Breaking the Vicious Circle of Escalating Control: Connecting Politicians and Public Employees through Stewardship
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Political Leadership
2.2. Agency Theory
2.3. Stewardship Theory
2.4. Agency or Stewardship: Subsidiary or Complementary?
3. Methods
4. Analysis
4.1. General Trust in Stewards—While Spotting and Handling Agents
“You need to trust that all employees are doing the best they can and vouch for that”(Politician)
“We had a case at a Home Care Center where some of the employees cheated with registering work hours. That case fundamentally raised questions about the whole profession. But I kept saying ‘These employees are isolated cases’. I simply refused to scold all the stalwart ladies working in this sector because of a few bad eggs. Yes, there have been some misdemeanors, but all in all our employees are doing well”.(Mayor)
4.2. Reducing, Differentiating and Co-Creating Control
“Politicians must have the courage to let go of detailed control. Instead, as much local autonomy as possible should be given to leaders and employees in order to enable them to execute their professionalism and focus on their core tasks”(Code of Trust)
“The trust reform does not mean that all control is bad. Most existing documentation requirements cater to a legitimate need to reduce risk for citizens. It is important that we maintain that protection—for everybody’s sake”(internal speech—Mayor SFO)
“We (politicians) have had a tendency to standardize regulation too much. Now there is a development in the direction of differentiating control according to areas and also according to local needs”.(Committee leader in the area of Social Care)
4.3. Empowering Stewards While Sanctioning Agents
“Usually, political leaders have always paid attention to citizens and things that might catch the eye of the press. The ‘machinery’ aspects like the development of leaders or frontline workers—that was left to the administration. That has changed”.(Union Representative)
”Some think that the trust reform means that there are no sanctions. But you lose trust if you don’t’ sanction leaders who do not respect collective goals”.(CEO)
“People have often told me that the word ‘sanctions’ does note rhyme with ‘trust’. However, I actually think it does. Because if you do not sanction employees who cannot honor the fundamental values of the common good, you undermine trust”.(Politician)
4.4. Supplementing Institutional Power with Personal Power
“The signals you send, the rhetoric you use, the discourse you use are incredibly important to how they act at all levels. Is it going to be about trust or is it going to be about control and rules to protect yourself?”.(Committee Leader in Social Care). Especially local leaders notice the new style of attention from political leaders, which is perceived as acknowledgement
“If employees are to trust you, you also need to show that you trust them. In order to do that you need to consider the personal signals you send in order to define a new direction”(Mayor of Copenhagen)
“If I didn’t have the formal power as politically elected leader, I could not have succeeded in creating this movement towards trust. Especially at the beginning. I have had to control things in detail in order to ensure that the administration was onboard”.(Mayor)
4.5. Creating Arenas with Lower Power Distance
“If you want the employees to trust you, you need to get out and talk with them”(Committee leader in Social Care)
“It is tremendously important! I was here when politicians didn’t want anything to do with employees. Didn’t even want to talk to them… I’m surprised how much they now engage in dialogue with us about the way we experience control”(local leader)
“You have to deepen collaboration with professionals and bring them in earlier in the process, so they are not stuck in the role of critics. They need to be engaged in defining the problems and developing the solutions”.(Politician)
4.6. Stewardship: Opportunities and Challenges for Political Leaders?
“Although the politicians in my committee are on board with this trust reform, there are limits to their loyalty. There will always be somebody who can see the personal benefit of a quick win if a scandal occurs”.(Politician)
“One of my physiotherapists was in a dialogue group with the mayor. And she tells the mayor that quality is worsening because the trust reform has led to downsizing in our institution. Then I am contacted by my boss, who starts questioning me. But the reality is that our budgets have been cut, and although this is not directly related to the trust reform, it is my job to make these tough decisions”.
5. Discussion
6. Conclusions
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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Agency Approach | Stewardship Approach | |
---|---|---|
Political principals’ perception of employee motivation and goals | Conflict of interests between principal and agent. | Congruent or overlapping interests between principal and steward. |
Extrinsically motivated agents/ Egocentric goals/Lower order needs (Economy, security) | Intrinsically motivated stewards/collective goals/Higher order needs (Self-actualization, acknowledgement) | |
Management style of political principal | External monitoring and control delimiting delegated autonomy (Reducing risk by enhancing control) | Involvement and bounded self-regulation enabling delegation of extensive autonomy (Absorbing risk by building trust) |
Leadership style of political principal | Correction and rewards | Empowerment and acknowledgement |
(Incentives and coercion) | (Training, personal development and collective learning) | |
Power base of political principal | Institutional power | Personal power |
(Democratic sovereignty) | (Referent and expert) | |
Power distance | High power distance (Power is kept from agent) | Low power distance (Power is shared with steward) |
Empirical Data | Type of Data | Total Number |
---|---|---|
Documents | Official policies on the trust reform (3) Folders/written communication to local level (3) Manuscript/slides for political speeches aimed at the local level (4) Internal agendas/recommendations/policy drafts (4) | 14 |
Interviews | Political leaders (3) Top administration (3) Employees in administration (6) Local leaders (6) Union representatives (3) | 21 |
Focus group interviews | Employees (2 focus groups with 4 employees in each group) | 2 |
Observations | Political speech at internal conference for leaders (2) Meetings at city council (2) | 4 |
Empirical Patterns of Stewardship and Agency | |
---|---|
Political principals’ perception of employee motivation and goals | Employees are generally seen as trustworthy, pro-socially motivated stewards, working loyally to promote the politicians’ goals. Problems and mistakes are handled locally with support and help, while the rest of the organization is not affected by the introduction of general rules or control. At the same time, politicians in collaboration with the administration, single out and handle “bad eggs” (self-serving agents), who act counter to organizational goals. |
Management style of political principal | Politicians actively strive to reduce exessive control and delegate as much autonomy as possible to local stewards. Politicians share an official ambition to reduce excessive regulation that erodes local autonomy. Control is differentiated according to local needs and risks, and is increasingly designed in collaboration with local actors. At the same time, external monitoring and control are viewed as legitimate and necessary to secure accountability and to keep self-serving agents in check. i.e., leaders must still document, benchmark and live up to several professional, legal and economical standards. |
Leadership style of political principal | Politicians engage more actively in empowering local stewards through training, facilitated learning and professional reflection, enabling them to navigate with extensive autonomy. i.e., politicians promote courses and platforms for organizational learning. Good local leaders are praised and acknowledged by political leaders, rather than economically rewarded.At the same time, correction and sanctioning of local agents who do not respect common goals or values is seen as a vital precondition for preserving general trust. |
Power base of political principal | Politicians increasingly use personal forms of power in their communication and interaction with local stewards. Politicians act as ambassadors of the trust reform and aim their personal communication directly at local actors. Politicians increasingly use metaphors and discursive means to inspire local actors to pursue political goals. At the same time, politicians draw on their institutional power bases to defend desired directions or values against disloyal agents. i.e., institutional power is used to force the reluctant administration to comply with the political ambition to de-crease control. |
Power distance of political principal | Politicians increasingly seek face-to-face dialogue with stewards and invite them to share knowledge and ideas. i.e., politicians attend local meetings, invite local actors to coffee meetings or engage in “internships” at the frontline of the organization. In some arenas, political principals actively share their formal power with local actors e.g., by inviting them to co-create control solutions in direct face-to-face collaboration. At the same time, fundamental decisions about reforms designed to stop escalating control are taken top down by political principals, with high power distance from agents. |
Opportunies for Political Leaders | Challenges for Political Leaders |
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Bentzen, T.Ø. Breaking the Vicious Circle of Escalating Control: Connecting Politicians and Public Employees through Stewardship. Adm. Sci. 2021, 11, 63. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11030063
Bentzen TØ. Breaking the Vicious Circle of Escalating Control: Connecting Politicians and Public Employees through Stewardship. Administrative Sciences. 2021; 11(3):63. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11030063
Chicago/Turabian StyleBentzen, Tina Øllgaard. 2021. "Breaking the Vicious Circle of Escalating Control: Connecting Politicians and Public Employees through Stewardship" Administrative Sciences 11, no. 3: 63. https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci11030063