1. Introduction
Increasing agricultural green development is a key strategy for accelerating agricultural modernization and promoting agricultural sustainable development. It is also an inevitable choice for realizing the strategy of rural revitalization. Farmers are the main body of agricultural green production, and their willingness to participate in green production determines the effectiveness of agricultural green development. However, farmers’ revenues from agricultural productivity are steadily declining. The fact that agricultural production expenses are growing while earnings are decreasing must be considered while supporting green growth in agriculture. Achieving green agrarian development is a challenge. As a result, directing industrial integration and implementing agricultural diversification is a key step toward achieving efficient green agrarian growth. China’s rural tourism generated operational revenue of more than 850 billion yuan (122 billion Euro) in 2019. There were 3.3 billion visitors, accounting for 6.86 percent of the country’s total agricultural output value, demonstrating that the integration of agriculture and tourism is an important symbol of diversified agricultural production and the main starting point for promoting rural economic development. As a result of integrating agriculture and tourism, farmers’ ecological consciousness will be raised, and their green output will be encouraged [
1,
2]. Farmer green production is hampered, however, by the lack of innovation in conventional agriculture–tourism integration attempts and the difficulties of properly monitoring and disciplining farmers who pretend to be green.
Central government policy for 2021, dubbed the “No. 1 paper”, calls for a tighter linkage between the digital economy and agriculture. Agricultural green development requires digitally enabled integration of agriculture and tourism to be a significant strategic key factor in China, since conventional integration of agriculture and tourism lack the driving power for farmers’ green output. Thus, the following questions are the focus of our investigation. Compared to the conventional integration of agriculture and tourism, has the digital empowerment of farmers further encouraged green production? In addition, what new vigor and qualities do digital empowerment have in the integration of agriculture and tourism compared to conventional agriculture and tourist integration to help farmers achieve green production? How can green production be encouraged among farmers after providing them with new vigor and characteristics?
The key to implementing the rural revitalization plan is the green growth of agriculture. Farmers’ green practices directly impact the development of agriculture as a whole. The research on farmers’ green production behavior mainly focuses on the following four aspects. Firstly, scholars research the impact of farmers’ characteristics and perceived value on farmers’ green production. The per capita income of rural residents, the productive characteristics of farmers, human capital and other factors play important roles in agricultural technological progress and agricultural green production [
3,
4]. The heterogeneity of ecological compensation affects farmers’ green production behavior [
5], and farmers’ green production behavior largely depends on their perceived value of green agricultural production [
6]. Secondly, existing research examines the impact of government support on farmers’ green production. Agricultural technology training, economic stimulus, confirmation of land and other policies can reduce the use of chemical inputs by farmers [
7,
8,
9], and grass-roots public agricultural technology extension services affect the adoption of agricultural technology by farmers [
10]. Thirdly, research investigates the impact of social networks on farmers’ green production. The exchange between villagers and neighbors is an important channel for farmers to obtain agricultural technology information [
11]. Whether it is a circle of friends or a clan network, it promotes the dissemination of information, thereby contributing to the promotion of agricultural green technology [
12]. Fourthly, scholars focus on researching the role of organization in promoting the green development of agriculture. Joining a cooperative organization can help farmers overcome the limitation of the farmland scale of a single farmer, lead more small farmers adopting the soil testing formula fertilization and plant protection UAV technology [
13], significantly reduce the application amount of pesticides [
14] and promote the green production of farmers.
The Agricultural Internet of Things system may be used to precisely monitor the environmental impact of environmental operations and create the strategy, organization, execution and control methods of agricultural activities to minimize the negative influence on the environment [
15]. The application of digital technology in agriculture is an important measure to realize agricultural modernization [
16]. The digital transformation of modern agriculture can provide key production factors for the development of digital agriculture, thereby promoting the construction of precision agriculture and the research of smart agriculture [
17]. Scholars mainly study the impact of figures on agriculture from the macro level but rarely from the micro subject of farmers. The research on the impact of digital empowerment on tourism is mainly from the perspective of the impact of informatization on tourism. Informatization is an essential element to promote the development of the tourism industry [
18,
19]. Information technology affects the organizational change, service innovation and tourism flow prediction of tourism enterprises [
20,
21].
In general, digital technology can promote the development of the tourism industry, and such technology plays an important role in the sustainable development of agriculture. The existing research on the impact of agricultural tourism integration on agriculture mostly focuses on the effect of this integration on agricultural quantity [
22]. Few studies have been conducted from the perspective of the impact of agricultural tourism integration on agricultural quality. Furthermore, few studies have been conducted from the perspective of the differences in external characteristics between agricultural tourism integration and traditional agricultural tourism integration from the perspective of digital empowerment, especially on the green production behavior of farmers, a microsubject. Some scholars use a Markov chain to describe the probability transfer process of an uncertain phenomenon [
23,
24,
25,
26], and some scholars use Bayesian network models to integrate the characteristics of graph theory and probability theory to diagnose and analyze the causal relationship [
27,
28]. However, this paper mainly studies the problem of farmers’ green behavior strategies under different conditions, so the incomplete information dynamic game mode is more suitable. Existing literature has explored the promotion effect of agrotourism integration on agricultural green development from a macroperspective [
1], but few scholars have explored the impact of agrotourism integration on farmers’ green production from the perspective of digital empowerment. Therefore, this study has some innovations from that perspective. Thus, on the basis of analyzing the mechanism of the impact of agricultural tourism integration on farmers’ green production behavior from the digital empowerment perspective by using the dynamic signal game model, the paper tries to make innovations in the following ways. Firstly, this work explores the differences between agricultural tourism integration and traditional agricultural tourism integration under the digital empowerment perspective. Secondly, it analyses the promotion mechanism of agricultural tourism integration into farmers’ green production from the perspective of digital empowerment. Thirdly, it explores the role of agricultural tourism integration in promoting farmers’ green production from the perspective of digital empowerment, expands the path of farmers’ green production and enriches the existing research on agricultural tourism integration.
2. Basic Model Analysis
2.1. Basic Model Settings
Farmers are divided into two types: honest farmers (HP) and opportunistic farmers (OP). The type of farmer is private information and remains unchanged throughout the game. Honest farmers will never pass off inferior agricultural products as high-quality agricultural products, regardless of green production. Meanwhile, opportunistic farmers are motivated to pass off inferior agricultural products as high-quality agricultural products; that is, they promise that high-quality agricultural products may come from green production or non-green production. Honest farmers and opportunistic farmers choose green production or non-green production to maximize their own interests.
The total scale of farmers is abstracted as one. Each farmer produces the same amount of agricultural products. The proportion of honest green farmers in the market is , the proportion of honest non-green farmers is and the proportion of opportunistic farmers is . The quality difference in agricultural products market is assumed; when farmers opt for green production, they may produce high-quality agricultural products. Meanwhile, when farmers opt for non-green production, the probability of producing high-quality agricultural products is 0; that is, all the agricultural products are low-quality agricultural products. The value of high-quality agricultural products to consumers (C) is , and the value of low-quality agricultural products to consumers is 0. The cost of farmers’ green production is or . If , the honest farmers choose green production; if , the honest farmers give up green production. The cost of non-green production is standardized to 0. However, opportunistic farmers who pretend to produce high-quality agricultural products need to pay fees . If the government and other regulatory agencies discover opportunistic farmers’ impostor behavior, they will punish the farmers. The probability of being discovered and investigated by the regulator is assumed to be , and the punishment intensity is f. Moreover, agricultural products produced by the same farmer are assumed to have the same quality in the same period, and the output probability and cost of high-quality agricultural products in green production c are affected by ecological environment, technological level, farmer capital and other factors. Consumers do not know the type of farmer but judge the probability of high-quality agricultural products in the market with prior beliefs . Prior beliefs are consumers’ initial judgments on the probability of high-quality agricultural products in the market. All consumers are assumed to have the same prior beliefs, .
The model makes the following assumptions. Firstly, both farmers and consumers are risk-neutral. Secondly, in each stage of the game, each consumer and the farmer trade once. After each stage of the game, the farmer and the consumer rematch, regardless of the repeated transactions between the consumer and the same farmer. Thirdly, different transactions are independent of each other.
The game process of each stage is as follows: (1) natural (N) selects the type of farmers, honest farmers (HP) and opportunistic farmers (OP). The types of farmers remain unchanged in the next game process, but honest green production farmers (HPB) and honest non-green production farmers (HPN) can be converted to each other, and the price of high-quality agricultural products is
p. (2) Consumers opt to buy high-quality agricultural products or not. If they decide to buy and their products are high-quality agricultural products, the profit is
. Meanwhile, if they decide to buy but their products are non-high-quality agricultural products, the profit is
. Opportunistic farmers choose green production or non-green production. If opportunistic farmers choose green production, the profit is
. If they choose non-green production, the profit is
. For honest green production farmers, the income is
, and the profit of honest non-green farmers is 0. The game tree is shown in
Figure 1.
The selection strategies of honest farmers and opportunistic farmers (honest farmers choose green production or not, and opportunistic farmers choose green production without impersonation or non-green production and impersonation) are to pursue the maximization of longterm profits, and consumers pursue the optimization of short-term utility. When consumers opt to consume high-quality agricultural products, they think the probability of purchasing high-quality agricultural products is . However, they cannot judge the quality level of agricultural products before purchase, and the quality level can only be determined after purchasing. As such, third parties, such as the court, also cannot verify the quality level.
2.2. Basic Model Equilibrium
In traditional agricultural production, the ecological characteristics of agricultural products have not been integrated into the new business mode of agro-tourism integration. Thus, the value of high-quality agricultural products produced by farmers is difficult to reflect in this type of production, and the price of high-quality agricultural products is low. The price of agricultural products with high quality and non-high quality production remains the same because the cost
c of producing high-quality agricultural products is higher than that of producing non-high-quality agricultural products. Thus, in traditional agricultural production, farmers will not choose high quality production [
1].
The integration of agriculture and tourism can better reflect the value of high-quality agricultural products, which are re-priced. In the period , consumers believe that the probability of purchasing high-quality agricultural products is based on a priori belief . In the period , consumers’ belief in the probability of purchasing high-quality agricultural products is updated based on the probability of purchasing high-quality agricultural products in the process of agricultural tourism integration. Although they do not know the private information of opportunistic farmers, they know the probability of high-quality agricultural products being in the market in the previous period. In the traditional integration of agriculture and tourism, the game has a static perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and the opportunistic farmers have the same strategy in each period. In the period does not change with t. For the convenience of expression, under , consumers can judge the probability of high-quality agricultural products in the market according to a priori belief , that is, . Consumers do not know the exact quality of agricultural products at the time of purchase. Nevertheless, they know the probability of high-quality agricultural products.
The premise that consumers choose to buy high-quality agricultural products is that the benefits outweigh the costs, so consumers choose green consumption to meet:
The pricing of opportunistic farmers is the same as that of honest green production farmers. The premise of honest farmers choosing green production is that the benefit of green production is greater than that of non-green production, so honest farmers choose green production to meet:
Meanwhile, opportunistic farmers choose to pretend as long as the pretend income is greater than the pretend total payment. Opportunistic farmers choose non-green production and impersonation to meet:
Therefore, under the conditions of (1), (2) and (3), the game has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Honest farmers opt for green production, and opportunistic farmers opt for non-green production and impersonation.
Among them, is obtained from Formula (1); that is, consumers opt to consume high-quality agricultural products when the price of high-quality agricultural products is less than p. The price of high-quality agricultural products that consumers can accept is affected by the value of high-quality agricultural products, the output probability of high-quality agricultural products and the proportion of green farmers. is obtained from Formula (2), as long as the price of high-quality agricultural products is higher than the cost of green production c, and honest farmers choose green production. Developing the integration of agriculture and tourism can promote the green production of honest farmers through the following ways. Firstly, the ecological value of agricultural products must be improved, and the output probability of high-quality agricultural products must be raised to increase the price p of high-quality agricultural products. Secondly, technological progress has reduced the cost c of green production.
However,
is obtained from Formula (3). The left side of the inequality is the current profit of opportunistic farmers when they decide to engage in green production, and the right side is the impersonation expected profit. When the individual reputation is not formed, the opportunistic farmers only consider the maximization of the current profit, that is, impersonation cost
u. The probability
of being investigated and punished after impersonation and the punishment intensity
f determine whether the opportunistic farmers impersonate sellers of high-quality agricultural products in the current period. China has a large demand base for agricultural products, and relying solely on government supervision is difficult, resulting in “failure to check out’ and inadequate punishment [
29]. The traditional integration of agriculture and tourism cannot track the production behavior of farmers and has no information diffusion function. In reality, opportunistic farmers often pretend to have high-quality agricultural products because of the low cost of pretending, the great difficulty of investigation and the small punishment after investigation. To sum up, the traditional integration of agriculture and tourism can enhance the value of high-quality agricultural products and reduce the cost of green production to stimulate the willingness of honest farmers to produce high-quality products to a certain extent. However, such integration cannot effectively restrict the behavior of opportunistic producers, which limits the effectiveness of the integration of agriculture and tourism in promoting green production of farmers.
3. Extended Model Analysis
3.1. Extended Model Setting
Traditional agriculture-tourism integration cannot track the data. Thus, opportunistic farmers’ impostor behavior is difficult to curb. Digital empowerment of agro-tourism integration, which is characterized by “data traceability”, increases the risk of opportunistic farmers being investigated after their non-green agricultural products are disguised as high-quality agricultural products. Assuming the integration of agriculture and tourism through digital empowerment, the production process of farmers can be tracked on the platform, and the quality information of agricultural products purchased by consumers can also be reported on the platform. Whether they are honest farmers or opportunistic farmers, historical records show the quality of agricultural products sold in the past on the platform. At this time, the selection strategy of farmers should consider not only the current income but also the impact of reputation on future income. The number of agricultural products produced by farmers in each period remains the same, which is abstracted as 1. At , consumers’ belief in the probability of high-quality agricultural products came from information . refers to no historical record of opportunistic farmers pretending to be high-quality agricultural products on the platform, in the integration of agriculture and tourism through digital empowerment. Assume that farmers choosing green production is also likely to produce non-high-quality agricultural products, but based on the following two reasons. Firstly, digital empowerment makes the production process of agricultural products traceable. Secondly, the quality of non-high-quality agricultural products in green production is still higher than that of low-quality agricultural products in non-green production. Thus, consumers can forgive farmers who provide non-high-quality agricultural products in green production. However, the probability that consumers will forgive opportunistic farmers pretending to sell high-quality agricultural products is 0.
3.2. Extended Model Equilibrium
Considering that opportunistic farmers choose green production:
Consumers choose high quality agricultural products as long as they expect revenue to be greater than expenditure. Consumers choose green consumption to meet:
is obtained from (4) and (5), which indicates that consumers choose green consumption when the price is lower than .
Under the information transmission mechanism, opportunistic farmers consider their total income in all periods. Assuming the discount rate is
, according to the dynamic programming [
30], the income
can be expressed as:
Among them,
is the current income of opportunistic farmers’ green production,
means the opportunistic farmers’ green production,
is the follow-up income caused by different quality signals and
is the average expected follow-up income when opportunistic farmers choose green production.
The following can be obtained from Equations (6) and (7):
Formula (8) shows that if opportunistic farmers choose green production, a probability of producing high-quality agricultural products exists. The average income from the next period is the same as the average income from the current period. Moreover, the probability of producing low-quality agricultural products is . Given that customers can forgive non-high-quality agricultural products in green production, the average income from the next period is the same as the average income from the current period.
If opportunistic farmers choose non-green production, they can only “cheat’ once, and then they will be seen through by consumers and filled in on the platform. After that, consumers will never forgive them. Therefore, the total income of opportunistic farmers impersonating is
. Opportunistic farmers choose green production under the premise that the expected return of green production being greater than the total return of sham. The conditions for opportunistic farmers to not deviate from green production are:
is obtained from Formula (9); the left side of inequality (9) is the expected income of opportunistic farmers discounted for the current period, and the right-hand side is the expected income with fake high-quality agricultural products discounted in the current period.
By further calculating the partial derivatives of and for , the partial derivatives are all less than 0, which indicates that the expected income of counterfeiting high-quality agricultural products gradually decreases with the increase in the cost of counterfeiting, the strengthening of the punishment for counterfeiting and an increase in the risk of being investigated.
The lack of information weakens the green production power of farmers. In recent years, high-quality agricultural products promoted by rural tourism have been counterfeit and shoddy, indicating that the problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard in the supply of high-quality agricultural products cannot be ignored. The above model analysis shows that when the opportunity cost of impersonation is higher than the income of green production, opportunistic farmers may give up impersonation and turn to green production. The result of this model is the same as the research conclusion of Kreps et al.; that is, when information transparency increases, the reputation mechanism can effectively inhibit opportunistic farmers’ impersonation [
31]. Digital empowerment of agro-tourism has enhanced the convenience of information dissemination, and the big data processing capability of the information platform has provided new possibilities for the tracking and recording of farmers’ production and transaction information. Through these scientific and technological means, on the one hand, opportunistic farmers’ impersonation is easier to identify and verify. On the other hand, it is easier to build a multilateral punishment mechanism for opportunistic farmers’ impersonation, which makes it possible for opportunistic farmers to conduct green production.
Honest farmers’ decision making is consistent with the basic model. As long as the price of high-quality agricultural products increases and the cost decreases, honest farmers will choose green production. According to the above mechanism model, compared with the traditional agricultural tourism integration, the agricultural tourism integration under the digital empowerment perspective can restrict the opportunistic production behavior, further stimulate honest farmers’ willingness to green production, promote the farmers’ green production and promote the green development of agriculture.
5. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1. Conclusions
Based on the incomplete information dynamic game model, this study takes the development of organic agriculture in Xichong, as an example to explore the impact of agricultural tourism integration on farmers’ green production from the perspective of digital empowerment. The study found that Xichong promotes green production of farmers through three ways.
Firstly, we should restrain the opportunistic farmers’ impersonation behavior and increase the probability of their being investigated, the cost of impersonation and the effect of punishment. From the perspective of digital empowerment, the integration of agriculture and tourism has the characteristics of “data traceability”, which leads to an increase in the probability of being punished for pretending to be an opportunistic farmer and an increase in the cost of pretending to be an opportunistic farmer. The characteristic of “information diffusion” is easily punishable by regulators and consumers. The above two characteristics make opportunistic farmers pretend to have less expected income than green production and restrain their impersonation behavior.
Secondly, improving the production probability of high-quality agricultural products and reducing the cost of green production will help farmers’ green production. From the perspective of digital empowerment, the integration of agriculture and tourism has the characteristics of knowledge sharing, which improves the level of green production technology of farmers and then promotes the production probability and cost reduction of high-quality agricultural products.
Finally, the demand information is matched, the dilemma of the lemon market is resolved, and the demand for high-quality agricultural products is increased. From the perspective of digital empowerment, the integration of agriculture and tourism has the characteristics of information matching. Firstly, it starts from the supply side, retraces the consumer trust mechanism and breaks the dilemma of the lemon market. Secondly, it eases the search resistance and location resistance and increases the demand for high-quality agricultural products.
Among them, the former path promotes the green production of opportunistic farmers, and the latter two paths promote the green production of honest farmers. Previous research has demonstrated that the impact of agro-tourism integration on agricultural development presents nonlinear characteristics, but the black box of why agro-tourism integration presents nonlinear characteristics in relation to agricultural development has not been opened, and the bottleneck problem of agro-tourism integration to further promote agricultural development cannot be solved. This study explored the differences in the impact of agrotourism integration on green production of different types of farmers from the microperspective, which could effectively explain the reasons for its nonlinear characteristics and effectively solve the bottleneck problem of agrotourism integration in promoting agricultural development.
5.2. Practical Implications
Firstly, we should pay equal attention to punishing opportunistic farmers’ impersonation and protecting the interests of green production farmers to achieve green agricultural development. Using data tracing and information diffusion to build a multilateral punishment mechanism can effectively restrain opportunistic counterfeiting and achieve effective governance of opportunistic farmers. This study has affirmed this conclusion, but only punishment without incentives cannot effectively promote farmers’ green production. Meanwhile, only protecting farmers’ green production interests can achieve effective governance. Therefore, to realize the green production of farmers, while increasing the punishment for opportunistic farmers’ impersonation, digital-enabled agriculture and tourism must be integrated to promote the value of high-quality agricultural products and protect the interests of green production farmers.
Secondly, the government should strengthen information construction, overcome the dilemma of agricultural production cycle and guide the rational allocation of resources. Xichong has resolved the dilemma of consumers’ information asymmetry through information matching, realized the price increase of high-quality agricultural products and guided farmers’ green production. However, farmers have difficulty understanding the market information fully in a timely manner. Hence, information asymmetry between supply and demand still exists. Digital technologies, such as big data, are necessary to match and guide the rational allocation of resources accurately to achieve high-quality agricultural development.
Thirdly, by leveraging the digital empowerment of agriculture and tourism integration, digital technology can effectively protect the profits of small farmers and enhance their willingness toward green production. To stabilize the market for high-quality agricultural products, we need to take the road of scale and branding, that is, to become stronger and bigger. The development of organic agriculture in Xichong has effectively expanded the production scale of agricultural products by invigorating land circulation and introducing diversified business entities. Moreover, it has innovated more industrial development models in the process of becoming stronger and bigger. In its further development, we can look for differentiation and service opportunities with the help of the integration of digital agriculture and tourism. Furthermore, we can reverse the competitive disadvantage of small farmers with small capital and small scale with the core competitiveness of original ecology and customization, meet the long-tail demand that consumers cannot meet, protect the profits of small farmers, enhance their green production willingness and promote the high-quality development of agriculture.