Technology continues to foster development in all aspects of human endeavor (
Adeoti 2002), making life better-off in comparison to what was obtainable during medieval times (
Landes 1970). Nevertheless, not all human societies belong to the same technological scale (
Dongarra et al. 1979), implying that some nations are more technologically-oriented than others, a factor which is considered when distinguishing developed economies from emerging ones (
Nielsen 2011). Emerging nations are mostly technology receivers, especially owing to the fact that most of these countries are consumer economies. On the other hand, developed countries are mostly industrialized. As a result of varying levels of technological applications around the world, there is a large number of literature on innovation transfer to countries with technology deficits.
As early as the 1980s, developing countries either paid directly for transferred technologies, or entered into some form of contract with their developed partners. With these arrangements all set on a laissez-faire platform,
McCullough (
1981) reported that some emerging economies started to activate national laws to manage knowledge transfer, with some approaching the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for better policies on technology transfer to emerging nations. The use of these national laws to date has raised questions as regards whether such collaborations can continue. One popular example is the case of China, a country whose status of development has been largely met with varying debates (
Cutler and Doyle 2019).
Holmes et al. (
2013) noted that the importation of technology into China followed the so-called “Quid pro quo” policy. Within the realm of Quid pro quo, a technology developer must be willing to share knowledge of the technology with a Chinese firm before having access to the Chinese market. There have been reported cases where Kawasaki and Siemens, two high-speed train giants, have shared knowledge with Chinese firms (
Nowak 2012).
Beyond the enactment of new, unfavorable national laws to guide the transfer of technology,
Padgett (
1990) identified culture as being a major challenge to effective North to South technology transfer. Although this cultural constraint was mainly studied between two third-world nations, it also remains one of the major challenges in technology transfer, regardless of the status of the transferor and receiver. As a solution to technology transfer creating social conflicts,
Saeed (
1990) proffered a simplistic consideration approach, in which the technology producer factors in the culture of the consumer into the manufacturing of a new technology. By this, we mean that the producer must survey what the needs of the technology receiver are, the level to which the procedure of technology transfer (TT) is in line with the receiving country’s best practices, and the availability of human resources within the receiving nation needed for effective transfer, among other factors (
Sathaye and Ravindranath 1998). Although this solution remains largely unclear, it remains one of the very few solutions to some of the problems faced by technology transfer globally. In a critical line of thinking,
Carrillo-Hermosilla and Chafla (
2003) explained that emerging nations should endeavor to critically evaluate every new technology, noting that a technology manufacturer rarely releases the most effective technology due to certain lock-ins.
2.1. Technology Transfer Situation in Africa
While Africa largely relies on transferred technology, it faces several challenges and threats posed to effectively utilize these technologies. The most common among the challenges African nations face is the absorption of transferred technology (
Danquah 2018). As reported by
Maya (
2010), better analysis and implementation of policies, upgrading of business skills and the creation of technology carrying firms are some of the key areas where African nations are lagging in TT. In a research work that examined the relationship between development and technology transfer,
Costantini and Liberati (
2014) noted that working institutional systems are crucial for the effective conversion of imported technology for domestic usage. Furthermore, it is difficult for some African countries to evaluate incoming technology against existing needs. This causes over-reliance of many African countries on third-world nations.
Having looked at North to South knowledge transfer, let us consider TT within individual African settings. South Africa is unarguably Africa’s most technology-driven nation, having painstakingly developed its TT platform with the enactment of the ‘Technology Innovation Agency Act’ (Act 26, 2008) as well as the ‘Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) from Publicly Financed Research and Development Act’ (Act 51, 2008) (
University of Pretoria 2019). Both acts have helped in the creation of the Technology Innovation Agency (TIA), an organization saddled with the responsibilities of fostering research in the line of ground-breaking inventions capable of further improving the nation’s economy. Within the jurisdiction of the IPR Act, university research output is made to serve the public at several levels. Another indigenous body, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), carries out interdisciplinary research studies with the goal of improving innovation within the country. The body is controlled by the country’s parliament, having been earlier established by a parliamentary consensus act in 1945 (
Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 2019). The guidelines of the CSIR are partly intertwined with the IPR Act, with both organizations pursuing the common goal of economic improvement for South Africans through innovations. According to
Wolson (
2007), before the enactment of the IPR Act, only a few South African higher institutions possessed clearly stated intellectual property (IP) rules. Generally, individuals or universities can lay claims to an IP. However, this depends on the policies in place. According to
Mustapha et al. (
2019), about five South African companies succeeded in spinning off 45 start-ups within a six-year period from 2008. This was made possible through government funding, which is largely from taxpayers’ money. With coordination and joint funding from both the Department of Higher Education as well as the Department of Science and Technology in 2013, analysis of an investment of R1 billion showed that technology transfer offices announced 33 disclosures, while over a 150 new technologies were being managed (
Mustapha et al. 2019). Additionally, five new start-ups were created from the research output of five universities.
In Kenya,
Bakuli (
1994) maintained that excessively rigid structures in most organizations disallow the ease of technology transfer from universities. Even though the government develops policies with good intentions, the implementation stage is often problematic. However, the role of “LIWA: Linking Industry with Academia” is easing up the situation a little more. With the goal of creating long-standing partnerships between East African firms and universities, LIWA is gradually helping to foster a better environment for knowledge transfer (
LIWA 2016). Furthermore, technology transfer within Kenya is guided by “The Science and Technology Act of 1977 Cap. 250”, a law established due to the defunct East African Community (EAC) (
Kandel et al. 2017).
In Egypt,
Kirby and El Hadidi (
2019) noted that there are no effective policies in place to guide knowledge transfer and commercialization. Using a questionnaire survey of over 350 academics and about 200 industry experts, the study outcome revealed that even though a number of measures have been introduced in the past, none of these measures have been enough to guide university–industry collaborations to success. In 2010, with the support of the University of Freie in Germany, Helwan University, Asyut University, and the University of Cairo as well as the American University in Cairo each created a new start-up during a three-year cooperation period (
Freie University Cairo Office 2014). The Academy of Scientific Research and Technology (ASRT) is Egypt’s technology transfer management agency, and the body continues to work hard towards building country-wide “Technology Innovation and Commercialization Offices” (TICO). There is hope that the establishment of TICO offices will bring about the desired change in the transfer of academic knowledge to Egyptian industries, in order to further foster development.
In Ghana, preference is given to collaborations with international partners on knowledge that is being transferred into the country; as such, national university–industry collaboration is not as effectively handled as knowledge exchange with a third-world nation. Ghana’s international relationship in terms of innovation transfer is governed by two unique laws; Ghana’s Investment Promotion Act of 2013, otherwise known as Act 865, and Technology Transfer Regulation Act of 1992 (
Danquah 2018). Within the domains of these acts, the body in charge in investment and promotion coordinates all patenting and licensing procedures. As reported by
Mamudu and Hymore (
2016), collaborations are mainly in terms of students’ internships in local firms and faculty “research/study leaves” to industries. Although well-established universities have recently started to develop novel ideas for industries, smaller universities are yet to effectively key into the process.
Morocco’s intellectual property and technology transfer front is rather complex, with several organizations (The Permanent Inter-ministerial Committee for Scientific Research and Technological Development (PICSRTD); The National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (NCSTR); The Hassan II Academy of Science and Technology (HIIAST); The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and New Technologies (MCINT); The Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Professional Training (MHESRPT)) playing a number of intertwined roles. As described by
Hamidi and Benabdeljalil (
2013), there seems to be a weak coordination of these bodies, perhaps due to similar roles, even when there exist some forms of hierarchy. Nevertheless, a unique feature of the technology transfer process in the North African nation is the presence of a variety of research funding sources, such as “INNOVACT”.
Hamidi and Benabdeljalil (
2013) in their study noted that the many arms of technology transfer and available funding sources do not translate to innovation progress within the country. As a result, the authorities in Morocco introduced the “Morocco Innovation Strategy” in 2009.
In a study carried out by
Ssebuwufu et al. (
2012), the authors observed that collaboration between university and industry is very recent in many universities across Africa. Nevertheless, for an improvement on the process, there is a need for a better understanding of the expertise and capabilities of individual universities and firms, which will help them to understand each other’s interests and needs.
Thus far, it is clear that most of Africa’s strongest economies tend to adopt the triple helix approach to technology transfer, with the government mediating between university and industry. Nevertheless, the government’s presence in knowledge transfer in many African countries is exercised through agencies who mediate the process using some form of regulation. Since there are marked differences in political and research ideologies in African nations, it is important that African nations begin to look at technology transfer methods that will suit the individual countries, based on these differences. A similar situation is seen in the studies by
Novickis et al. (
2017), as well as
Kalnins and Jarohnovich (
2015), where country-specific solutions were developed as suggestive models for TT process flow.
While the conventional TT model can be easily implemented, the triple helix model, which seems to be dominant in Africa, has been widely accepted as an improvement on the linear TT method. Although several other models exist in literature to improve the process of TT transfer in many countries (
Maresova et al. 2019), the triple helix serves as a foundation to some of these models. About a decade ago,
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff (
1999) gave specific details on the triple helix approach to knowledge transfer. The duo explained it as a TT model where a University (through its technology transfer offices (TTOs)) works hand-in-hand with industry to bring innovation close to the public, and this relationship is often moderated by the government. This government–industry–academia relationship is known to be crucial, if scientific research ideas are to bring about expected developments for society (
Miller et al. 2018;
McAdam et al. 2018). The triple helix model was introduced by Etzkowitz and Leyesdorff (
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995) as a framework for further learning on the inter-relationship between University, Industry, and Government. It was initially aimed at understanding how government policies influence University research output as well as Industrial production output in the long run, and at understanding University–Industry–Government relations and their further development. In a study by
Afzal et al. (
2018), it was observed that the triple helix method could support the economic drive of Malaysia, if the right resources are channeled into the process. The authors further argued that the triple helix approach pushes for innovation to be derived from the so-called “learning-based economy”. While innovation is crucial for further development, it must be fostered through advances in cooperation by three important helices (
Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1998).
While there are many more TT models nowadays to foster development and drive for advances in innovation and economy,
Maresova et al. (
2019) noted that emerging economies must carefully make model choices within the TT domains. In other words, the roles played by actors within any TT method adopted, especially by a developing society (African countries in this case), must be well spelled out. The implication of this clarity of roles and processes is the ease of achievement of the goals of TT within the society.
2.2. Technology Transfer in Nigerian Universities
Being one of Africa’s largest economies, Nigeria has had its fair share of the challenges typical to African nations within the technology transfer domains. Nigeria’s technological settings were mainly dominated by foreign firms until 1979, when the federal government set up the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP) to help develop local technological expertise, as well as manage internationally transferred technology. In 2006, NOTAP found that research results in Nigeria ended on university shelves and were not fully converted for industrial use. Although some Intellectual Property and Technology Transfer Offices (IPTTOs) were already in existence at the time, NOTAP again set up more IPTTOs in tertiary institutions across Nigeria (
Aroture 2017).
NOTAP has effectively developed many more possibilities for Nigerian industries and entrepreneurs to develop their technological know-how through technology transfer agreements with universities (
Aroture 2013). For instance, the rules of NOTAP stipulate that at least 40% of annual technical maintenance paid to foreign software-technology vendors should go to local affiliates to acquire abilities to implement, customize, integrate and support foreign innovation. This aims to ensure that local vendors are involved in maintaining such software in the country, thus reducing the cost of involving expatriates in local processes, and enhancing the capacity of nationals (
Kruss et al. 2012). Many Nigerian software firms are now engaged in the execution of software projects, technology engineering and technical facilities that were once provided only by foreign firms. A major Nigerian software company, the Computer Warehouse Group (CWG), has discovered so much that it has grown into a tiny multinational company, operating in 18 of the 36 Nigerian states, with offices in other western African countries such as Ghana, Uganda, and Cameroon. Since 2006, more than 40 higher institutions in Nigeria have also facilitated the creation of more IPTTOs. Within the first six months of the introduction of NOTAP’s system, many Nigerian universities that were without a single patent in their many years of existence can now boast 10 to 20 inventions (
Aroture 2013;
Aroture 2017). As a result, the number of patents registered in Nigeria has since risen from a yearly average of 100 in 2006 to 400 in 2012 (
Kruss et al. 2012). NOTAP works in a comparatively fragile scheme of information and in a nation where government agencies are often criticized for unnecessary bureaucracy, delays, bad expertise, and unmotivated workforce. Better equipping NOTAP to fulfill its obligation is another task. Most recently, the organization explained the need for a large exhibition center, where entrepreneurs can come and see worldwide technology, domesticate these techniques and set up companies (
Aroture 2013). NOTAP’s project is also becoming a model for a number of African nations, collaborating with organizations in Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania, among others, to set up science and technology museums and to improve the effective commercialization of intellectual properties.