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Article

Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior in 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Quantitative Approach

1
Department of Political Sciences, International Relations and European Studies, “Al.I.Cuza” University of Iași, 700506 Iasi, Romania
2
Department of Communication Sciences and Public Relations, “Al.I.Cuza” University of Iași, 700506 Iasi, Romania
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14(4), 226; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040226
Submission received: 8 December 2024 / Revised: 14 March 2025 / Accepted: 24 March 2025 / Published: 3 April 2025
(This article belongs to the Section Contemporary Politics and Society)

Abstract

:
This study evaluates the link between economic voting and electoral behavior in the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections. This study is grounded in both selective perception and economic voting theories, examining how different independent factors could interact with electoral behavior. In this regard, the research aims to achieve several research directions: (i) the evaluation of the statistical differences in voters’ turnout in 2024 EP elections by geographical regions; (ii) the analysis of the interaction between voters’ perceptions of the current or future economic situations and voter turnout; (iii) the analysis of the interaction between objective economic conditions and electoral behavior. Using both multiple linear regression and logistic models, the study highlights that voter turnout and incumbent party reelection are significantly related to voters’ perceptions of the current or future state of the national economy. The results reveal that regional differences in voter turnout are largely explained by significant differences in voters’ economic perceptions, while the decision to vote for the incumbent party is driven by future economic expectations. The empirical findings underscore the pivotal role played by subjective perceptions in shaping electoral behavior, illustrating that political attitudes and behaviors are derived from personal interpretation of the national economic situations. Beyond theoretical perspectives that highlight the link between psychological processes and voting, the paper might have several practical implications for academics or decision makers interested in the field of electoral behavior.

1. Introduction

The 2024 European Parliament elections took place in a complex economic and political context, characterized by multiple and overlapped crises. Post-pandemic economic recovery and geopolitical context characterized by the war in Ukraine created premises for economic imbalances and economic dissatisfaction in EU-27 membership. While economic vote is a well-established phenomenon, its impact varies depending on the extent to which economic conditions are a central concern in public discourse and voter perceptions. Together with post-pandemic effects and the war in Ukraine (at the Eastern boarder of the EU-27), this political context is characterized by the rise of populism and radical political parties. In many EU-27 countries, nationalist and Eurosceptic political parties have gained traction, influencing both political of economic strategies (Supplementary Materials). A crucial effect of the 2024 EP elections is that the new European Parliament will influence legislation, the selection of the European Commission members, and the overall direction of EU policymaking. European Parliament elections are seen as second-order elections (SOEs), being perceived as less important than national legislative elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980). In practice, second-order elections are more likely to be characterized by national issues and politics than EU-level elections. An important key feature of second-order elections is represented by lower voter turnout compared to national elections. Several academic studies have pointed out that lower voter turnout and interest in elections, weaker support for governing parties, and stronger support for opposition and smallest parties are relevant for understanding EP elections in terms of second-order elections (Schmitt 2005; Bartels 2023). Other scholars critically assess the applicability of the second-order elections model to regional and European elections (Schakel and Jeffery 2012). They argue that this conceptual framework needs to be redefined in conditions in which smaller political parties treat these elections as a strategic opportunity. National politics and the level of citizens’ information regarding the EU are relevant factors in second-order elections. An empirical study conducted by Hobolta and Wittrock demonstrated the relevance of information in shaping electoral decisions (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). Other scholars argued the importance of second-order elections in the field of inter- and intra-institutional politics of the European Union (Koepke and Ringe 2006). Strategic motivations and political dynamics are relevant features of the EP elections as a model of second-order elections (Schmitt et al. 2020). EP elections are important, creating opportunities to reward or punish the national governing parties. Second-order economic vote is a relevant variable for understanding how economic conditions could interact with electoral preferences. The rise of populist parties and increasing contestation of the EU could affect voters’ behavior in further elections (Bosch 2024). Other empirical studies have demonstrated a limited economic impact in the field of voter behavior in EP second-order elections. Empirical findings reflect limited evidence for economic voting in the EP elections. Subjective economic assessments are relevant only in single-party government contexts, where responsibility is clear. In coalition government contexts, the results indicate little impact of economic perceptions on voters’ electoral behavior (Tilley et al. 2008). In correlation with these perspectives, we argue that economic context and EU support during economic crises are relevant factors that influence voters’ behavior in EP elections (Okolikj and Quinlan 2016). In practice, scholars argue that social, political, or economic contexts are important variables for understanding the link between economic dimension and electoral preferences. Regarding the long-term effect of the economic vote in the field of European elections, scholars have observed a constant relationship between economic perception, economic growth, unemployment, inflation, and incumbent support. The contextual and regional differences between countries are relevant for understanding the dynamics of economic opinions and voters’ preferences during different economic crises (Talving 2018).
In connection with these assumptions, the paper highlights the interaction between economic perceptions and electoral decisions in the 2024 EP elections. To aid understanding of this complex and important correlation, we expose several theoretical directions in the field of political behavior. Therefore, together with social and economic behavior, political attitudes are analyzed using a hybrid theoretical strategy based on sociology, psychology, and the theory of rational choice. Since the early 1950s, scholars have analyzed political attitudes and behaviors in correlation with the social environment, social class, and political culture. These attitudes are analyzed in the context of democratic political systems, in which scholars have observed the complex interactions between citizens’ demands and governmental outcomes. By these assumptions, social class, partisanship, and punishment–reward mechanisms are seen to be relevant predictors of voters’ turnout, ideological preferences, and electoral decisions (Alford and Hibbing 2004; Dalton and Klingemann 2007; Balatif et al. 2023; Bruter and Harrison 2020; Neuman et al. 2007; Schoen 2014; Harrison 2020).
The seminal work of Lazarsfeld, The People’s Choice, emphasized the importance of the mass media in shaping electoral attitudes among American voters (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944). Media exposure is an important indicator for measuring citizens’ political education and accountability. Besides media exposure, social class could predict voters’ decisions in different electoral situations. However, ideological preferences are strongly related to voters’ social class membership. In this context, social class could be seen as a long-term force that could influence voters’ electoral attitudes and behaviors (Elff 2009; Laver and Garry 2000; Elff 2007; McGregor 2018; Kreiss 2016). Beyond social class membership, both geographical and physical proximity are relevant variables for analyzing political behavior (Flavin and Law 2022; Pietryka and Debats 2017; Adams 1999; Singh and Roy 2014; Rosati 2000; Dolan and Holbrook 2001). Empirical studies revealed the influence of social proximity in generating a particular set of political attitudes and beliefs. Using these theoretical perspectives regarding political behavior, this paper aims to create the nexus between psychological and economic determinants of electoral decisions.
An important theoretical field dedicated to understanding political behavior derives from psychology and cognitive sciences. Individuals’ cognitive structures, social perceptions, and emotions are relevant variables related to electoral decisions (Antunes 2010; Arcuri et al. 2008; Bandura 1971; Dunbar 2011). Using the cognitive perspective, we stress the idea that political elections are salient stimuli in voters’ decisions. Voters’ electoral decisions are related to both emotional and rational processes. Moreover, salient stimuli are involved in generating emotional responses and reactions (Veale et al. 2017; Krasovskaya and Macinnes 2019; Schrimpf et al. 2018; Morris and Dolan 1997; Pinheiro et al. 2016; Allman et al. 2001). Current researchers in neurocognitive studies stress the fact that individuals develop emotional responses when they are faced with salient stimuli (Amodio et al. 2007; Jost et al. 2014; Bell et al. 2009; Alford et al. 2005; Inbar et al. 2009; Kanai et al. 2011). Using the concept of “playground cognition”, Fowler and Schreiber demonstrated that political activity could be integrated into this sphere of cognitive processes (Fowler and Schreiber 2008).
Voters’ electoral decisions should be seen as a complex output that derives from social class membership, personal cognitions and beliefs, and social and economic expectations. In this regard, a sustainable economic context is more likely to conduct support for the incumbent reelection, an increased level of voter turnout, and civic accountability.

Personal Beliefs and Economic Determinants of Voting Behavior. Literature Review and Deducing Hypotheses

A pivotal role in the analysis of political behavior is played by social cognition. Through the lens of neuropsychology, we gained an important understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying cognitive processes, including decision making and perception. Meanwhile, sociology provides an important framework for analyzing how social structures and context influence individuals’ cognitive processes, particularly in shaping political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Within this cognitive framework, selective perception emerges as a crucial mechanism, where individuals interpret social, economic, or political stimuli through a lens shaped by both their neural responses and social influences. Understanding this cognitive bias is relevant for explaining how economic conditions impact voters’ behavior. Developed in the early 1950s and 1960s, the theory of selective perception pointed out that individuals are motivated to maintain their opinions and beliefs to avoid psychological discomfort such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957). Thus, individuals frequently experience different forms of inconsistencies among their beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors (Abelson et al. 1968). To avoid personal discomfort, they seek to reduce it and restore psychological consistency by changing their attitudes and behaviors (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Rosenberg 1956). Moreover, selective perception could be seen as a confirmation bias (Aronson 1969; Harmon-Jones and Mills 2019; Stone and Cooper 2001). By this assumption, individuals seek to retain or maintain different social or political information that sustains their personal beliefs (Rabin 1994; Elliot and Devine 1994; Cooper 2019). However, they react to or reject social or political information which is in contrast with their personal beliefs and attitudes. Using these explanations, we argue that ideological perspective could be strongly related to the personal manner of interpreting and understanding social and political actions (Metzger et al. 2020; Christen and Gunther 2003). Scholars explained why individuals interpreted political events by their ideological affiliations or partisanship (Brannon et al. 2007). Selective perception creates mechanisms for individual resilience. In the field of political sciences, an example is based on the process of targeting political messages during electoral campaigns (Ditto et al. 1998; Garrett 2009). These messages resonate with the target electorate, reinforcing individuals’ personal beliefs regarding social, economic, and political aspects (Johnson and Kaye 2009). Empirical studies have assessed the relationship between attention and selective perception. Results have confirmed that individuals’ attention is focused on events, situations, or contexts that are congruent with individuals’ beliefs or expectations. Strong affective implications in the political sphere or political partisanship are involved in selective perceptions (Nelson-Field and Riebe 2011). Individuals with strong political attachments are more likely to be interested in political events or actions that confirm their personal beliefs (Stroud 2008, 2010). For this reason, the cognitive mechanism is based on both social context and neuropsychological predisposition to understand and interpret political reality.
An important issue in the field of selective perception theory is represented by the asymmetry of information (Stroud and Lee 2013). Scholars theorized that individuals do not analyze all the information equally. They can retain or utilize only the information that matches their motivations (Taber and Lodge 2006). For this reason, individuals seek to maintain their psychological comfort and consistency (Westerwick et al. 2013). By using these cognitive strategies in the political realm, individuals maintain a personal coherent perspective of political reality. To maintain consistency and coherent perspective, they avoid contradictory information.
In order to evaluate the role played by the selective perceptions in the political sphere, we underline the idea that citizens handle political or mass media messages in ways that align with their personal ideological positions. Political polarization and conflicting attitudes could be explained using this theoretical strategy. Antagonistic political groups tend to develop personal interpretations of the same political event. Cognitive bias and selective perception can lead to polarized opinions, groups, and actions. Both traditional and digital media exposure could influence individuals’ cognitive biases and selective perceptions. Empirical studies highlighted that selective media exposure could reduce the likelihood of changing personal beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Levendusky and Malhotra 2015; Hoewe and Peacock 2019; Prior 2013).
Although theoretical perspectives have pointed out the importance of selective perceptions in shaping individuals’ cognitions, we emphasize the nexus between perceptive mechanisms and the “mere exposure effect”. Developed by Robert Zajonc, the “mere exposure effect” theoretical approach explains the emergence of positive attitudes in individuals through repeated exposure to a stimulus or a set of stimuli (Monahan et al. 2000; Zajonc et al. 1974; Zajonc 2001). If selective perception expresses peoples’ attitudes related to information which are in contrast with their beliefs, the “mere exposure” approach highlights the importance of simple and repeated exposure for developing favorable attitudes regarding events, situations, or information. The nexus between these theoretical perspectives consists in reinforcing individuals’ personal beliefs. Repeated exposure to different salient stimuli could lead to a reinforcement of personal beliefs, magnifying the effect of selective perception. In the political field, repeated exposure to the same political media channels, news, or events related to personal ideological preferences could predict the crystallization of positive attitudes in line with political situations. Repetition increases the likelihood of accepting information and selective perception increases the likelihood of filtering information in accordance with personal values and beliefs.
As regards the relationship between the economy and the political dimension, these psychological processes are relevant for shaping favorable attitudes for incumbent political parties. In this context, an important set of predictors for both voters’ turnout and preferences for incumbent parties is represented by economic indicators. Political scientists have observed this important association between the economy and political preferences within democratic countries. Since the early 1950s, Downs’ theoretical perspective of rational choice has been one of the most important directions for the study of political behavior (Downs 1957). Both economists and political scientists have developed a large number of academic papers on economic vote theory (Lewis-Beck 1988). Beyond the objective macroeconomic factors, personal beliefs and subjective perceptions of the state of the economy could increase the likelihood of electoral decisions. Starting from the end of the 1970s, Fiorina, Kinder, and Lewis-Beck explained the impact of economic perceptions on electoral decisions (Fiorina 1978; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Thus, we agree that “vote choice and macroeconomic perceptions are the respective action and attitude for which people will seek consistency” (Anderson et al. 2004, p. 685). However, the importance of economic perceptions in voting behaviors can be explained as follows: “Because a cast ballot cannot be undone, people will restore consistency by bringing their attitudes—in this case, attitudes about past economic performance under the old government and expectations about future performance under the new government—in line with their vote choice” (Anderson et al. 2004, p. 686). Recent findings in the field of economics and social psychology have argued that subjective economic status (SES) influences political preferences, particularly attitudes towards redistributive policies. Scholars have argued that individuals’ perceptions of personal status shape their support for social and economic policies. Empirical findings suggest that subjective perceptions of socioeconomic status contribute to political divisions, especially as economic inequality rises. Moreover, shifts in perceived status could influence voters’ attitudes and behaviors (Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2016). In accordance with these findings, Condon and Wichowsky conducted an important study that correlated the perceived social distance with political attitudes. Using upward and downward comparison, scholars have argued that, together with personal perceptions, political attitudes are related with structural factors such as class segregation, influence, perception of inequality, and redistributive policies (Condon and Wichowsky 2020). Economic performance, fiscal policies, taxation, and individuals’ income are key variables that could be relevant in the field of economic vote (Fernández-Albertos and Kuo 2018). According to these theoretical perspectives, we postulate the following hypothesis:
H1. 
Subjective perceptions on the current state of the economic situation are positively related to an increased level of voter turnout.
Given the fact that the economy is the most important issue in political debates or electoral campaigns, we support the idea that individuals’ perceptions of economic evolution are more likely related to citizens’ voting decisions. Bad economic situations increase the likelihood of voting for opposition or radical political parties. Economic stability or future perspectives of economic development could increase the likelihood of incumbent reelection. In this regard, economic voting is seen in terms of punishment–reward mechanism. Citizens punish, through their vote, political parties that fail to demonstrate economic performance. Conversely, they support and vote for parties perceived as delivering economic stability and performance. Economic variables are seen as a complex set of salient stimuli that generate future political attitudes and behaviors.
Economic voting theory assesses electoral behavior in terms of choice to either reelect the governing party or alter the electoral strategy for opposition parties. Scholars developed a model of incumbent vote share as a dependency on GDP growth rate and time. Moreover, alongside GDP, growth scholars have brought socio-demographic variables and partisanship to the conversation. Regarding the European space, empirical studies confirmed that economic growth has an important weight in the equation that associates electoral behavior with economic variables. For these reasons, scholars defined Europeans’ electoral behavior in terms of sociotropic voting. Empirical results show that economic evaluations, both subjective (in terms of perception of the state of the national economy) and objective (the evaluations of the GDP dynamics between two electoral cycles), are significant and positively related to electoral decisions (p < 0.01). However, the long-term analysis pointed out that there is a constant effect of the economic evaluations in the field of electoral decisions for preserving the incumbent party. In this respect, scholars have confirmed that “the economic vote coefficient does not change significantly over time” (Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck 2019, p. 101).
Taking the psychological dimension of the economic vote into consideration, political scientists have assessed the impact of personal economic cognitions in incumbent reelection. Scholars have stressed the idea that, beyond sociotropic voters interested in social externalities of the economy, a high level of political sophistication is related to egotropic voters. There is a synonymy between egotropic voters and pocketbook voters. This category of individuals is interested in the impact of the economic outcomes in the field of personal finances or economic benefits. An important theoretical perspective on the differences between sociotropic and pocketbook voting is discussed by Gomez and Matthew in the following terms: “citizens who are less cognitively engaged with politics tend to make simple, proximal attributions, while politically sophisticated citizens often make attributions of responsibility to less obvious, distal factors. This postulate leads to a nonobvious prediction regarding sophistication and economic voting: pocketbook voting is most likely to occur among politically sophisticated individuals, whereas low sophisticates tend to rely exclusively on sociotropic evaluations” (Gomez and Matthew 2006, p. 128). In connection to these perspectives, scholars have emphasized the role played by objective economic factors in shaping voting decisions. Therefore, an empirical study conducted by Szewczyk and Crowder-Meyer highlighted how community-level income inequality influences political participation, and how it affects the gap between rich and poor in political engagement. The research argues that local experiences of inequality increase awareness in income disparities, which in turn motivates political participation, especially among wealthier individuals who have the resources to act. However, the study provides evidence that economic inequality deepens political inequality, which has significant consequences in the field of democratic representation (Szewczyk and Crowder-Meyer 2022).
Cross-national statistical analyses of the economy and vote correlations highlight that objective economic factors that conduct individuals in electoral decisions are represented by unemployment, GDP growth, net wages, and inflation. Although there are significant associations among these macroeconomic indicators, in practice, we have to stress that satisfaction regarding the way the economy works nationally, personal evaluations of economic growth, or perception of the current and future economic situation are relevant factors for arguing the complex link between cognitive processes, economic determinants, and electoral behavior. Individuals’ perceptions of the current economic situation and personal evaluations of the way the economy and democracy work nationally created premises for the V-P theoretical approach (vote and popularity). Lewis-Back and Paldam’s V-P function presents electoral behavior in the following terms: the robustness of the voting function depends on economic performance (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000). Several empirical studies regarding economic and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern European countries have shown the main economic factors involved in voters’ electoral decisions: unemployment rate, real wage growth, entrepreneurship, and GDP growth economics of voting in the post-communist era (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Bochsler and Hänni 2024; Kotnarowski 2016; Jiménez 2023; Wimpy and Whitten 2017). Using this theoretical framework, related to economic voting, we formulate the following research hypotheses:
H2. 
Objective economic factors such as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rates significantly influence individuals’ subjective perceptions of the current economic situation.
H3. 
Objective economic factors are strongly associated with the electorate’s decision to reelect the incumbent political party.
As regards the economic perception of governmental performance, scholars have observed two main types of electoral behavior: retrospective and prospective vote decisions. In this respect, a high level of economic satisfaction related to current governmental economic policies is considered a retrospective vote. An incumbent party has an increased probability of being voted for in national elections if citizens have an increased level of satisfaction related to the current economic situation (Gomez and Matthew 2001; Harper 2000; Cowden and Hartley 1992). Otherwise, we observed a punishment mechanism based on the election of the opposition parties. The second group of voters is represented by individuals with future economic expectations. They are not interested in the field of the current economic situation; rather, they expect better future economic conditions in their community. In this case, opposition parties have an increased likelihood of being elected. Using these models of voting behavior (sociotropic versus egotropic (pocketbook) and retrospective versus prospective), scholars have defined economic voting in terms of punishment and reward mechanisms. In order to evaluate this perspective, political scientists have confirmed that governmental stability is strongly correlated with retrospective and sociotropic voting (Lockerbie 2006; Klašnja et al. 2014; Hansford and Gomez 2015; Kirkland and Coppock 2018). From these theoretical perspectives, we assume the following research hypotheses:
H4. 
An increased level of satisfaction connected with personal finances and work is positively related to an increased likelihood of the incumbent party being reelected (retrospective vote).
H5. 
An increased level of economic expectations is positively related to the incumbent party’s reelection (prospective vote).
A pivotal empirical study for our research perspectives confirms that there are significant differences between real economic variables (GDP, inflation, and unemployment) and individuals’ perceptions associated with economic situation—perceptions on the state of the economy and perceptions on the state of personal finances (Freire and Lobo 2005). Results show that sociotropic perceptions of the economy are more likely to predict voters’ electoral behavior than other economic or political independent factors (p < 0.001). Also, variations in unemployment and inflation are moderate and significantly correlated with the perception of the state of the national economy (p < 0.05). However, individuals’ perceptions of the economic situation have an increased probability of explaining the share of votes for the incumbent political party. We consider this approach to be key, presenting the importance of perception in shaping voters’ attitudes and behaviors.
Using the cognitivist approach, based on selective perception, we aim to assess the impact of personal cognition in the field of electoral utility. In this case, electoral behavior is reflected in the subjective manner in which individuals perceive economic situations and evaluate their financial status and quality of life. As we pointed out in the preliminary section of the study, political behavior could be understood as a hybrid model based on the interactions of personal emotions and rational cognition. Incumbent status is involved in shaping economic perceptions of the national economy (De Vries et al. 2018). Academic studies conducted by Evans and Pickup reflect the idea that the nexus between real-world economic conditions and economic perceptions is rather weak (Evans and Pickup 2010). Moreover, partisanship is correlated to economic conditions and electoral behavior. Informational bias and selective perception of the state of the national economy could be involved in predicting voting behavior. From this research perspective, scholars have argued that personal beliefs coupled with economy and policies are more relevant than economic indicators’ variation in time (Wlezien et al. 1997). For this reason, voters’ electoral decision is more likely to be explainable by subjective economy rather than other econometrics or objective governmental indicators (Sanders 2000).
In accordance with these theoretical premises, the paper aims to highlight the importance of the subjective economy in shaping electoral decisions. However, the electoral space seems to be a place where both partisan attitudes and strategic votes influence the future of political decision makers. Although economic reality is important in understanding political evolutions, personal and subjective perceptions of current economic status could influence individuals’ decisions to vote for incumbent or opposing political parties.

2. Materials and Methods

The present study aims to link subjective and objective economic factors with electoral behavior in the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. As we underlined in the previous sections of the paper, electoral behavior depends on the selective perception of the current or future state of the national economy. Moreover, objective factors of economic perception could be seen in macroeconomic indicators, such as economic evolutions, unemployment rates, and the level of national inflation rates. We conducted an empirical investigation of the main important subjective and objective factors that could influence voters’ turnout and decisions for electing the incumbent party. For data analysis we used the statistical software IBM SPSS, version 29. We also used Data Aanalysis from MS EXCEL, version 2013 to perform descriptive statistics.

2.1. Theoretical Research Design: Research Questions, Objectives, and Hypotheses

In order to obtain a better understanding of the relationship between independent factors and electoral behavior, we start the current research paper using the following research questions: What is the relationship between sociotropic perspectives and voters’ turnout in the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections? How could these factors influence individuals’ economic perceptions of the dynamics of the EP voters’ turnout? What is the impact of the objective economy in the field of electoral citizens’ decisions to participate in EP elections? What is the correlation between individuals’ economic perceptions and the decision to reelect the incumbent party? What is the impact of national economic indicators in the field of voters’ decisions to reelect the incumbent party? To examine these associations among economic perceptions, objective economic conditions, and electoral behaviors in the 2024 EP elections, we have several research objectives. O1: To estimate the statistical differences in voters’ turnout in 2024 EP elections by geographical regions. O2: To estimate the effect of economic perceptions in the field of voters’ turnout. O3: To analyze the relevance of economic factors in shaping voters’ perceptions about the current economic situation. O4: To assess the impact of the objective economic factors in explaining the dynamics of voters’ electoral behavior. O5: To evaluate the role played by the economic perception in shaping voters’ electoral behavior in the 2024 EP elections.

2.2. Data Collection, Quantitative Methods, and Research Design

This research is focused on the impact of economic perceptions on electoral behavior, specifically on voter turnout and electoral decisions in the 2024 EP elections. While factors such as attitudes toward European Union, political loyalties, immigration, security, and climate issues are relevant for understanding political behavior in second-order elections for the European Parliament, we chose to isolate the effects of economic perceptions to clarify how economic conditions directly influence electoral decisions. Our research aims to create a link between economic perceptions and electoral behavior. This is particularly relevant as economic voting is a reflexive action, primarily influenced by citizens’ subjective assessments of the current economic climate and their future economic expectations. In order to assess this link between economic perceptions and voting behavior, we used individual-level variables like perceptions of the current state of economy, satisfaction with personal income and employment, and future economic and financial expectations. We assume that these variables are important for EP elections, when other influences such as domestic political issues or pro-European attitudes are less prioritized. We acknowledge that this study does not include all potential political, social, or economic factors that could predict voter turnout and electoral preferences. The study aims to focus on the deeper examination of the role played by economic perceptions in voting behavior in second-order elections like the 2024 EP elections. While sociological and ideological factors are important in analyzing voters’ profiles, we aim to test the theoretical approach based on the interaction between selective perception and economic performance. Thus, following academic literature, we aim to assess the dynamics of voters’ behavior in EP elections using a social psychological and economic approach.
To achieve the research objectives, we used secondary statistical data provided by the European Parliament (European Parliament 2024), Eurostat (Eurostat 2024), Trading Economics (Trading Economics 2024), and the World Bank (World Bank Group 2024). To assess the impact of the objective economic factors in the field of electoral behavior, we used quantitative data associated with the dynamics of GDP, inflation rates, and unemployment level in EU-27 countries. Using the Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024 (Standard Eurobarometer 2024), fieldwork EU, 2 April–9 May 2024, we collected data regarding the perception of the current economic situation (QA1.2), the financial situation of households (QA1), and personal job situations (QA1). The data are qualitative and are measured on a scale between Total Bad and Total Good. In correlation with the perceptions regarding the current economic situation, we collected relevant data for the economic expectations of EU-27 citizens. Thus, we used empirical results from the QA2 (”What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will be better, worse or the same...”) regarding economic and unemployment situations and personal jobs. The sample of the Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024 consists of 26,423 interviews, covering EU-27 countries.
(a)
Dependent variables
The study aims to explain the dynamics of electoral behavior in the 2024 EP elections in association with economic determinants. Thus, as markers of electoral behavior, we used voter turnout and the decision to vote for the incumbent party. Voter turnout is a measure of citizens’ involvement in the political sphere, a distinctive feature of the democratic political regime. An increased level of Voter Turnout reflects an increased level of civic accountability and interest in public affairs. The vote for the incumbent party is seen as a measure of retrospective/prospective vote and a punish–reward mechanism by the current economic performance.
(b)
Independent factors
Concerning the academic literature on the economic vote, we identified two factors that could influence electoral behavior. Thus, macroeconomic dimensions and personal perceptions and expectations of political and economic outcomes are relevant for understanding how citizens vote in different types of democratic elections.
Objective macroeconomic indicators are relevant variables for measuring the interaction between economic policies and votes. Relevant variables used in the academic literature for explaining voters’ behavior are GDP growth, inflation rates, and unemployment levels. Several academic studies have focused on voters’ behavior and democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe, and they have used, alongside these factors, the level of net average wages as an additional factor. We used only three relevant economic measures: real GDP growth rates (%), inflation rates (%), and unemployment (%). Quantitative values were collected from Eurostat, Trading Economics, and World Bank.
Subjective economy is a relevant dimension of voters’ behaviors for determining how personal economic perceptions and expectations could influence electoral behavior. Meanwhile, we aim to illustrate both elements of retrospective and prospective voting. Individuals’ perceptions of the current state of the national economy are relevant for explaining the retrospective vote. Individuals’ satisfaction and dissatisfaction regarding the economic situation could predict their interest in the political field and their preferences for the incumbent political party. Bad economic situation are more likely to be related to voters’ preferences for non-incumbent political parties. Conversely, good economic situations could increase the rates of reward and reelection for the incumbent party. For measuring this dimension, we used the percentages of respondents for QA1.2. and QA1): “How would you judge the current situation in each of the following: the situation of the national economy; the financial situation of the household; personal job situation” (Standard Eurobarometer 2024).
Future expectations regarding the economic situation are related to the prospective vote. However, these expectations are strongly related to how individuals perceive and judge future economic and political events. For measuring these expectations, we used the percentages of respondents for QA2 and QA2.3 (from the Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024): “What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse, or the same?” (regarding the economic situation, unemployment, and job situation). In Table 1, we present the research variables, units of measurement, and sources of data used in this study.
Regarding the methodological guidelines, here, we highlight the importance of subjective economy in shaping both voter turnout and electoral decisions in the 2024 EP elections. The data are relevant for the year 2024 and present the cross-national perspectives related to the impact of the perception of economic issues within EU-27 countries. In order to highlight the correlations between the research constructs we propose, we present a graphical model, shown in Figure 1.
The data analysis conducted here is based on both descriptive and inferential statistics. However, at the descriptive level, we have measured central tendency indicators, dispersion, and distribution. The variables have a Shapiro–Wilk distribution > 0.920, p > 0.05. We used statistical parametric tests and models. The variable vote for incumbent party (VI) is a dummy variable, with two values: 0—non-incumbent or opposition party; 1—incumbent party. At the inferential level, we used both multiple linear regression for quantitative data and binary logistic regression for the model which captures the vote for the incumbent party. In this respect, the formal models of the current research are presented below.
Let be Y = { y 1 ,   y 2 y n } ,   y 1 , n R and a set of predictors X = { x 1 ,   x 2 x n } ,   x 1 , n R . The equation which captures the importance and significance of the predictors is a multiple linear equation of regression, as follows:
Y = α + β 1 × x 1 + β 2 × x 2 + + β n × x n + ε i , j
where α = intercept (constant), β 1 , n = slope/regression coefficients (standardized), and ε i , j = standardized residuals.
In accordance with the baseline model, in our case, the equation captures the following relations:
V T = α + β 1 × E G + β 2 × I N F + β 3 × U N + β 4 × P E 1 + β 8 F P 2 + ε i , j
For estimating the importance of the economic variables, both subjective and objective, we used a binary logistic equation, as follows:
l n ω = α + + β 1 × x 1 + β 2 × x 2 + + β n × x n + ε i , j
In the logistic equation, ω = p 1 p , highlighting the odds ratio of the dependent variable. In our research design, the logistic regression is as follows:
l n I N C = α + β 1 × E G + β 2 × I N F + β 3 × U N + β 4 × P E 1 + β 8 F P 2 + ε i , j
The following section of the paper shows the main empirical findings in the interaction among subjective economy, objective economy, voter turnout, and voters’ electoral decisions for the incumbent party. The goal of this is to compare the differences between voters’ behavior and economic factors between geographic regions. The EU-27 countries were categorized into four groups based on their geographical positions: 1. Western Europe; 2. North Europe and Scandinavia; 3. Southern Europe; 4. Central and Eastern Europe. Statistical results are considered statistically significant when p < 0.05.

3. Results

The empirical findings of the present study provide important insights into the relationship between electoral behavior and individuals’ perceptions of economic conditions. To illustrate the importance of these psychological dimensions in the field of electoral behavior, we divided the results section into three parts that are relevant to a general perspective of the 2024 EP elections, the importance of current perceptions in shaping individuals’ decisions regarding political participation, and the impact of the prospective vote in the field of electoral options of reelecting the incumbent parties. Voters appear to cast their ballots to parties they believe will foster improved economic outcomes, underlying the complex relationship/interplay between economic realities and long-term expectations.

3.1. A General View of the 2024 European Parliament Elections: Political and Economic Conditions

The EP elections are considered “second-order” elections in comparison to national elections. Although voter turnout is generally lower at EP elections, these elections are important for illustrating the importance of democratic participation. Voters might use these elections to express satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the national governments rather than being interested in generating a crucial input for the EU political agenda. Moreover, these elections play an important role in creating opportunities for democratic political participation in EU-27 countries and ensuring an important balance between EU institutions. Due to the fact that the 2024 EP elections were the first major electoral event in the post-COVID-19 pandemic era, we focused our research on capturing the complex interactions between objective and subjective economic factors that could predict the vote for the members of the EP. The pandemic’s effects on political, health, social relations, and economic national situations might have redefined citizens’ beliefs, attitudes, and political perspectives. As we pointed out in the previous sections, bad economic situations are more likely to be associated with prospective voting. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic effects almost overlapped with the previous 2019–2024 cycle. For this reason, we consider that it is very important to determine whether there were significant changes in voters’ electoral behavior. Although during 2020–2022 the EU-27 countries were characterized by severe economic recession—with important implications in the field of macroeconomic stability, employability, and material deprivation—recent statistical data of the economic indicators could reflect the image of a stable economic context. Economic policies and national governmental strategies for reducing the pandemic’s impact on social and individual lives are relevant for understanding how people judge or assess the economic and political situation in their country. These medical and political conditions might influence voters’ behavior, creating differences in both political participation and ideological preferences based on the degree of economic recovery in the post-pandemic period. An important relationship is observed between individuals’ economic perception and economic or fiscal policies for reducing imbalances during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Worse perceptions of the state of the national economy could lead to political mistrust and an increased level of electoral absenteeism. Beyond political mistrust and other social factors, we sustain that personal financial situation, job status, and a general perception of the economic evolutions in post-pandemic times could explain electoral behavior in the EU-27 countries. In order to obtain a complex perspective of the 2024 EP elections, we present the main statistical results concerning the interaction between economy and voters’ behavior. Table 2 shows descriptive statistical values related to both dependent and independent variables.
Regarding political behavior, voter turnout (VT) has an average of 48.91 with a confidence level between 42.66 and 55.14 with p = 0.05. The lowest scores in voter turnout in 2024 EP elections were registered in Croatia (21.35%), Lithuania (28.35%), and Bulgaria (33.78%). In contrast, in Q3, we integrated countries with higher rates of voter turnout as follows: Denmark (58.25%), Cyprus (58.86%), Hungary (59.46%), Germany (64.74%), Luxemburg (82.84%), and Belgium (89.01). Differences in voters’ participative behavior could be explained by both geographical position in the EU-27 (including social, cultural, and historical explanations) and the economic performance of the incumbent parties during and after the pandemic. The results confirm that there are significant differences in voter turnout based on geographical region (F = 4.608, p = 0.011). Western EU-27 countries are more likely to develop participative behavior, with an average of 64.05% and a standard deviation of 17.94%. Another important geographical region, characterized by increased levels of voter turnout, is represented by Northern Europe and Scandinavia, where VT = 50.68% with a standard deviation of 9.22%. The lowest scores of electoral participation were registered in Central and Eastern European countries, with an average value of VT = 39.72% and a standard deviation of 11.30%. Figure 2 shows the significant differences in voter turnout, taking into consideration the different geographical regions.
Other relevant variables that might underline the economic differences within the geographical regions of the EU-27 are relevant in the field of personal beliefs and perceptions of economic conditions. In line with the theoretical approach, the results confirm that the perception of personal finances or jobs are relevant for understanding disparities between the EU-27 countries. In this respect, we observed that, in Northern Europe and Scandinavia, citizens have a better perception of the financial dimension. An average value of 90%, with a standard deviation of 1%, considered that their household finances were favorable (Total Good). An average of 68.83% with a standard deviation of 11.16% of the Southern European citizens considered that their household finances were favorable (F = 4.74, p = 0.01). Another significant difference is observed in the field of perceptions of the current state of their employment (F = 3.314, p = 0.03). Citizens from Scandinavia considered that their job situation is favorable, with an average of 74.33% and a standard deviation of 2.54%. Conversely, citizens from Southern EU perceived themselves to be in a favorable situation in their jobs, with an average of 59.50 and a standard deviation of 6.44%. Regarding objective economic indicators, such as GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rates, the statistical results show that there are no significant differences based on geographical position.
Even if objective economic factors such as economic growth, inflation, or unemployment reveal no significant differences by geographical region, it is important to underline their role in shaping both the economic and political contexts and the coordinates of political behavior. While economic growth, inflation, and unemployment do not show significant variations across the EU-27 regions, in practice, these objective factors could be seen as a baseline mechanism that interacts with individuals’ subjective perceptions and expectations. These factors interplay between personal cognitions and objective reality, generating a nuanced and complex understanding of the electoral behavior in the 2024 EP elections. Personal beliefs, perceptions, cognitions, and attitudes are strongly related to the subjective manner in which individuals understand and interpret both economic and political reality. In this respect, economic growth, measured as real GDP growth, is relevant in Malta (+5%), Poland (+3.1%), and Croatia (+3%). Between 2023 and 2024, most the EU-27 countries have registered economic growth between +1% and +2%. In a single case, represented by Estonia, the data reflect a negative trend of economic growth (−0.5%). Taking into account the inflation rates, we observed that Romania (5.42%), Poland (4.2%), Hungary (4.1%), Netherlands (3.7%), and Estonia (3.4%) registered inflation rates above the EU-27 average. In comparison, Scandinavian countries such as Denmark (1.1%) and Finland (1%) registered the lowest rates of inflation. Together with inflation and economic growth, unemployment is seen as a relevant economic factor that interacts with quality of life and economic status. From this perspective, the highest unemployment rates are found in Spain (11.27%), Greece (9.7%), and Lithuania (8.2%). In contrast, Denmark (2.5%), Malta (3%), Netherlands (3.6%), and Czech Republic (3.8%) are relevant examples of a decreased and stable level of unemployment.

3.2. Economic Perceptions and Voter Turnout

Comparing data from the 2024 EP elections with data from the 2019 EP elections, we find that there are insignificant differences in the field of voter turnout ( μ 2019 = 50.66 ;   μ 2024 = 48.91 ;   T = 0.113 ;   p = 0.911 ) . However, we observed significant differences regarding the individuals’ perceptions of the current economic situation ( μ 2019 = 54.11 ;   μ 2024 = 45.52 ;   T = 2.850 ;   p = 0.008 ) . The results reveal that voter turnout in EP elections remains largely stable. In contrast, the significant differences in perceptions of the national economic situation suggest that economic conditions were viewed more negatively in 2024 compared to 2019. This shift might indicate evolving economic conditions or dissatisfaction, underscoring the impact of economic perceptions on political behavior and swaying voter preferences in the 2024 EP elections. This situation could be explained by the overlapping crises: the health crises during the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic situation in the post-pandemic time, and the geopolitical crises at the Eastern border of the European Union, generated by the war in Ukraine. These aspects might confirm a particular situation in which economic perceptions are important for understanding the dynamics of voters’ behaviors in second-order elections. This particular situation is confirmed by the statistical results of the panel analysis based on data from 2019 and 2024. The statistical results confirmed that there are insignificant fixed effects in the field of voters’ behavior, generated by both subjective and objective economic factors (p > 0.05).
Regarding the rise of populist or radical parties in 2024 EP elections due to economic imbalances, the results were less dramatic. Contextual factors such as European security, climate changes, and the war in Ukraine dominated the political agenda. These dynamics suggest that, while second-order economic voting remains influential, it operates alongside other critical factors, shaping EP election outcomes.
An important finding of the study presents the impact of personal beliefs, cognitions, and perceptions in the field of political behavior. There are significant differences in voters’ turnout and economic perceptions by geographical region. To underscore these results, we used a comparison between voter turnout in countries with bad perceptions of the current economic situation and voter turnout in countries with good perceptions of national economic conditions. We observed differences in voter turnout between states where citizens have more negative perceptions of the current economic situation compared to those with more positive perceptions. Thus, in countries with more negative perceptions of the current economic situation (PE1), the average value of voter turnout is 43.79%, with a standard deviation of 11.66%. Conversely, in countries with more positive perceptions of the current economic situation, the average value of voter turnout is 56.34%, with a standard deviation of 18.45% (T = 2.171, p < 0.05). Figure 3 presents the differences between voter turnouts, taking into consideration subjective perceptions of the economy.
In accordance with these findings, evaluating the impact of both subjective and objective economic factors, we used the multiple linear equation of regression. The baseline model shows the following values: R2 = 0.423, F = 8.787, and p < 0.01. Table 3 presents the regression coefficients and level of significance of the economic predictors in association with voter turnout rates in EU-27 countries.
The results show that the subjective economic dimension is more likely to be associated with voter behavior than the objective macroeconomic dimension. Significant associations are registered in the field of perceptions on the current state of the economy ( β = 0.635 ,   p < 0.01 ) and expectations regarding future economic and unemployment situation ( β = 0.504 ,   p < 0.01 ) . We obtained a similar statistical coefficient of determination as other important academic studies that assessed the impact of economic perceptions in shaping electoral behavior. The value of the standardized coefficient of regression ( β ) suggests that perception of the current economic situation is a meaningful predictor of voter turnout, supporting the idea that individuals are more likely to engage in elections when they perceive the economic situation favorably. Positive economic outlooks often could increase civic engagement and trust in political institutions. This moderate–strong positive association between economic perception and active electoral behavior supports the idea that voters are more motivated to participate in elections when they perceive economic stability, reflecting an engagement in maintaining propitious economic conditions. This result creates opportunities for understanding the subjective dimension of voters’ behavior, suggesting that selective perception—rather than economic growth, inflation, or unemployment rates—influences voter turnout. Regarding the negative association between the perception of the future economic situation and the voter turnout ( β = 0.504 ,   p < 0.01 ) , we stress that, when individuals are more pessimistic (worse or the same economic situation), the voter turnout tends to increase. When people anticipate a difficult economic situation, they may still be motivated to participate in elections to influence the negative political or economic outcomes. The results reflect that, in 33.33% of EU-27 countries, unfavorable perceptions of the future economic situation are related to an increased level of voter turnout. For instance, only 15% of Danes (Denmark VT = 58.25%), 12% of Germans (Germany VT = 64.74), 19% of Luxembourgers (Luxembourg VT = 82.24%), and 19% of Belgians (Belgium VT = 89.01) perceive the future of economic and unemployment situation as favorable. Most of the EU citizens evaluate in terms of “the same” the future economic and unemployment situation.
These findings reflect the interactions between personal assessments based on economic perceptions in the field of electoral participation. Several academic studies have explained the dynamics of individuals’ subjective perceptions in correlation with political and economic objective factors. We measured the correlations between economic perceptions and objective economic indicators repressed by real GDP growth (%), inflation rate (%), and unemployment rate (%). We observed a single significant correlation between economic perceptions and unemployment. Thus, this finding suggests that individuals’ perceptions are associated with decreased rates of unemployment (r = −0.434, p = 0.02). A large level of employment coverage is more likely to lead to favorable perceptions on the current state of the economy. Figure 4 reflects the correlation between perceptions on the current economic situation and unemployment rates.
Whether voters are reacting to the current economic situation or are anticipating future economic conditions, their perceptions influence their engagement in the democratic electoral process. An important finding for political scientists or social psychologists consists in the fact that individuals’ perceptions are seen as important forces in political behavior.

3.3. Future Economic Perceptions and Consistency in Electoral Support: Prospective Vote

Besides the voter turnout, we evaluate electoral behavior in terms of electoral decisions for incumbent reelection. We used the concept of the incumbent party with the meaning of consistency in electoral support. In this respect, consistency in electoral support refers to the phenomenon where a political party or candidate maintains a stable level of support from voters over time. This means that the party or candidate consistently receives a specific proportion of votes or maintains a similar level of popularity across different elections or polling periods. Most of the electoral studies evaluate the relation between economic factors and opportunities for incumbent reelection. In this context, scholars have demonstrated that economic voting is based on the punishment–reward mechanism. In order to analyze this important relation in our study, we used the logistic regression model, using incumbent reelection as a dependent variable. Our baseline model stresses that incumbent reelection depends on both objective and subjective economic determinants. However, subjective perceptions play an important role in explaining why people are interested in voting and how people vote in different electoral contexts. Cross-national studies confirm that the odds of an incumbent party are positively related to macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, inflation, unemployment, and net average wages. Regarding the 2024 EP elections, the data reflect that 66.7% of the EU-27 countries were reelected the incumbent political parties. In Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Spain, Denmark, Belgium, and Estonia, statistical data reflect citizens’ electoral preferences for non-incumbent political parties. Figure 5 presents the distribution of votes for the incumbent party in the 2024 EP elections.
In accordance with the previous results, we developed a statistical model for explaining the odds of incumbent party reelection in the 2024 EP elections. Table 4 shows the logistic regression coefficients and significance levels.
The results reveal that the significant variable that could predict the dynamics of the vote for the incumbent party is represented by perceptions on the future state of economy and unemployment (FP1). We obtained a positive association between the vote for the incumbent party and the prospective dimension of the national economy and unemployment ( β = 0.417 ,   p = 0.029 ) . The value of the standardized β reflects the idea that the prospective economic situation is moderately related to voters’ decisions to reelect the incumbent party. Whilst voter turnout (VT) is largely influenced by the present economic circumstances, the incumbent support is linked with future expectations. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction correlated to the current economic state motivates electoral participation. Conversely, a positive outlook means the voters believe that the incumbent party might support or improve the economic conditions. The perception of the current economic situation motivates political participation, while future expectations are more tied to the issue of whether citizens choose to vote for the incumbent party. Comparing the average of positive perceptions coupled with the current economic situation with the future expectations related to the economy and unemployment, we observed significant differences with t = 7.108, p < 0.01. Future expectations are much more optimistic, with an average of 69.22% of respondents in the 2024 Spring Eurobarometer believing that the economic situation will remain the same or will be better. Figure 6 reveals the significant differences between the perception of the current economic situation and the future economic expectations.
Having explored the differences in the field of economic perceptions, the study focused on the model that examines how these perceptions influence voting behavior, particularly regarding incumbent support. The models highlight the importance of future economic outlooks in shaping political preferences. However, the following logistic equation of regression captures the relationship between prospective vote and electoral preferences for the incumbent party:
ln [ I N C ] = 2.09 + 0.417 × F P 1 + ε i , j
This quantitative model facilitates a better understanding of the real impact of the psychological variables in the field of political behavior. This complex interaction allows us to assess how optimistic or pessimistic perceptions about future economic conditions influence support for an incumbent party. The model fits the data from specific countries—such as the Netherlands, Ireland, Lithuania, Denmark, Portugal, Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovenia, and Croatia—where positive economic expectations (better outlook) predict a significant level of incumbent party reelection rates. In contrast, Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, and Luxembourg are characterized by economic pessimism (expectations of a worse future economic situation) and decreased levels of incumbent party reelections. Figure 7 shows the relationship between future economic expectations (worse or better) and predicted probabilities of incumbent reelection rates in the 2024 EP elections.
The empirical findings underscore the idea that voters’ behavior and electoral preferences interact with subjective perceptions on the state of the national economy rather than objective macroeconomic indicators. While the traditional economic factors provide a general backdrop, individuals’ perceptions of these economic conditions play a decisive role in political and electoral outcomes. As voters interpret the economic landscape through their various lenses, their engagement within the electoral process and their preferences for the incumbent party are guided less by economic data and more by how they expect their economic future to look.

4. Discussion

The present study reveals important regional differences in electoral behavior across the EU-27 countries during the 2024 EP elections. Voter turnout and incumbent party reelection, as the dependent variables of the study, present statistical differences across geographical regions. Western and Northern EU-27 countries are more likely to be characterized by an increased level of civic engagement than other geographical regions. Even though individuals’ interest in the EP elections shows significant variations across geographic positions, the incumbent party reelection rate is constant, with an increased level of predicted probability. Scholars observed that socio-demographic variables, social interactions, partisanship, and personal values are relevant for understanding these differences. Beyond cultural or political factors, individuals’ cognitive and perceptive processes are important predictors of voters’ behavior.
Voters are not simply reacting to economic indicators; rather, they filter economic reality through subjective perceptions and personal experiences. Using the theory of selective perception, we observe that similar economic results may lead to vastly different electoral outcomes. In order to evaluate the impact of personal perceptions in the field of electoral behavior, we observe that real economic indicators have not generated significant differences in voter turnout and electoral behavior. The statistical results confirm that GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment rate are insignificant factors in association with voter turnout and incumbent reelection in the 2024 EP elections. For this reason, we aimed to emphasize that individuals’ psychological processes, such as social cognition and economic perception, are more likely to be related to the dynamics of voter turnout and incumbent reelection in EU-27 countries.
From a theoretical perspective, selective perception is an important aspect that is related to both economic and political behaviors. Recent academic studies have emphasized that social and political cognition might be understood using a hybrid theoretical approach based on both rational factors and a subjective (emotional) manner of interpreting the real social or political world. If political novices are more likely to understand political reality in terms of technical issues, politically engaged citizens are more prone to developing “hot cognitions” when they are faced with social or political reality. Emotions like fear, hope, or anger often drive political engagement, influencing not only political participation but also the choice of candidates or parties. This highlights the importance of building an understanding of the idea that political behavior is not based on rational estimations but is, rather, deeply intertwined with emotional factors. Political campaigns, electoral marketing, and political communication are several examples of the interaction between political decisions and emotional factors. An important study based on the link between emotions and votes in EP elections presents anger and anxiety as the main psychological determinants of political behavior. Druckman and McDermott observed that there is a direct link between negative emotions and support for “risky” policies (Druckman and McDermott 2008). Radical perspectives or risky policies are more likely to be correlated to individuals’ negative emotions. In contrast, anxious people are more likely to be associated with conservative policies or moderate political perspectives. In correlation with selective perception theory, we argue that, when people become emotionally invested in politics, their positions tend to become fixed and unchanging. Therefore, emotional responses determine whether people act as deliberative citizens who are open to discussion or as partisan citizens who defend their personal beliefs.
The academic debate on what drives voters’ behavior in EU elections reveals the importance of both emotional and cognitive processes. Emotional responses shape how voters engage with and respond to electoral issues. Research on affective influence in decision making or political cognition confirms that politics often evokes strong emotional responses (Bartkowska and Tiemann 2015; Stevenson and Duch 2013; Tilley et al. 2008; Tverdova 2012). Using region- and country-level case studies, scholars have observed differences in voters’ behaviors that are generated by individual and community levels of income. Despite these objective factors, empirical findings suggest that both rich and poor people use inequality perceptions as a heuristic technique when deciding whether to vote (Han and Kwon 2023). Together with economic perceptions, perceptions of social status play a crucial role in shaping political behavior. As individuals often see themselves as being positioned in the middle of the social hierarchy, regardless of their objective status, these objective perceptions might influence their electoral decisions. In the context of economic voting, such perceptions may lead to electoral support for incumbent or oppositional political parties. These dynamics highlight the importance of social identity in shaping voting behavior amidst economic conditions (Evans and Kelley 2004). Individuals’ cognitive styles interact with their attitudes and beliefs, as they relate to political reality. Understanding the role played by both emotional and cognitive processes confirms the complex nexus between psychological state and electoral behavior, illustrating how affective responses can shape support for various types of political ideologies and political parties.
In accordance with these psychological perspectives, we argue that perceptions of current social, economic, or political states are relevant predictors of political behavior. Using economic data that support the economic vote theoretical model, this study reveals the importance of psychological determinants in electoral decision making. However, perceptions of the economy play a crucial role in shaping voters’ behavior, especially when macroeconomic indicators have a limited political impact.
Regarding the research objective O1, the study presents significant differences in voter turnout (F = 4.608, p = 0.011) and economic perceptions (F > 3.31, p < 0.05) according to geographic region. Northern and Western EU-27 countries are more likely to be associated with an increased level of political participation and favorable perceptions linked to current economic conditions. Beyond political, cultural, and historical factors, economic determinants are important for understanding why individuals are interested in political participation and why they reelect incumbent parties. However, as we pointed out in the theoretical approach, economic votes could predict both electoral participation and decisions.
In order to achieve O2, we tested research hypothesis H1, which assumed that perceptions on the current state of the economic situation are positively related to an increased level of voter turnout (Bandura 1971; Bell et al. 2009; Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2016; McGregor 2018; Metzger et al. 2020; Monahan et al. 2000; Morris and Dolan 1997; Nelson-Field and Riebe 2011; Neuman et al. 2007). The empirical findings confirmed research hypothesis H1. Using multiple linear regression based on the stepwise method, we estimated a moderate–high positive correlation between perceptions of the current economic situation and voter turnout with β = 0.635 ,   p < 0.01 . Both Table 3 and Figure 3 confirm the significant impact of the perceptions of the current economic situation in the field of electoral behavior. The results confirmed the existence of the reward–punishment mechanism and the main hypothesis postulated in the field of economic voting as it is related to political responsibility. EU-27 countries characterized by an increased level of favorable economic perceptions were found to have registered an increased level of voter turnout in the 2024 EP elections.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) investigated the impact of the objective economy in generating individuals’ economic perception, being in accordance with the research objective O3. The empirical findings suggest a negative but significant correlation between macroeconomic indicators and economic perceptions. In this respect, the only significant variable which is related to favorable perceptions on the current economic situation is represented by unemployment rates (r = −0.434, p = 0.02). Citizens of EU-27 countries with low unemployment rates are more likely to have favorable perceptions of the current economic situation. Low unemployment suggests that most people can find and maintain jobs (Gomez and Matthew 2001; Han and Kwon 2023; Hansford and Gomez 2015; Harmon-Jones and Mills 2019; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011; Jiménez 2023; Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Okolikj and Quinlan 2016; Stone and Cooper 2001; Stroud 2010; Szewczyk and Crowder-Meyer 2022). This fact might lead to the financial security of individuals, which fosters a sense of confidence in the economy. Moreover, there is an important psychological impact. Thus, employment provides a sense of purpose and accomplishment.
Regarding the research objective O4, we tested research hypothesis H3, which assumes that objective economic factors are strongly associated with the electorate’s decision to reelect the incumbent political party (Freire and Lobo 2005; Garrett 2009; Gomez and Matthew 2001; Kanai et al. 2011; Kirkland and Coppock 2018; Klašnja et al. 2014; Koepke and Ringe 2006; Kotnarowski 2016; Lewis-Beck 1988; Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Wimpy and Whitten 2017; Wlezien et al. 1997). The empirical findings suggest that there is no significant evidence that an objective economy is related to both voter turnout and incumbent reelection. Using the multiple linear equation of regression, we rejected this hypothesis, demonstrating that GDP growth, inflation rate, and unemployment do not have significant regression coefficients for predicting voter turnout (p > 0.05). By the logit model, we assessed the impact of both objective and subjective economic factors on voters’ electoral behavior (Table 4). We observed that objective economic factors are not significant for predicting the incumbent reelection rates ( β E G = 0.073 ,   p = 0.596 ;   β I N F = 0.261 ,   p = 0.305 ;   β U N = 0.0002 ;   p = 0.941 ) .
A significant result of the study confirms research hypothesis H5, which postulates that an increased level of economic expectations is positively related to the incumbent party’ reelection (prospective vote) (Cowden and Hartley 1992; Klašnja et al. 2014; Kirkland and Coppock 2018; Freire and Lobo 2005; De Vries et al. 2018; Evans and Pickup 2010; Wlezien et al. 1997, Sanders 2000). This research hypothesis is related to O5, which stresses the correlation between subjective economic factors and electoral behavior. Therefore, we assume two research hypotheses: H4, which presents the relation between voters’ behavior and economic perception in terms of retrospective vote; H5, which indicates that the prospective vote is more likely to be related to the incumbent party’s reelection. Our evaluations, based on the logit model, highlighted that future economic expectations are moderately and positively related to electoral decisions for incumbent party reelection ( β F P 1 = 0.417 ,   p = 0.029 ) . There is insufficient evidence to assert that retrospective voting is relevant for incumbent reelection. Consequently, research hypothesis H4 is rejected ( β P E 1 = 1.333 ,   p = 0.248 ;   β P E 2 = 972 ,   p = 0.367 ;   β P E 3 = 0.280 ,   p = 0.228 ) .
In order to assess the relevance of the statistical models associated with voter turnout and incumbent reelection in the 2024 EP elections, we obtained R2 = 0.423, p < 0.01 for the model that explained voter turnout, and pseudo-R2 = 0.352, p < 0.01 for the incumbent reelection model. These results align with the findings of similar academic studies and reinforce an economic theory of voting behavior (Anderson et al. 2004; Gomez and Matthew 2006; Szewczyk and Crowder-Meyer 2022; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Brown-Iannuzzi et al. 2016). This model highlights the importance of subjective economic perceptions in shaping decisions to participate politically and political preferences. Although real economic conditions undoubtedly might influence these perceptions, they act primarily as a foundation upon which subjective interpretations are built. These perceptions and interpretations serve as a filter through which individuals decide whether to vote and which candidates to support. Voters tend to select parties they may believe address their specific concerns, emphasizing the critical role played by subjective economic perceptions and expectations. The interaction between voters’ behavior and economic perceptions is not merely a statistical correlation but is deeply rooted in psychological mechanisms. Pessimism about the future can mobilize voters due to fear or anger, which are emotions associated with the desire to avert perceived negative economic outcomes. The literature on cognition and motivation supports the idea that voters are interested in elections to change the negative outcomes in social and economic fields. Positive perceptions of economic conditions might increase voter turnout by fostering contentment and trust in political governance. Content voters are more likely to participate in elections, believing that their political preferences will further secure their well-being, and creating premises for an important mechanism based on accountability and political trust. Using psychological perspectives, we argue that selective perception plays a crucial role in shaping both voter participation and electoral decision making. Partisan biases shape how individuals perceive the economy, with voters from different political backgrounds interpreting economic conditions in ways that align with their beliefs. This psychological process can result in varied voting behaviors based on how the economy is framed within partisan contexts, further influencing turnout and voting choice. By incorporating these mechanisms in our analysis, the empirical findings provide a more comprehensive and nuanced explanation of voter behavior, linking economic perceptions to emotional responses and biases that shape electoral decisions.
As for the limitations of the present study, several factors may affect the results, including the influence of uncontrolled factors and the challenges that arise in attempting to accurately measure subjective perceptions. To address these limitations, further studies will explore the influence of external factors, such as media exposure and political interest, on attempts to measure the impact of subjective economic perceptions in the field of electoral behavior. Such efforts will help to refine our understanding of how perceptions and the economy have a real impact on electoral attitudes and behavior. Another limitation of the study stems from the fact that we did not consider other factors for second-order elections, such as attitudes toward the EU, national political issues, or partisan loyalties. However, by isolating these factors, we aimed to assess the impact of economic perceptions in the field of voting behavior. Although we obtained a relatively low value of R2, the results align with other empirical research, illustrating that the economic dimension can only partially predict voting behavior in European elections. The aim of the research was to determine the extent to which the economic dimension of voting can be extrapolated from national legislative elections to European Parliamentary elections. In order to observe these nuances, we stress the fact that our models have several limitations related to logistic regression and generalizability. We used data for 2024 only; our sample was limited to 27 statistical observations represented by EU-27 countries. Our results do not establish causality between economic dimension and voters’ behavior; rather, they highlight how votes are filtered through subjective economic perceptions. Using a panel analysis, we estimated insignificant statistical values for all subjective and objective economic factors (p > 0.05) regarding the impact of fixed effects in the field of electoral behavior. These findings highlight the particular context of the second-order elections (2024 EP elections), where both sociotropic and prospective votes are relevant coordinates of electoral behaviors. Political, social, and post-pandemic contexts can be called upon to explain these results and prospective votes for a stable and optimistic economic future.

5. Conclusions

This study creates a link between personal beliefs and economic determinants of electoral behavior. To evaluate this nexus, the paper integrates perceptions and economic voting decision to analyze voters’ behaviors in the 2024 EP elections. The study confirms the link between subjective and objective economic conditions as relevant factors in shaping electoral behaviors. There are notable differences between EU-27 countries across geographic regions, which are primarily explained by perceptions on the current state of the economy in the national space. This highlights the importance of the national economic situation in shaping favorable or unfavorable economic perceptions. Thus, individuals’ perceptions, rather than economic growth, inflation, and unemployment, play a crucial role in electoral decisions. The lowest values of determination coefficients could be explained by partisan perceptions, non-economic factors, national political responses, strategic voting decisions, and other loyalties related to political actors. The weak association between economic factors and voters’ behaviors suggests that a broader range of factors should be considered in future research. Exploring sociocultural values, educational levels of voters, social class, and party alignment, as well as using longitudinal data, can provide a more comprehensive approach of voter behavior in EP second-order elections. Overall, the study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of voter behavior, providing practical insights for political actors, scholars, and policymakers to better address the concerns and expectations of voters in the context of a sustainable economy.

Supplementary Materials

The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/socsci14040226/s1.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, H.C., S.G. and S.V.; methodology, S.G; software, S.G.; validation, S.G.; formal analysis, S.G.; investigation, H.C., S.G. and S.V.; resources, S.V.; data curation, S.V.; writing—original draft preparation, S.G.; writing—review and editing, H.C. and S.V.; visualization, H.C.; supervision, S.G.; project administration, S.G.; funding acquisition, H.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Quantitative data were extracted and collected from secondary sources and archives as follows: Voter turnout—European Parliament, European Elections, 6–9 June 2024. Available online: https://elections.europa.eu/en/ (accessed on 15 July 2024). Economic variables: GDP growth—data were retrieved from Eurostat, Real GDP growth rate, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tec00115/default/table?lang=en (accessed on 20 July 2024) and 96, World Bank Group, GDP (Current USD), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (accessed on 25 July 2024). Inflation and unemployment rates—data were retrieved from Trading Economics, Main Indicators, https://tradingeconomics.com/indicators (accessed on 20 July 2024). Data regarding economic perceptions (perceptions on the current state of the economy, perceptions on the current state of household finances, perceptions on the current state of one’s employment, perceptions on the future state of economy and unemployment, and perceptions on the future state of one’s employment) were retrieved from Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3216 (accessed on 25 July 2024).

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflicts of interest.

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Figure 1. Correlations between research constructs.
Figure 1. Correlations between research constructs.
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Figure 2. Voter turnout in 2024 EP elections by geographical region.
Figure 2. Voter turnout in 2024 EP elections by geographical region.
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Figure 3. Voter turnout by perceptions on the current state of the economy.
Figure 3. Voter turnout by perceptions on the current state of the economy.
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Figure 4. Statistical correlation between perceptions on the state of the economy and unemployment rates.
Figure 4. Statistical correlation between perceptions on the state of the economy and unemployment rates.
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Figure 5. Share of votes for incumbent and opposition party.
Figure 5. Share of votes for incumbent and opposition party.
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Figure 6. Economic perceptions on the state of the economy. Differences between current situation and future expectations.
Figure 6. Economic perceptions on the state of the economy. Differences between current situation and future expectations.
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Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of incumbent party vote and perceptions on the future state of the economy and unemployment.
Figure 7. Predicted probabilities of incumbent party vote and perceptions on the future state of the economy and unemployment.
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Table 1. Research variables: symbols, measures, and sources of data.
Table 1. Research variables: symbols, measures, and sources of data.
VariablesSymbolUnits of MeasurementData Source
Voter turnoutVT[0–100]European Parliament
Incumbent partyINC
0
Non-incumbent, Opposition Party
1
Incumbent Party
European Parliament
Economic growthEG[0–100]Eurostat; Trading Economics; World Bank Group Data
Inflation rateINF[0–100]Trading Economics
Unemployment rateUN[0–100]Trading Economics
Perceptions on the current state of the economyPE1[0–100]Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024
Perceptions on the current state of household financesPE2[0–100]Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024
Perceptions on the current state of one’s employmentPE3[0–100]Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024
Perceptions on the future state of economy and unemploymentFP1[0–100]Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024
Perceptions on the future state of one’s employmentFP2[0–100]Standard Eurobarometer 101 Spring 2024
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for research variables.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for research variables.
VariablesMeanMedianVarianceStd.
Deviation
SkewnessKurtosisMin.Max.
Voter turnout48.9148.31248.8815.780.810.7121.3589.01
Economic growth1.651.701.391.180.601.06−0.505.00
Inflation rate2.482.301.211.100.630.710.705.42
Unemployment rate6.015.804.362.090.640.282.5011.27
Perceptions on the current state of the economy45.5239.00345.1118.580.65−0.5218.0086.00
Perceptions on the current state of household finances74.3074.00121.0611.00−0.24−0.7055.0091.00
Perceptions on the current state of one’s employment64.4463.0078.188.84−0.10−0.5247.0082.00
Perceptions on the future state of economy and unemployment69.2270.0065.498.09−0.16−0.1650.0084.00
Perceptions on the future state of one’s employment79.5280.0064.118.01−0.700.3959.0092.00
Table 3. Economic predictors of voter turnout. Multiple linear regression coefficients.
Table 3. Economic predictors of voter turnout. Multiple linear regression coefficients.
Independent Factors(β)Sig.
Economic growth−0.0550.766
Inflation rate0.2330.198
Unemployment rate0.0260.898
Perceptions on the current state of the economy0.6350.001 **
Perceptions on the current state of household finances−0.0240.928
Perceptions on the current state of one’s employment0.0200.942
Perceptions on the future state of economy and unemployment−0.5040.006 **
Perceptions on the future state of one’s employment−0.3130.122
Constant (Intercept)31.506
R2 = 0.423
Dependent variable: voter turnout. ** p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 4. Economic predictors of incumbent reelections using binary logistic regression coefficients.
Table 4. Economic predictors of incumbent reelections using binary logistic regression coefficients.
Independent Factors(β)Sig.
Economic growth0.0730.596
Inflation rate0.2610.305
Unemployment rate0.0020.941
Perceptions on the current state of the economy1.3330.248
Perceptions on the current state of household finances0.9720.367
Perceptions on the current state of one’s employment0.2800.228
Perceptions on the future state of economy and unemployment0.4170.029 *
Perceptions on the future state of one’s employment0.0010.971
Constant−2.09
Pseudo R2 = 0.352, p < 0.01
Dependent variable: vote for incumbent party; * p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
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Grecu, S.; Vranceanu, S.; Chiriac, H. Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior in 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Quantitative Approach. Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040226

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Grecu S, Vranceanu S, Chiriac H. Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior in 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Quantitative Approach. Social Sciences. 2025; 14(4):226. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040226

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Grecu, Silviu, Simona Vranceanu, and Horia Chiriac. 2025. "Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior in 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Quantitative Approach" Social Sciences 14, no. 4: 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040226

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Grecu, S., Vranceanu, S., & Chiriac, H. (2025). Economic Voting and Electoral Behavior in 2024 European Parliament Elections: A Quantitative Approach. Social Sciences, 14(4), 226. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040226

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