Warriors Who Do Not Kill in War: A Buddhist Interpretation of the Warrior’s Role in Relation to the Precept against Killing

Abstract

Buddhist scriptures in ancient South Asia include discourses that teach measures by which a warrior can face problems in confrontation with foreign armies and domestic rebel troops without resorting to killing them in battle. These moderate measures have not attracted much attention in previous studies on Buddhist statecraft and warfare. There are eleven kinds, and they can be organized according to the following three types: retreat from the role of warrior, resolution without pitched battle, and fighting in a pitched battle without killing. Similar ideas regarding measures for resolving military confrontations can be found in Indian Classics in the context of statecraft. The compilers of the Buddhist discourses collected ideas about similar measures from common sources and reshaped those borrowed ideas from the perspective of the Buddhist precept against killing. A warrior who implemented such measures did not acquire as much negative karmic potential as intentional killing produces. In premodern warrior societies, religion often provided the institutional basis for both a code of ethics and a soteriology for warriors, for whom fighting was in fulfillment of their social role. The compilation of discourses containing measures that do not involve killing represents an aspect of Buddhism’s function in ancient South Asia.

1. Introduction

In ancient South Asia, kings and other warriors, as well as religious specialists such as brahmins and renouncers, constituted an important social stratum.1 They were given a special role in lay society. As Kane put it, the fundamental function of a king is to protect his people, and the daṇḍa, i.e., the use of armed forces comprised of warriors to counter foreign armies and domestic rebel troops (as well as to punish domestic criminals, which this paper does not address), was often an important means of offering that protection.2 However, such protection may involve killing opponents. According to the general Buddhist view of karmic law, intentional killing creates negative karmic potential. For committing such an act, a killer suffers negative karmic retribution, typically rebirth to a miserable existence, such as hell. This dilemma raises the question: what instructions do Buddhist scriptures provide for warriors who must confront armed opponents in order to fulfill their social role?

Buddhist instructions for warriors in and around war can roughly be divided into three categories in terms of whether a warrior is allowed to kill his opponents in battle: instructions from the standpoint that intentional killing must be avoided; instructions from the standpoint that if certain measures are taken, a warrior who intentionally kills his opponents can still attain rebirth in heaven; and instructions that do not articulate whether a warrior is allowed to kill in battle. In this paper, I focus on the first set of instructions,3 which teach moderate measures by which a warrior can face (albeit not necessarily solve) problems in confrontation without killing his opponents.

This paper presents an examination of Buddhist discourses on measures by which a warrior can face problems in confrontation with armed opponents without resorting to intentionally killing them in battle and elucidates both the warrior code of ethics and a soteriology for warriors represented in those discourses. Such discourses can be found in ethical teachings for warriors and narratives that feature a warrior (who was often the Buddha in a former life) as a protagonist.4 As their full texts and translations that I provide in the footnotes show, these Buddhist discourses, which teach moderate measures for facing military confrontations, are not actually concrete, detailed manuals for use in implementing those measures. In those discourses, the explanations of the measures are concise and vague and are often more religious than tactically pragmatic. The most likely compilers of those discourses were monks, who were religious specialists and not military strategists or tacticians. The discourses are presented as religious ones in the form of discourses on military actions; they provide rough teachings about how to behave during military confrontation, while simultaneously espousing both a code of ethics and a soteriology for warriors who must face military confrontations.

All the Buddhist texts that are examined in this paper were written sometime between the third century BCE and the seventh century CE thereabouts (which I call the “ancient age” for conciseness)5 on the Indian subcontinent or in Sri Lanka. The Pāli scriptures, for which the exact compilation dates are unknown, were compiled before the fifth century CE. I have also used Indian Classic scriptures outside Buddhism, particularly Kauṭilya’s book of statecraft, the Arthaśāstra (c. first century BCE–third century CE),6 for comparison to clarify the peculiarity of the Buddhist discourses in question.

In other words, this paper explores Buddhist conceptions of the warrior who does not kill in war. The ultimate ideal of such a warrior is the wheel-turner (cakkavatti/cakravartin), an ideal monarch who conquers and rules the world without killing anyone, in accordance with dhamma/dharma (“the righteousness”). However, this paper focuses on cases of kings or other warriors who cannot become wheel-turners. As I argued in (2020), according to the Buddhist scriptures that expound the wheel-turner, such as the Cakkavattisīhanādasutta (“Wheel-turner’s Lion’s Roar Sutta”) and Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa (“Treasury of Abhidharma,” both its kārikā, “verses,” and bhāṣya, “commentary,” fourth–fifth centuries), a king can become a wheel-turner only in an age when all people, if they fall short of perfection, voluntarily conduct themselves righteously and are therefore able to live to be 80,000 (or more) years old. In such a golden age of dharma, since kings in foreign countries are also moral, they do not aspire to fight in battle; instead, they follow the wheel-turner, who is the most righteous ruler. The wheel-turner is therefore able to conquer the world without killing in battle.7 However, ancient India (and perhaps all ages in the real world) was not morally utopian. People often did not act righteously, and armed conflicts involving killing frequently broke out. In this paper, I explore Buddhist thoughts on how warriors could refrain from killing in war in a morally imperfect age.

Jenkins and Keown discussed some aspects of the Buddhist ideas about how to settle problems with armed opponents without killing. Although Jenkin’s analysis is brief and undetailed, he pointed out that the Jātakas frequently refer to capturing enemies alive and intimidation as measures for subduing the enemy without bloodshed.8 Keown examined the role of military deterrence in peace-building, using the discourse on the wheel-turner in the Cakkavattisīhanādasutta, who, with his huge, strong fourfold army, conquers foreign kings without bloodshed.9

These studies are significant but insufficient. Keown did not fully consider the moral status of a world in which a king may become a wheel-turner, as I mentioned earlier. Consequently, he deemed the wheel-turner’s bloodless conquest to be an effect of the deterrence by his huge army. However, it is, in fact, an effect of a mutual coupling of the wheel-turner’s virtue and the foreign kings’ morality in the Cakkavattisīhanādasutta. It is not that the wheel-turner’s huge army exerts a negative impact that causes foreign kings to become fearful or resigned.10 Moreover, capturing enemies alive and employing intimidation strategies, as Jenkins pointed out, in addition to military deterrence (which I treat, in this paper, as a result of a king’s virtue), as Keown argued, do not constitute all the measures for settling military problems without bloodshed. Buddhist scriptures teach more.

Furthermore, as discussed below, most of the measures are taught explicitly in connection with the precept against killing or warriors’ own wish to avoid killing. Given that the precept against killing, the first of the Buddhist Five Precepts, has soteriological significance,11 one should not understand the bloodless measures to have been presented merely for justifying particular forms of military conduct; they were also composed as a soteriological means for a warrior to avoid accruing the negative karmic retribution that intentional killing normally produces. Previous studies have not fully considered the soteriological aspect.12 One must explore the ethical implications of those discourses with careful consideration of this aspect.

Buddhist measures by which a warrior can face problems in confrontation with armed opponents without killing can be divided into three types:

• Type 1: Retreat from the role of warrior;
• Type 2: Resolution without fighting in a pitched battle;
• Type 3: Fighting in a pitched battle without killing.

They can be further divided into several subtypes.13 Type 1 is distinct from Types 2 and 3 in terms of whether a warrior maintains the warrior role that was given to him. Meanwhile, Types 1 and 2 are distinguished from Type 3 in terms of whether a warrior fights in a pitched battle. In this paper, a “pitched battle” (yuddha) means a situation in which opposing armies meet, clash, and attack each other, regardless of the army’s relative sizes; however, the term does not refer to situations in which the physical clash between both sides has not actually started, such as a circumstance where one side shoots arrows at the other from a distance for intimidation purposes only. Dividing the types in this way is the most faithful to the texts.

The sections that follow in this paper are organized as follows. Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4 discuss the abovementioned Types 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Section 5 compares the Buddhist measures with similar measures found in the Arthaśāstra in order to clarify the ideology that underlies the Buddhist discourses. The Conclusion summarizes the discussion and clarifies the discourses as ethical and soteriological instructions for warriors.

2. Type 1: Retreat from the Role of Warrior

One measure by which a warrior can refrain from killing others in battle is to abandon the status of warrior and become a renouner; as a renouncer, he is permanently freed from his duty to fight.14 The Mahāvagga (“Large Part”) in the Khandaka book in the Vinayapiṭaka (“The Discipline Division [of the Pāli Canon]”) contains a story about royal warriors who abandoned their positions in the royal army and became Buddhist monks. The royal warriors say, ‘Really, delighted in battle, we go to [battle] and do a sinful deed. We produce many evils. Really, in what way can we be released from the sinful deed and do a good deed?’ and ‘If we can become monks among the Buddhist monks, we can likewise (like the monks) be released from the sinful deed and do a good deed.’ It is obvious that the royal warriors abandoned their roles in order to be released from the requirement, per their social role, to commit the sinful deed of warfare.15

As is well known, the abovementioned story is part of a narrative that explains why the Buddha prohibited monks from ordaining royal warriors as monks–on the premise that if warriors left, kings would be furious, possibly to the point of killing or injuring monks, who ordained the warriors. The Buddha proclaimed any monk who ordained a royal warrior as a monk to be guilty of the dukkaṭa offence (the “evil deed” offence, which is one of the lightest in monastic law).16 After this rule was established, royal warriors had few chances to become monks. However, the rule did not apply to a warrior who did not officially belong to any royal army,17 and it is also noteworthy that Buddhist scriptures contain many narratives of the lives of kings, princes, and other warriors who abandoned their warrior status to become monks.18

3. Type 2: Resolution without Fighting in a Pitched Battle

Another measure by which a king or a warrior could refrain from killing his opponents in war is to resolve problems with his challengers in moderate ways that do not include resorting to fighting in a pitched battle. Many discourses can be classified as belonging to this type. They can be grouped according to eight derived measures.

The first measure entails a warrior surrendering to or fleeing from the invading enemy without fighting. In the Seyyajātaka (“Excellent [Man] Jātaka”), when the enemy king’s army was approaching, the king of Bārāṇasī (the Buddha in a former life), who observed the precept (sīlaṃ rakkhati), said to his retainers, ‘For me there is no use [having] a kingdom [if it has been] acquired (defended) by harming others. Do not do anything!’ The king then gave his kingdom to the enemy king without any resistance.19 A similar story of a king’s surrender can be found in the Mahāsīlavajātaka (“Great Sīlava Jātaka”). When the king of Kosala’s army was approaching to take Bārāṇasī, King Sīlava (also called the Great Sīlava, another former life of the Buddha) in Bārāṇasī, who was called “the righteous dhamma king” (dhammiko dhammarājā), said to his retainer warriors, ‘O friends! It is not the duty of the others (subjects) to languish for me. Let those who want the kingdom take the kingdom! Do not go [to counter them].’20 Similarly, the Mahāvaṃsa (“Great Chronicle”), a chronicle of kings in ancient Sri Lanka (fifth century CE), contains a story of King Siri Saṃghabodhi (active in the third century CE), who was an observer of the Five Precepts (pañcasīlavā). One day the king’s finance minister, Goṭhakābhaya, amassed rebel troops and marched on the capital where Saṃghabodhi resided to seize the throne. Having had prior knowledge of the coup, Saṃghabodhi fled (palāyi) the capital alone; he did not fight because he disliked harming others (parahiṃsaṃ arocento) in battle. As a result, Goṭhakābhaya ascended the throne.21

The three kings did not fight against their opponent invaders because of their desire to avoid killing, in accordance with the precept against killing.22 However, in contrast to the Type 1 royal warriors who abandoned their roles, the three kings seem to have fulfilled their duty to protect their subjects, either by surrendering or fleeing. The texts do not say anything about the subjects meeting unhappy fates after the kings surrendered or fled, and, as discussed below, the kings in the Seyyajātaka and the Mahāsīlavajātaka later regained their kingdoms without bloodshed.23

The second measure is to be virtuous: a king resolves problems without resorting to fighting in battle thanks to the impact his virtue exerts upon his opponents.24 According to the Kūṭadantasutta (“Kūṭadanta Sutta”), King Mahāvijita, who possesses all the kingly elements, such as a fourfold army that is allegiant and obedient to his command, ‘torments [his] enemies with the heat of [his] splendor.’25 A similar idea can be found in the Aśokāvadāna (“Aśoka’s Legend, “c. second century CE),26 which is a narrative of the life of King Aśoka (active in the third century BCE) in the Maurya Dynasty. Aśoka marched with his fourfold army, which was a supernatural manifestation resulting from his virtue (kuśala). The people in some cities welcomed Aśoka, and the gods commanded the people on the continent as whole not to oppose him.27 Similarly, in the Palāyijātaka (“‘Fled’ Jātaka”), having witnessed the brilliance of the king of Takkasilā’s (another former life of the Buddha) tower gate (dvārakoṭṭhaka), King Brahmadatta in Bārāṇasī retreated with his army, saying, ‘We will not be able to fight against the king, [who is] glorious in such a way (i.e., having such a brilliant tower gate).’28 Moreover, in the aforementioned Mahāsīlavajātaka, with the aid of Yakkhas (Yakṣas, demons), the conquered King Sīlava snuck into the enemy king’s bedroom at night. Seeing this, the enemy king realized that Sīlava was so virtuous (guṇa) that even the cruel Yakkhas worked for him; he apologized to Sīlava and returned the kingdom to him.29 The Seyyajātaka, which was examined earlier, tells the rest of the story as follows. The conquered king (the king of Bārāṇasī) was imprisoned, but he kept his thoughts about the enemy king merciful (mettāyanto). Due to the supernatural effect of his merciful meditation, the enemy king’s body grew hot and tormented. The enemy king was informed that his miserable physical state was punishment for imprisoning the precept-observing king (sīlavantaṃ rājānaṃ); he apologized to the king, released him, and returned the kingdom.30 It seems that due to the imprisoned king’s observance of the precept, he was able to supernaturally affect the enemy king (i.e., heat his body) through his meditative mercy. Similar stories of a king who exerted the same supernatural effect thanks to his meditation can be found in the two texts that are discussed in the next paragraph. However, they have a different element, viz., preaching.

The third measure is to preach: a king talks to his enemy about impermanence, kingship, and other related topics, causing the enemy to regret his actions and retreat. The Maṇikuṇḍalajātaka (“Jeweled Earing Jātaka”) tells a story about a king of Bārāṇasī (another former life of the Buddha), who was conquered and imprisoned by the king of Kosala. In jail, the king of Bārāṇasī was intent on meditating, which caused the king of Kosala’s body to grow very hot.31 The king of Kosala came to the jail to see the king of Bārāṇasī. From inside his prison, the king of Bārāṇasī told the king of Kosala that because he understood the impermanence (asassata) of all things, he personally never grieved the loss (confiscation) of wealth. In addition, he instructed his captor as follows: ‘O king, glory and fame increase for [the one] whose actions are considerate.’ The king of Kosala apologized to the king of Bārāṇasī, released him, and returned the kingdom.32 The Ghatajātaka (“Ghata Jātaka”) includes a similar story about another royal man, Prince Ghata (another former life of the Buddha), who told his enemy king that grief could not help him and that nothing can bring pleasure to someone who is dissatisfied with his own existence and who seeks to take all the things he desires.33

The fourth measure is intimidation: a king or warrior intimidates his enemy using words, weapons, or his alliance with other countries, so that the enemy abandons the fight and retreats. In the Dutiyapalāyijātaka (“The Second ‘Fled’ Jātaka”), showing his moon-like face, the king of Bārāṇasī (another former life of the Buddha) intimidated the king of Gandhāra, who had come with his army to take Bārāṇasī, by saying, ‘Now, I will crush your soldiers and vehicles just like an excellent elephant, [which is] intoxicated, [crushes] a forest of reeds.’ The king of Gandhāra was frightened and ran away.34 Espousing a similar theme, several Buddhist scriptures contain the narrative of the furious king Virūḍhaka’s destruction of the Śākyas, the Buddha’s kinsmen. There are different versions of this narrative, but the version in Zhi Qian’s (third century CE) Chinese translation of the Arthapadasūtra (義足経or Yizujing, “Footstep of Meaning Sūtra”) is perhaps the oldest.35 It tells that before Virūḍhaka’s army reached the Śākyas’ stronghold, the Śākya warriors, having seen the invaders from a distance, hit their chariots and the soldiers’ ornaments very precisely with arrows. The Śākya warriors did this to intimidate Virūḍhaka into abandoning the battle; because the Śākyas observed the Five Precepts, they had no intention of killing their opponents.36 Similarly, in the Asadisajātaka (“Asadisa Jātaka”), Prince Asadisa of Bārāṇasī (another former life of the Buddha) used his skill in archery to intimidate seven kings who marched with their armies to take Bārāṇasī. From a remote sentry tower, Asadisa hit the seven kings’ golden dish with his arrow while the kings were having a meal; naturally, the kings were frightened and ran away. The text says, ‘The great one (Prince Asadisa) thus made the seven kings run away without causing the shedding of as much blood as a gadfly sucks.’ Intimidation by use of an arrow is thus related here as a counterproposal to fighting (bloodshed) in battle.37 The Sudhanakumārāvadhāna (“Legend of Prince Sudhana,” before the fifth to the seventh centuries thereabouts)38 also mentions intimidation through the use of armed forces as a counterproposal to killing in battle. Prince Sudhana (another former life of the Buddha) was on an expedition to quell a rebellion. Having seen this, Vaiśravaṇa (a god) commanded Pāñcika (the general of Yakṣas) to help Sudhana: ‘Having set out for the purpose of fighting in battle, this [Sudhana], the bodhisattva in the Fortunate Aeon, will experience pain. Help must be given to him. The local chief (rebel) must be subjugated. And yet no living being must be pained.’ Pāñcika created a fourfold army comprised of celestial beings (e.g., a man as tall as a tāla tree); the army intimidated the rebel chief’s people with roaring sounds, the splendor of its supernatural troops, and the destruction of the rebel’s castle’s rampart. Although the rampart was roundly destroyed, no one was killed in this counterinsurgency campaign.39 (Seen from Sudhana’s viewpoint, this is an application of the second measure: given Sudhana’s virtue as a bodhisattva, the gods helped subjugate the enemy without killing.) As mentioned below, the Mahāyāna Satyakaparivarta (“Chapter of Satyaka,” the fourth to sixth centuries) teaches that a righteous king (chos dang ldan pa’i rgyal po) can employ the strategy of intimidating (’jigs pa bstan pa) his enemies into abandoning fighting by forming alliances with other countries.

The fifth and sixth measures are forming friendships with and giving gifts to one’s enemies, respectively. The Satyakaparivarta teaches three diplomatic policies to convince foreign opponents to abandon fighting before a pitched battle breaks out; they are to become friends (mdza’ bar bgyi ba) with them, give them gifts (phan gdags pa), and, as mentioned earlier, intimidate them using allied countries.40

The seventh measure entails the use of starvation tactics,41 which is a form of economic sanction. In the Asātarūpajātaka (“Disagreeable State Jātaka”), the prince recaptured the kingdom of Bārāṇasī, which had been seized by the king of Kosala, by cutting off the kingdom’s supply of food and fuel for seven days. The prince’s mother advised him that ‘Pitched battle is not necessary. You should block the passages from all directions and surround the city of Bārāṇasī. Consequently, you will certainly acquire the people, [who] have suffered the loss of [fuel] woods, water, and food, and the city without pitched battle (i.e., If you cause the people to suffer the loss of fuel woods, water, and food by blocking the passages and besieging the city, you will certainly reclaim the city without pitched battle).’ The use of starvation tactics is thus distinguished from pitched battle, perhaps because the former do not involve the direct killing of opponents using weapons. However, the text appears to treat the use of starvation tactics as a less recommendable measure. Unlike in most of the Jātakas that are examined in this paper, the prince was not the Buddha in a former life. In the present life, the then-prince and his mother have suffered negative karmic retribution for their seven-day implementation of starvation tactics, which carries a much lighter soteriological sentence than rebirth in hell: the prince remained in his mother’s womb for seven years and then suffered a difficult birth for seven days, while the mother endured pregnancy for seven years and then suffered a difficult childbirth for seven days. During the seven-day starvation period, the king of Kosala was beheaded by the hungry people in Bārāṇasī, which was accidental on the part of the prince. The text does not explicitly mention any karmic retribution for the enemy king’s death, perhaps because the king’s death was not his intention.42

The eighth measure, which can be found in the Mahāparinibbānasutta (“Great Perfect-Nibbāna Sutta”), is resolution through the equitable distribution of profits. After the Buddha passed away and his physical body was cremated, eight groups of people insisted on taking the Buddha’s ashes for worship; as a result of these eight claims, tension arose between the claimant groups. Having reminded the claimants about Buddha’s teaching of forbearance (khanti) with the words, ‘It is not right indeed that [there] should be strife (sampahāro, which means āvudhasampahāro or ‘strife by weapons’ according to Buddhaghosa’s Sumaṅgalavilāsinī commentary in the fifth century CE) in sharing out the best person’s ashes.,’ a Brahmin named Doṇa divided the Buddha’s ashes into eight equal portions and distributed them among the groups of people, which included warriors of different ethnicities. They agreed with this solution, and each group amiably received its portion of ashes.43

4. Type 3: Fighting in a Pitched Battle without Killing

The other measures by which a warrior can refrain from killing are to fight in battle but avoid killing any of his opponents. This type can be further divided into two derived measures.

The first measure is to capture the enemy alive and force him to swear an oath: a warrior wins a battle by destroying the enemy’s military camp and capturing his opponents alive; he then induces them to swear an oath to no longer antagonize him, after which the warrior releases them.44 The Bhojājānīyajātaka (“Swift Horse Jātaka”) tells a story about a military horse (another former life of the Buddha) that destroyed seven enemy kings’ military camps (balakoṭṭhakaṃ bhinditvā), captured the kings alive (jīvagāhaṃ gahetvā), and asked his king to spare them and send them back to their countries if they would take an oath (sapathaṃ) to no longer antagonize him.45 Similarly, in the Alīnacittajātaka (“Alīnacitta Jātaka”), Prince Alīnacitta (another former life of the Buddha) won a war against the king of Kosala with the help of his military elephant, which destroyed the enemy king’s military camp, captured the king alive, admonished (ovaditvā) the captive king with the words, ‘From now on you must be careful; never think [the prince is just] a young boy!’ and released him. In this case, the admonishment is equivalent to inducing the enemy king swear an oath to no longer antagonize him.46 Both in the Bhojājānīyajātaka and the Alīnacittajātaka, the measure of capturing one’s enemy alive, inducing an oath, and setting him free is mentioned after the words, ‘O Great king, please do not let [your retainers] slay the seven kings’ and ‘[The elephant] stopped those who rose to kill him (the king of Kosala),’ respectively. Hence, the measure is proposed as a viable alternative to killing. Although those who capture enemy kings alive in these narratives are military animals (a horse and an elephant) and not human warriors, this idea seems to be recommendable for human warriors as well.

In these texts, the enemy kings are captured alive; however, the texts do not mention whether the other enemy fighters, i.e., the enemy kings’ retainer soldiers, are also captured alive. The Satyakaparivarta also teaches capturing alive (although the text does not mention the steps that should be taken before and after capturing one’s enemy alive, i.e., destroying his military camp, inducing an oath, and setting him free, they can be considered to be implied.) Even though the text does not state which enemy warriors are captured alive, since its phrasing does not limit those who are captured alive to enemy kings, the implication seems to be that on the battlefield, a righteous king is required not only to capture the enemy king alive, but also to preserve the lives of his retainers.47

The second measure entails using weapons only to stop the enemy’s attack and not to kill, that is, only for the purpose of protecting the true dharma (dam pa’i chos) or the Buddhist teachings. This is taught in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (“Great Perfect-Nirvāṇa Sūtra,” c. fourth century CE). The text tells of an age of moral depravity, when monks are in danger of being attacked by corrupt monks and their evil devotees; monks are, therefore, allowed to be accompanied by lay devotees (dge bsnyen) who are armed, such as a king, when they travel. However, these armed companions are not allowed to kill their opponents; during their travels, they are permitted to use their weapons to stop attacks, but they must avoid killing their opponents. This is ‘the precept of the excellently wise [lay devotees]’ (mchog tu mkhas pa’i tshul khrims) in the age of moral depravity. After death, these lay devotees are reborn in Abhirati (mngon par dga’ ba, “rejoicing in”), which is a paradise controlled by Akṣobhya Buddha, where they may attain enlightenment. A lay devotee is encouraged to arm himself and fight to protect monks because monks preserve the true dharma and because the devotee who protects the true dharma can reap great fruits, such as rebirth in Abhirati.48

5. The Ideology Underlying the Buddhist Discourses

The Buddhist scriptures thus teach various measures by which a warrior can face problems in confrontation with armed opponents without killing them. In this paper’s Introduction, I described the teachings that espouse moderate measures as “instructions from the standpoint that intentional killing must be avoided.” However, it is necessary to ascertain whether they were really developed from such standpoint. Did the compilers of the instructions really intend to develop measures that do not involve killing? Is there not a possibility that the instructions avoid mentioning killing because such mentions were omitted in the transmission of the texts or because they are implied, thus rendering the explicit mention of killing unnecessary from the compilers’ perspective?

It seems most likely that the measures were deliberately developed to prohibit killing in battle. As Section 3 and Section 4 of this paper clarify, many of the discourses explicitly state that the protagonist warriors implemented the measures because of their wish to avoid killing in battle,49 or the texts teach the measures in connection with the precept against killing. Comparison with Indian Classics supports that analysis.

Some of the Indian Classics that include discourses on warfare, such as the Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan), the Manusmṛti, and the Arthaśāstra, teach measures that bear similarity to the Type 2 and 3 measures in the Buddhist scriptures, as discussed in Section 3 and Section 4.50 However, there are also differences, among which the most important, from the perspective espoused in Section 5, concern differences regarding a warrior’s motivation for adhering to a certain measure. I will discuss the differences regarding the reason for or purpose of adherence to a particular measure, using the Arthaśāstra specifically because it includes more discourses on similar measures than the Mahābhārata (Śāntiparvan) and the Manusmṛti.51

In the Arthśāstra, an interlocutor named Bhāradvāja teaches that a weaker king who is attacked by a stronger king and his army should wholly surrender.52 This measure is similar to the Buddhist measure of surrendering to the enemy without resistance (see Section 3). However, in the Buddhist texts, such as the Seyyajātaka, a king surrenders because he does not wish to kill in battle and not because the enemy is stronger.

The Arthaśāstra teaches that a weaker king whose castle is captured by his enemy king should hide until an opportunity arises to sneak into the enemy king’s castle (bedroom) under cover of night and assassinate him.53 This is in some ways similar to the story of King Sīlava in the Buddhist Mahāsīlavajātaka (Section 3); however, Sīlava did not assassinate the enemy king in his bedroom. Instead, the enemy king was struck by Sīlava’s virtue, which is what enabled the latter to miraculously sneak into the former’s bedroom, prompting the former to return Sīlava’s kingdom.

Capturing the enemy alive is also a common measure that is taught in both Buddhist texts, such as the Bhojājānīyajātaka (Section 4), and the Arthaśāstra. However, in the Buddhist texts, a warrior captures his enemy alive to avoid killing him, while in the Arthaśāstra, it is done to force the captured king to trade his kingdom for his freedom.54

The inducement of an oath is considered to be an effective means to end conflict, both in the Buddhist texts, such as the Bhojājānīyajātaka (Section 4), and in the Arthaśāstra. In the Buddhist texts, the enemy is coerced into swearing an oath after he is captured alive; however, in the Arthaśāstra, an oath (śapatha) is made when the means of “promise” (or being truthful, satya), which means to promise peace-making, may be broken. In the Arthaśāstra, a king or warrior makes an oath with his hand touching fire, water, or another element/thing that could take his life, for instance, in the form of a fire disaster, and so on, if he breaks the oath.55 However, the Buddhist texts do not explicitly explain whether an enemy who has made an oath may be deprived of his life if he were to break the oath.

Evidently, the Arthaśāstra and the Buddhist texts have several ideas in common, although they differ with regard to some details. The differences can be summarized as follows. In the Arthaśāstra, the measures are politically more pragmatic. They are not explicitly connected to a warrior’s religious desire to refrain from killing, and some of the measures involve or result in the killing of opponents. However, in the Buddhist scriptures, none of the measures involve or result in killing. On that premise, I propose the following hypothesis to explain the similarities and differences between the Arthaśāstra and the Buddhist texts: the compilers of the Buddhist texts and the Arthaśāstra collected ideas about the various means by which warriors could settle conflicts with their opponents from common oral and textual sources. (The Buddhist compilers may have borrowed some ideas from the Arthaśāstra and vice versa.) The texts therefore reflect similar ideas. However, whether the ideas were ultimately developed into measures involving killing depended on the compilers.

Based on all the material that has been discussed above, it seems most likely that from among the various pan-Indic ideas about settling conflict, the compilers of the Buddhist discourses selected certain measures and reshaped them from the perspective of the Buddhist precept against killing. Hence, I maintain that they are “instructions from the standpoint that intentional killing must be avoided.”

6. Conclusions

Buddhist scriptures in ancient South Asia include discourses on moderate measures by which a warrior can face conflicts with armed opponents without resorting to killing them in battle. These measures can be divided into three types, which are summarized as follows.

Type 1 is to renounce the role of warrior. Type 2 is to solve problems with armed opponents without resorting to pitched battle. The measures that fall into this type are (2-1) surrendering without resistance or fleeing; (2-2) being virtuous (i.e., possessing a well-trained fourfold army, having such merit that gods and demons are inclined to help, having gorgeous royal architecture, observing the precepts, and harnessing the supernatural power of meditation); (2-3) preaching to the enemy; (2-4) intimidating the enemy with words, weapons, an enormous army (i.e., one that makes frightening sounds, is splendid in appearance, and wields destructive power), and alliances with other countries; (2-5) forming a friendship with the enemy; (2-6) giving the enemy a gift; (2-7) using starvation tactics, which perhaps constitute a less recommendable measure because such tactics cause people to suffer hunger; and (2-8) evenly distributing profits. Type 3 is to refrain from killing one’s opponents while fighting a pitched battle. This type includes (3-1) capturing the enemy alive, forcing him to swear an oath, and then releasing him; and (3-2) using weapons only to stop the enemy’s attack rather than killing him in the context of battles to protect monks who know and teach the true dharma. None of the texts that teach these measures state that a warrior has been or will be reborn in hell as karmic retribution for his implementation of any of the measures. Only the discourse in the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, which teaches measure (3-2), explicitly states that a fighter attains rebirth in heaven (Abhirati) because of his adherence to the measure.

The fundamental ideology or code of ethics that underlies the abovementioned types of measures is the precept against killing. From this perspective, the Type 1 measure is presented as leading to a warrior’s permanent release from his duty to fight in war. Meanwhile, the measures that can be classified as Types 2 and 3 acknowledge the warrior’s role in settling problems with opponents insofar as he does not intentionally kill his opponents. Similar ideas regarding measures for facing military confrontation can be found in some of the Indian Classics that teach statecraft, such as the Arthaśāstra. It seems that Buddhist compilers collected certain ideas about such measures from common oral and textual sources, reshaped the ideas, and developed the measures in accordance with the Buddhist precept against killing. As a result, kings and other warriors who implement these measures do not attract the bad karmic retribution that intentional killing normally produces. However, at the same time, their implementation of these measures (except for measure (3-2) according to the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra) is not sufficient if they wish to accrue enough good karmic potential to attain rebirth in heaven. Constant effort is required to earn a happy state of existence after death. As I said in (2020), in premodern warrior societies, religions often provided the institutional basis for both a code of ethics and a soteriology for warriors, for whom fighting was a duty dictated by their social role.56 Thus, Buddhist compilers’ development of ethically and soteriologically significant discourses on those measures represents an aspect of Buddhism’s function as a religion in ancient South Asia.