Collective Bargaining in Post-Memoranda Greece: Could It Guarantee Decent Work by Greek Employees?

Abstract

The aim of this work was to assess the developments in the Greek collective bargaining system and the wage policy after the period of the Memoranda of Understanding with the lenders. Moreover, it discusses the critical role of collective bargaining (CB) in the Greek economy and society and its contributions to forging a new balance between capital and labor in the post-memoranda era. Finally, it provides a number of proposals that could improve the state of play in the field. Firstly, a comprehensive approach to the current debate on the key issues of collective bargaining was portrayed. Secondly, the main developments in the Greek case of collective bargaining and the wage policy were recorded. Thirdly, an effort to interpret the pertinent developments that could lead to the diffusion of a decent work status in the domestic labor market was made. Finally, this work examined whether the current situation of collective bargaining threatens Greek employees’ living and working conditions, which were regarded as being at stake during the memoranda period.

1. Introduction

During the 2010s, a fiscal crisis connected to high public debt obliged Greece to accept three memoranda. This fact led to a series of reforms in the domestic labor market and the mechanisms of wage regulation. Thus, a new legal framework concerning collective bargaining and minimum wages was established. In this new landscape, the industrial relations system was transformed. Larger amounts of flexibility, decentralization, and liberalization were among its main features.

The aim of this work was to assess the new face of the Greek collective bargaining system as well as its contribution to wage formation. Moreover, it discusses the critical role of collective bargaining (CB) in the Greek economy and society, as well as its contributions to forging a new balance between capital and labor in the post-memoranda era. Finally, it provides a number of proposals that could improve the state of play in the field. For this reason, the contemporary literature on collective bargaining is presented, and the most significant dimensions of employment relations are portrayed. Then, using relevant data processing, this research assessed the current trends in bipartite social dialogue and recorded several proposals.

Current Trends in Collective Bargaining

Collective bargaining (CB) is an essential tool in the European labor markets, as it provides a voice to the employee, improves the working environment, and covers more than 75% of the workforce (Hijzen et al. 2017). Moreover, CB is a crucial redistributive and conflict-solving instrument in democratic societies.

CB is considered to be a cornerstone of industrial democracy, as it provides a voice to the employee side. Thus, employees could collectively negotiate all the terms of the employment relation with employers, including wages and working conditions (Traxler and Brandt 2011, p. 227). Having that in mind, workers become a significant part of the total number of consumers and/or citizens. Thus, CB has a critical impact not only on socioeconomic life, but on democracy as well (Fick 2009).

The three most important indicators of its contribution are (a) bargaining coverage, (b) centralization, and (c) control (Visser 2024).

Previous studies in the EU zone have shown that decentralization may cause an increase in the wage difference among several employee groups (Kauhanen 2024). The link between the wage setting and minimum wage is, however, very significant (Palokangas 2002). When the statutory or bargained minimum wage increases, pressures are exerted on the wage determination system, which may lead to relevant adjustments in lower wages via bargaining or via the growing discretion of employers. In this way, the employer side assures that wages will remain competitive in their firms. Evidence from sectoral CB shows that an increase in the statutory minimum wage may push forward renegotiated pay scales, mainly for employees with weak skills (Besamusca and Kahancová 2024).

Moreover, CB has been linked with the labor market performance through its contribution to adaptability and the resilience of firms. In fact, the contemporary tendency of decentralization reflects (a) a gradual shift to minimum standards of working conditions and (b) the freedom of single employers to select the proper pattern for their own firms from an increasing number of sectoral collective agreements (CAs) (Hijzen et al. 2017).

However, the current shift to decentralization is different from one national institutional level to another (Kauhanen 2024). During the last decade, the decentralization of CB has been a dominant tendency, since it provides a space for negotiations on the terms of employment at the enterprise level, in addition to the national and sectoral ones (Hijzen et al. 2017).

The introduction of more flexible patterns in the CB system can be achieved without undermining choices about the inclusiveness of sectoral CB (Hijzen et al. 2017). Effective coordination between bargaining units and high-quality labor relations are crucial to the performance of CB (Hijzen et al. 2017).

Liberalization is a universal tendency. It provides firms with expanding discretion possibilities. Thus, socioeconomic changes have motivated employers to invent alternatives, abandoning the 20th-century compromises with the unions. Despite this, an employer’s decision to abandon or support the multi-employer bargaining procedures and structures may lead to significant implications for both bargaining coverage and/or trade union influence. It has been underlined that the existence of fruitful maintenance makes it more likely that employers will try to restructure rather than abandon CB. In addition, sectoral bargaining requires strong employer organizations with a mandate from their members to negotiate with trade unions (Visser 2024).

During the last decades, the coverage deficiency has been challenged by alternative regulating methods (i.e., mandatory minimum wages, enterprise-level agreements, the opting out of single employers from a CA, commercial contracts in the platform’s economic activities, etc.) (Visser 2024). The extension of CB coverage may help to foster inclusiveness if it can incorporate criteria of representativeness and/or public interest (Hijzen et al. 2017). Certain scholars have claimed that employees in firms that apply a CA are better protected from the risk of being given low pay, as CB has increased the probability that employees earn more than the statutory minimum wage (Besamusca and Kahancová 2024). CB can be revived with the restoration of relevant conditions and incentives from which the employer associations can benefit (Visser 2024). In a situation of crisis and inflation, the European Directive on Minimum Wage has a significant role to play, as it predicts the establishment of a national CB mechanism that will foster a level of CB coverage of 80% or more and the strengthening of CB in public procurement (Luebker and Janssen 2022). Comprehensive CB coverage is beneficial for unemployed and/or inactive individuals and may reduce health inequalities between workers and non-workers. In addition, a higher CB coverage has been linked to lower health inequalities between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore, CB coverage influences the policies supported by trade unions (Sochas and Reeves 2023). Thus, CB coverage can be promoted with a state decision to implement the employer-side obligation to bargain, the right to strike for solidarity, and the formation of a CA extension to non-unionized employees in the same sector or occupation (Sochas and Reeves 2023).

Some scholars have stressed that CB should be allowed in every contractual economic relationship when a service is offered B2B (Rainone and Countouris 2021). The majority of workers have a cushion (statutory or CB-negotiated minimum wage) that acts as a wage adjustment during recessions (Adamopoulou and Villanueva 2022). However, the overall impact of a CA extension to all firms can be measured by the quantity of employment that will be lost due to the CA terms on employment and wages. New evidence reveals that, after such an extension, the wage and employment responses are mainly associated with those employees who have earnings close to the minimum (Adamopoulou and Villanueva 2022). Wage and cost pressures may diffuse across various sectors. In some sectors, several employers do not have past experience, and furthermore, it would not be realistic if statutory bargaining extensions took part against representative employer associations (Günther and Höpner 2023). Intersectoral statutory collective bargaining extensions seem to reflect a distinction in a dualized model. Large firms with tendent exporting activities used to be covered by sectoral CAs and also used to foster their coordination with their employees via the mechanisms of codetermination (Günther and Höpner 2023). Another implication is that struggling firms could be allowed to temporarily opt out of CAs until they overcome their economic difficulties. Furthermore, several policy mechanisms, i.e., representation requirements and opt-out clauses, could limit those concerns (Adamopoulou and Villanueva 2022) and often contribute to improvements in productivity (Brandl and Braakmann 2021).

It is worth noting that, in several European countries that were obliged to sign memoranda and/or adopt austerity policies and reforms in their economies, SD institutions and procedures were met with a similar level of disdain. Even in the beginning of the crisis, most of the countries of Southern Europe tried to activate several SD procedures; after the intensification of their economic and fiscal problems, SD had a rather lesser contribution to designing structural reforms and to consolidating policies of austerity (Papadakis 2014, p. 2; Afonso et al. 2025). During the crisis, the social pacts in Italy, Spain, and Portugal were more or less deactivated. Although the European Union has never denied the necessity of social partners’ involvement in consultations on economic, labor, and social policy, it did not persist in the maintenance of such procedures when the crisis started (Baldona and Begega 2015). As a matter of fact, governments in Southern Europe need the positive signals of the international markets much more than the consensus of stakeholders in designing and implementing national economic and fiscal policies (Baldona and Begega 2015). Eventually, CB became more decentralized in Greece, Portugal, and Cyprus and was shifted to company-level bargaining (Papadakis 2014, p. 3).

2. Methods

This section is dedicated to the description of the methodology that was followed. First, a literature review was conducted that covered the current trends in CB, especially in Europe. Moreover, some fundamental meanings in the field of employment relations are clarified and discussed (decentralization, CB coverage, labor market performance, flexibility, deregulation, wage policy, etc.).

Second, the state of play in Greece is presented. An evaluation of the 15-year developments in the Greek industrial relations system is portrayed and the works of many scholars are discussed. Third, reliable evidence on the Greek case from the years 2008–2023 is presented. The primary data were collected by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration. It is worth noting that this evidence reflects only the formal labor–management agreements that have been recorded by state organizations, and not the informal ones. These data were processed by the author(s) using tables and graphs in order to reveal the big picture of the Greek CB outcomes and effectiveness, as well as the shift of CB towards decentralization (Ibsen and Keune 2018).

Fourth, the evidence is discussed in combination with other scholars’ outcomes. Fifth, the conclusions of this work are presented, as well as certain proposals for the improvement of the Greek CB regime. Some recommendations for future researchers are also included.

3. The Greek Case

According to the Greek Economic and Social Committee (OKE), social dialogue can be defined as “attempts that aim to touch differing opinions and interests in order to solve common problems or efforts to explore and to appoint common targets regarding related issues or simply procedures that help distinct social groups to exchange ideas” (OKE 1999).

It is widely believed that social dialogue (SD) is extremely important for the promotion of effective economic and social policies (Koutroukis and Kretsos 2004; Hayter and Stoevska 2011, p. 1).

Certain studies have shown that social dialogue (SD) can act catalytically in the implementation of socioeconomic restructuring and in the fostering of successful economic, social, and labor policies (Koutroukis and Kretsos 2008).

To summarize, SD procedures may add value for the participants. Specifically, the commitment in SD develops human capital, improves operational efficiency, promotes innovation within organizations, diffuses innovation, increases access to various resources, offers better access to information, and provides more effective products and services (Nelson and Zadek 2000, pp. 27–28).

During the 1990s, Greece adopted an SD procedure, according to which the government consulted with representatives of social partners before making a decision on socioeconomic policies (OKE 2002).

During the 2000s, Greece had to adjust to the conditions that were prevalent in the EU. Consequently, the EU’s central regulation of wages hindered the decentralization of wage bargaining, a trend prevalent across the globe (Lavdas 2007). As a result, wage bargaining at the sectoral, company, and local levels was influenced by this form of centralized CB (Ioannou 2011; Lavdas 2007).

It is important to underline that, even though the OKE was rather effective before the recession of 2008, most SDs were only moderately effective (Vogiatzoglou 2014; Kouzis 2015; Zambarloukou 2014), since the objective preconditions that would ensure their efficiency were not met (Koutroukis 2004).

The last crisis was a turning point for the adaptation of firm-specific circumstances in employment relations. In spite of the legal provision for employer and employee organizations’ dialogue before the adoption of policy measures in the Greek labor relations landscape, the unions avoided involvement in such procedures, as they considered such consultations to be useless.

For almost twenty years, Greece experienced an interesting effort to involve professional organizations in a venture of social partnership (Vogiatzoglou 2014). Thus, a new partnership climate had been achieved and several SD fora (i.e., OKE, OMED) had demonstrated significant consultations. These positive circumstances changed radically thanks to the impact of the memoranda (OMED 2012).

The aid that the Greek government requested from the EU and the IMF in order to regulate its public debt in 2010 (Tsarouhas 2012) led to the adoption of several austerity measures, fiscal discipline, and market reforms. It is believed that these measures were against the directions given by the Greek Constitution and by various international labor conventions (Venieris 2011; Kouzis 2015).

The EU, the ECB, the IMF, and the Greek government shaped the agenda of reforms without any SD procedures. Moreover, the memoranda had a substantial impact on long-lasting SD practices (i.e., bargaining levels, coverage rate of Cas, etc.) and affected the standpoint of social partners to the crisis.

The OKE, the main Greek SD forum, hardly participated in these procedures, since most legislative proposals concerning employment relations were adopted following a rapid procedure (Lanara-Tzotze 2013). Moreover, the vast majority of social partners’ proposals were rejected by the Troika. Lastly, relevant bipartite SD ventures failed without reaching any compromises (Patra 2012).

Thus, the culture of tripartite agreements, prevalent in the EU and the International Labour Organization, was abandoned in favor of the IMF’s approach. This caused the collapse of any notion of social partnership (Koutroukis and Roukanas 2016).

Even in the third memorandum, the adoption of the final agreement with the lenders in the summer of 2015 was completed by an “emergency procedure”. As a result, there are essential constraints in fostering consultations with some types of social partners (Zambarloukou 2014).

Fifteen years after the beginning of the lenders’ initiative to help Greece, the impact of the pertinent measures to the Greek CB system can be concluded by the reduction in sectoral CAs, the increase in company-level agreements, the lower coverage of the workforce by CAs, the adoption of a new union-free model of CA at the company level between management and worker groups, and the so-called “union of persons” (UP).

The memoranda changed the system of collective bargaining in Greece. According to Ioannou and Papadimitriou (2013), the number of sectoral CAs decreased, while the company-level CAs increased. During the period of 2012–2014, only 10 arbitrator decisions were issued, so it is clear that CB in Greece followed a trend of decentralization. During the same period, a decrease in sectoral CAs was observed. The probable causes for this decrease were, on the one hand, the temporary waiver for arbitration about unilateral actions and, on the other hand, the fact that company-level CAs were increased.

During those years, CAs and their coverage of the labor market were restricted. For example, only 190 agreements were regulated between social partners in order to set working conditions and wages (Ioannou 2015).

The UPs helped enterprises to overcome sectoral CAs. For example, in 2012, 83.4% of company-level CAs were signed with a UP. This fact contributed to the decentralization of company-level CAs and drastically changed the way that the national CB system works. The termination of company-level CAs was initiated by the employer side (Ioannou and Papadimitriou 2013). The transformation of the legal framework for arbitration in collective labor disputed in 2014 led to an increase in arbitration through the relevant mechanisms of the OMED (Ioannou 2015).

The reasons that the provision of sectoral collective agreements failed are linked with the following (Ioannou 2015):

• The disagreements that arose between the social partners while negotiating on wages and benefits;
• The institutional amendments in the period of 2012–2014 (regarding arbitration);
• Structural reasons connected to the economic crisis, and the resulting downfall of the Greek economy (during these years, unemployment increased and the number of companies decreased).

At the end of 2015, just 10% of the past CAs were in force; moreover, the remaining CAs have exerted a limited impact on labor–management relations. Furthermore, an increase in the company-level agreements was noticed (Ioannou 2015). Therefore, the shift to decentralization through company-level CAs was not as rapid after 2 or 3 years. In the period of 2015–2019, the adoption of measures recommended by the lenders was fully implemented.

After 2019, Greece chose a more flexible labor market policy, even though the recommendations of the memoranda have never really been in doubt. In addition, several measures that contributed to the weakening of trade unions (as a social partner) in the economy and social dialogue procedures were adopted (OMED 2023).

The deregulation of CB destabilized the macroeconomic system and pushed the economy to a labor-intensive and low-productivity model (Pierros 2023, pp. 57, 102). The main institutional reason for the collapse of the domestic CB system is connected with (a) the abolition of the unilateral recourse to arbitration and (b) the suspension of the expansion mechanism during the implementation of EC-ECB-IMF program of economic adjustment (Ioannou 2019, p. 52). The behavioral reasons refer to the way in which social partners face the new challenge of bargaining in the new framework. In addition, the abolition of the national partners’ right to determine the national minimum wage was an obstacle in their cooperation and mutual understanding and interaction (Ioannou 2019, p. 53).

The case of Greece can be manifested as a case study of how institutional reforms can reflect the change in power dynamics at the ER arena (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis 2019, p. 28). The Greek ER system changed radically and decisively. The balance between labor and capital changed in favor of the latter (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis 2019, p. 27). In the new framework of CBs, employer associations do not have any motivation to participate in sectoral and/or occupational bargaining. Moreover, companies regard firm-level bargaining as more proper for them because they have the right to opt out, and their preference is to bargain with the weaker association of persons, if possible. Thus, sectoral CAs have survived in only a few “tradable” sectors, i.e., the hotel, tobacco, and cement industries (Ioannou 2019, p. 53). The contemporary operation of the Greek CB system now depicts a very different picture compared to the pre-crisis period, and the reforms seem to be permanent.

The abolition of the social partners’ right to determine the minimum wage in favor of the government was a radical change (Malagardi and Stampoulis 2025, p. 222). In addition, contractual wage reductions during the EC-ECB-IMF program were higher in firms where employees were represented by APs rather than typical unions (Ioannou 2019, p. 53). The connection between wage determination and sectoral bargaining came to an end. The new worker representation bodies that were introduced within enterprises are weak actors in bargaining. The traditional role of the sectoral labor federation was undermined and the latter failed to support workers in their everyday needs in the workplace (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis 2019, p. 27).

Especially for firm-level bargaining, the possibility of a firm-level CA increased after the reform of the national employment relations system. Indeed, small firms were more likely to participate in such negotiations after the introduction of associations of persons, where few unions participated (Giannakopoulos and Laliotis 2019, p. 101). Finally, the effort to bypass company unions via APs at the enterprise level, after the initial raise, is not important anymore (Malagardi and Stampoulis 2025, p. 223).

In the post-crisis socioeconomic framework, workers in small firms without past bargaining experience were more willing and/or obliged to agree to a wage decrease towards the minimum wage. Moreover, they probably did so because their will to secure their employment posts was dominant during that period (since the APs had limited bargaining power) (Ioannou 2019, p. 53).

To sum up, Greece is regarded as having adopted a polarized state-centered industrial relations regime. This model provides an average CB coverage of 76.3% at the industry level, a trade union density of 19.1%, and an employer’s density of 67.7%. The principal level of CB is variable, and the state intervenes frequently in CB (UNI Europa Global Union n.d., etc.). There was a degradation of employee relations during the memoranda period, specifically when the public sector abolished its functions as an employer and mimed the industrial relations model of private enterprises (Rompoti et al. 2022). Following the lenders’ recommendations, the wage-setting procedures were deregulated, since the employment protection regulation faded (Rompoti et al. 2022). It has been stressed that the current trend of liberalization/decentralization is not appropriate for Greece, as young employees are mostly non-unionized and unaware of the workers’ rights of the past decades (1982–2012). Last, but not least, the undermining of the traditional role of social partners was promoted during the memoranda era. A decollectivization trend toward single-employer bargaining was also noticed. Furthermore, the presence of unionization and CB coverage dramatically decreased (Rompoti et al. 2022). In addition, the legacy of strong and active trade unions is a critical factor that could improve to some degree the working and living conditions of the precarious workers (Papadopoulos and Ioannou 2023).

Both unions and employer associations are suppressed by the new critical change in the EC-ECB-IMF program that decollectivizes the Greek CB system and the pertinent institutional developments. Thus, they should enhance their membership base and convince their organizations and/or members to participate by providing specific motivation and promoting CBs (Ioannou 2019, p. 54). The re-regulation on the CB landscape is estimated to limit income inequality and to protect wages from the impact of inflation. Moreover, the rise in the coverage rate by CB will ensure a decent level of living (Pierros 2023, p. 103).

In the new era, the number of sectoral and occupational labor agreements and the coverage of employees have decreased significantly. Furthermore, company labor agreements initially increased, and following a period of the rapid adjustment of employee relations and a reduction in wages, they stabilized (Malagardi and Stampoulis 2025, p. 223).

All these developments have caused dramatic changes in terms of decent work, as the GDP of the country has fallen by about 25% during the implementation of the memoranda, while the labor income has significantly decreased as well.

4. Findings

The main findings of the pertinent evidence reflected in

Table 1. Collective agreements and arbitrator decisions, 2008–2023.

Year	Craft				Sectoral		Company		Total
	National		Local
	CA	AD	CA	AD	CA	AD	CA	AD	CA	AD	CA+AD
2008	43	17	27	2	117	25	215	15	403	59	462
2009	15	11	12	5	47	30	215	12	289	58	347
2010	33	8	14	6	31	21	227	11	306	46	352
2011	15	5	7	1	23	12	170	9	215	27	242
2012	4	1	6		19	7	975		1004	8	1012
2013	3		10		10		410		434	0	434
2014	3	1	5	1	10	5	290	2	309	9	318
2015	6	1	7		5	6	265	4	284	11	295
2016	3		7		5	10	325	14	341	24	365
2017	4	2	6		10	8	248	3	269	13	282
2018	6		10		12	9	279	0	308	9	317
2019	5		4		10	5	164	0	183	5	188
2020	2	3	3	2	8	2	151	0	165	7	172
2021	5		7		12	0	159	0	184	0	184
2022	3		6		18	0	184	1	212	1	213
2023	4		3		11	0	169	1	187	1	188

Source: data were processed from OMED and Ministry of Labor.

and Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 are presented in the following paragraphs. In Table 1, data on the numbers of collective agreements (CAs) and arbitrator decisions (ADs) during the years 2008–2023 are presented. Figure 1 presents the percentages of sectoral collective bargaining and the division of the pertinent regulations between collective agreements and arbitration decisions. Similarly, Figure 2 shows the percentages in the field of company-level bargaining and, more specifically, the division of the relevant regulations between collective agreements and arbitrator decisions. Both graphs indicate the relationship between voluntary labor agreements and compulsory arbitrator involvement in building the terms of employment in multi-employer and single-employer levels of negotiations. Figure 3 shows the total collective bargaining data for the same period of time (2008–2023). The data were collected from the Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration (OMED) and the Ministry of Labor.

The role of arbitration as a mechanism that regulates the terms of employment at the craft and sectoral levels has been minimized dramatically. A rapid fall in sectoral regulations (CA and AD) has also appeared. The number of company-level agreements was stabilized at the levels recorded before the economic crisis of 2008. Company-level agreements were used in order to foster a divergence of wages from the sectoral-level agreements. The latter is not anymore (or now) as important as it was before. The total number of collective regulations (CA and AD) in the labor market has been drastically limited, as well as their coverage. Evidence shows that employers used to conclude company-level agreements only when a pertinent tradition existed, otherwise they preferred not to be covered by a CA or AD. Before 2012, in the national CB system, a single employer did not have any incentive to negotiate at the company level, as such a negotiation could only improve the wages and the other terms of employment in favor of the workforce. Thus, negotiations took place only within undertakings, which had an active company union with a capacity to push employers to satisfy several of their demands. After the reforms of 2012, a single employer is motivated to negotiate, as he can use a novel mechanism to adjust the terms of employment to his own needs.

5. Discussion

During the Greek crisis, CB was overhauled. A new priority was given to company-level agreements between management and union or non-union representatives (i.e., association of persons). The principle of favorability extension of CAs was suspended and the unilateral recourse to arbitration was abolished.

In the post-memoranda period—when Greece exited the European Stability Mechanism of Support in September 2018—the Minister of Labor’s capability to extend the sectoral CAs was introduced again. Furthermore, the unilateral resources to arbitration in some circumstances were also re-established. Nonetheless, when a liberal government came into office in the summer of 2019, it limited the right to arbitration services and provided several opt-out possibilities from the multi-employer CAs in favor of the single-employer ones (OECD 2019, p. 80).

The regulations that defined collective bargaining in Greece according to Law 1876/90, while capable of yielding results under conditions of prosperity, was not suitable for either the competitiveness and internal devaluation that the crisis brought forth or for the agreements that the government had to reach with the IMF-ECB-EU (Ioannou 2011; Zambarloukou 2014).

The adoption of the measures concerning the labor market and CB was made without following pertinent SD, thus confirming Hyman, who stated the following:

“… in countries with little previous tradition of such concentration, the crisis of 2008–09 does not seem to have had the same effect. This may be in part a reflection of the speed and enormity of the crisis: where the necessary institutions were not already well established, the urgency of the situation provided little scope for their creation”.

(2010)

The laws that were passed and the relevant measures led to the formation of the current social environment. Their influence on the redistribution of power between employer and employee organizations was great.

Due to the memoranda, SD and CB were weakened in favor of the monologue of the lenders’ representatives (Lanara-Tzotze 2013). The bargaining power of the employer organizations and the unions was limited, so the government satisfied the lenders’ recommendations to a larger extent, while failing to take the will of the social partners under serious consideration.

The uncertain future of SD has dramatically weakened the trade unions, since unionization and employment has been rapidly declining in sectors where the presence of unions is traditionally greater (for example, banks) and they have lost their economic independence (Koutroukis and Roukanas 2016).

Moreover, it is more difficult for the unions in the private sector to recruit new members, since work flexibility has been rising. In this new environment, it seems that unions consent to the employers’ will more often in order to save jobs (Glassner and Keune 2010).

6. Conclusions

The global economic crisis has dramatically changed the balance of power between employers and unions and has greatly limited the possibility of achieving win–win agreements (Hyman 2010).

In the new labor market landscape, employers lack motivation, and they choose not to adopt SD processes. They can also evade sectoral CAs and opt to regulate the wages and the working conditions unilaterally (de facto) (Koukiadaki and Kretsos 2012). Consequently, the regulation of the working conditions and remuneration will most probably depend on the market itself, without the participation of the social partners and unions (Zambarloukou 2014).

The use of arbitration mechanisms on collective labor disputes is not easy anymore. It is likely that the terms of the labor contract will be mainly determined by company-level CAs and individual contracts, and the domestic labor market will be much more flexible. The use of the alternative method of tripartism in facing socioeconomic crises is considered a time-consuming tool that will undermine the rapid implementation of the urgent memoranda measures (Zambarloukou 2014; Lanara-Tzotze 2013).

Furthermore, according to the OMED, an estimation of its role seems to be enforced in the near future and the majority of its cases will concern wage increases due to the significant inflation. Its contribution to assisting the country with fulfilling its obligation to raise the coverage rate of collective labor agreements among all workers will be critical (OMED 2025).

During consultations with social partners, several new ideas for the CB framework have emerged (OMED 2025). Several proposals that could contribute to the revitalization of SD in Greece have been presented:

• Employers of companies experiencing difficulties could have the opportunity to opt out of collective regulation for a short period of time.
• The state could regulate migrants’ wages and terms of employment if they are not represented in trade unions.
• The National General Collective Labor Agreement (EGSSE) may be linked with motives of trade union participation. Thus, CB coverage could be expanded.
• The state could provide incentives for employers in order to conclude company-level agreements using tax exceptions or through a reduction in the non-wage labor cost for the enterprises that conclude CAs on their own or with the supporting services of the Greek Organization for Mediation and Arbitration.

It is worth pointing out that the European social partners have played a critical role in founding the current CB legal framework in Greece through their indirect participation in tripartite consultations within the ILO and the EU institutions. Moreover, the European social partners support their Greek affiliates using tailor-made training programs and technical support. Despite the fact that the Greek governments did not seriously consider the opinions of the social partners over the last decade, certain Greek organizations (especially trade unions) that oppose the state of play in CB have not received much external support. However, whether or not a new initiative on the SD framework and practices is to begin, it is likely that the European social partners and ad hoc institutions will offer know-how and best practices.

Thus, various partnership schemes in the relevant circumstances have become meaningless. If Greece continues to adopt lenders’ recommendations in its labor policy—without the involvement of social partners—there will be limited chances for SD and sectoral CB.

Although this has been initially sought as a short-term practice, it may be transformed into a long-term one. The future regime of the Greek labor market is linked with the industrial relations climate, the durability of SD institutions, the employee and employer organizations involved in consultations, and the impact of the European SD paradigm, which is supposed to assure decent work in the EU countries, including Greece.

Prospects for Future Research

Taking into consideration the experience obtained through this work, certain future researchers could shift to the study of several best practices in Greek undertakings that have used alternative mechanisms/tools to overcome the CB system’s rigidities via single-employer soft regulations. Moreover, other scholars may choose to use more advanced statistical techniques in order to investigate the CB data in correlation with several labor market indicators (i.e., labor productivity, CD coverage, trade union density, sectoral strike activity, decentralization index, etc.).