Honneth’s Theory of Recognition and Material Poverty

Abstract

This paper explores the intersection of poverty and recognition theory, grounded in Axel Honneth’s framework, to offer a novel perspective on poverty as a multifaceted social phenomenon. It argues that poverty should be understood not only as a lack of material resources but also as a significant deficit in social recognition, encompassing respect and social esteem. By situating poverty within the institutionalized order of recognition, the paper highlights how poverty both stems from and contributes to a lack of recognition, leading to social exclusion, shame, and stigmatization. The theoretical approach is complemented by selected empirical studies that illustrate the lived experiences of poverty, emphasizing the emotional and psychological impacts that extend beyond material deprivation. While the paper advances the theoretical understanding of poverty, it also identifies gaps in the current research, particularly the need for more empirical studies to substantiate these claims. Future research could expand upon these insights through cross-cultural studies and empirical investigations that further explore the connection between recognition and poverty. This work lays the groundwork for a deeper exploration of poverty as a social phenomenon that transcends economic metrics, advocating for a more holistic approach to poverty research.

1. Introduction

It is the task and aim of poverty research both to clarify the concept of poverty, to operationalize and measure it, and to uncover the causes and effects of poverty (Wisor 2012; Spicker 2007; Kakwani and Silber 2008). In this paper, however, the focus is not on empirical poverty research, nor on the question of how poverty should be appropriately defined and conceptualized, but on questions about the meaning, causes, and effects of poverty and the attempt to grasp these by means of a social theory, namely the theory of recognition. This follows Nicholas H. Smith’s (2012) articulation of a recognition–theoretical research paradigm for the social sciences, rooted in Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. Smith likens recognition theory to Imre Lakatos’s concept of a scientific research program. This model comprises a “hard core” of foundational assumptions and a “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses that can be tested and expanded. The hard core of recognition theory includes key assumptions about the nature of social conflicts, the importance of recognition for individual psychological integrity, and the moral dimensions of recognition and misrecognition. The methodology proposed involves using these core assumptions to generate auxiliary hypotheses that can be empirically tested and adapted to various social phenomena. This approach ensures that the research remains progressive and capable of yielding novel insights, maintaining coherence despite anomalies or counterexamples. Smith emphasizes the distinction between this approach and other social science methodologies. Unlike natural sciences, where predictive power is paramount, the social sciences prioritize understanding meanings and advancing human freedom. The recognition–theoretical paradigm focuses on the subjective experiences of disrespect and the social struggles these engender, aligning closely with the lived realities of individuals. Such immanent critique ensures that the solutions proposed are grounded in the experiences and self-understandings of those involved in social struggles (Stahl 2017). Benno Herzog (2014) describes such immanent critique as a method of critique in social research that arises from within the existing social norms and practices of a society. Rather than applying external standards, immanent critique utilizes the contradictions and tensions within a society’s own values, norms, and practices to challenge and potentially transform that society. Herzog emphasizes that immanent critique serves both as a normative position and a methodological approach. It leverages the existing, often implicit, norms within a society to expose contradictions and areas where reality does not align with the society’s professed ideals. This form of critique does not aim to impose new values but to reveal and activate the transformative potential within the society’s own normative framework.

In recent decades, recognition theory has been taken up many times in social research in order to investigate various social phenomena and fields. In Germany, the sociology of work and industry should be mentioned here in particular with the work of Stephan Voswinkel and others (Voswinkel 2012a, 2012b). For Voswinkel, the relationship between “recognition” and “interest” is a central theme in the sociology of work. He contends that recognition and interest are often intertwined, both playing crucial roles in shaping labor relations. Recognition, in Voswinkel’s view, is not merely a reward for work completed but also a necessary condition that enables individuals to pursue their interests. While interest focuses on the pragmatic, goal-oriented aspects of action, recognition involves the social appreciation that accompanies these actions. Voswinkel highlights that recognition and interest can sometimes come into conflict. For instance, pursuing a particular interest might lead to a violation in the need for recognition, especially if the actions are perceived as selfish or opportunistic. Conversely, the pursuit of recognition might require individuals to forgo certain interests, particularly when they tailor their actions to gain social approval, even if it does not align with their material or professional goals.

For poverty research, however, the theory of recognition has so far only been used fruitfully in isolated cases—for example, Heiner Schoneville (2023) recently presented an empirical study and critique of food banks from the perspective of recognition theory—and a systematic analysis of the relationship between poverty and recognition (from this perspective) is still pending. The few contributions on the relationship between poverty and recognition come from normative social philosophy. Monica Mookherjee (2023) and Gottfried Schweiger (2013, 2014, 2020b, 2021a) should be mentioned here. While Mookherjee focuses on global poverty and aims to show that recognition beyond the liberal paradigm is suitable for conceptualizing global justice, Schweiger is concerned with the application of recognition to gain a better understanding of poverty as a form of disrespect. Despite these contributions from social philosophy, there is a lack of explicitly social scientific and social theoretical foundation on the relationship between poverty and recognition and its connection to empirical research. This paper aims to fill this gap with an attempt to social-theoretically clarify the relationship between recognition and poverty. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to provide initial insights and to further specify the theoretical framework.

Although this paper is of a social–theoretical nature, it is useful to say a few words about the methodology. This paper is not a systematic review in the sense of evaluating existing studies, but rather the explication of a theoretical framework, which is made plausible using a few selected examples from empirical poverty research. The method of critical theory is used to analyze the relationship between recognition and poverty. The basis of this analysis is Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, developed within the framework of social philosophy and widely applied to the investigation of social phenomena such as inequality, migration, or work (O’Neill and Smith 2012; Harris 2021; Schweiger 2021b, 2021c). This theory is systematically utilized to examine the hypotheses that poverty can be understood as a lack of recognition and that poverty leads to a lack of recognition. The methodological approach involves a theoretical engagement with the central concepts of recognition as formulated by Honneth: love, respect, and social esteem. These concepts are employed to elucidate the structural conditions under which recognition occurs in modern societies and how these conditions are affected by poverty.

The selection of literature and empirical studies is related to the topics of recognition and poverty. Both foundational theoretical works by Honneth and current empirical studies were considered. The selection criteria included the relevance of the sources for examining the interactions between poverty and recognition as well as the quality of the empirical studies. The focus of this paper is on the analysis of qualitative literature and studies that reflect the experiences of people living in poverty, thereby providing access to the experience of recognition and non-recognition. Quantitative studies on the prevalence of poverty were excluded due to space constraints, as were studies that delve into the systematic and structural causes of poverty. These will need to be addressed in further research.

In summary, the methodology of this paper relies on the theoretical analysis and interpretation of social theories, particularly the theory of recognition, supported by a careful selection of relevant literature and empirical studies. This approach aims to understand the complex interactions between poverty and recognition and to provide new perspectives for future empirical research.

2. On the Theory of Recognition

The theory of recognition was largely developed by Axel Honneth in social philosophy, certainly with a view to social research, but primarily as a normative social theory. However, the most important sources in the early elaboration were not sociology, but social psychology (including George H. Mead and Donald Winnicot) and the early Hegel from the Jena period. However, social research became increasingly important for his theorizing and its application to social phenomena, and in Freedom’s Right (Honneth 2014) Honneth therefore no longer primarily analyzes intersubjective forms of recognition (love, respect, social esteem), but rather the social spheres (family and couple relationships, law, and gainful employment) in which they are formed, realized, become conflictual, and change.

Honneth’s theory, which he has changed and developed in some respects in the decades since its original formulation in the early 1990s, should and can only be summarized here in a few key points. Honneth’s theory is presented here in a very condensed form and the current much differentiated (philosophical as well as social science) discussion of his work cannot be pursued either. I am essentially following the version in Struggle for Recognition (Honneth 1996) but also include some later modifications, for example, in his debate with Fraser (Fraser and Honneth 2003).

Firstly, Honneth is concerned with showing what people need in order to understand themselves as free, equal, and authentic human beings and thus be able to live together in society. He summarizes these conditions under the concept of recognition, whereby three forms can be distinguished, namely, recognition as a unique human being (which he calls love), recognition as a free and rational human being (which he calls respect), and recognition as a special person with talents and achievements (which he calls social esteem). Secondly, Honneth assumes that people need, seek, and demand such recognition (in these three forms) and that they not only do this individually, but also join together and make collective demands. Thirdly, recognition cannot be reduced to an interpersonal event, but is institutionalized in societies, both in social norms and practices as well as in law—this is where the aforementioned collective demands for recognition play a role. Institutionalization here means that the form in which and for what people demand and receive these three forms of recognition is formed at a societal level. This institutionalization is both stable and open to change through struggles for recognition. Fourthly, Honneth finally assigns the three forms of recognition to social institutions or fields in which they are decisive. For love, these are the couple relationship, family, and friendships; for respect, these are the public sphere, politics, and law; and for social esteem, these are the markets and the economy, especially gainful employment.

Honneth’s view is that of social philosophy, so he is not only concerned with the theoretical understanding of (modern) society and its development, but also with developing a standard of ethical social criticism. Recognition is not a mere social fact, but is normatively charged, i.e., it is morally valuable and a society in which people cannot experience love, respect, and social esteem is unjust for him. This socio-philosophical criticism will not be pursued further here. Normative social criticism and social research are (and always have been) mutually compatible (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005). This is supported by Gerard Delanty’s (2011) examination of critique in sociological theory, focusing particularly on Axel Honneth’s recognition theory and its methodological implications. His framework for social critical research consists of four key elements: diagnostic analysis, reconstructive critique, explanatory critique, and disclosing critique. Diagnostic analysis involves identifying social problems and crises that indicate a lack of recognition. Reconstructive critique focuses on understanding how social actors interpret and respond to recognition and misrecognition. Explanatory critique investigates the structural and institutional mechanisms that produce social pathologies and hinder recognition. Disclosing critique aims to reveal new possibilities for social change and transformation through enhanced recognition practices. These varieties of critique are important for an approach to poverty research based within Honneth’s theoretical framework of recognition.

If Honneth is right and society is indeed (also) an institutionalized order of recognition in which love, respect, and social esteem are of central importance, then it stands to reason that poverty as a social phenomenon can also be analyzed—and subsequently empirically researched—with the help of this theory.

3. Poverty as a Lack of Recognition

The first connection postulated in this paper between poverty and recognition is that poverty is a lack of recognition. What does this mean in concrete terms? Let us first briefly explain the underlying understanding of poverty.

Poverty is a lack of important material goods. In welfare states, this is usually operationalized and measured with a relative concept of poverty as income poverty in relation to median income (Nolan and Whelan 2011). Poverty is most often measured by income because all modern societies are “money societies”—Christoph Deutschmann (2001, 2009) coined this term to mean money as a universal means of inclusion, which is why moneylessness is also the most important mode of social exclusion—societies in which almost everything that people need to live and participate in society is not produced by them, but is bought and in which people spend their income on it. To measure poverty as a lack of money, a threshold is needed. In the EU, this threshold is set at 60% of the median income. Therefore, anyone with less than this amount is considered poor (or, as the EU terms it: at-risk-of-poverty). The threshold value of 60% of the median income can justifiably be described as arbitrary (50% or 70% could also be argued); in any case, it is intended to express the fact that people who are at risk of poverty have less than most other people living in their country. The fact that the EU uses the term “at-risk-of-poverty” rather than “poverty” makes sense: monthly income does correlate with the standard of living, but not always. Two people whose income is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold can have a very different standard of living, e.g., if one has to pay rent while the other has inherited a house or if one has large cash assets while the other is destitute. This is why the statistics on poverty and social living conditions in the EU are also supplemented by the concept of material deprivation, whereby it is not income that counts here, but the question of affordability of important goods and services that are part of a normal standard of living (e.g., a washing machine, rent, or a cell phone). There is a strong correlation between a low income and material deprivation, but, as written, there are also exceptions. It would also be conceivable that people who only have an income below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold could be provided free of charge by the state with all the important goods and services that constitute material deprivation. This would not reduce the risk of poverty as recorded by the EU, but it would certainly reduce what can plausibly be called poverty. This does not mean that there cannot be other social problems, such as the stigma of not being able to afford a washing machine or a vacation on their own, but having these things provided by the state. Especially from the perspective of the theory of recognition, it is plausible to assume that the provision of goods and services is not unproblematic in the absence of income, because people nevertheless remain excluded from an important sphere of recognition, namely gainful employment. The fact that work and labor also have important latent functions in addition to earning money was already a finding of the Marienthal Study (Jahoda et al. 1972; Paul and Batinic 2009).

For the purposes of this paper, the focus here is on this material understanding of poverty, i.e., essentially a lack of income that is so severe that the goods that form part of a normal standard of living and sufficient social participation can no longer be afforded. Poverty is thus defined as a lack that is associated with falling below a threshold and therefore does not coincide with (social) inequality. Being poor does not (only) mean having less than others, but having too little. This is based on the now classic understanding of poverty that Peter Townsend (1979) developed for the UK in the 1970s and which became decisive for poverty measurement in the EU and all member states, as well as for the expansion of poverty to include the concept of social exclusion (Nolan and Whelan 2011):

“Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the type of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or are at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong. Their resources are so seriously below those commanded by the average individual or family that they are, in effect, excluded from ordinary living patterns, customs and activities”.

(Townsend 1979, p. 31)

Based on this understanding, how can poverty be understood as a lack of recognition? That would mean that poverty is a lack of love, respect, or social esteem, which does not seem very plausible at first glance. It is precisely such an understanding, at least with regard to respect and social esteem, which is now to be plausibilized.

Respect is the form of recognition that refers to people as free, equal, and rational. Honneth and others understand the institutionalization of respect in modern societies to mean the overcoming of feudal hierarchies by the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a democratic and liberal political order. This idea is of course much older than Honneth’s theory of recognition and can already be found in Rousseau and Kant, among others. What Honneth has introduced into the debate is that the implementation of this idea is to be understood as a struggle for recognition and that its realization in a society is based on the institutionalization of recognition. In a democracy, the idea is that everyone is equal—everyone should have the same rights and treat each other as equal, free, and reasonable citizens. The material standard of living plays a dual role here. On the one hand, it can be seen as the basis for this respect—without a sufficient material standard of living, citizens cannot recognize themselves and each other as free, equal, and reasonable—on the other hand, the juridification of respect—which was initially aimed at liberal civil rights—pushes for the establishment of social rights that ensure this material basis of respect. The formation of the welfare state is understood as the result of struggles for recognition (Honneth 1996; Lessenich 2007).

Insofar as material poverty can still be found in the welfare state, this can be understood as a lack of recognition. The issue here is therefore not that people in poverty are not respected enough or not respected at all by other people in interpersonal relationships (more on this in the next section), but instead it is a social and political relationship.

Honneth (1996) contrasts the (positive) forms of recognition with negative forms of misrecognition and disregard; respect with disenfranchisement and social esteem with degradation. Stephan Voswinkel (2001) has extended this duality in his study on recognition in gainful employment and industrial relations and emphasizes that “neutral” and passive non-recognition is also relevant, while Honneth refers to active forms of disregard by disenfranchisement and degradation. This opens the way to asking three social–theoretical—and therefore empirically researchable—questions about the connection between poverty and recognition, which unfortunately cannot be answered here for reasons of space. Firstly, the clarification of whether poverty as a lack of social rights follows the logic of active disenfranchisement or that of passive non-recognition, i.e., also what (social and political) function this lack of recognition has. The disenfranchisement rather indicates that it is about power, control, and deliberate exclusion; the passive non-recognition rather indicates a forgetting of this group’s claims to recognition and a lack of lobbying.

Secondly—closely related to this—the question of why material poverty is accepted in view of the potent possibilities to alleviate it through social policy and why it is also widely accepted by the population. Thirdly, the question of whether social rights are primarily an expression of social esteem and not, as Honneth’s system suggests, of respect. Social esteem is linked to performance and performance evaluation and is therefore also central to gainful employment. It does not seem implausible that material poverty is therefore insufficiently prevented by social policy because (in this area at least) social policy—and the relationship of the majority society to citizens at the lower margins—is not institutionalized as egalitarian respect, but in the mode of performance evaluation. This certainly seems to tie in with debates about some neoliberal changes to social policy (Peters 2012; Lessenich 2009). Neoliberalism, according to Guy Feldman (2019), is not merely a continuation of classical liberal economic policies but a distinct and pervasive political–economic doctrine that extends market logic into almost every aspect of human life. This doctrine reconfigures government, non-profits, and individuals as economic actors driven by competition and market efficiency. One of the central impacts of neoliberalism is for Feldman the restructuring of the welfare state. Neoliberal policies have shifted welfare from income redistribution and social protection to facilitating market participation, often at the expense of the most vulnerable populations. This shift has led to a rise in economic insecurity and inequality, with policies increasingly favoring the interests of capital over the needs of the poor. Feldman also shows how neoliberalism promotes the idea of the “entrepreneurial subject”, wherein individuals, particularly the poor, are expected to adopt entrepreneurial behaviors as a solution to their poverty. This expectation overlooks the systemic barriers that prevent true economic mobility and instead blames the poor for their circumstances.

A critical application of Honneth’s theory for a sociological critique of neoliberalism was done by Pauline Johnson (2014). She highlights that neoliberalism has entrenched itself by commodifying various social aspects and bringing market logic into areas where it previously did not exist. This has created a scenario where the traditional critiques of capitalism seem less effective, as neoliberalism co-opts and resignifies critical impulses, including those from movements that initially opposed capitalist values. For Johnson, Honneth critiques neoliberalism for its strategy of appropriating and resignifying cultural ideals, making it difficult for traditional forms of social critique to be effective (Honneth 2004; Hartmann and Honneth 2006). He suggests that critical theory should focus on diagnosing the distortions in social reality caused by neoliberalism, particularly how it erodes “normative surpluses”—the societal conditions that allow for the pursuit of emancipatory goals. As neoliberalism undermines these conditions, it becomes increasingly challenging for critique to find a foothold. However, Johnson points out that Honneth’s reliance on a somewhat optimistic view of history and communication might be insufficient in the face of neoliberalism’s pervasive influence. As neoliberalism neutralizes the conditions necessary for effective social critique, the link between sociology and critical theory becomes increasingly strained, leading to potential weaknesses in Honneth’s framework.

This brings us to the connection between recognition in the form of social esteem and poverty. Social esteem is the form of recognition that dominates in the sphere of gainful employment and the market-driven public sphere. The basic idea here, which is also supported by research in the sociology of work, is that people demand and receive social appreciation for their achievements in gainful employment (and that this is also central to their identity and self-image). Social esteem thus materializes essentially as earned income. Here, too, the monetary society plays a key role. This reduction in earned income is, of course, very simplistic. Social esteem (in gainful employment) can also manifest itself in social prestige, power over others, leisure time, control over one’s own work, a larger office, and in many other material and symbolic forms. Upheavals in recent years, where income, especially for people with good earnings, has lost value compared to leisure time, work–life balance, or self-realization, should be mentioned here. All of these things can also become the subject of (individual and collective) demands and struggles for recognition. Nevertheless, it should be noted here that this shows that the accusation (and the core of the debate between Honneth and Nancy Fraser (Fraser and Honneth 2003)) that recognition theory is idealistic and cannot grasp material conditions is unjustified. Honneth may have focused on the interpersonal constitution of the subject, especially in the first works, coming from psychology and (Hegelian) anthropology, but this does not exhaust its potential as a social theory.

Here too, it is difficult to make the connection to material poverty. Material poverty, which by definition represents a lack of income, is then a lack of recognition, insofar as income is a central and socially institutionalized form of recognition. According to this paradigm of the “achievement principle”, people who live in material poverty do not show any performance worthy of recognition. Of course, this does not say anything about the moral legitimacy of such a recognition system, although recognition theory can immediately move from social theory to social criticism in order to work out that this lack of recognition is unjust because it is the result of selective, distorted, and unfair performance assessment via markets. This criticism will not be pursued further here, partly for reasons of space.

This is expressed either in the fact that they are unable to find gainful employment or that they receive so little income for their gainful employment that they remain materially poor. Material poverty as a lack of social esteem is thus closely linked to exclusion from the labor market (unemployment) and changes in the labor market that can be described as precarization (Millar 2017; Deranty 2008; Castel and Dörre 2009). Robert Castel (2016) identified three critical areas of change, which are relevant here and also rely on the change in the recognition order and the institutionalization of recognition in modern societies and how this in turn affects poverty: labor market deregulations, the reconfiguration of protective measures, and the emergence of paths of disaffiliation. Firstly, Castel highlights how labor market deregulations have led to the erosion of job security and the rise of precarious employment. This shift has dismantled the stable employment conditions that once provided workers with long-term contracts and social protections, replacing them with insecure, short-term jobs. As a result, a new social class, which Castel terms the “precariat”, has emerged, characterized by chronic job insecurity and a lack of traditional labor protections. Secondly, Castel discusses the reconfiguration of protective measures in response to these labor market changes. The traditional welfare systems, which were built on the foundation of stable employment, are now struggling to adapt to the realities of widespread unemployment and casualized work. New welfare measures, such as minimum income programs, have been introduced, but they are often conditional and insufficient, leading to social stigmatization for those who rely on them. Lastly, Castel examines the paths of disaffiliation, where individuals who are unable to secure stable employment or adequate social protections find themselves marginalized and socially invalidated. These “individuals by default”, as Castel calls them, struggle to achieve autonomy and maintain a stable social identity in a society that increasingly values self-reliance and individual responsibility.

The question that arises here again is whether this lack of recognition is to be understood as active exclusion or passive non-recognition. Ultimately, however, it is about the moral economy of the labor market and the idea of a meritocratic society as such (McNamee and Miller 2009). This reveals a tension between Honneth’s social philosophy and the ideal of meritocracy and the principle of justice through achievement (Schmidt am Busch 2010), and the actual social, political, and economic reality where unequal opportunities and unequal access to work and resources exist, often mistakenly justified by merit. Poverty can then appear just if people achieve less. However, this is not the case, as most poor people have no chance to realize their potential, and structural inequalities exist (e.g., in education, training, pay, and the labor market). Therefore, it is necessary to develop a critical perspective on meritocracy. As Jo Littler (2013) has argued, meritocracy, which is commonly understood as a system where talent and effort lead to success, has been manipulated to justify and perpetuate social and economic inequalities. Littler traces the historical evolution of the term “meritocracy”, noting its origins in the 1950s as a satirical critique of social stratification, and how it has since been embraced by neoliberal thinkers and politicians as a positive goal. Littler concludes that meritocracy, as it is currently deployed, serves to marketize the concept of equality and obscure the persistence of inherited privilege and lack of social mobility.

This means that material poverty is the result of a labor market in which there is neither room for everyone nor in which everyone is sufficiently remunerated to avoid poverty, and that this collides with the high valuation of gainful employment, its functions as a central inclusion mechanism of modern societies and as a source of identity and self-worth. This is also linked to debates on decommodification (Esping-Andersen 1990), including the devaluation of the manifest function of gainful employment as a source of income, culminating in the idea of an unconditional and sufficiently high basic income. One theoretical and empirical finding, which supports the function of employment for recognition and status, is the work of Marie Jahoda. Karsten I. Paul and Bernad Batinic’s (2009) findings strongly support Jahoda’s model for four of the five latent functions. While unemployed individuals reported significantly lower status compared to all other groups, there was no significant difference in perceived status between employed individuals and those out of the labor force. This indicates that the experience of low status is specifically pronounced among the unemployed, highlighting a unique disadvantage tied to the lack of employment. This study reinforces the importance of employment beyond mere financial benefits, highlighting its critical role in fulfilling fundamental human needs and supporting mental health.

Here too, as with the lack of social rights—i.e., truly poverty-preventing social benefits—we can ask about the functions and reasons for this institutionalization, as well as its effects. This could then be differentiated in terms of various exclusion and devaluation phenomena associated with material poverty. These include the low social esteem for “female” forms of gainful employment (“women’s professions”), for care and reproductive work (especially that which takes place outside the labor market), or for “dirty” and “hard” work. Wimbauer and Motakef (2020) rightly criticize the focus on gainful employment as androcentic and devaluing other forms of work, especially care work. For this reason, too, they argue for an extension of the threefold division of recognition to include other forms or spheres. This criticism is also shared by Julia Connolly from the perspective of feminist political economy (Connolly 2016). Connolly argues that while Honneth’s theories are valuable, they fall short in addressing certain structural injustices, particularly those illuminated by feminist political economy. The article critiques Honneth’s “recognition monism”, which prioritizes struggles for recognition over other forms of social justice, such as redistribution. Connolly aligns with feminist critiques that point out the limitations of Honneth’s framework in addressing issues like gendered divisions of labor and the recognition of non-commodified work, such as domestic labor. Connolly concludes that integrating feminist insights requires revising Honneth’s account of social rationalization in modernity. She argues for a more nuanced understanding of how recognition, work, and justice intersect, suggesting that Honneth’s categories of love, rights, and solidarity are too rigid and do not fully capture the complexities of contemporary social struggles, particularly those related to gender.

From the perspective of the theory of recognition, material poverty must therefore be classified in the specific way in which recognition is institutionalized in modern societies and the forms in which it materializes. The lack of income, which is essential for material poverty, cannot be adequately understood without this theoretical background.

4. Lack of Recognition in Poverty

Now to the second connection between recognition and poverty postulated at the beginning, namely that poverty leads to a lack of recognition. This can also be summarized as follows: people who live in poverty experience their situation as a lack of recognition. It could appear that this is nothing other than what was explained above in the section, and there is indeed an overlap here. It is plausible to assume that poverty as a lack of recognition—essentially as an expression of a lack of respect (in the form of welfare state protection) and a lack of social esteem (in the form of poverty-avoiding gainful employment)—is also experienced as such a lack by people affected by poverty. However, the second connection between poverty and recognition postulated here goes beyond this. It means that specific lacks of recognition occur in the situation of poverty. It has long been known in poverty research and has been proven many times that the poverty situation is not only a lack of income and other material goods, but also has serious effects on the mental and physical health, identity, self-image, and social relationships of those affected. Shame and stigmatization are two central concepts here, which can be understood as (negative) counterparts to (positive) recognition. The aforementioned counterpart to social esteem, degradation, is particularly relevant here. It is also important to note that disenfranchisement, as well as passive non-recognition, that is, the mere absence of rights or social esteem, can be experienced as shameful and stigmatizing. Evidence can be found in some qualitative studies (Dobson and Knezevic 2017; Reutter et al. 2009; Purdam et al. 2016). Simon Pemberton and colleagues (Pemberton et al. 2016) examined how austerity policies in the UK have reinforced stigmatizing narratives around poverty, framing it as a result of personal failure rather than structural factors. Their research draws on testimonies from 62 people in England and Scotland who experience poverty. It reveals that the dominant societal narrative often portrays poverty as a consequence of laziness, poor choices, or a lack of effort, leading to widespread stigma. This stigma is deeply internalized by some, who come to view their situations as personal failures. However, many participants resist these explanations, instead attributing their circumstances to external factors like unemployment, illness, or economic recession. Pemberton and colleagues highlight the damaging effects of stigma on individuals’ self-worth, noting that many participants felt judged and devalued by society, particularly through media portrayals and political rhetoric that emphasize a dichotomy between “workers” and “shirkers”. This stigmatization not only affects how they are treated by others but also how they view themselves, often leading to feelings of shame and low self-esteem.

Robert Walker (2019; Walker et al. 2013) has gone so far as to argue that shame should be understood as a universal, essential, and constitutive dimension of poverty. Without shame, in his view, there is no poverty and what constitutes poverty is that it is shameful. He writes about this in a study on the international comparison of the experience of shame through poverty:

“Though socially and culturally nuanced, shame was found to be associated with poverty in each location, variably leading to pretence, withdrawal, self-loathing, ‘othering’, despair, depression, thoughts of suicide and generally to reductions in personal efficacy. While internally felt, poverty-related shame was equally imposed by the attitudes and behavior of those not in poverty, framed by public discourse and influenced by the objectives and implementation of anti-poverty policy. The evidence appears to confirm the negative consequences of shame, implicates it as a factor in increasing the persistence of poverty and suggests important implications for the framing, design and delivery of anti-poverty policies” (Walker et al. 2013, p. 215).

This is also supported by a study by Yongmie Nicola Jo (2013), which emphasizes the necessity of recognizing shame as a critical aspect of poverty and how this emotion negatively affects the lives of those experiencing it. Shame is portrayed not only as a personal feeling but also as socially constructed, and cultural and policy institutions contribute to the generation and maintenance of shame, undermining efforts to alleviate poverty and enhance social inclusion. The negative effects extend to psychological well-being and group identity, potentially causing individuals to avoid public services that could benefit them, and in extreme cases, leading to conflict. In conclusion, the persistent shaming of people living in poverty through media-fueled dominant discourses, political rhetoric, and institutional paternalism exacerbates their marginalization rather than promoting a sense of agency. For social policies to be effective in drawing marginalized individuals into economic security and acceptable social standing, they must engage with the notion of shame and its potential to perpetuate social distance and exclusion.

This is the link to the theory of recognition, which is also a theory about the social conditions of the (modern) constitution of the subject. The threat to this constitution, i.e., the possibility of understanding oneself as a free, equal, rational person and interacting with others in this way, posed by the poverty situation can be linked to the theory of recognition. Shame and stigmatization are two central concepts here, which can be understood as (negative) counterparts to (positive) recognition. The aforementioned counterpart to social esteem, degradation, lends itself to this. However, it is also relevant here that disenfranchisement as well as passive non-recognition, i.e., the mere lack of rights or social esteem, are (or can be) experienced as shameful and stigmatizing.

However, the observation that poverty is experienced as a lack of recognition, i.e., that those affected experience it in this way, does not exhaust the potential of recognition theory. In this respect, it would not yet offer any great added value to poverty research, as shaming, stigmatization, othering, degradation, and similar concepts are already established and poverty is known as their social cause, which basically confirms the plausibility of the basic assumptions of the theory of recognition. Nevertheless, there are some arguments in favor of making the theory of recognition the starting point for researching the experience and processing of poverty and, among other things, investigating the question of whether those affected also experience and articulate a lack of other forms of recognition (love and respect) in addition to the lack of appreciation and how the lack of social appreciation (e.g., from society, politics, the media, social services, etc.) affects other areas of life (e.g., the family) and forms of recognition (e.g., love and care). The study by Wimbauer and Motakef (2020) essentially takes this research direction, not for poverty but for precarization. They have shown, among other things, that and how those affected try to compensate for a lack of recognition in one sphere (gainful employment) in another sphere (couple relationship) (and that this compensation cannot satisfy them), and how the demands for recognition in different spheres are related.

The form of recognition of love, which was omitted in the previous section, also becomes relevant here. There is a reason for this. While the above section was about locating material poverty in the institutionalized order of recognition, this section addresses the consequences of material poverty, how people affected by poverty experience their situation—and what poverty-related experiences they have in different contexts and how this is reflected in their lives. The lack of social esteem can affect the ability to experience love. Be it because it changes the relationship dynamics (e.g., how is the partner seen), because it changes the self-image (e.g., how can one give and receive love), or because it changes the material conditions of love (e.g., what position in the relationship market can someone who is materially poor occupy; is there room for privacy or funds for what Eva Illouz (1997) calls the consumption of romance). This indicates diffusion: Lack of one form of recognition can negatively affect the experience of the other, or, to put it another way: the spheres of recognition of private life, gainful employment, and law influence each other. This is not a new insight, but the theory of recognition can also provide a plausible theoretical basis for understanding these interactions. Based on the discussion about the dissolution of boundaries between work and life, it can also be asked whether there is a blurring of boundaries between spheres and forms of recognition.

It is important to emphasize once again that this is not only about recognition as an interpersonal relationship, but also about its materialization. To emphasize it again: material poverty is a lack of recognition not only (or mainly) because, in addition to the lack of money, the people affected are degraded (shamed and stigmatized) (by other people, the media, politics, at the social welfare office, at the food bank, etc.), but the lack of money in and of itself is an expression of this lack, because in modern monetary societies and welfare states, social esteem and social rights are essentially materialized in money. This is why the provision of benefits in kind is not always a good way out, but can confirm the experience of poverty and the lack of recognition. To give just two examples from empirical research on food banks:

Schoneville (2023) central thesis posits that food banks, while offering necessary support to those in need, simultaneously expose users to experiences that challenge their self-worth and dignity. This dual reality underscores the complex social dynamics where integration and exclusion coexist. His research reflects on poverty and social exclusion as inherent societal conditions, not as isolated experiences outside the social fabric. It argues that people affected by exclusion are still part of society, albeit in marginalized ways. The analysis is based on an empirical case study involving a biographical interview with a regular user of a food bank. The narrative reveals how the need for assistance often collides with personal pride, leading to a painful compromise between material necessity and emotional well-being. Using Honneth’s theory of recognition to frame the discussion, particularly focusing on how societal norms and intersubjective recognition shape individuals’ experiences of shame and disrespect. These feelings are not only personal but are also rooted in the broader social conpaper, highlighting the intricate relationship between individual identity and societal structures.

Stefan Selke (2012, 2017) impressively describes how poor families who (have to) go to the food bank experience this as shameful. There are a number of reasons for this (not all of which are explicitly articulated by Selke, but can be documented in his material), the most important of which are listed here: It is shameful to have to show one’s own material poverty in public, it is shameful not to be able to choose one’s own food, but only to be presented with a limited selection, it is shameful not to be able to provide for oneself and one’s own children, but to be dependent on help, it is shameful to know that one’s own children experience it as shameful, it is shameful to know that one’s social environment sees it as a stigma (which is why one conceals going to the food bank). There is a lack of recognition here, not because the material poverty would not be alleviated (it will) or no recognition would be given at all (the food bank is the materialization of the recognition that these people need help and deserve it), but because this recognition is deficient (is experienced as shameful), because it stands outside the institutionalized order of recognition, in which what counts is that you earn enough income yourself (for your own efforts—in gainful employment) that allows you to choose and buy your own food in sufficient quantity and quality. This can be linked to what is referred to in the literature as “social hunger” or “social food poverty”. People who do not have to go hungry, but who are unable to meet the social standards of food. Sabine Pfeiffer and colleagues (Pfeiffer et al. 2011) have argued that in modern societies this also includes going out to eat and inviting others. The connection with Townsend’s previously cited definition of relative poverty is obvious here. Pfeiffer and colleagues show that despite Germany’s wealth, social welfare recipients are often unable to afford a balanced diet, leading to both physiological hunger and a form of social exclusion, as dining out becomes inaccessible. These individuals struggle to maintain adequate nutrition, resorting to food banks and making difficult compromises in their food choices. The German welfare system has failed to address these issues adequately, often delegating the responsibility to private charities and volunteers, which leads to inconsistent food security. The societal response to hunger and nutritional poverty is characterized by denial, delegation, and stigmatization, which exacerbates the problem and leads to further social exclusion.

Finally, a further aspect of the lack of recognition due to material poverty should be mentioned, which once again demonstrates its potential for social theory and social science, namely the temporal structures in which this lack becomes entrenched. Two perspectives are addressed here. First is the temporal extension of a lack of recognition, i.e., the duration of poverty. There is solid empirical evidence that the negative effects of poverty depend on its depth and duration, making it all the more difficult for those affected to break out of poverty. The fact that not all people affected by poverty are equally poor and that this is important was recently highlighted by Max Keck (2021) in his study on the inequality of the poor in Germany. Another source of evidence for this inequality among the poor can be found in the research on absolute poverty in the EU (Gaisbauer et al. 2019a). In their introduction to the collection of papers on this topic, Helmut Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger, and Clemens Sedmak (Gaisbauer et al. 2019b) argue that absolute poverty covers those forms of poverty that are deeper and more affecting than relative poverty. Traditionally, absolute poverty is characterized by the deprivation of fundamental necessities vital for human survival, including adequate food, shelter, and healthcare. This definition contrasts with that of relative poverty, which gauges an individual’s economic standing in relation to the societal average. In the EU, absolute poverty often surfaces not merely as a lack of material resources but as an extreme manifestation of relative poverty. Individuals ensnared in this condition find themselves at the nadir of the social and economic hierarchy, experiencing deprivation that transcends mere economic metrics. Moreover, absolute poverty in this context frequently intertwines with severe social exclusion. Groups such as undocumented migrants, the homeless, and certain ethnic minorities are systematically marginalized, effectively rendering them invisible within mainstream societal structures and data collection methodologies. The political dimensions of absolute poverty further complicate its landscape. Those trapped in absolute poverty often suffer from a pronounced lack of political representation and agency. Their voices are seldom heard in policy-making arenas, and their needs are frequently overlooked or inadequately addressed. This political marginalization not only exacerbates their material deprivation but also perpetuates a cycle of exclusion and disenfranchisement.

Poverty biographies are rarely monothematic; they often overlap as migration biographies, as incarcerated biographies, as addiction biographies, as violent biographies. Caroline Dewilde (2003) argued that the life-course perspective is more flexible and accounts for differentiation and heterogeneity in people’s lives and to understand poverty biographies. This perspective considers not just the static points in a person’s life, but also the transitions and events that significantly impact their socio-economic status. The political economy of the life course further explores how state, market, and family interactions create and perpetuate social inequalities over time. Dewilde emphasizes that understanding poverty and social exclusion requires examining both the stratification of the life course (how societal institutions differentiate between groups) and stratification over the life course (how inequalities grow or diminish throughout a person’s life). This can be understood from the perspective of recognition theory as the through-time experience of recognition/misrecognition and how the institutionalized recognition order frames this. Gottfried Schweiger (2020a, 2022) presented a social philosophical model to understand that, which he labeled “life course of poverty”. This conceptual model examines how different forms of non- and misrecognition evolve and accumulate over time, ultimately shaping the experiences and futures of the poor. Schweiger identifies four key temporal forms of non- and misrecognition: disappointed expectation, enduring denial, lack of predictability, and long-term suffering. Each of these forms highlights how time plays a crucial role in the lives of those in poverty. For instance, “disappointed expectation” refers to the moment when an individual’s legitimate expectations for recognition are unmet, leading to immediate harm. “Enduring denial” extends this harm over longer periods, where recognition is consistently withheld, resulting in chronic feelings of neglect and marginalization. “Lack of predictability” describes the uncertainty that poor individuals face when they cannot foresee how they will be treated, making it difficult for them to plan their lives. Finally, “long-term suffering” captures the cumulative impact of these experiences, where the effects of non- and misrecognition endure well beyond the immediate moment, affecting individuals’ mental and physical well-being over the course of their lives. The “life course of poverty” model illustrates how institutionalized norms and practices systematically deny recognition to the poor over time, leading to a cycle of persistent poverty and social exclusion. Schweiger emphasizes that understanding the temporal dimension of poverty is essential to addressing the deeper injustices faced by the poor.

Christine Wimbauer and Mona Motakef (2020) have described a “trajectory-shaped” accumulation of recognition deficits for the relationship between precarious work and love, i.e., that different experiences of recognition deficits accumulate over time. This can be reconstructed for material poverty, whose “career” often begins in childhood and can lead via material child poverty and early educational drop-outs to precarious or no work, dependence on welfare state benefits, and here in turn to family and social difficulties, poor coping measures (e.g., drugs, alcohol, delinquency), and even social decline into homelessness. It seems obvious that recognition deficits, to stay with Wimbauer and Motakef’s terminology, can also be reconstructed in the lives of people affected by poverty. Secondly, as Kai Dröge and Irene Somm (2005) have questioned concerning the highly qualified unemployed and self-employed, we can ask about the role of “long-sightedness” and “deferral of needs”—Dröge and Somm take these two terms from Norbert Elias—under the conditions of material poverty. What is meant by this is that recognition in modern societies and welfare states is institutionalized in such a way that it enables (is supposed to enable) the ability to plan one’s own biography, which means that the materialization and legal protection of recognition is not always immediate, but is often stretched out over years or delayed. Examples from employment would be all the benefits associated with the seniority principle, and in social policy the income-based pension amount. Here, people receive benefits (materialized recognition) not for current but for past achievements. Long-sightedness means looking to the future, while deferral of needs means deferring current needs in order to fulfill them at a later date. From the perspective of recognition theory, it is interesting to see how people in material poverty experience and articulate such temporally stretched and asynchronous forms of recognition, or how their absence, the negative outlook on their own future, manifests itself as a lack of recognition and what effects this in turn has on their lives (e.g., the abandonment of long-sightedness and deferral of needs or mistrust of the future-related recognition promises of politics). Such a temporally dynamic perspective on the institutionalized recognition system could also open up new research perspectives for the questions mentioned in the previous section, when it comes to understanding material poverty not only as a lack of social esteem in the sense of a current exclusion from (poverty-avoiding) gainful employment, but also as the consolidation of a poverty biography with short, medium, and long-term consequences (e.g., a low pension and poverty in old age).

5. Conclusions

This paper provides a significant theoretical exploration of the relationship between poverty and recognition, drawing on Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition. By situating poverty within the framework of recognition theory, the paper offers a novel perspective on understanding poverty not merely as a lack of material resources but as a profound social phenomenon intertwined with issues of respect, social esteem, and institutionalized recognition. The approach taken here underscores the importance of considering the social and psychological dimensions of poverty, which are often overlooked in empirical research focused solely on economic indicators.

One of the primary contributions of this paper is the articulation of how poverty can be understood as both a cause and a consequence of a lack of recognition. This dual perspective enriches the theoretical understanding of poverty by highlighting its impact on individuals’ self-esteem, social standing, and their experiences of social exclusion. The discussion on how poverty is experienced as a lack of recognition, particularly through the lens of shame and stigmatization, opens new avenues for empirical research that could further validate and expand upon these theoretical insights.

However, the paper also reveals several limitations. The reliance on theoretical analysis means that the conclusions drawn are primarily conceptual and may require empirical substantiation to be fully validated. While the paper references existing empirical studies to support its arguments, there is a noticeable gap in the integration of comprehensive empirical data that could solidify the theoretical claims. Furthermore, the focus on recognition theory, while offering deep insights, may also limit the scope by potentially overlooking other theoretical frameworks that could provide complementary or even contrasting perspectives on poverty.

In terms of untapped potential, the paper hints at but does not fully explore the possibilities for a more empirical application of recognition theory in poverty research. Future studies could build on this work by conducting empirical research that directly investigates the relationship between recognition and poverty, using qualitative and quantitative methods to explore how individuals in poverty experience and articulate their need for recognition in various social contexts. Additionally, cross-cultural studies could examine whether and how these dynamics play out differently in diverse societal settings, potentially offering a more global understanding of poverty and recognition. Furthermore, two fundamental difficulties of the theory of recognition should be named, which would be worth pursuing further in both theory and social research. The first difficulty is the relationship between protest and recognition. The theory assumes that experiences of disregard and lack of recognition have a motivating effect, i.e., that they motivate people to organize themselves and (collectively) stand up for their demands for recognition. However, people in poverty seem to be rather paralyzed and the lack of recognition cannot develop the power to organize and protest (although poverty uprisings have not been uncommon). One explanation could be that people in poverty are also convinced that social esteem is more important than respect and that the market and labor-based distribution of social esteem is correct, which is why they do not want to rebel against it. The second difficulty concerns the relationship between respect and social esteem and the causation of poverty. From the perspective of recognition theory, it is unclear which social forces are behind the prevailing order of recognition and maintain it. Even if it is plausible to understand poverty as a lack of recognition, this does not say anything—or at least not very much—about who is responsible for this lack. You could also state it this way: does not the theory of recognition need to be supplemented by a political economy and a theory of social power and domination, especially in order to adequately understand phenomena such as material poverty?

In conclusion, while this paper makes a valuable theoretical contribution to the understanding of poverty through the lens of recognition theory, there remains significant potential for further empirical research to explore and validate these ideas. Addressing the limitations and expanding the empirical base will be crucial for developing a more comprehensive understanding of poverty and its social implications. Whether the connections between recognition and poverty formulated in this paper can also be found and deepened in empirical research beyond an initial plausibility must remain an open question at this point. Whereby “grand” social theories that aim to describe the basic structures of society (in terms of “time diagnostics”) can only ever be plausibilized and cannot actually be empirically tested as such. However, the (few) empirical references presented suggest that this is the case.