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Article

“Shocking the System” in the 21st Century: Conservative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Plan for Authoritarianism in the U.S.

Department of Political Science, Geography and International Studies, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529, USA
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14(4), 235; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040235
Submission received: 28 March 2024 / Revised: 11 March 2025 / Accepted: 20 March 2025 / Published: 11 April 2025

Abstract

:
The first few days of the second Trump presidency saw a flurry of executive orders targeting immigrants, the transgender community, blacks, and federal government employees. The resulting “shocks” to the system are unprecedented, causing many to question the continuation of American democracy. These actions are a few of many policy preferences developed by conservatives and captured in “Project 2025”, spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation and with the overall intent of restructuring the federal government to suit authoritarian aims. Using a theoretical framework regarding policy entrepreneurs (PEs), I argue that conservative PEs (CPEs), under the aegis of the Republican Party and a second Trump term, are encouraging a shift away from a federal democratic republic to an authoritarian regime. CPEs of interest include elected officials, think tanks, media outlets, interest groups, and political operatives; collectively, these entities constitute a network of mostly unnoticed conservative political professionals using the mechanisms of policy entrepreneurship to damage American democracy. Overall, the actions CPEs take in terms of setting the agenda, controlling the electoral process, and informing the media indicate an eventual abandonment of democratic norms, an inclination towards the establishment of an authoritarian regime, and acceptance of said regime by a significant portion of the American people.

1. Introduction

The nonprofit organization Freedom House was created because the U.S. commitment to values of freedom and democracy constituted “a bulwark against authoritarian encroachment around the world”1. The concept of democracy and belief in the Constitution is so ingrained in the U.S. public that any other type of governing seems foreign. To the average American, authoritarian governments happen “over there somewhere”. However, the 2024 presidential election was framed as “keeping democracy intact” under Kamala Harris versus the threat of authoritarianism under Trump. Trump, who mused publicly about becoming a dictator, is back in office. Immediately after being inaugurated, several executive orders were signed that caused an immediate shakeup in the federal government and shocked the American public. In the flurry of executive orders, several took aim at immigrants, the transgender community, African Americans, and federal government employees. In addition, Trump’s nominations for Cabinet and other key positions raised eyebrows as none of the nominees are actively qualified for the positions they sought. Among them are Russell Vought, Peter Navarro, Paul Atkins, and Brendan Carr2—all who contributed to drafting “Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise” (colloquially referred to as “Project 2025”, Heritage Foundation (2025)), a set of conservative policy and government personnel preferences spearheaded by the Heritage Foundation. The overall aim of Project 2025 is to restructure the federal government away from a democratic republic with constitutional checks and balances/separation of powers and into an authoritarian regime with federal powers concentrated in the President. In addition, entrepreneur Elon Musk has emerged as a sort of “shadow president” who, after contributing over $200 million to Trump’s reelection campaign3, heads the “Department of Government Efficiency” (a department he created) and inserts his opinions regarding potential hirings and firings of government employees. Finally, in the case of Trump v. United States (2024), the Supreme Court ruled, “Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority”. As such, Trump has been given wide latitude to act, even if his actions could otherwise be deemed “criminal” in scope. His actions are supported by Republican officials who believe them to be in the best interests of the country and suggest they are ready to embrace a new political regime that moves away from democracy. As such, it begs the question: What happens when the U.S., which calls itself the “arsenal of democracy”, begins to emulate the rhetoric and actions of known authoritarian countries through one of its two major ideologies and political parties?
In this paper, I present the notion that the U.S. is on pace to supplant democratic republicanism with authoritarianism due to the actions of conservative policy entrepreneurs (“CPEs”) under the aegis of the Republican Party and the leadership of Donald Trump. With Trump’s reelection, he is relying on conservative policy entrepreneurs to assist in instilling authoritarianism in U.S. politics. Collectively, the actions of these parties represent “shocks” to the federal system designed to first discombobulate the American people and then force them to accept regime change. First, I provide a theoretical framework to define “policy entrepreneurs” and explore authoritarian elements vis-à-vis CPEs that exist in the U.S. and show how they seek to reshape government at all levels, using “Project 2025 ‘Mandate for Leadership: A Conservative Promise’” as the blueprint. Next, I develop a “relationship map” that shows CPEs are represented by five specific categories: (1) Elected officials, (2) think tanks, (3) media outlets, (4) interest groups, and (5) political operatives. Each category maintains a specific relationship to one or more of the others, and all are on an active quest to transmogrify the current political system from democratic to authoritarian. Collectively, CPEs and the roles they play in policymaking serve as the strongest determinant which is reshaping the government structure. Next, I discuss how the influence of conservative policy entrepreneurs, alongside the actions of the current presidential administration, are sending “shocks” through the U.S. political and economic systems to enshrine and maintain the new regime. Finally, I discuss the current reactions of the public, which suggest a significant percentage of (mostly Republican) U.S. citizens support a move towards authoritarianism.

2. Authoritarianism and Policy Entrepreneurs

The study of authoritarianism as a political system expanded greatly in the wake of WWII and the inception of the Cold War (Eckhardt 1991; Donno 2013; Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Shirah 2016; Solt 2012). Political Science scholars sought to identify countries affected by it, understand how and why countries adopted it and, borrowing heavily from psychology literature, examine the personalities of authoritarian leaders and groups under this type of leadership (Heaven and Bucci 2001; Napier and Jost 2008; Perry et al. 2013). However, a succinct definition of “authoritarian” can be summed up as:
A type of government whereby there are few limits placed on the government itself; yet the government is “nevertheless kept in check by other political and social institutions that it cannot control—such as self-governing territories; organized religions; business organizations; or labor unions” (Ginsberg et al. 2022).
In addition, there are certain characteristics that identify a governing regime as “authoritarian”; this type of government tends to have:
A strong central power (often, concentrated power in a single executive or branch of government, and little to no sharing of power with states or local governments). In the U.S., this could also mean stripping power away from independent agencies such as the CIA, EPA, Federal Reserve, and the Office of Personnel Management.
Restrictions in the “rule of law” (i.e., courts are either unable to rule or must do so according to policy decisions deemed acceptable by the central power).
Lesser dependence on the “separation of powers” (i.e., other branches of government—e.g., legislative and/or judiciary—are unable or unwilling to act as a “check” on the executive).
Fewer opportunities for “pluralism” (i.e., few groups will be able to approach the government with their policy agenda).
Any existing constitution—and rights of citizens enshrined within—are enervated greatly or eliminated altogether (civil liberties and civil rights in particular).
Political “legitimacy” of the regime is based on appeals to emotion, and the regime is seen as a “necessity” to combat perceived “societal problems” (e.g., minority and ethnic groups, minority religious groups, progressives, immigrants).
Few (if any) “free and fair” elections at all levels of government (e.g., elections may be rigged in favor of the central power, while opposing candidates and/or parties precluded from appearing on ballots, voter suppression).
Bureaucracy is staffed by the regime in power (i.e., populated by loyalists); and
The regime does not go away easily and can remain in power for long periods of time.4
Theoretically, an authoritarian regime can embody a left-wing ideology; however, most studies show that conservatives are more likely to embrace it (see Aspelund et al. 2013; Conway et al. 2018; Duckitt and Bizumic 2013; Eysenck 1981; Feldman 2003; Goertzel 1994; McClosky and Chong 1985; Milburn et al. 2014; Ray 1983; Stone 1980; Todosijević and Enyedi 2008; Van Hiel et al. 2006). Arguably, this is more attractive to conservatives because of the restrictions inherent in authoritarianism—in particular, curtailment of civil rights/liberties, “othering” of groups, emphasis on tradition/culture/religion, and a desire for a government structure that will adhere to these preferences. According to Eckhardt’s study of psychological patterns (1991), authoritarianism and conservatism share several traits: First, both “share a psychological pattern that renders them each a “self-destructive and antisocial guide to human relations” (Eckhardt 1991, p. 111). In addition, both share a pattern of “punitive and restrictive childhood training which tends to contribute to both of these personality patterns, especially (and perhaps only) if reinforced by similar disciplines at church, school, factory, and office” (Eckhardt 1991, p. 112). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the authoritarian regime being established in the U.S. is predicated on the actions of conservative policy entrepreneurs, and those actions are accepted by conservative voters, as they share a desire to subjugate groups and base their decisions largely on religion, bigotry, and the desire to “remake government” in a way that establishes a clear political hierarchy with conservatives at the top. Finally, as to whether authoritarianism will be accepted by the U.S. public at large, Giroux (2011) argues that the specter of authoritarianism grew during the Obama administration as an extension of Bush 43’s administration and its implementation of wiretapping, state-sanctioned kidnapping, and warrantless surveillance. However, the desire for authoritarianism grew in the minds of conservative voters during Obama’s administration; many white voters could not accept the first African American president, and Republicans honed their obstructionist skills during his tenure. Collectively, these actions culminated in the election of Trump as the 45th POTUS.5 The Republican Party itself moved even farther to the right by helping Trump win the election as the 47th president and completely supporting the implementation of “Project 2025” (despite copious warnings from the Democratic Party and its presidential nominee, former VP Kamala Harris).

2.1. Policy Entrepreneurs and the Allure of Conservatism

The steady rise of conservatives (and their influence on the Republican Party) from the late 20th Century to date is predicated on the work of “policy entrepreneurs” (PEs). In business, the “entrepreneur” is the person who has an end goal of building and sustaining a successful, highly profitable business using funding, connections (to funding sources, other businesses, suppliers, etc.), advertising, initiative, drive, and timing to bring their goal to fruition. In politics, the “entrepreneur” utilizes similar factors with the goal of promulgating a certain policy preference by taking advantage of opportune times (“policy windows”) to execute their plans (see Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2011; Chamberlain and Haider-Markel 2005; DeGregorio 1988; Di Lorenzo 1994; Djupe and Olson 2010; Fafard 2015; Fox and Schuhmann 1999; Frisch-Aviram et al. 2018; Garrett and Jansa 2015; Gel’man 2022; Harris 2022; Hornung et al. 2019; Jia 2016; King 2010; King and Roberts 1992; Lamont 2021; Mintrom 1997a, 1997b; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Mooney 2000, 2001; Roberts and King 1991; Weible et al. 2012).
For these reasons, the policy entrepreneurs connected to the current administration can be regarded as conservative policy entrepreneurs, or CPEs. For the categories of CPEs to be discussed, a “policy window”—an opportune time to approach government with problems, proposals, and solutions–opened with the election of Trump in 2016 and expanded with his return to the Presidency in 2025. It can be argued that CPEs in government since the early 2000s have been less concerned about developing policy goals, resolving conflicts, or competing for policy preferences; rather, decision-making has become a “zero-sum” game where compromise with the opposite party is considered verboten. In addition, King and Roberts (1992) see PEs as “risk takers”, and executive PEs as possessing skill and clear direction and being Machiavellian in their policy pursuits. For CPEs, we are witnessing all these factors: specific policy goals are rather clear—for example, severe restrictions to abortion access in the wake of the Dobbs decision6; eradicating affirmative action in college admissions7; and stringent policies restricting immigration. In a second Trump administration, additional policy goals include (but are not limited to) (a) eliminating all diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) initiatives across public (and private) institutions, (b) completing a massive deportation scheme to remove approximately 12 million immigrants8, and (c) aggressive restructuring or dismantling of government agencies and termination of government employees9. In addition, CPEs are Machiavellian in their policy quests; because the “ends justify the means”, CPEs approach their version of policymaking as a necessity to accomplish the goals of the Republican Party (i.e., to regress social policy by 60+ years while acquiring and maintaining as much political power as possible—both of which fit well within the ideals of an authoritarian regime). Finally, the existence of “Project 2025” (discussed later) represents a confluence of conservative policy experts crafting a “conservative playbook” by which the current administration is operating. As such, CPEs appear to be the most responsible for fostering the current levels of political polarization and the most likely to usher in an authoritarian regime.

2.2. “Project 2025” and CPE Influence

2024 was the year many people learned not only about Project 2025 but also about the Heritage Foundation—the conservative think tank responsible for putting it together. “Project 2025” (as it is referred to colloquially) is the culmination of nearly six decades of conservative organizations working to reverse progressive changes to government and society while emphasizing conservative ideals of tax cuts for the wealthy and incorporating Evangelical Christian ideas into the governmental apparatus. Consisting of (1) the Mandate for Leadership—the Conservative Promise; (2) the Presidential Personnel Database; (3) the Presidential Administration Academy; and (4) the 180-Day Playbook, Project 2025 was crafted by the Heritage Foundation with the assistance of over 100 conservative organizations.10 The overall objective of Project 2025 is to
“…start undoing the damage the Left has wrought (emphasis added) and building a better country for all Americans in 2025. It is not enough for conservatives to win elections. If we are going to rescue the country from the grip of the radical Left, we need both a governing agenda and the right people in place, ready to carry this agenda out on day one of the next conservative administration” (emphasis added).11
The actions of the progenitors of Project 2025 appear to follow the “multiple policy streams” approach developed by Kingdon (1984) and used to set the political agenda. The approach contains three elements: (1) the “problem stream”, where specific concerns and problems are identified; (2) the “policy proposals stream”, where possible solutions to the problems are contrived; and (3) the “politics stream”, where the seekers are paying attention to election results, changes in presidential administration, and public mood regarding an issue, gauging all to determine if there is sentiment for the “problems” they identified and a desire to resolve them. When the three streams converge, the expectation is that a policy “window”—an opportune time to approach government with problems; proposals; and solutions—will open and the policy entrepreneurs will act. While “stream convergence” seems somewhat spontaneous, it does not have to be. When the “window” is closed (or perceived to be), policy entrepreneurs may spend time planning while updating all three streams. In the case of Project 2025, the “Mandate for Leadership” plans have been published since 1981 during the Reagan Administration, implemented (to a much smaller degree) during every Republican presidential administration, and updated every four years.12 Arguably, conservatives have been playing the “long game” and saw their “window” open with Trump’s first presidency but close briefly during Biden’s administration. Since Trump has returned to office, the Heritage Foundation (and the other conservative organizations) see the year 2025 as “the year to strike, as the iron is hot” and the policy window is fully reopened.
To accomplish this, CPEs responsible for Project 2025 expect the federal government to (1) Implement conservative policies across the federal government while rolling back progressive gains of the past 60+ years; (2) concentrate power in the hands of the president; and (3) eliminate any influence of Democrats, moderates, liberals, or progressives. Finally, the “project” aims to restructure the federal government, with emphasis on the executive branch. Under the plan, power concentrated in the hands of the President is heavily influenced by the “Unitary Executive Theory” (Calabresi and Rhodes 1992; Gostin 2009; Rudalevige 2012; Waterman 2009). The theory holds that Presidential power should extend beyond the enumerated powers of Article II in the Constitution; rather, the president is entitled to exercise complete control not only over the rest of the Executive Branch but should also be able to supersede the constitutional requirements of “separation of powers” and “checks and balances”. Thus, the confluence of Trump’s dictatorial aspirations coupled with the Heritage Foundation’s plans for a restructured, completely conservative federal government apparatus designed to roll back decades of progressive accomplishments and decimate the notion of bipartisanship starts to look less like the “democracy” upon which the Constitution—and our nation—was founded. These actions, coupled with those of other conservative organizations, media, interest groups, elected officials, and political operatives, are helping to facilitate the overall shift from democracy to authoritarianism in 2025.

3. 21st Century CPE Categories and Relationship Mapping

In this section, I outline the categories of CPEs, along with the relationship each has with Trump, the federal government, and other categories, for the overall purpose of installing an authoritarian regime in the U.S. The categories include: (1) Think Tanks, (2) Elected Officials (and candidates) for local/state/federal elections, (3) Political Operatives, (4) Interest Groups, and (5) Media (including social media). In the “relationship map” (Figure 1), the arrows indicate the direction of information among the categories, with the media—including social media—expected to be the most important CPE. According to the map, all groups utilize the media—including social media—to extend their influence over the political system and simultaneously communicate their policy goals to the public. Conservative media outlets (e.g., Fox News, Newsmax, Washington Examiner) cover those stories in a manner favorable to the regime and communicate directly with the other CPE categories for information; at the same time, social media will communicate information to its users, prompting support among conservatives and contentious debate between conservatives and non-conservatives. Since Donald Trump has been in the political eye, conservative media has grown considerably in terms of the number of outlets, social media groups, and the ubiquity of right-wing perspectives on virtually any political news story.13 Because the threat of authoritarianism comes from conservatives (and the right-wing in general), the actions of CPEs in each category will be supportive of a given policy pronouncement that adheres to the dictates of a conservative constituency, both of which help to promote an authoritarian government.
Chamberlain and Haider-Markel (2005) examined the role of right-wing groups (RWG), through CPEs, seeking to impose “phony liens” against the opposition while fighting those placed on them; arguably, we will see RWG pursue actions against other groups if a new or existing policy is regarded as detrimental to the political right. For example, if a new policy promulgated by progressives/liberals recognizes the rights of a marginalized group, RWG (through CPEs) will argue against its implementation and express concerns that the new policy imperils the rights of the RWG. Thus, the perceived “policy window opening” for CPEs may expand to mitigate (or perhaps obliterate) the successes of their liberal/progressive/moderate counterparts. Under the current regime, CPEs are willing to partner with RWG in pursuit of the same policy outcome but for different reasons, especially if “morality politics” are in play (Simmons et al. 2011). For example, CPEs identified as “evangelical” view abortion as a violation of the tenets of their faith; however, they may be joined by RWG, which view abortion rights as the facilitator of the “Great Replacement Theory”. During this administration, we see a confluence of disparate RWG and CPEs regarding policy and tacit embrace of U.S. authoritarianism, as the agenda of both will center on stifling and eventually eradicating, the principles of progressivism across government and society. The idea is supported in part by Trump’s pardon of most of the January 6 insurrectionists who, while technically engaging in treason with their 2021 attack on the Capitol, are viewed as “patriots” by the many on the right.14 In addition, CPEs are instrumental in presenting the notion of “threat” as the need for authoritarian measures. Feldman and Stenner (1997) found that a predisposition towards authoritarianism makes it easier to identify perceived “threats”. As such, it appears that conservatives, believing that the government has moved “too far to the left” (and “strong leadership” is required to move it rightward), have identified their perceived “threats” and ways to eliminate them via policymaking enshrined in Project 2025. (Putative “threats”, according to Project 2025, include, but are not limited to, “DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion)”, “LGBTQ+ rights”, “abortion”, and “Democrats/liberals”. Therefore, the public is instructed to view Project 2025’s “threats” as their own, and the Mandate for Leadership sets forth means for attacking these “threats” on behalf of the American people.) Finally, CPEs pursuing an authoritarian agenda are likely to adhere to the policy preferences of certain institutions (e.g., Evangelical Christians) if the regime’s constraints stem from these institutions.

3.1. Think Tanks

The existence of “think tanks” is generally unknown to the public, yet they are key players in policymaking at the federal level, especially regarding foreign policy (Houk et al. 2011; Tsai and Lin 2021). However, think tanks have expanded their reach in domestic policy matters, and their perceived expertise is utilized especially by conservatives to shape policy through groups such as the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and the American Legislative Exchange Council. Conservative organizations have existed alongside American democracy since its inception; however, societal changes of the 1960s (Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War, etc.) and 1970s (Roe v. Wade, gay rights) led conservatives to establish organizations dedicated to reversing changes brought about by these events. Reagan’s first election laid the foundation for the modern conservative movement and its systemic plans to create an authoritarian government over time (which culminated in Project 2025’s “Mandate for Leadership”).
Several highly influential conservative think tanks were founded in the 1970s and 1980s, including
i.
Heritage Foundation (1973)
ii.
ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council) (1973)
iii.
Cato Institute (1977)
iv.
Council for National Policy (1981)
v.
Federalist Society (1982)
Conservative think tank organizations are many and vary according to specific policy preferences pursued, groups they represent, and functions. Examples of the forms of influence they wield include:
  • Drafting legislation (state/federal level)—ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council)
  • Influencing churches and religious organizations—Moral Majority
  • Articulating conservative goals in public—Heritage Foundation
  • Conducting research (which draws conclusions that favor conservative policymaking)—Cato Institute
  • Influencing judge selection at the state/federal levels—Federalist Society
  • Introducing young, college-aged people to conservatism—Turning Point USA
The role of CPEs in the drafting and promulgation of Project 2025 is prominent, as many conservative think tanks (along with interest groups and individuals) are acting jointly and severally as policy entrepreneurs. All used the basic tools at the policy entrepreneur’s disposal (i.e., money, influence, power) to bring this overarching set of conservative policy plans to print and later to fruition with the installation of a government that is decidedly. Bertelli and Wenger (2009) discussed the impact of think tanks on Congressional activity. In their work, they found think tank leaders were regarded as policy entrepreneurs who focused on “demand-side” policy assistance (i.e., Congress requesting policy research and advice from the think tank). This demand for information tends to expand as the sides become more polarized ideologically. In turn, increased polarization gives rise to new think tanks, which may be created to provide information on a specific policy area or communicate the needs or concerns of a particular demographic. Examples of think tanks fitting this criterion and listed as part of the Project 2025 Advisory Board include the Family Research Council, the Institute for Energy Research, and Susan B. Anthony’s Pro-Life America. As such, Project 2025 is having a definitive impact on the actions of the Executive Branch with apparent support from Congressional conservatives and conservative elected officials at the state/local level.
The Heritage Foundation is the organization best known for promulgating Project 2025; however, it is but one of several conservative organizations that fall under the umbrella of a more powerful organization, the Council for National Policy (CNP). The CNP is an overarching, highly secretive organization that serves as the institution from which other conservative organizations emerged and that has subsumed most if not all conservative political organizations in the U.S.15 The CNP directory is extensive and consists of leaders of conservative organizations, businesses that support conservative causes, and elected officials. Interestingly, the creator of the CNP, Paul Weyrich (1942–2008), was perhaps the most influential, yet relatively unknown, conservative political operative in the U.S. In addition to being a founding member of the CNP, he also co-founded the Heritage Foundation and ALEC. Thus, the actions of Weyrich and other think tank leaders have culminated in the policies of Project 2025 coming to fruition under the “policy window” opened due to Trump’s reelection.
Thus, with the U.S. embarking on an authoritarian regime and using Project 2025 as a blueprint, we see (and will continue to see):
  • Think tanks are being tasked with drafting most of the legislation at the federal level, which cements authoritarian language in the existing governmental structure (e.g., emphasis on language that supports the “unitary executive” theory).
  • Policy language that is more “convoluted” (as it may be designed to obfuscate the true nature of the policy or policy actor when implemented) but will be a source for “talking points” used by elected officials, candidates, and the media.
  • The production of new (or support of existing) research with pseudo-scientific claims to justify policy actions taken. (For example, research that shows DEI programs are harmful, wasteful, and “promote radical ideologies”.16) By presenting dubious and highly subjective information as “research”, the uninformed public assumes its veracity and supports policies backed by it.
  • Using the elected officials (and candidates) as the main source of communication, with media reporting on these interactions (and conservative media using framing techniques to present reported material in a light that is favorable to the current presidential administration and conservatives alike).

3.2. Elected Officials (Local/State/Federal)

Conservative elected officials rallied around Trump during the 2016 presidential election and, with few exceptions, remained supportive during the January 6th insurrection, two attempts at impeachment, and the 2020/2024 presidential contests. In authoritarian regimes, the officials controlling the government tend to espouse certain rhetoric that epitomizes the characteristics referenced earlier. With the current administration pursuing the policy goals of Project 2025, conservative elected officials at the local, state, and federal levels are also pursuing policy goals to this end. In fact, in the years before the 2024 election, many states and local governments began pursuing policy aims aligning with the Mandate regarding abortion, transgender rights, and “CRT”, or “Critical Race Theory” (first, and later “diversity/equity/inclusion, or “DEI” measures). As an example, Figure 2 shows actions taken by state/local governments to eradicate transgender rights (in particular, gender-affirming care for minors), which supports the Mandate’s promise to deliver the American public from the “toxic normalization of transgenderism” (Mandate for Leadership, 1) and children from the “new woke gender ideology”, which includes gender-affirming care’ and ‘sex-change’ surgeries on minors as established by the Gender Policy Council (Mandate for Leadership, 62).
As CPEs, conservative elected officials communicate their plans directly with the media—in particular, conservative-friendly media. In addition, it is expected that they will work closely with the think tanks connected to Project 2025 to help structure the language for legislation and develop media talking points. With Trump’s reelection, we have seen (and perhaps will continue to see) the following actions by elected officials at all levels of government, which support conservative ideological positioning and Project 2025 goals:
  • Engaging in “othering” of opponents, opposition parties, specific racial/ethnic groups, countries, and leaders. Conservative governors have pledged support to the president to comply with immigration orders outlined by the Executive Branch.17
  • Use of hyperbole to install fear in conservative voters (e.g., “Our cities are being overrun with migrant crime”18). In fact, some officials (including sitting Congressmen) have attempted to match Trump’s extreme rhetoric on immigrants, particularly the Haitian community up to the 2024 election.19
  • Verbal overtures that suggest the need for a “strong man” in office, especially at the federal level.
  • Emphasis on “traditional” role expressions based on gender (e.g., men are “masculine”, women are “feminine”, and there is no such thing as “transgender”).
  • Use of expressions that emphasize nationalism (especially Christian nationalism—e.g., “The church is supposed to direct the government. The government is not supposed to direct the church”, quoted from Congresswoman Lauren Boebert20).
  • Support for Project 2025 as a policy platform that emphasizes all that is perceived to be wrong with the country’s direction and what conservatives alone can do to correct it.
  • Encourage friendly, open relationships with foreign leaders who head authoritarian regimes in their home country (e.g., Trump’s putative “friendship” with Putin in Russia or Viktor Orban of Hungary21).
  • Finally, obfuscation of the truth, spread of incomplete/incorrect information, and countering truthful information with “fake news” comments, communicating primarily through conservative-friendly media outlets.

3.3. Interest Groups (Including Religious, Corporate, and Ideological Groups)

Interest groups—especially religious; corporate, and ideological groups—are vital to the transition to authoritarianism. Over the past five decades, policy preferences of Evangelical Christians (in particular, the “Moral Majority” under the leadership of Rev. Jerry Falwell, Sr.) and corporations have shaped the conservative movement and helped push the Republican Party further to the right. Policy successes claimed by these groups include overturning Roe v. Wade, Kennedy v. Bremerton (which essentially removes the barrier between “church and state”, Citizens United v. FEC (which gives corporations “personhood” and regards political contributions by corporations as “free speech”), and tax breaks to the wealthiest individuals and corporations. In addition, interest group influence comprises an overwhelming amount of Project 2025’s Mandate for Leadership. For example, policy preferences that address “sexual orientation”, “gender identity”, and “abortion” in the Mandate are large contributions of conservative religious organizations (and conservative educational institutions) such as Hillsdale College, Liberty University, and the Family Research Council.
In addition to religious and ideological groups, corporations will benefit considerably under authoritarianism through plans for greater tax cuts (even though many of the wealthiest corporations have paid very little or no tax for at least one year since 2018, with rebates to many of these corporations in the “no tax” years). Figure 3 below shows the number of companies that paid little to no tax at least once since 2018 and the amount of rebate in “no tax” years.22
As such, it is not unreasonable to assume that one or more of these groups will provide the putative authoritarian “limits” by which the new regime will abide. We expect to see these groups increase donations to candidates/campaigns that espouse favorability with authoritarianism and the principles of the Mandate for Leadership. In addition, they are likely to reiterate their positions through increased public exposure at conferences such as the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), along with advertisements and media presence. While wealthy corporations are not likely to “advertise” their positions as “tax cut beneficiaries”, they may approach elected officials and think tanks directly to address this.

3.4. Political Operatives

The role of political operatives in advancing the conservative agenda goes back to the 1980s and Lee Atwater, who utilized the “Southern Strategy” to encourage disaffected white Democrats to change their allegiance to Republicans, helping Reagan and Bush 41 become president. Through the early 2000s, the conservative/Republican agenda was shaped further by the likes of Karl Rove and Roger Stone. Through Trump, newer, younger political operatives include Stephen Miller (the architect of Trump’s immigration policies) and Christopher Rufo, who spearheaded the push to roll back diversity efforts and civil rights protections of marginalized groups in education, beginning with the vilification of CRT (“critical race theory”). The imprint of these and other political operatives is prominent in Project 2025; the Mandate for Leadership addresses the need to dismantle “all things ‘woke’”, which includes
“deleting the terms sexual orientation and gender identity (“SOGI”), diversity, equity, and inclusion (“DEI”), gender, gender equality, gender equity, gender awareness, gender-sensitive, abortion, reproductive health, reproductive rights, and any other term used to deprive Americans of their First Amendment rights out of every federal rule, agency regulation, contract, grant, regulation, and piece of legislation that exists”. (Mandate, 5)

3.5. Oligarchs as “CPEs”? Are They Really Committed to Authoritarianism?

Perhaps no political operative has emerged more powerful under the Trump administration than multibillionaire, South African-born, political neophyte Elon Musk. Though the oligarchical class is, arguably, most concerned with enriching themselves (at the expense of others), Musk is attempting to shape policymaking singlehandedly while exerting influence over departments. Most recently, Musk’s actions include the (unprecedented) act of gaining access to a U.S. Treasury Department payment system and halting payments to USAID, both conducted as part of Musk’s oversight of the wholly invented Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE).23 In addition, Musk has involved himself in foreign matters by contacting officials and participating in meetings, giving rise to the public perception that he is acting as a “co-president” with Trump24 and in spite of his perceived allegiance to Nazism via a salute on Inauguration Day.
Despite Musk’s actions: other oligarchs are staying close to Trump and his administration—after all; Bezos; Zuckerberg; Tim Cook; and other billionaires joined Trump and Musk for the inauguration and festivities. However, instead of getting directly involved with government affairs like Musk, it is reasonable to assume most oligarchs are mostly waiting for the proposed tax breaks designed to turn billionaires into multibillionaires and perhaps propel the wealthiest multibillionaires into previously unheard-of “trillionaire” status. Due to the nature of authoritarianism (which can include an “economic shock and subsequent “hollowing of the state”), oligarchs know this regime type will potentially make them much wealthier. As such, they (except for Musk) may not care about ideological issues such as abortion or government restructuring, but they are supportive of authoritarian measures through which greater accumulation of wealth is the byproduct. And, to ensure they are not forgotten when the government doles out the breaks, they are willing to submit to policy ideas presented by the administration and are perhaps in line with Project 2025 aims (including scaling back on diversity initiatives at their respective companies).25 Finally, because Musk (X) and Zuckerberg (Facebook, Meta) own media outlets, they do not necessarily obligate themselves to reach out to other media sources. Thus, media—in particular, social media, with stories and posts favorable to them and conservative interests—becomes the main tool of communication with the public and other CPEs.

3.6. Media Outlets (Including Social Media)

As stated previously, the other CPE categories will make considerable use of media—including social media—to spread authoritarianism via digital means (Sherman 2021). Existing outlets that embrace the prospect of authoritarianism will (a) emphasize potential devotion to the regime and (b) provide a rationale for embracing regime change. In addition, they emphasize talking points, messaging, and policy plans from think tanks, political operatives, and elected officials/candidates. We see conservative media “spotlighting” other examples of authoritarianism around the world while extolling the virtues of their leaders; this is especially true of Truth Social, the social media outlet owned by the president. At the same time, the role of social media is critical to dictating the extent to which the public will embrace—or reject—an authoritarian regime. Social media currently reports stories and commentary from CPEs, which is viewed favorably within “information silos” dedicated to conservative or RWG members. (In turn, this increases the already elevated levels of vitriol and polarization). Owners of social media outlets (especially X and Facebook) are encouraging such activity under the guise of “First Amendment freedoms” and generate increases in site traffic and/or revenue. At the same time, owners are discouraging, even blocking, content and users who oppose the new regime, and may cooperate with the regime to create a “watch list” using posts from opposing groups and users. In addition, an increase in “misinformation dissemination” and conspiracy theories is expected because social media users will use their platforms to support the authoritarian regime and CPEs while seeking to antagonize those in opposition to it. Finally, non-conservative media outlets will vary in terms of whether they capitulate and accept conservative stories without question or whether they fulfill their duties as the “Fourth Estate” by approaching stories about conservatives and the current administration in an objective manner.

3.7. CPEs and the Trump Administration—Who Works for Whom?

A symbiotic (mutualistic) relationship exists between the CPEs and Trump; Trump gets reelected POTUS and is given control of the federal government apparatus, and CPEs get to begin systematically dismantling and restructuring it to suit conservative and right-wing populist aims. As to whether either entity is “fragile” and could be removed from the equation, one could argue that the “fragile” entity is Trump. Though acting as a CPE himself, should he fail to implement a policy that aligns with current conservative expectations (esp. Project 2025), he could be removed from office (most likely via invocation of the 25th Amendment). As such, VP Vance would assume the presidency and, given his intimate acquaintance with Project 2025 and conservative goals (and virtually no likelihood of abandoning them), the aims of Project 2025 and CPEs would continue even if Trump is no longer in government. Despite denying knowledge of Project 2025 during the campaign, most Trump’s actions taken since resuming office are detailed in the Mandate for Leadership. Also, to ensure that Project 2025 is implemented, several nominees for the presidential cabinet are directly affiliated with the Heritage Foundation, including Russel Vought (selected to run the Office of Management and Budget), Peter Navarro (senior counselor for trade and manufacturing), Paul Atkins (Securities and Exchange Commission), and Brendan Carr (Federal Communications Commission). Thus, though Trump has been reinstalled as U.S. president, Project 2025 is a stand-alone system of government restructuring that is designed to be effective if a conservative/Republican is in office.
Therefore, the relationship between Trump and the (mostly) unnoticed conservative professionals represents a pas de deux of quid pro quo activity: Trump gets back in the White House and the chance to pursue his goal of becoming a dictator, while the CPEs fulfill their mission of successfully instilling an authoritarian regime—an act that failed in 1933 when bankers sought to overthrow FDR and replace him with a fascist government rooted in military authority (Denton 2012). A similar scenario is playing out in the 21st Century—groups unhappy with the direction of government are seeking to upend things and create their own regime; this time, the Chief Executive is complicit and, using the power of the office, is working to bring this regime change to fruition.

4. “Chaos Quid Pro Quo”

“Shock Doctrine 2.0”, U.S. Style

In Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Klein 2007), she argues that the doctrine works like this: An original catastrophic event (e.g., war, disaster, government coup) puts the entire population in a state of collective shock. The constant terror “softens up” the people, who in turn come to accept the actions and give up that which they would otherwise protect This allows for others (in particular, wealthy individuals or corporations) to come in and “remake reality” for a price vis-à-vis privatization (radical capitalization) and the blessing of the government regime. A few of the “shocks” she discusses include governmental upheaval (such as the political coup in Chile in the 1970s, which installed Auguste Pinochet as dictator), the Falklands War (which resulted in British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher expanding the powers of government), and Boris Yeltsin’s leadership in Russia, which gave rise to mass privatization efforts and created an oligarchical class. The desire to inflict endogenous shocks on a country (e.g., a coup) or take advantage of an exogenous shock (e.g., a disaster) is rooted in the “Chicago School” of economic orthodoxy created by Milton Friedman. Friedman advocated for what he termed “economic shock treatment”: Create a significant upheaval in government and society, using (1) government restructuring (into something decidedly less “democratic”), (2) tax cuts (directed primarily to the wealthy), (3) privatization of government services, (4) cuts to social spending, and (5) deregulation (Klein 2007, p. 8).
While Klein discusses these “shocks” in the context of emphasizing the free market, the fact remains that governmental restructuring is a key component in bringing this to fruition. Arguably, “disaster capitalism” is but a small part of Trump’s overall quest in his second term. His overarching goal is to become a dictator; yet he also embraces the idea of creating (additional) wealth for himself, the billionaire class, and corporations. At the same time, he, along with conservative organizations, seeks to remake the federal government structure into an authoritarian regime led by plutocrats and intent on restructuring the U.S. with regard to (1) who is/is not an American citizen, (2) whose rights should/should not be protected, (3) official recognition of the U.S. as a “Christian theocracy”, (4) the largest redistribution of wealth from the poor and middle class to the wealthy in history, and (5) concentration of governmental, military, domestic, foreign, and economic power of the U.S. into fewer hands. While Klein’s book focuses primarily on the “shock and awe” events that lead to the creation of the “hollow state” in countries around the globe, her discussions regarding the city of New Orleans (in the wake of Hurricane Katrina) and the U.S. federal government response to terror show that the ability to completely transform government in such a way that authoritarianism could be implemented across all areas of government has been difficult in the U.S.—until now. Because of our systems of federalism, checks and balances, separation of powers, and belief in the power of democracy, it seemed unlikely that America would lend itself to authoritarian influences. However, all these systems have since been co-opted by conservative forces, and, with a conservative president in office, it makes the regime change extremely possible.
Creating a “shock” to the political, social, and economic system of a country naturally engenders chaos. In a matter of days (beginning minutes after being inaugurated), Trump has induced shocks to the system in the form of executive orders designed to (1) eliminate protections for marginalized communities, (2) upend the economy (with large-scale deportation efforts of ostensibly undocumented immigrants and high tariffs on trading partners), (3) propose shifts in government hiring that reward loyalty to him (instead of remaining merit-based, per Progressive Era reforms), and (4) force the U.S. to rethink its global position in terms of world health, climate change, and allyship.
All these changes are encouraged by CPEs and are, in fact, policy goals of Project 2025. Conservative actors and outlets are, arguably, expecting chaos (on a much greater scale) across systems; they believe upheaval is necessary to restructure government and society according to their beliefs and preferences. When Trump introduced the slogan, “Make America Great Again”, conservatives saw this as a “shared vision” that not only reverses 60+ years of progressive efforts regarding marginalized groups, women, abortion, and immigration but also provides a “sharp reset” designed to force Americans to accept a “new normal”—that is, an overtly authoritarian government controlled by CPEs and plutocrats under the aegis of the Republican Party and controlled by Donald Trump, with a veneer of “democracy” and “republicanism”.
In this turbulent period, CPEs (and the current presidential administration) expect to see people lose their jobs, livelihoods, and homes; they anticipate a massive uprooting of millions of undocumented immigrants (who they see as criminals); they expect to see prices and costs of living skyrocket; they expect to see perceived “enemies” be punished (especially since Trump has called for retribution and retaliation since his 2020 defeat and subsequent charges/convictions); they expect to see places of learning and education systems dismantled and remade in the image of conservative principles and Christian nationalism; they expect thousands—if not millions—to succumb to illness (mostly preventable) or because of “failure to help themselves”.

5. Authoritarianism—What About the U.S. Public?

As previously stated, the American public equates authoritarianism with governments in other countries. However, if faced with the prospect of living under such a regime, Americans will likely engage in three types of behavior: (1) Some will not know—or care—that the change has occurred; (2) Some will challenge the shift (at the risk of incurring the wrath of the regime), and (3) Others will welcome the change.
People may not notice regime change if certain elements of the current governmental system remain in place; therefore, the presence of the Constitution, federalism, separation of powers, and elections may convince them that this is “government as usual”, and it will take time for them to realize the change. (For example, elections may seem “free and fair”, but some Republican candidates may claim victory even when it is clear they lost.) Those who will not care if the regime changes most likely have low levels of political efficacy in the first place; if citizens feel their political participation does not matter because the government is unresponsive to their needs, then a change in regime may not matter much to them. Some Americans are likely to challenge the regime shift; already, many news sources and social media groups are dedicated to discussing the actions of the former president and the Republican Party and expressing fears that the country may be moving in the direction of authoritarianism. Solt (2012) argues that economic inequality fosters a desire for some to gravitate towards a hierarchical structure and greater authority invested at the top. As such, many people rationalized voting for Trump because they thought he would bring down the costs of food (especially eggs) and fossil fuels and that proposed tariffs against countries such as China would help bring down those costs. Thus, when given the stark contrast between maintaining democracy and possibly giving the country over to authoritarianism, many voted for Trump in 2024 anyway because they expect he will alleviate economic suffering. (As of this writing, that has not occurred; egg prices have gone up, and food prices across the board are expected to increase because of tariffs imposed on Mexico and Canada.26)
The largest issue is the fact that some Americans—Republicans; especially—agree with the prospect of an authoritarian regime. A poll conducted by the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in January 2024 asked respondents if they thought it would be a good or bad idea for Trump to act as dictator on the first day (only) of his second term. Of the respondents, 74% of those who identified as Republicans (and 71% who identified as ideologically conservative) said it would be a “good thing”.27 If this sample is applicable across party and ideology, it is reasonable to assume that conservatives accept the idea of Trump being re-elected despite the current and pending “shocks” to the political, economic, and social systems. In addition, a Quinnipiac poll from 29 January 2025 shows that 86% of Republicans approve of the way Trump is handling the job as president, and 91% of Republicans are optimistic about the next four years.28

6. Conclusions

No country is free from the threat of an authoritarian regime; in fact, research shows that around the world, more countries are becoming dissatisfied with democracy—including the United States. To reiterate, the roots of authoritarian intent in the U.S. go back as far as the 1930s with the “Wall Street Putsch”, an attempt by right-wing financiers to overthrow Franklin Roosevelt and install Smedley Butler as president in response to the Great Depression (Denton 2012). Since World War II, America has accepted its form of government and reveled in the idea of being the one country on earth that both epitomizes democracy and makes it our mission to spread democracy across the planet. However, the arrival of Trump on the political scene and the country’s rightward push during this first term have given many the notion that in the 21st Century, a different type of government, with Trump at the helm, may be needed. According to Pew Research, a 2022 study showed that 62% of its respondents were dissatisfied with the way democracy was working.29 This suggests that many citizens feel our democratic system is untenable and that now, it needs to sport an authoritarian “sheen”. The thought of authoritarianism has become a reality with CPEs at the forefront of bringing this regime to fruition as they exist already inside of our “democratic republic” and are engaging in activity that will seek to entrench this new form of government (as outlined in “Project 2025”). As Americans, we must be mindful that with the U.S. embarking upon a regime of this type, the repercussions could last for years—even decades. Finally, there are the questions: If the U.S. adopted authoritarianism, would we remain the United States? If not, what would we become? Regardless of the answer, United States citizens should be mindful of one thing: The “fabric of democracy” is delicate; seemingly innocuous elections of people to office have consequences, especially if the elected ones seek to undermine it in pursuit of an authoritarian regime.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

1
Freedom House—Strengthening U.S. Democracy. https://freedomhouse.org/issues/strengthening-us-democracy (accessed on 27 February 2024).
2
Durkee, Alison. 12 December 2024. Trump Defends Nominating People With Project 2025 Ties. Here’s the Full List. Forbes magazine, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2024/12/12/trump-defends-nominating-people-with-project-2025-ties-heres-the-full-list/ (accessed on 31 January 2025).
3
Durkee, Alison, 6 December 2024. Elon Musk Spent More than $200 Million to Help Trump Get Elected. Forbes magazine, https://www.forbes.com/sites/alisondurkee/2024/12/05/elon-musk-spent-more-than-200-million-to-help-trump-get-elected/ (accessed on 31 January 2025).
4
Horizons Project. “Authoritarianism: You Know It When You See It.” The Commons Social Change website, https://commonslibrary.org/authoritarianism-how-you-know-it-when-you-see-it/ (accessed on 2 March 2025).
5
Kruse, Kevin M. and Julian E. Zelizer. 22 December 2019. How America went from Barack Obama to Donald Trump in one head-spinning political decade. USA Today, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/12/22/donald-trump-capped-political-decade-barack-obama-launched-column/2700108001/ (accessed on 31 January 2025).
6
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 549 (S.D. Miss. 2019).
7
Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (SFFA) v. President & Fellows of Harvard College (Harvard) and SFFA v. University of North Carolina (UNC), Nos. 20-1199 & 21-707.
8
Burns, Dasha and Maya Ward. 25 February 2025. “Trump allies circulate mass deportation plan calling for ‘processing camps’ and a private citizen ‘army’.” POLITICO website, https://www.politico.com/news/2025/02/25/documents-military-contractors-mass-deportations-022648 (accessed on 2 March 2025).
9
Friedman, Drew. 26 February 2025. “Trump administration tells agencies to begin conducting reductions in force.” Federal News Network website, https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2025/02/trump-administration-tells-agencies-to-begin-conducting-reductions-in-force/ (accessed on 2 March 2025).
10
Project 2025—Presidential Transition Project. https://www.project2025.org/ (accessed on 4 April 2024).
11
About Project 2025. www.project2025.org/about/about-project-2025 (accessed on 4 April 2024).
12
Project 2025 Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2024).
13
Polskin, Howard. 19 August 2019. How conservative media has grown under Trump. Columbia Journalism Review website, https://www.cjr.org/analysis/conservative-media-grown.php (accessed on 8 March 2024).
14
Chavez, Julio-cesar, Andrew Goudsward, Jason Lange and Nathan Layne. 22 January 2025. Trump’s Jan 6 Pardon Frees Hundreds of Capitol Rioters From Prison. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-supporters-who-stormed-us-capitol-begin-leave-prison-following-sweeping-2025-01-21/ (accessed on 31 January 2025).
15
(No author) 18 March 2022. Documented Has Obtained a New Council for National Policy Membership List. Documented website. https://documented.net/investigations/documented-has-obtained-a-recent-council-for-national-policy-membership-list (accessed on 2 February 2025).
16
Greene, Jay and Mike Gonzalez. 21 September 2023. The Dangerous DEI bloat at Virginia’s Public Universities. Heritage Foundation Report. https://www.heritage.org/education/report/the-dangerous-dei-bloat-virginias-public-universities (accessed on 9 March 2024).
17
Republican Governors Association. 11 December 2024. Republican Governors Join to Support President Trump’s Immigration Policies. Republican Governors Association website. https://www.rga.org/republican-governors-join-support-president-trumps-immigration-policies/ (accessed on 2 February 2025).
18
Giridharadas, Anand. 6 March 2024. Trump’s dark vision of America—and an alternative. The.Ink website. https://the.ink/p/trumps-dark-vision-of-america (accessed on 9 March 2024).
19
Duster, Chandelis. 26 September 2024. Louisiana Rep. Clay Higgins walks back racist comments about Haitians after backlash. NPR website, https://www.npr.org/2024/09/26/nx-s1-5129844/clay-higgins-racist-comments-haitians-backlash (accessed on 1 February 2025).
20
The Christian Right is winning in court while losing in public opinion. NPR Transcript. 1 July 2022. https://www.npr.org/transcripts/1109141110 (accessed on 9 March 2024).
21
Riccardi, Nicholas and Justin Spike. 8 March 2024. Trump meets with Hungary’s leader, Viktor Orbán, continuing his embrace of autocrats. Associated Press News website. https://apnews.com/article/trump-orban-hungary-conservatives-autocrats-biden-97d6998f747d3543f2f1df069b0f9165 (accessed on 9 March 2024).
22
Report (No author). 29 February 2024. Corporate Tax Avoidance in the First Five Years of the Trump Tax Law. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy website. https://itep.org/corporate-tax-avoidance-trump-tax-law/ (accessed on 1 February 2025).
23
Knickmeyer, Ellen. 2 February 2025. USAID security leaders on leave after trying to keep Musk’s DOGE from classified info, officials say. Associated Press website. https://apnews.com/article/doge-musk-trump-classified-information-usaid-security-35101dee28a766e0d9705e0d47958611 (accessed on 2 February 2025).
24
Martin, Jonathan. 2 February 2025. Memo to Elon: Know Your Boss. Politico website. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2025/02/02/trump-musk-alliance-00201756 (accessed on 2 February 2025).
25
Sherman, Natalie. 10 January 2025. Meta and Amazon scale back diversity initiatives. BBC News website. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cgmy7xpw3pyo (accessed on 2 February 2025).
26
Plume, Karl, Tom Polansek and Renee Hickman. 31 January 2025. Trump tariffs to stoke US food inflation despite pledge to lower costs. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/trump-tariffs-stoke-us-food-inflation-despite-pledge-lower-costs-2025-01-31/ (accessed on 31 January 2025).
27
UMass Amherst Poll Crosstab, January 2024. https://polsci.umass.edu/sites/default/files/january2024trumpdictatortoplinecrosstabs.pdf (accessed on 9 March 2024).
28
Quinnipiac University. 29 January 2025. Trump Begins Second Term Stronger Than The First, 6 In 10 Voters Approve Of Sending U.S. Troops To Southern Border, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Majority Disapprove Of Elon Musk’s Role In Trump Administration. Quinnipiac University polling website. https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3918 (accessed on 1 February 2025).
29
Wilke et al. 2 December 2022. Satisfaction with democracy and political efficacy. Pew Research Center website. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/12/06/satisfaction-with-democracy-and-political-efficacy-in-advanced-economies-2022/ (accessed on 10 March 2024).

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Figure 1. Anticipated CPE Relationships in an Authoritarian Regime.
Figure 1. Anticipated CPE Relationships in an Authoritarian Regime.
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Figure 2. Attacks on Gender Affirming Care by State. Source: Human Rights Campaign website, https://www.hrc.org/resources/attacks-on-gender-affirming-care-by-state-map (accessed on 2 February 2025).
Figure 2. Attacks on Gender Affirming Care by State. Source: Human Rights Campaign website, https://www.hrc.org/resources/attacks-on-gender-affirming-care-by-state-map (accessed on 2 February 2025).
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Figure 3. Corporations That Paid Zero Tax in At Least One Year, 2018–2022. Source: https://itep.org/corporate-tax-avoidance-trump-tax-law/ (accessed on 2 February 2025).
Figure 3. Corporations That Paid Zero Tax in At Least One Year, 2018–2022. Source: https://itep.org/corporate-tax-avoidance-trump-tax-law/ (accessed on 2 February 2025).
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King, A.M. “Shocking the System” in the 21st Century: Conservative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Plan for Authoritarianism in the U.S. Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, 235. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040235

AMA Style

King AM. “Shocking the System” in the 21st Century: Conservative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Plan for Authoritarianism in the U.S. Social Sciences. 2025; 14(4):235. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040235

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King, Athena M. 2025. "“Shocking the System” in the 21st Century: Conservative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Plan for Authoritarianism in the U.S." Social Sciences 14, no. 4: 235. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040235

APA Style

King, A. M. (2025). “Shocking the System” in the 21st Century: Conservative Policy Entrepreneurs and the Plan for Authoritarianism in the U.S. Social Sciences, 14(4), 235. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040235

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