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Article

Public Support for Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from The Bahamas Before and After Hurricane Dorian

by
Barry S. Levitt
1,* and
Richard S. Olson
2
1
Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA
2
Extreme Events Institute and Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Soc. Sci. 2025, 14(4), 248; https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040248
Submission received: 1 February 2025 / Revised: 23 March 2025 / Accepted: 25 March 2025 / Published: 21 April 2025
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Building Community Resilience to Disasters)
Browse Figures
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Abstract

:
Studies in public policy have suggested that disasters can potentially serve as “focusing events”, catalyzing significant changes to disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies and practices. How and why this effect does (or does not) ensue, and for how long, are less well understood. This article tests hypotheses about the nature and duration of the impact of a major hazard event on public support for DRR policies and their implementation. It does so by analyzing survey data collected in The Bahamas before and, crucially, at multiple intervals after a massive 2019 storm, the Category 5 Hurricane Dorian. Results suggest that experiencing a major hurricane boosts public support for DRR. This effect was observed one month after the event; support declined at three months but remained elevated for nearly two years afterwards. At the individual level, support for DRR was also strongly associated with the perception of future disaster risk—but was not associated with any measure of direct harm from the event. These findings support the notion that disasters may open “windows of opportunity” for improving policy implementation, in part by changing public opinion broadly and not just among those most acutely affected.

1. Introduction

There is a substantial body of research in political science suggesting that public policy is often congruent with, even responsive to, public opinion (Wlezien and Soroka 2021, inter alia). Though there is disagreement about the precise mechanisms and causal paths, there is ample evidence that public support for specific policies or public attention to specific policy areas matters to politicians and bureaucrats at all levels of government (Erikson et al. 1993; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Tausanovitch and Warshaw 2014). Ensuing debates have centered on whether and how public opinion can shape (and be shaped by) public policy, and how this might vary over time and across different policy areas and different political systems and political cultures.
Most of this scholarship has analyzed public opinion and public policy in the US or in other “advanced industrialized democracies” of the Global North (Wlezien and Soroka 2021). Here, we focus on public opinion about public policy in a less-studied democracy: The Bahamas, a small island developing state in the Caribbean region (see UN-OHRLLS n.d.). Our study homes in on a crucial policy objective: reducing or mitigating the risk from natural hazards. On this issue, too, research to date suggests that politicians and bureaucrats are responsive to, or seek to align with, public sentiment (Rossi et al. 1982; Frazier et al. 2013; Bechtel and Mannino 2020; Ross and Atoba 2022).
This article analyzes public opinion regarding a policy area—disaster risk reduction (DRR)—that is usually not top of mind for most people but might become more salient in the aftermath of an actual disaster (Prater and Lindell 2000, inter alia). The public policy literature offers an oft-cited concept for framing such phenomena: the “focusing event”, a sudden episode that inflicts harm (or reveals or accentuates the risk of future harms) in ways that can disrupt current practices and open a “window of opportunity” for new policies and procedures. Among the possible causal paths by which this is thought to take place are drawing public attention to, and shifting public opinion about, problems and policy solutions (Kingdon 1994; Birkmann et al. 2010; Birkland and Warnement 2014).
Does experiencing a disaster change how a person thinks about policies for reducing risk from future disasters? In this article, we seek to answer the question of whether and how a major hazard event might shift public opinion about the value of DRR policies such as building codes and construction regulations. We also seek to better understand other factors, aside from the effects of experiencing a disaster, that shape public support for DRR—including the perception of future risk. To do so, we analyze public opinion data from The Bahamas before and, especially, after a devastating hurricane in 2019.

1.1. Hurricane Dorian and The Bahamas

On 1 September 2019, Hurricane Dorian made landfall on The Bahamas’ Abaco islands as a Category 5 hurricane on the Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, with sustained winds of 160 kt (185 mph) and a minimum central pressure of 910 mb (Avila et al. 2020; NHC n.d.). With the storm moving relatively slowly, Abaco experienced tropical storm force winds for nearly three days, and peak storm surge was estimated at more than 20 feet above normal tide levels (Avila et al. 2020). The storm made landfall on the more populous island of Grand Bahama later that same day, with 155 kt (178 mph) winds. It then became essentially stationary for more than 24 h, with accumulated rainfall in western Little Abaco and eastern Grand Bahama reaching 36 inches (NASA 2019). According to EM-DAT (the consensus Emergency Events Database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université Catholique de Louvain), Hurricane Dorian caused 356 deaths and inflicted USD $3.4 billion in damages (EM-DAT n.d.). (By contrast, the Government of The Bahamas officially counts 74 dead and 281 missing; see IFRC 2022). The Inter-American Development bank estimated that roughly 9000 homes were damaged, including 75% of all dwellings on Abaco (IDB 2020). In the final calculation, Hurricane Dorian was the most destructive storm in the history of The Bahamas—and one of the strongest Atlantic hurricane landfalls ever recorded.
It is worth noting that The Bahamas was one of the earliest Caribbean countries to adopt and maintain a mandatory building code set to internationally recognized standards, first implementing The Bahamas Building Code in the early 1970s and then updating its codes several times since. However, as with many countries around the world, code enforcement in The Bahamas “plays a significant role in vulnerability… [because] inspections are not always very stringent and can result in deficiencies” (Karamlou and Ramanathan 2019, np). What is more, a large segment of Bahamian society views code enforcement as fraught with corruption. A 2014 poll indicated that, in the years prior to Hurricane Dorian, fully half of all Bahamians expected that the permitting process would entail being asked to pay a bribe (AmericasBarometer 2014; Levitt et al. 2019).
After Hurricane Dorian, a flurry of disaster-related policies and legislation could be observed. In September and October 2019, within weeks of Hurricane Dorian, the government of Prime Minister Hubert Minnis created a new ministry of state: the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness, Management and Reconstruction (IFRC 2022). While not a full cabinet position, it was a ministry located within, and with authority delegated by, the Office of the Prime Minister. Then, in 2021, The Bahamas’ National Emergency Management Agency, in partnership with the University of Hawaii’s Pacific Disaster Center, completed a National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment (NDPBA 2021). In late 2022, The Bahamas’ Parliament passed new legislation: the Disaster Risk Management Act, which created a new Disaster Risk Management Authority, designed to yield a more comprehensive approach to planning for, and mitigating against, disaster risk. Specifically, on building codes, the new legislation added an additional risk analysis requirement to the permitting process (Disaster Risk Management Act 2022). All of this suggests that Hurricane Dorian may indeed have served as a “focusing event”, opening “windows of opportunity” for change and innovation. In the words of a key policy actor, The Bahamas’ very first Minister of Disaster Preparedness, Management and Reconstruction, the Hon. Iram Lewis: “A lot more attention now is being paid. Dorian has been a clarion call to not take the forces of nature lightly. Pay strict attention to it, and have mitigating plans in place…” (Meyers 2020).
In the remainder of this paper, we focus specifically on the dynamics of public opinion in The Bahamas in the two years following Hurricane Dorian, analyzing public support for building codes and construction regulations—the kind of DRR that members of the public are likely to recognize, if not personally encounter.

1.2. Research Questions

By analyzing change over time in public opinion in The Bahamas, we pursue answers to several important questions about individual- and national-level support for DRR practices and policies, and their more rigorous implementation/enforcement:
  • Does national experience of a major hazard event—one that comes to be defined as a disaster—increase public support for DRR? If so, for how long?
  • Does personally experiencing direct harm from a disaster increase an individual’s support for DRR?
  • Does perceiving greater risk from future disasters increase an individual’s support for DRR?

1.3. Theory and Prior Research

In public policy scholarship, moments of crisis and disruption are central to a school of thought known as the Multiple Streams Approach (MSA) to policymaking. (See Kingdon 1984, 1995, 2011; Zahariadis 1999, 2003, 2007, 2014; Herweg et al. 2017; O’Donovan 2017a, 2017b; DeLeo 2018). The MSA maintains that opportunities for policy change can sometimes emerge quickly, in the form of a “focusing event” such as a major crisis or disaster. Birkland (1998) more concretely defined focusing events as events that are “sudden; relatively uncommon; [and] can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms” (Birkland 1998, p. 54). In this view, focusing events may enable the convergence of the three streams of the MSA framework (problems, solutions, and politics). Birkland (1997, 1998, 2006, [2016] 2019; see also May 1992) has identified instances of agenda changes and policy innovations induced specifically by disasters. What is more, event-driven shifts in public opinion can help open these “windows of opportunity” for major policy change (Kingdon 1994; Birkmann et al. 2010; Birkland and Warnement 2014).
Much of the research on disasters as potential focusing events has centered on the ways that experiencing a hazard event might change people’s perceptions of risk and/or their support for policies and practices to reduce that risk. The (social) science, however, is far from settled.
Prater and Lindell (2000) and Motta and Rohrman (2021) offer some evidence of disaster experience affecting public perceptions of risk and public demands for risk mitigation policies. Other research has suggested that risk perception varies by experience with, or memory of, hazard events (Lindell and Perry 2000; Peacock et al. 2005; Solberg et al. 2010; Trumbo et al. 2011)—or even by exposure to media coverage of a disaster (Lichtenstein et al. 1978; Wachinger et al. 2013). There is also some evidence that exposure to risk and proximity (real or imagined) to a hazard event can activate public demand for government regulation and risk mitigation policies (Sjöberg 1994, 1998, 1999; Schubert and Brück 2014). Several studies found increased support for DRR among residents of areas hit by hurricanes (Baker 1977; Beatley and Brower 1986) or earthquakes (Meli and Alcocer 2004).
Other results complicate this view, however. In Japan, experiencing floods increased willingness to pay for risk reduction (Zhai et al. 2006), but in New Jersey, after Hurricane Sandy, heavily impacted areas were no more supportive of DRR than the rest of the state (Greenberg et al. 2014). In Taiwan, disaster victims perceived higher levels of risk than the general public but were less willing to adopt risk mitigation measures (Lin et al. 2008), and in a flooded town in Slovenia, residents were willing to spend more money on individual preparedness but not on governmental risk mitigation efforts (Brilly and Polic 2005). Likewise, some post-disaster studies suggest nearby communities (or neighboring countries) shared in this heightened risk perception or support for DRR (Lavell 1994; Prater and Lindell 2000), while in other studies, a “near miss” reduced perceptions of risk and mitigation behaviors (Dillon et al. 2011; Albright and Crow 2016).
Finally, even where there is evidence of a heightened post-disaster awareness of risk or support for DRR, it is not clear whether these event-driven shifts in public opinion are temporary or permanent. Several studies suggest that these changes are very short-lived (Pennebaker and Harber 1993; Trumbo et al. 2014), including among people substantially affected by the hazard event (Baker et al. 2009; Shaw and Baker 2010).

1.4. Hypotheses

To answer the research questions posed above, we test the following hypotheses:
H1: 
Public support for DRR will increase immediately following a major hazard event, then decrease over time.
H2: 
Personally experiencing direct harm from a disaster will increase one’s support for DRR.
H3: 
Perceiving greater risk from future disasters will increase one’s support for DRR.

2. Materials and Methods

Data for this study comprise six waves of nationally representative survey data from The Bahamas: a baseline survey conducted in 2014, and five post-event surveys conducted in 2019–2021. The baseline data were derived from the 2014 AmericasBarometer (a biennial multi-country survey conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Lab; see below). The five post-hurricane surveys were conducted under the auspices of Florida International University’s Extreme Events Institute (FIU EEI), partially supported by an NSF RAPID Grant (Award No. 2011872). The first of these post-event surveys was initiated less than a month after Hurricane Dorian made landfall in the island nation; the fifth and final survey wave was completed nearly two years later. (See Table 1 for details. For additional description of this data, see Supplemental Materials, Table S1). All surveys, including for the 2014 AmericasBarometer (AB), were conducted locally by Public Domain, a Nassau-based research firm.
The main dependent variable of interest was support for DRR policies and practices. On the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey (designed by Vanderbilt LAPOP and conducted prior to the initiation of this study), this variable was operationalized as the following question:
In your opinion, what should be given higher priority: safer construction of homes or avoiding cost increases?
(1)
Safer construction of homes
(2)
Avoiding cost increases
(3)
Both [DON’T READ]
In the post-event surveys, designed by the authors, this variable was operationalized via two different survey items: the binomial forced choice question from the 2014 AmericasBarometer cited above; and a seven-point Likert scale adopted by Vanderbilt LAPOP for later waves of the AmericasBarometer:
On a 1-to-7 scale, where 1 is “strongly disagree” and 7 is “strongly agree,” how much do you agree or disagree with this statement: “Governments should spend more money to enforce building codes and construction regulations to make homes safer from natural [sic] disasters, even if it means spending less on other programs.”
The data were analyzed at both the aggregate and individual levels. In the aggregate, we simply tracked change over time in the weighted mean of each of these two variables of interest (rescaled from 0 to 1 to facilitate interpretation), calculating 95% confidence intervals for these means.
At the individual level, we used regression-style analysis—multinomial logit models as well as linear regression—to predict support for DRR policies and practices. In all models, we include variables for time (i.e., survey wave) as well as a common array of demographic traits (age, gender, education, homeownership, and income).
In models analyzing post-event data only, we also included several additional variables germane to the topics of disasters, disaster risk, and DRR. These included: degree of harm suffered from Hurricane Dorian; perception of risk from future disasters; and belief in the potential efficacy of DRR.
I would like to ask, if I may, whether you or your family were physically or materially affected by Hurricane Dorian (for example, by the injury or death of a person, or because of damage to a home or other property). In terms of harm experienced by you and your family, were you very affected, slightly affected or not affected by the hurricane?
How likely do you think it is that you or someone in your immediate family here in The Bahamas could be killed or seriously injured in a natural disaster, such as hurricanes, floods, tornados or storms, in the next 25 years? Do you think it is: not likely; a little likely; somewhat likely; or very likely?
Some people believe that damage from Hurricane Dorian could have been prevented if building codes and construction regulations had been better enforced, while other people believe that the damage could not have been prevented by any means. With which of the following arguments do you agree more? (1) Damage could have been prevented if building codes and construction regulations had been better enforced. (2) Damage could not have been prevented by any means.

3. Results

The baseline level of support for DRR as measured in 2014 was quite low in The Bahamas, compared to other Caribbean and Latin American countries surveyed in that wave of the AmericasBarometer (see Figure 1). A weighted average of 0.26 means that just over one quarter of Bahamians supported safer construction (vs keeping costs down or prioritizing “both”). This level of support for DRR, while similar to that observed in Belize, is less than half of the average support measured in other Caribbean countries such as Barbados and the Dominican Republic.
Looking at change over time in aggregate support for DRR in The Bahamas, however, we can observe a high level of support for DRR in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Dorian, relative to the 2014 baseline (see Figure 2). Compared to their attitudes as measured in 2014, Bahamians expressed much stronger support in October 2019 for safer construction. Nearly two-thirds of respondents in October 2019, just a month after the storm, said that safer construction practices should be the priority—more than double the proportion who expressed that opinion in 2014.
When measured again three months after the storm (in December 2019), however, average support had markedly declined, with fewer than half of respondents saying that safer construction practices should be the priority. Levels of support for DRR may have then ticked up and plateaued in subsequent months, though these averages—as measured at 9, 15 and 23 months after the hurricane—have overlapping confidence intervals, i.e., they do not differ significantly.
A similar dynamic of change over time can be observed using the other version of the DRR variable, support for government enforcement of building codes and construction regulations (vs. spending on other government programs). Mean levels of support for DRR were high in the wake of Hurricane Dorian. At the one-month mark, in October 2019, the weighted average of Likert scale responses, rescaled from 0 to 1, was 0.75 (see Figure 3). An astonishing 60% of respondents expressed the strongest possible support—i.e., a 7 on the original 1–7 scale—for enforcing DRR policies.
This version of the DRR survey item was not included on the 2014 AmericasBarometer, so we cannot compare pre- and post-event levels of support for government enforcement of these policies, as we were able to do with DRR operationalized as “safer construction”. We can, however, observe a similar, post-event pattern of aggregate support; relative to October 2019 (the one-month post-event mark), support for enforcement of DRR policies had declined by December 2019 (three months after the storm). Support for DRR then rose again and may have plateaued at a level at or just below that which was observed in October 2019, though again, the averages measured at 15 and 23 months after the hurricane have overlapping confidence intervals, i.e., they do not differ significantly.
The common pattern of change over time in both versions of support for DRR is: high levels of aggregate support for DRR one month after a major hurricane, followed by a decline in this collective sentiment by the three-month mark.
However, aggregate-level analysis can only tell us so much about individual attitudes and beliefs. To better understand the causal mechanisms at work here, we next used regression-style modeling to analyze these data at the individual level. Models 1–4 are multinomial logit models; model 5 is a linear regression. All models are adjusted for survey weights and use linearized, i.e., robust, standard errors to assess statistical significance.
In models 1–3, the dependent variable combines both versions of the survey item, where possible, making use of all available data. Models 4 and 5, by contrast, each, respectively, use one of the two versions of the dependent variable, modeling them separately.
Model 1 captures the effects of change over time before and after Hurricane Dorian, i.e., it includes the 2014 pre-event, baseline measures (see Table 2). The results indicate significant, positive effects on support for DRR for all post-event wave variables, with the pre-event observation (“Wave 0”) as the reference category. Akin to what we observed at the aggregate level, the likelihood of an individual expressing stronger support for DRR was significantly higher if the interview took place after the hurricane, rather than before. This impact is stronger for Waves 1, 3 and 4 and slightly weaker for Waves 2 and 5, but again, the coefficients for the dummy variables for all post-event waves are positive and statistically significant.
In Models 2 and 3, which only analyze data collected after the hurricane, we see individual-level evidence of a dip in the likelihood of supporting DRR for those interviewed three months post-event (Wave 2, December 2019), relative to those interviewed at the one-month mark (October 2019), even controlling for other variables.
Model 3, in a sense, is the “full” or “unrestricted” model of post-event data. It includes additional variables representing the individual’s perception of future disaster risk and the degree to which that person or their immediate family suffered direct harm from Hurricane Dorian—as well as their beliefs about whether hurricane damage was (or was not) preventable. Results demonstrate that a heightened perception of future disaster risk makes one significantly more likely to be a strong supporter of DRR (as does a belief in the efficacy of DRR policies, i.e., that Hurricane Dorian would have caused less damage if building codes and construction regulations had been better enforced). Notably, how severely a respondent or their family was affected by Hurricane Dorian did not have a significant effect on their subsequent support for DRR.
Among our control variables, it is worth noting that being older and highly educated were also traits associated with support for DRR, but gender, income level, and homeownership status had no significant effects.
In all of the above models, we also included a control variable (“Split Sample”), indicating whether or not the respondent was asked both versions of the support-for-DRR question or just one. In Models 1–3, the coefficients for the split sample indicator were indeed significant. For this reason, we ran the extended version of the model (with additional independent variables, like Model 3) separately for each of the two versions of our dependent variable. Those results are presented in Models 4 and 5 (see Table 3).
In Model 5, as in Models 2 and 3, we again see individual-level evidence of a significant decrease in support for DRR—operationalized as support for code enforcement—among those interviewed at the three-month mark after the hurricane (December 2019) relative to those interviewed at the one-month mark (October 2019). We do not, however, see such an effect on the likelihood of supporting DRR operationalized as safer construction practices (Model 4).
How severely a respondent or their family was affected by Hurricane Dorian again had no significant effect on their support for DRR, regardless of operationalization. On the other hand, perception of future disaster risk strongly predicted support for both safer construction practices and for improving policy enforcement (i.e., in both Model 4 and Model 5), just as it did in Models 1–3. And, not surprisingly, a belief in the efficacy of DRR policies and the preventability of damages incurred during Hurricane Dorian strongly predicted support for both versions of DRR when analyzed separately in Models 4–5.

4. Discussion

The results presented above shed new light on disasters as potential focusing events. We begin with the first of our three hypotheses: that public support for DRR will increase immediately following a major hazard event, then decrease over time (H1). We found some evidence that support for DRR in The Bahamas did increase following Hurricane Dorian, at least relative to the 2014 baseline. Both the aggregate means in Figure 2 and the regression results in Model 1 suggest that support for DRR was stronger after the 2019 hurricane than it was in 2014. It is also the case that the 2019–2021 mean levels of support for DRR in The Bahamas are more in line with regional averages from that same period (see AmericasBarometer 2021).
Regarding the latter clause of H1—that post-event support for DRR is a temporary spike and will decrease over time—the results are somewhat more nuanced. The aggregate change-over-time data and (most of) the individual-level analyses demonstrate a decline in support for DRR at the three-month mark (Wave 2), relative to the one-month mark (Wave 1). The exception is Model 4, in which none of the time variables is significant. The aggregate data also show some evidence of a significant increase in mean support for DRR between Waves 2 and 3, returning to levels similar to the immediate post-event survey.
What the results do not show is anything close to a reversion to the 2014, pre-event mean. Model 1 confirms the finding that, controlling for a host of other variables, respondents in all post-event survey waves tended towards higher levels of support for DRR than respondents in 2014. Our tentative conclusion is that support for DRR may have surged in the first month after Hurricane Dorian but clearly declined in the period between one and three months after the event (though more so when DRR is measured as “better policy enforcement” rather than “safer construction”). Support for DRR may have recovered slightly at the nine-month mark and then remained fairly flat when measured at fifteen and twenty-three months post-hurricane. Relative to 2014, however, levels of support remained significantly elevated at least through July 2021, nearly two years after the event. This may speak to the lasting effects, in public opinion, of such a massive hurricane experienced by a small island nation.
Nonetheless, we must point to an important caveat regarding all of our findings based on data collected in Waves 3–5. Any analyses of public opinion at the nine-month mark (June 2020) and beyond should consider that Bahamians—and people everywhere—were by then experiencing the COVID-19 pandemic, a very impactful, if much slower-moving, hazard event. It may be that the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a heightened perception of disaster risk and, consequently, elevated support for DRR policies and practices. For Wave 3 of the survey, we included a module of questions about the impact of the pandemic, perceptions of pandemic risk, and support for public health policies. Our analysis suggests that Bahamians’ support for storm/flood policies and practices was positively associated with their attitudes towards public health policies and practices. In June 2020, support for building codes and construction regulations was significantly correlated with support for public health programs (Spearman’s rho = 0.34; p > t = 0.000), as were perceptions of future storm/flood risk and perceptions of future pandemic risk (Spearman’s rho = 0.41; p > t = 0.000). It is difficult to know what post-Dorian attitudes towards DRR policies might have been in the absence of a global pandemic that began roughly six months after the hurricane.
Our second hypothesis (H2) proposed that personally experiencing direct harm from a disaster will increase one’s support for DRR. We did not find any support for this notion: a person’s attitudes towards DRR policies and practices were not a function of how much harm befell them or their families. If support for DRR is affected by the occurrence of disaster, it may be because the country as a whole is in some sense collectively “experiencing” the event, even if only some individuals or some parts of the country were directly affected. Put differently, the effect seems to be sociotropic rather than egotropic.
Regarding H3, our analysis did support the notion that Bahamians who sense greater risk from future disasters are more likely to favor better—and better-enforced—DRR. In all of our analyses that included risk perception (Models 3–5), a higher perception of future risk is significantly associated with higher levels of support for DRR. This also means that changing levels of risk perception may drive changing levels of support for DRR, even controlling for survey wave/time since a hazard event. Risk perception itself did decline, however, as time went on: in October 2019, in the immediate aftermath of the hurricane, 42.1% of respondents said that it was “Very likely” that they or their families would be harmed by another disaster within the next 25 years. Two years later, by July–August 2021, that percentage had dropped to 28.8%.
Although it was not one of our proposed hypotheses (and although this variable was included mainly as a control), we also confirmed that a person’s belief in the effectiveness of DRR—the notion that building codes and construction regulations would have made a difference in reducing harm, had they been better enforced prior to Hurricane Dorian—was, not surprisingly, positively and significantly associated with support for DRR.
Before concluding, we would like to acknowledge several additional limitations regarding the findings presented here:
  • Our surveys, especially those conducted in the immediate aftermath of Dorian, likely did not reach the areas (e.g., Abaco) or the people (e.g., undocumented Haitian migrants) hardest hit by the storm. Note, however, that though the reach of our surveys would improve in subsequent waves, we still saw no effect on support for DRR based on direct harms suffered from the disaster.
  • As noted above, the survey data that we use as our baseline, pre-event data were collected several years before the hazard event in question. Hurricane Dorian may not have been the only catalyst for changing public opinion about DRR in the intervening years.
  • The post-event data cover only a two-year period after Hurricane Dorian. The ongoing success or failure of any public policy changes adopted in Dorian’s wake may depend on whether or not the aggregate level of support for DRR in Bahamian society remains elevated—well above the low baseline level measured in 2014—for a more sustained period of time.
  • Our analysis was unexpectedly confounded by the outbreak of a major pandemic. However, as noted above, this also provided opportunities to ask unforeseen, but important, new questions about the politics of DRR and the psychology of risk. Future research should further explore how this causal process operates not just within but also across different categories of hazard events.

5. Conclusions

To the extent that the 2019 Hurricane Dorian may be viewed as a “focusing event”, with a spate of policy changes following the disaster, changes in public opinion may have been one of the causal paths, or “streams”, for changes in policy. Future research should further investigate the various steps along this purported causal path.
What is more, to build on this analysis and move beyond the limited generalizability of a single-country study, future research should draw on multi-country studies and cross-national data to further elucidate whether experiencing a disaster can reveal or catalyze the formation of more durable public constituencies for stronger disaster risk reduction policies and their improved implementation (Mitchell 2019, inter alia).
At present, however, our findings from The Bahamas in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian do provide some evidence of a major hazard event shifting public attitudes in favor of improving DRR. Public support for disaster risk reduction seems to increase as a consequence of a collective experience of disaster and of a heightened perception of future personal risk. Support for DRR does not, however, appear to be shaped by individual harms actually suffered (or not suffered) in a recent disaster.
What is more, this sociotropic effect may wane but not entirely fade. The evidence here suggests that, at least in the medium term (and given the caveats above), support for DRR in The Bahamas settled at a level perhaps lower than that what was observed immediately after a major hazard event but markedly higher than the support that Bahamians expressed prior to the event.
Why does this matter? DRR measures—though they save lives, protect property, and preserve critical infrastructure—can be costly and, oftentimes, politically difficult. In the absence of public support for or even awareness of these policies, politicians and policy makers may have little short-term incentive to improve or enforce them, even if doing so would be broadly beneficial for their societies in the long term. In the aftermath of a disaster, however, that calculus can change: politicians and policy makers might indeed see a “window of opportunity” to do something different—and might even feel some otherwise unlikely pressure to do so from their electorates and from the public at large.
Finally, because risk perception was found to be a strong predictor of support for DRR, opening the “window of opportunity” is not only a function of living through a disaster but of more conscious communication strategies by politicians, policy makers, advocacy groups or others, reminding people of these risks and keeping the threat of disasters—and the proactive benefits of DRR—top of mind for people, even as memories fade, traumas are healed, and immediate disaster response gives way to longer-term recovery.

Supplementary Materials

The following supporting information can be downloaded at: https://www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/socsci14040248/s1, Table S1: Age and Gender Compositions of Survey Samples (Unweighted and Weighted).

Author Contributions

B.S.L. and R.S.O. both contributed to the conceptualization, methodology, analysis, writing, review/editing, visualization, and funding acquisition. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This work was supported by the FIU Extreme Events Institute and by a National Science Foundation RAPID Grant (Award# 2011872).

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the Institutional Review Board of Florida International University (IRB Protocol Exemption #: IRB-19-0330. IRB Exemption Date: 23 September 2019).

Informed Consent Statement

Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement

The original data presented and analyzed in the study are openly available. AmericasBarometer 2014 survey data is available at http://datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/files/942821218Bahamas%20LAPOP%20AmericasBarometer%202014%20v3.0_W.dta (accessed on 24 March 2025). Survey data collected by FIU EEI from 2019 to 2021, after Hurricane Dorian, is available at https://eei.fiu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Public-Opinion-Data-from-The-Bahamas-after-Hurricane-Dorian.zip (accessed on 24 March 2025).

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP Lab) for the AmericasBarometer data and for project feedback; M’wale Rahming and Public Domain for all survey data collection in The Bahamas; and Claire Q. Evans, for help with data management and analysis.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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Socsci 14 00248 g001
Figure 1. Support for Safer Construction Practices in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2014 (weighted average).
Figure 1. Support for Safer Construction Practices in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2014 (weighted average).
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Figure 2. Support for Safer Construction Practices in The Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian (weighted average, 95% CI).
Figure 2. Support for Safer Construction Practices in The Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian (weighted average, 95% CI).
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Figure 3. Support for Government Enforcement of Building Codes in The Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian (weighted average, 95%CD).
Figure 3. Support for Government Enforcement of Building Codes in The Bahamas after Hurricane Dorian (weighted average, 95%CD).
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Table 1. Survey Data Collected.
Table 1. Survey Data Collected.
Survey WaveInterview
Dates		# of Months After Event Data
Source		Sample SizeSampling ErrorSampling
Method		Survey Modality
017 June 2014–
7 Oct. 2014		-Americas
Barometer		3429+/−1.8%Stratified multistage cluster samplingIn Person
126 Sept. 2019–
12 Oct. 2019		1FIU EEI 1000+/−3.1%Simple random samplingTelephone
212 Dec. 2019–
22 Dec. 2019		3FIU EEI1013+/−3.1%Simple random samplingTelephone
328 May 2020–
29 June 2020		9FIU EEI1005+/−3.1%Simple random samplingTelephone
421 Dec. 2020–
29 Dec. 2020		15FIU EEI1000+/−3.1%Simple random samplingTelephone
520 July 2021–
7 Aug. 2021		23FIU EEI1000+/−3.1%Simple random samplingTelephone
Table 2. Predicting Support for DRR in The Bahamas.
Table 2. Predicting Support for DRR in The Bahamas.
Model 1
Pre- and Post-Event		Model 2
Post-Event Only		Model 3
Post-Event Only
Strong Support for DRR
(Combined)		Strong Support for DRR
(Combined)		Strong Support for DRR
(Combined)
Wave 0: June–October 2014REF--
Wave 1: October 20191.221 ***REFREF
Wave 2: December 20190.882 ***−0.332 **−0.250 *
Wave 3: June 20201.278 ***−0.0080.046
Wave 4: December 20201.251 ***0.0120.067
Wave 5: July 20210.930 ***−0.326 **−0.226
Not affected by hurricane REF
Slightly affected by hurricane 0.065
Very affected by hurricane −0.087
Perceived disaster risk 0.521 ***
Belief that damage was preventable 0.445 ***
Age, 18–24 yearsREFREFREF
Age, 25–34 years−0.174−0.281 *−0.337 **
Age, 35–44 years0.067−0.030−0.083
Age, 45–54 years0.206 *0.090−0.050
Age, 55–64 years0.1540.1230.018
Age, 65 years or over0.768 ***0.548 ***0.486 ***
Gender (female)0.0780.1490.150
Education (post-secondary)0.0370.204 **0.199 *
Homeownership−0.106−0.096−0.098
Income (higher)−0.0030.0520.021
Split Sample Indicator0.751 ***0.762 ***0.763 ***
Constant−0.563 ***0.377 *−0.070
Observations739643033839
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. REF indicates reference category.
Table 3. Predicting Support for Safer Construction and Code Enforcement in The Bahamas.
Table 3. Predicting Support for Safer Construction and Code Enforcement in The Bahamas.
Model 4
Post-Event Only		Model 5
Post-Event Only
Prioritize Safer Construction Support Government Enforcement of Building Codes
Wave 1: October 2019REFREF
Wave 2: December 2019−0.056−0.532 ***
Wave 3: June 2020−0.081−0.075
Wave 4: December 2020−0.154−0.069
Wave 5: July 2021−0.250−0.112
Not affected by hurricaneREFREF
Slightly affected by hurricane0.023−0.092
Very affected by hurricane−0.033−0.087
Perceived disaster risk0.438 **0.514 ***
Belief that damage was preventable0.335 ***0.610 ***
Age, 18–24 yearsREFREF
Age, 25–34 years−0.341 *−0.305 *
Age, 35–44 years0.003−0.154
Age, 45–54 years0.069−0.230
Age, 55–64 years0.220−0.089
Age, 65 years or over0.824 ***0.065
Gender (female)0.1380.155
Education (post-secondary)0.261 **−0.184 *
Homeownership−0.135−0.070
Income (higher)0.189−0.056
Constant−0.1365.341 ***
Observations23382244
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. REF indicates reference category.
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Levitt, B.S.; Olson, R.S. Public Support for Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from The Bahamas Before and After Hurricane Dorian. Soc. Sci. 2025, 14, 248. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040248

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Levitt BS, Olson RS. Public Support for Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from The Bahamas Before and After Hurricane Dorian. Social Sciences. 2025; 14(4):248. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040248

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Levitt, Barry S., and Richard S. Olson. 2025. "Public Support for Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from The Bahamas Before and After Hurricane Dorian" Social Sciences 14, no. 4: 248. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040248

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Levitt, B. S., & Olson, R. S. (2025). Public Support for Disaster Risk Reduction: Evidence from The Bahamas Before and After Hurricane Dorian. Social Sciences, 14(4), 248. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci14040248

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