 0.05. As Kline summarizes, the p-value is sensitive to the sample size, resulting in challenges when large sample sizes are used [63]. Thus, χ 2 / df can be used in these cases, where χ 2 / df < 3.0 indicates a high model fit [64]. Our study had an effective sample size of 544, and χ 2 / df = 1.912 < 3.0 , suggesting a good model fit.
The SEM results (Figure 3) show that the standardized estimates of the six latent variables are greater than 0.5, indicating significance. The average variance extracted (AVE) was calculated based on the factor loadings (standardized path coefficients) and measurement errors from the Amos analysis results. The square root of AVE was compared with the absolute values of the correlation coefficients between the six latent variables (see Table 4). The results show that the internal consistency is higher than the external consistency for all variables, indicating that the model has satisfactory discriminant validity [65].
The impacts of the FOD and FOT and IOD and IOT on TR and AC are significant at the 0.01 level. The positive behavior and fair regulations of the government and construction enterprises have a significant positive impact on public trust, and the level of public trust is positively associated with the social acceptance of NIMBY infrastructure projects. All research hypotheses (H1 to H9) are supported.

4.3. Mediation Effect

The bootstrap test results presented in Table 5 indicate that the government’s FOT and FOD and the construction enterprises’ IOD and IOT affect AC. These influences occur through TR as a mediating variable.
This study adopts the significance criterion suggested by Shrout and Bolger, where the mediation effect is considered statistically significant if the confidence interval does not include zero [66]. The effect values, standard errors (SEs), and lower and upper bounds of the confidence intervals for the mediating paths indicate the significant mediating role of public trust.
The findings demonstrate that all four mediation paths have p-values less than 0.05, confirming mediation effects. However, since each path also has a direct effect, we can conclude that partial mediation occurs. This finding suggests that although procedural regulations and behavior attitudes directly impact public acceptance, their influence is more pronounced when trust is high.

5. Discussion

5.1. Research Findings

This paper examined the influence of the four components of procedural justice on the SLO for NIMBY infrastructure projects using SEM and bootstrap validation. The results underscore the significance of the four components of procedural justice in the SLO, aligning with Tyler and Blader’s theory of procedural justice and corroborated by other studies [7,39,42]. Equitable and transparent practices and the fair conduct of the government and construction companies directly or indirectly increase social acceptance of projects. These findings reflect the pivotal role of procedural justice principles in strengthening community members’ perceptions of transparency and fairness in decision-making [35,41,44,67]. Additionally, the findings agree with those of Siegrist et al. that a significant positive correlation exists between community trust and acceptance [48,68]. Procedural justice enhances trust and promotes the acceptance of projects.
This study not only thoroughly analyzed the linkages between the four components of procedural justice (behaviors and procedural regulations of governments and businesses) and the SLO in China’s cultural and societal context but also highlights the unique contribution of cultural and social settings in this process. Explicitly, unlike the early research by Moffat and Zhang, which could not fully capture these cultural dimensions, this study uncovers distinct differences in procedural justice linkages within the Chinese context, suggesting indispensable influences of these settings on the SLO mechanism [22].
Furthermore, corroborating the observations by Manetti et al. and Huijts et al. about significant regional cultural impacts on the SLO, this study provides fresh insights into how local expectations from government and businesses, cultural norms related to evaluations of procedural justice, and preferences for public participation shape the SLO in diverse societies [69,70,71]. These nuances underline the need for a more granular understanding of SLO processes across different cultural and societal landscapes.
The SEM and bootstrap test results indicated the significant impact of the four components of procedural justice on enhancing trust and increasing the acceptance of NIMBY facilities. These findings are consistent with Tyler’s theory on the contribution of procedural justice to trust-building and its effect on organizational efficiency [67]. They also support Folger and Konovsky’s findings on the positive impact of procedural justice on attitudes and behaviors [72]. The rationale is that procedural justice satisfies individuals’ needs for autonomy and respect by enhancing transparency and participation; thus, building trust leads to greater acceptance [43]. This relationship reveals the crucial role of procedural justice in the SLO and emphasizes the necessity of understanding these interactions against diverse cultural and societal backdrops.
The mediation analysis results further underscore the significant mediating role of public trust between procedural justice and acceptance. This mediation effect underscores community members’ heightened sensitivity to the integrity and accountability of the government and enterprises within diverse societal constructs, as demonstrated by Koehn [73]. It is particularly notable that, unlike open discussion and negotiation mechanisms prevalent in Western societies, the decision-making process in Chinese society often embodies unique top-down characteristics that can influence the means of establishing and sustaining trust, illuminating the multifaceted nature of SLO acquisition in different sociocultural constructs.

5.2. Policy Recommendations

The findings of this study suggest that maintaining and enhancing procedural justice is crucial for obtaining the SLO. The government can implement the following measures to strengthen the fairness of procedures:
(1)
Enhance Decision Transparency: Governments can ensure that every step of the decision-making process is understandable to the public by establishing and maintaining open and transparent communication channels. This transparency allows the public to access key information and participate in the decision cycle. As Bingham pointed out, high levels of transparency enhance public trust in policy formation and ensure fair public decision-making [74]. Ensuring that the motivations, evidence bases, expected impacts, and alternative options of policy proposals are easily accessible and understandable to the public is crucial for maintaining the government’s sense of responsibility and credibility. Transparency enables the government to consider and incorporate opinions from all societal segments, leading to broad consensus and improving the performance and efficacy of public policies. Furthermore, enhancing transparency helps to identify and resolve potential inequality, thereby advancing democratic governance.
(2)
Guarantee Public Participation: Public engagement must be part of decision-making to ensure that the interests of all parties are proportionately considered and democratic principles are used. Studies and practices have shown that public involvement is critical for increasing transparency, legitimacy, and public acceptance of policies. As Arnstein described in her seminal “Ladder of Citizen Participation” model, effective public participation involves multiple levels where the public has a substantial role in decision-making beyond being provided with information or consulted [75]. Fung emphasized the importance of collaborative participation in bringing diverse perspectives and innovative solutions to policy formulation [76]. An inclusive public participation mechanism allows stakeholders to evaluate and construct policy options, ensuring that the policies address universal issues and cater to the needs and challenges of specific social groups. Therefore, government agencies should prioritize strengthening and refining pathways and mechanisms for public involvement to achieve efficient and fair policymaking. This strategy involves ensuring easy access to government information, open and transparent communication, genuinely listening to citizen feedback, and accurately reflecting the feedback in policy decisions. Achieving these goals improves public satisfaction and endorsement of policies and creates a more representative and responsive political environment. As Mansbridge et al. stated, procedural justice in decision-making involves constructive debates among people with differing views to promote broader societal considerations [77].
(3)
Strengthen Dialogue and Feedback Mechanisms: The government can enhance dialogue and exchange with community members by increasing feedback channels, ensuring the public is educated on critical issues to implement effective policies. This approach ensures that different positions are earnestly considered, promoting more effective decision-making and policy implementation, which aligns with the perspective of Barry et al [78]. Fung also stressed the significant role of public participation and feedback in improving the quality of public decisions [76]. In summary, citizens’ acceptance of NIMBY projects is likely to increase significantly when they are part of decision-making, are properly informed, and can clearly see the environmental and economic benefits [79].
(4)
Increase the Fairness of Decision-Making: The government must apply justice and fairness in decision-making, including inclusiveness, ensuring equal participation opportunities for varied stakeholders, equality, and treating every individual and community fairly without bias. In this approach, policy decisions are based on empirical research and ethical principles. Increasing fairness in decisions is a continuous effort, requiring the government to maintain these principles throughout all stages of policy formulation. According to Fraser’s concept of “participatory justice”, transparent and accountable procedures must be the basis of decision-making [80]. Young stated that justice is not only related to resource distribution but also to the distribution of decision-making power, ensuring every voice has the opportunity to be heard [81]. Additionally, as Rawls tated in his “Theory of Justice”, fairness should be seen as the foundation of societal institutions, comprising a set of principles that ensure fairness in the basic structure of society [82]. Businesses should develop coherent and green growth strategies that improve long-term economic benefits and corporate social responsibility, leading to a SLO and contributing to the sustainable development of NIMBY facilities [83].
(5)
Construct a Multi-Stakeholder Participation Platform: Enterprises should develop and maintain a participatory platform that allows stakeholders, including local community members, government representatives, and non-governmental organizations, to partake in critical decision points throughout project planning and execution. This mechanism helps the enterprise to understand the various interest points and potential issues while establishing a sense of joint ownership and a collaborative atmosphere in project decisions [84].
(6)
Establish a Foundation for Legitimacy and Mutual Trust: Enterprises should establish public trust through integrity, effective communication, and feedback mechanisms. Building legitimacy is especially important—enterprises should demonstrate social responsibility and prove their honesty and willingness to listen to and address community needs and concerns [85].

6. Conclusions

A model linking the four components of procedural justice with the SLO was established. Findings from 544 survey questionnaires confirmed the significant impact of procedural justice in establishing public trust and enhancing project acceptance in the Chinese sociocultural context.
The main findings of this study are as follows. All four components of procedural justice—the formal procedures of the government, the procedural regulations of construction companies, and the behavior and attitudes of both entities—significantly improve public trust and the SLO. Public trust had a partial mediating role in the relationship between the components of procedural justice and the SLO. Governments and enterprises should optimize the SLO by improving decision transparency, engaging in public interactions, and safeguarding the interests of stakeholders. These findings provide an in-depth understanding of the role of procedural justice in managing NIMBY conflicts theoretically and empirical guidance for policymakers and practitioners in managing infrastructure projects. The results suggest that fair decision-making and active public participation increase the chances of obtaining the SLO to ensure the sustainable development of communities and businesses.
However, the limitations of this study should not be overlooked. Due to the limited sample size and the selection of research subjects, the results may not be generalizable. Furthermore, this study focused on the socio-cultural environment of China and did not include other regions and cultures. Also, the research was limited to certain types of NIMBY facilities and did not consider those that could lead to significant social controversy. Future studies should focus on the following directions: (1) Expand the sampling scope to cover more regions with varying socioeconomic backgrounds; (2) include a variety of NIMBY facilities to enhance the theoretical depth and applicability of the role of procedural justice; (3) conduct comparative studies at transnational and cross-cultural scales to assess the implementation and influencing factors of procedural justice in different societal and cultural contexts. These improvements will broaden our understanding of the role and mechanisms of procedural justice in promoting the social acceptance of NIMBY projects, providing a wider perspective and strategies for global societies facing similar challenges.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, D.F. and Y.G.; Software, D.F.; Validation, D.F. and Y.G.; Investigation, D.F.; Resources, D.F. and Y.G.; Data curation, D.F.; Writing—original draft, D.F.; Writing—review & editing, Y.L. and Y.G.; Project administration, Y.L. and Y.G.; Funding acquisition, Y.L. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) (Grant Nos. 72072165 and 72374182), Hangzhou Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (Grant No. M22JC105), Keyi College of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University Research Project (Grant No. KY2024007).

Data Availability Statement

Data are contained within the article.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Appendix A

Appendix A.1. Survey on the Social License to Operate for NIMBY Infrastructure Projects Questionnaire

The purpose of this questionnaire is to explore and validate the impact of procedural justice on obtaining social licenses to operate for Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) infrastructure projects. Such projects typically include facilities like nuclear power plants, waste treatment facilities, sewage treatment plants, and high-voltage substations. A social license to operate refers to an informal accreditation where operators meet societal demands and, consequently, gain public acceptance, support, and trust. It underscores the operator’s considerations for social responsibilities and societal benefits throughout business operations, aiming for a harmonious win-win relationship with the community.
Your response plays a vital role in the research of this subject. Please select the answer that you believe is correct based on your personal experience and understanding.
Be assured that none of the questions in this questionnaire will touch upon any confidential work-related or personal information. Your responses will be strictly reserved for academic purposes only and carry no right or wrong value. We guarantee strict confidentiality in correspondence with academic standards, and your information will under no circumstances be employed for commercial purposes. All answers will be coded, making it impossible to identify the respondent from any given response.
We thank you again for your support and cooperation.

Appendix A.2. Background Information

  • Your age group (        )
    ☐18–34                   ☐35–59             ☐60 and above
  • Your gender (        )
    ☐Male            ☐Female
  • Your level of education (        )
    ☐High school or below    ☐Associate/Bachelor's degree      ☐Graduate degree or above
  • Your monthly income (        )
    ☐Below 5000 Yuan    ☐5001–8000 Yuan    ☐8001–10,000 Yuan    ☐Above 10,001 Yuan
  • Your occupation (        )
    ☐Civil servant or public service employee   ☐Company staff   ☐Medical personnel
    ☐Student   ☐Service industry worker      ☐Laborer     ☐Farmer
    ☐Freelancer      ☐Other
Please note: In the subsequent questionnaire, the number 1 represents “Strongly Disagree”, 2 is for “Disagree”, 3 signifies “Neutral”, 4 indicates “Agree”, and 5 stands for “Strongly Agree”. Base your responses on your experience and personal feelings, and mark a “√” on the number you think is correct for each statement.
Measurement
NO.ItemsLevel of Agreement
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q1National laws and regulations ensure decisions are made fairly and justly12345
Q2National laws and regulations are consistently applied to different individuals and situations12345
Q3Adhering to national laws and regulations can ensure that decisions are based on facts, rather than personal biases and opinions.12345
Q4National laws and regulations are fair to everyone.12345
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q5The operator makes consistent decisions regardless of the different people or situations involved.12345
Q6The operator’s decision-making is based on facts, not their personal biases and viewpoints.12345
Q7The decisions made by the operator are fair to everyone.12345
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q8National laws and regulations ensure that I am treated fairly in decision-making processes.12345
Q9National laws and regulations ensure that I am treated fairly during the implementation of decisions.12345
Q10National laws and regulations allow for a fair and transparent explanation of the decisions made.12345
Q11When national laws and regulations are applied, my opinions are taken into consideration.12345
Q12National laws and regulations ensure that my needs are considered.12345
Q13I trust that government authorities will make the best decisions for me and the local residents.12345
Q14National laws and regulations respect my rights as a stakeholder.12345
Q15National laws and regulations respect my personal rights and those of the local residents.12345
Q16I feel respected by government departments.12345
Q17When making relevant decisions, government departments strictly adhere to laws and regulations and fulfill their commitments.12345
Q18When making relevant decisions, government departments care about the well-being of me and the local residents.12345
Q19When making relevant decisions, government departments are concerned with my satisfaction.12345
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q20During the decision-making process, the operator treats me and the local residents fairly.12345
Q21During the construction and implementation process, the operator treats me and the local residents fairly.12345
Q22When I express my views, the operator considers and listens to my opinions.12345
Q23The operator provides a fair and transparent explanation for the decisions made.12345
Q24During the decision-making process, the operator takes my viewpoints into consideration.12345
Q25During the decision-making process, the operator takes my needs into account.12345
Q26I trust that the operator will make the best decisions on my behalf.12345
Q27The operator respects my rights as an interested stakeholder.12345
Q28The operator respects the personal rights of myself and the local residents.12345
Q29The operator is committed to following through with the decisions and commitments made.12345
Q30During the decision-making process, the operator cares about the well-being of myself and the local residents.12345
Q31During the decision-making process, the operator is concerned with the satisfaction of myself and the local residents.12345
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q32I believe that the government and relevant operators will act in the best interest of society.12345
Q33I believe that the government and relevant operators will act responsibly.12345
Q34I believe that the government and relevant operators will do the right thing.12345
Regarding the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in your region, do you think:
Q35I am tolerant of the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in my area.12345
Q36I accept the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in my area.12345
Q37I am in favor of the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in my area12345
Q38I support the construction or operation of NIMBY facilities in my area.12345

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Figure 1. The Four Components Model of Procedural Justice.
Figure 1. The Four Components Model of Procedural Justice.
Buildings 14 02465 g001
Figure 2. Mechanism Model of the Four Components of Procedural Justice.
Figure 2. Mechanism Model of the Four Components of Procedural Justice.
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Figure 3. Structural Equation Modeling Results. PS: ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Figure 3. Structural Equation Modeling Results. PS: ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
Buildings 14 02465 g003
Table 1. Detailed Demographics of Survey Participants.
Table 1. Detailed Demographics of Survey Participants.
CategoryNumberPercentage (%)
GenderMale28051.5
Female26448.5
Age18–3411120.4
35–5932960.5
60+10419.1
EducationHigh school and below33261.0
Associate/Bachelor’s degree18834.6
Graduate degree or above244.4
Monthly IncomeBelow 5000 Yuan23142.5
5001–8000 Yuan17732.5
8001–10,000 Yuan9517.5
Above 10,001 Yuan417.5
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables.
DimensionsMeasure ItemFrequencyMSDSkewnessKurtosis
12345
FODQ1 (Fair and Just Decisions)762209203633.451.04−0.165−0.243
Q2 (Consistent Application of Laws)969195200613.341.108−0.186−0.39
Q3 (Fact-based Decision Making)660203224513.41.052−0.25−0.139
Q4 (Fairness to All)669188216663.211.232−0.221−0.364
IODQ5 (Consistent Decision-making)561203210652.941.075−0.157−0.315
Q6 (Fact-based, Unbiased Decisions)564204207642.841.062−0.142−0.345
Q7 (Universal Fairness in Decisions)265215187752.621.170.023−0.576
FOTQ8 (Fair Treatment in Decision-making)1029179239873.181.136−0.057−0.527
Q9 (Fairness in Decision Implementation)622154269933.131.14−0.246−0.322
Q10 (Transparent Explanation of Decisions)625166252953.061.094−0.185−0.461
Q11 (Inclusion of My Opinions)521177247932.71.151−0.105−0.513
Q12 (Consideration of My Needs)522171256892.751.179−0.148−0.434
Q13 (Trust in Authorities’ Decisions)4241782351033.081.133−0.102−0.607
Q14 (Respect for Stakeholder Rights)823177240953.111.109−0.122−0.547
Q15 (Respect for Personal and Local Rights)1430185223923.081.178−0.077−0.555
Q16 (Respect from Government Departments)10321722291013.131.112−0.149−0.563
Q17 (Adherence to Laws and Commitments)723184232983.371.031−0.078−0.604
Q18 (Well-being Consideration by Departments)1620181240862.921.0080.087−0.609
Q19 (Concern for My Satisfaction)722161255992.851.076−0.129−0.492
IOTQ20 (Fair Treatment in Decisions)150200237552.90.971−0.141−0.34
Q21 (Fairness in Construction and Implementation)147197244542.761−0.169−0.29
Q22 (Consideration of Opinions)338200253512.551.09−0.126−0.302
Q23 (Transparent Decision Explanations)127238229482.611.060.069−0.151
Q24 (Inclusion of Viewpoints)141220222602.491.052−0.01−0.328
Q25 (Attention to Needs)244211228592.471.096−0.028−0.444
Q26 (Trust in Best Decisions)164275189142.691.074−0.046−0.228
Q27 (Respect for Stakeholder Rights)27427718282.71.062−0.151−0.293
Q28 (Respect for Personal and Local Rights)278268179172.721.107−0.047−0.265
Q29 (Commitment to Decisions and Promises)267292166172.871.0740.0560.012
Q30 (Care for Well-being in Decisions)171271189122.561.078−0.098−0.344
Q31 (Concern for Satisfaction in Decisions)168276188102.561.148−0.102−0.313
TRQ32 (Belief in Society’s Best Interest)1341782171133.331.052−0.155−0.611
Q33 (Belief in Responsible Actions)331178248843.191.111−0.14−0.458
Q34 (Belief in Doing the Right Thing)328171247963.151.095−0.279−0.118
ACQ35 (Tolerance of NIMBY Facilities)3271312381443.551.241−0.378−0.528
Q36 (Acceptance of NIMBY Facilities)8108251126503.061.367−0.340.164
Q37 (Favorability towards NIMBY Facilities)1770180192852.451.348−0.851−0.321
Q38 (Support for NIMBY Facilities)3356183208642.191.2980.3781.727
Table 3. Model Fit Test (N = 544).
Table 3. Model Fit Test (N = 544).
Fit IndexRecommended ValueTest Value
Chi-square 1259.937
d.f. 656
P>0.050.000 a
Chi-square/d.f.<3.01.921 a
RMR<0.050.139 b
RMSEA<0.050.041 a
GFI>0.90.884 b
AGFI>0.80.869 a
CFI>0.90.948 a
NFI>0.80.897 a
TLI>0.90.944 a
PS: a indicates that the test value meets the recommended value, b indicates that the test value does not meet the recommended value.
Table 4. Discriminant Validity Measures for Latent Variables (Covariance Matrix).
Table 4. Discriminant Validity Measures for Latent Variables (Covariance Matrix).
FODIODFOTIOTTRAC
FOD1
IOD0.657 **1
FOT0.739 **0.703 **1
IOT0.592 **0.770 **0.789 **1
TR0.577 **0.689 **0.777 **0.762 **1
AC0.579 **0.693 **0.783 **0.802 **0.768 **1
PS: ** indicates a significant correlation at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Table 5. Results of bootstrap mediation effect test.
Table 5. Results of bootstrap mediation effect test.
Mediation PathEffect ValueSEBias-Corrected 95%CI
LowerUpperp
FOT→TR→AC0.0620.0230.0260.1180.001
FOD→TR→AC0.0550.0190.0220.0960.001
IOD→TR→AC0.0380.0170.0120.0800.002
IOT→TR→AC0.1050.0280.0550.1680.001
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Feng, D.; Liu, Y.; Ge, Y. Social License to Operate for NIMBY Infrastructures: The Mechanism of the Four Components of Procedural Justice. Buildings 2024, 14, 2465. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14082465

AMA Style

Feng D, Liu Y, Ge Y. Social License to Operate for NIMBY Infrastructures: The Mechanism of the Four Components of Procedural Justice. Buildings. 2024; 14(8):2465. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14082465

Chicago/Turabian Style

Feng, Diyang, Yong Liu, and Yujia Ge. 2024. "Social License to Operate for NIMBY Infrastructures: The Mechanism of the Four Components of Procedural Justice" Buildings 14, no. 8: 2465. https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings14082465

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