These changes were favorable from the point of view of research into religion in IR, as they prepared the ground for a re-evaluation of the Westphalian synthesis and a weakening of the “power of secularism”. Thanks to the “Mesopotamian turn”, religious consideration could impact upon IR’s further evolution, with a way of achieving this being the reanalysis of the religion’s presence from the point of view of different levels of analysis.
4.1. The International System Level and Religion in the Middle East
It was at the level of the international system that the principles of the Westphalian system originating in Europe were injected and continue to operate. The process began with the UN Charter’s enshrining of the principle of state sovereignty and equality, and, in consequence, the doctrine of non-interference in states’ internal affairs. In line with the “Westphalian presumption”, religion remains beyond the sphere of interest of international institutions, even as it seems that a gradual change in this approach has occurred—thanks to a process in which these principles are set against the practice that can be seen in society. I would point to examples that at the same time portray the “ambivalence of the sacred” after Appleby.
An example of a positive impact of the factor of religion might be furnished by the aforementioned “Civilizational Dialogue” concept put forward by Khatami, whose basis is to be looked for in dialogue between religions. The Iranian President, who resembles most dignitaries in his country in having a theological academic background, made no attempt to hide this fact, and in fact sought to woo other religious leaders, not least during a meeting in The Vatican with Pope John Paul II. The initiative of the Iranian President garnered support from other Muslim states, which in May 1999 adopted the Tehran Declaration on Dialogue among Civilizations (Declaration text:
Segesvary 2000, p. 99). And, while this text does not especially expound the role of religion, there can be no doubt that what lies at the heart of the Declaration is a desire to perpetuate a positive image for Islam in international relations.
The relevant task at the level of the international system is the objective the organization that offered a forum for adoption of the above Declaration set for itself. This is, in fact, the only intergovernmental institution founded upon and grounded in religion. It appeared in the late 1960s and early 1970s on a wave of initiatives seeking to unify the Muslim Community, and has been known since 2011 as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This is, in fact, one of the largest organizations in the world of a non-universal nature. Here, documents signed up to by the governments of as many as 57 Muslim states always commence with an invocation of God, and are a manifestation of a deep conviction that Islam offers a resilient link bringing together countries often distant from each geographically, economically, and politically, and even in conflict with one another.
Yet the very existence of this international relations entity and whole system of associated institutions featuring the adjective “Islamic” poses a serious challenge to a Westphalian synthesis precluding cooperation of this type in a world made up of modern states. This may explain how the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has received little attention from IR, which indeed skirts around the fact that we have here a four-continent structure that is a strong and often influential voice at more conventional international institutions, while entirely capable of coordinating cooperation among members in matters of importance to Islam (
Gieryńska 2017).
The initiative from a Shiite cleric found fertile ground in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th (2001) attacks. It was as early as in the November of the same year that UNESCO adopted unanimously the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, while the General Assembly passed the Global Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations (2005). This was to be the international institutions’ response to religious and cultural conflicts proliferating as a consequence of Islam-linked terrorist attacks. Muslim states of the Middle East, in fact, played host to several meetings relating to the above initiative, e.g., in Yemen (in 2004), Iran (2005), and Morocco (2005). An International Center to promote the Civilizational Dialogue gained the support of the European Parliament, among others (
Dzisiów 2006). In 2004, the initiative also received the backing of Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan (in cooperation with the Prime Minister of Spain), while, in 2005, the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) was called into being, and has since collaborated closely with such bodies as the Committee of Religious NGOs at the United Nations, Religions for Peace, and the United Religions Initiative.
While researchers draw attention to the vanishingly limited direct influence these initiatives have on international life, it is necessary to note their significance for the evolution of principles in the international system, as well as for theoretical thinking in IR (with the concept even being termed “the new paradigm”) (
Solarz 2007, p. 83). The concept of the Dialogue Among Civilizations offers a more positive image of religions, perceives and emphasizes a positive role that can be played, and, in so doing, undermines the “Westphalian presumption”.
A second example undermining the Westphalian synthesis at the level of principles of the international system is linked with the negative impact of religion in the Middle East and involves an intensifying wave of persecution mounted against religious minorities. The guaranteeing of religious freedom—certainly an element of the above synthesis—emerges as difficult to make real in the non-Western, non-Christian world. In recent years, the numbers of states in which such persecution takes place has increased (from 58 in 2017 to 73 in 2018), with an attendant increase in numbers of people facing this problem—from 215 to 245 million (
Christian Persecutions 2020). Persecution in the Middle East afflicts the followers of various different religious minorities, but Christians suffer in particular (
Pew Research Center 2018), being deprived of their homes, killed, abducted, jailed, and discriminated against. According to a report prepared for the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office, cases of persecution are linked to Middle-Eastern sectarianism, with the parties directly answerable for this being governments (especially in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and latterly also Turkey and Algeria), armed groups of Muslim extremists (especially the so-called Islamic State, whose actions have all the hallmarks of genocide), and, in many places, also local communities (
Bishop of Truro’s 2019, p. 8). A simply alarming situation is being faced by Christians in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the share of the population of Israel that is Christian has fallen from 15% to 2% (
Bishop of Truro’s 2019, p. 8).
Post-2011, religious extremism has, in particular, taken its toll among the Christians and other religious minorities of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. A particularly difficult situation is faced by converts from Islam to Christianity, who, in particular, suffer persecution throughout the MENA region (pp. 8–10). Violations of religious freedoms are favored by a lack of legal protection in the Middle East (p. 10), notwithstanding the guarantee offered, inter alia, by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—in fact, signed up to by most countries in the region (
AHDR 2004, p. 108). Discrimination hits not only the indigenous Christians of the Middle East, but also economic migrants from other parts of the world (especially Asia)—who now constitute a noticeable share of the entire populations of the Gulf States (between 4.4% in Saudi Arabia and 14.5% in Bahrain) (
Meddeb et al. 2017, p. 24).
The situation in regard to the persecution of religious minorities arouses disquiet at the global level, as can be seen from the declarations and instruments of law adopted and monitoring institutions set up. Despite freedom of conscience and freedom of religion accompanying the UN system from its earliest days, a binding Convention regarding this matter has never actually been adopted, even though 1981 did see the General Assembly enact the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief. Indeed, the post of the UN Representative for religious freedom was established (known since 2000 as the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief), and there are also independent experts.
The USA became involved in the protection of persecuted religious minorities, with Congress in 1998 adopting the International Religious Freedom Act aimed at the worldwide promotion of religious freedom within the framework of US foreign policy. A post of Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom was instituted at the State Department, which was, i.a., to run negotiations with different states on this matter. A Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) was also established, with a mission to report and with a Special Adviser appointed within the National Security Council framework.
Likewise, the EU, while declaring its external policy secular, is nevertheless pursuing “religious engagement” in a circumstance of ever-greater awareness of the impairment those adopted assumptions denote. Awareness of “religious illiteracy” has been growing ever since the 2006 “Danish cartoon” crisis, though it was the phenomenon of revolt in the Arab World and of conflict in Syria that prompted the change of approach. In 2013, the EU Council adopted Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief (
Council of the European Union 2013), which, i.a., found their reflection in training in religious affairs European External Action Service (EEAS) diplomats received, as well as in an annual report from the European Parliament Intergroup on the State of Freedom of Religion or Belief in the world (
Wolff 2018, pp. 161–62). These activities would themselves denote a breach in the hitherto Westphalian approach taken by the EU institutions.
The problem of religion at the level of the international system, in large measure generated by the Middle-Eastern region, is therefore a present one in every sense, exerting a growing influence on the above system’s evolution. We may note that—between the two key components of the Westphalian synthesis that are non-interference and the delivery of freedom of religion—there is an inherent conflict, and one that is growing. The security-related issues that cause the above freedom to be violated encourage a recognition that the said interference or intervention might indeed take place, in line with the “responsibility to protect”—and that is a further breach of the impenetrable wall once known as the Westphalian synthesis.
4.2. The Level of the Nation-State and Religion in the Middle East
As the systemic conceptualization present in work on IR denotes reductionism, many researchers in this field prefer analysis at the level of the state (albeit treated as an element within the international system), with the prism being the achievement of state interests (as regards security, wellbeing, and order in society) (
Łoś-Nowak 2013, p. 15). The approach is, in fact, taken by many researchers dealing with the Middle East, with different levels of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) often deployed (see
Kostecki (
2013); see
Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (
2014),
Korany and Hillal Dessouki (
2010)).
The foreign policy of a state has its sources in its interior, and it is there that it takes its inspiration. It is at the level of home affairs or domestic policy that state interests are most often defined, though things are also obviously influenced by external conditioning, including the international structure. In terms of its principles, the system remains wedded to the Westphalian synthesis, so elements of the system are expected to pursue those principles. Simultaneously, in both the domestic and foreign policy of states of the Middle East, the factor of religion is present—and often “in collision with” the secular system. Causes of this may be sought in the process by which the modern states in this region took shape—a process in which religion played an entirely different role from the one it played in Europe. This is, in fact, true of both Muslim states and Israel. Religion was present at the very root of the process shaping the contemporary identities of different Middle Eastern states (
Solarz and Bobińska 2018, p. 21). As history and cultural trends did not lead to its rejection, the Westphalian synthesis is negated even at this stage. The emergence of the nation-state was thus a construct imposed by ruling elites who had in every case to organize their attitudes toward the religion still playing such a key role in society.
Other than Turkey, which declares itself a secular state, virtually all of the region’s other countries replicate a pre-modern system in which the powers that be anticipate their decisions gaining the approval of religious authorities. This denotes a fundamental assumption to the effect that the law in force in the state may not contravene religious law (Sharia or Halakha), and that is a clear and important difference from the Western system. On the other hand, the official religious institutions in the pay of the government have to submit to a measure of control of one type or another, with the intention here being to prevent religion from developing in directions regarded as undesirable from the state’s point of view.
Attesting to “Islamization of the discourse” in the Middle East’s Muslim states is the fact that religion often offers grounds for political battles. It is also dominant in political rhetoric—with both oppositions and governments invoking Islam to achieve credibility and support among the people. Iran’s 1978–1979 revolution against dictatorship and the repressions of the Shah was mounted in the name of freedom, in this way bringing together various opposition forces. What emerged as decisive, however, was the nationwide religious authority enjoyed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a Shiite cleric who established and introduced the concept of Velayat-e faqih in Iran. The Constitution of the country provides that: “Absolute sovereignty over the world and the human being belongs to God” (Art. 56). In the Shiite conviction, the head-of-state role falls to an Imam. Should he be absent, the state is led by the leader or marja’-e taqlid—the Grand Ayatollah, who is an Imam selected by clerics on the Council of Experts from among those regarded as most competent. God’s sovereignty in the Iranian system is linked with the sovereignty of the people, who also elect representatives—a President and the Majles, or Consultative Assembly. However, concordance between what the Assembly enacts and the strictures of Islam is checked for by a special body known as the Guardian Council, made up of six clerics appointed by the leader. While this whole concept was included in a Constitution enacted democratically and adopted by popular demand in a Referendum, it is hard to reconcile this in any way with the “Westphalian presumption”.
The political role of religion is also attested to by the fact that, where free elections take place, religious parties often win. This was the situation in Algeria (1990–1991), Turkey (2002), the Palestinian Autonomy (2006), Tunisia (2011), Egypt (2012–2013), and Morocco (2011). In Lebanon since the start of its statehood, and in Iraq since 2005, the division of power in place has been between different ethnic and religious groups. The year 2018 saw Hezbollah strengthen its position in the Lebanese Parliament greatly, to the extent that a return to government was made possible. In Israel, the religious parties have joined coalition governments ever since that state first existed, and have mostly held the balance of power. Since 1977, when Israel’s right won the election, their significance has been even greater.
Robert D. Lee notes four ways in which religion makes itself felt in all of the Middle-Eastern states he analyzed (i.e., Egypt, Israel, Turkey, and Iran), i.e., through identity, ideology, institutions, and political culture. He thus states that: “Politics has shaped religion as much as or more than religion has shaped politics” (
Lee 2010, p. xi). Observers of the political should thus track changes in religion and religiousness, given the way that this impacts upon politics and vice versa. This is also made clear by the case of Turkey, which has spent a century passing along a very long road from the political function of religion in the Ottoman state (as especially attested to by an attempt to consolidate the Sultan’s power around pan-Islamic ideology), via a secular nation-state, through to today’s post-secular Turkey. Today, we observe a renaissance for Islam’s political role in this state (neo-Ottomanism), but without any absolute disruption of the continuity with the secular past. The protection of Muslims and religion and the aid for fellow believers in need have, in fact, become key planks of Turkey’s foreign-policy platform (
Tabak 2017).
A contrast with Turkey is provided by the Middle-Eastern monarchies, in which an emphasis on links with Islam at the dawning of independence was to serve in legitimizing a King’s authority. Thus, one of the titles held by the King of Morocco is “Commander of the Faithful”, while the fact of his descending from the Prophet is regarded as confirming his religious authority. The King’s public prayers and declarations form a kind of state ritual. Today, given the presence of religious extremism, the King sees it as his task to promote a moderate, tolerant, and peaceful Islam. In this, he naturally wins the support of the international community, and especially in the EU, which has many of its hopes riding on Morocco. This situation sees the King supporting the Civilizational Dialogue initiative, and schooling his Imams in the specially-founded Mohammad VI Institute, whose theological and legal courses are accompanied by training in the social sciences and history. The Institute’s courses are also open to participants from Africa, the Middle East, and Europe (a special understanding in this matter has even been signed with France). While domestic politics does see issues arise with an Islamist opposition whose activities are legal, the moderate version of Islam can be regarded as a Moroccan “product for export”, and does represent a major plus-point of its foreign policy. His Majesty also propounds and supports a concept of “spiritual security” (
Meddeb et al. 2017, p. 9), which can be regarded as Morocco’s contribution to the aforementioned efforts to inject a dose of religion into human security.
The basis of Saudi Arabia’s political system is an alliance formed between rulers from the House of Saud and descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an 18th-century religious reformer. The
Ulama are present in the immediate vicinity of the leader and influence all of his key decisions, which need to be sanctioned from the religious point of view. Given that this is a country whose income from oil rose dramatically from the 1970s onwards, Saudi Arabia was faced with the dilemma of how to reconcile its newfound wealth with an ongoing declared attachment to a Puritan version of Islam (
Ochsenwald 1981, p. 274). In line with the latter, all wealth belongs to Allah and the
Ummah He leads. Money has thus been assigned in support of the pan-Islamic movement, and this was anyway in the interests of the ruling dynasty. As early as in 1926, 60 delegates from around the Muslim world meeting at Mecca (and including diplomats and religious leaders) conferred upon Abdulaziz ibn Saud (as founder of the Saudi state) the responsibility of safeguarding Islam’s holy places in Mecca and Medina. Called into being at that time was The World Muslim Congress, which convened in Mecca during the
Hajj each year through to the outbreak of World War II. The idea of the Congress was returned to in 1949, from which time it operated under the abbreviated name of
Motamar.
It was in large measure the determination of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal that ensured the appearance of today’s Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Saudi Arabia is also the patron of an NGO that came into being in 1962 under the name World Muslim League. The organization was to symbolize the unity of the Muslim world, while also backing Saudi interests in confronting the influence of Nasserism and other radical secular ideologies appearing in the region. Enjoying Saudi financial support, the League now has many different branches around the world, and backs mosque construction, the dissemination of the Holy Koran, and assistance for Muslim minorities. In this way, it has become one of the key centers propagating Islam in its Wahhabi version. Also associated with this organization is the International Islamic Relief Organization; in existence since 1978, it is the largest Islamic organization of its profile, cooperating with many other bodies and governments around the world, and active in many countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, Caribbean, and North America (
UNHCR 2020).
In the eyes of decision-makers in Israel, Iran as the supporter of movements seeking a radical form of Islam (who stand accused of terrorism) poses the greatest threat to both Israel and the world as a whole. Israel’s efforts thus seek to discredit Iran and achieve its total isolation. One aspect of this policy sees the religion in Iranian politics presented as Medieval superstition to be contrasted with the “enlightened” approach taken by Israeli politics. Prime Minister Netanyahu typically describes his country as the sole democracy in the Middle East. The reality that emerges from all this is much more complicated, however, as the “enlightened” Israel is becoming more and more “Jewish”—in the religious and national senses at one and the same time—since there is no way to separate the two components in this case (
Solarz 2014, p. 89). In a clip justifying the August 2019 pre-emptive strike that the Israeli Defence Force launched against Syria, Netanyahu cited a Talmudic dictum relating to self-defense: “If someone rises up to kill you, kill him first” (
Blum 2019). While this might be regarded as a typical example of rhetoric going out live, a careful examination of Israel’s domestic and foreign policy makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that Judaism is a constant presence, finding its reflection in the “religion of security” adhered to by Israel’s leaders and a great part of its society (
Jones 2002, p. 136;
Sandler 2018).
Religion is a constant presence in domestic and foreign policy in the Middle East since, from the moment that the region’s modern states took shape, it was an inseparable element of their identity, even as this initially went almost unnoticed by IR studies. The prevalence of the “Westphalian presumption” required that religion be treated as an aspect of (matter for) domestic policy, with this factor not needing to be exposed where foreign policy was concerned. The fact that this presence sooner or later made itself felt in the Middle East only attests to the way in which there was never any full implementation of the Westphalian synthesis in this region.
4.3. The Regional and Transnational Level of Analysis and Religion in the Middle East
In the Middle East, the process of transition from a Millet-, clan-, and tribe-based system to modern states did not happen by evolution, but was rather mostly a matter of manipulation and ideological impacts, including elite-imposed top-down modernizing of societies in line with European models. This was particularly visible with the reforms instituted by Atatürk or Reza Pahlavi, but was present to a greater or lesser extent in every country in the region. Far-reaching Westernization and the placing of Islam on some kind of “back burner” naturally raised resistance among Muslims attached to their religion (
Zdanowski 2014, p. 222). It was in such circumstances that (in 1928) there arose the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt—out of the idea of the Al-Nahda or “Arab renaissance”. The Brotherhood’s impact in fact extended beyond the state borders, offering a basis for the first transnational movement invoking Islam. Its appearance was a response to the chaos arising after the end of the Caliphate, but also to real social need that people outside a corrupt narrow elite had to contend with (
Kepel 2003, p. 33). From the very outset, there was very strong linkage between these two (religious and social) dimensions where the activity of the Brotherhood was concerned, but also in people’s lives.
By making use of IR analysis at the level of the region or transnationally, it is possible to note how the vision of a return to Islam as the foundation of the Muslim “nation” (or Ummah) and universal social order (via the “Muslim path to development”) can represent an alternative approach to the European one based around the nation-state, democracy, and modernization as linked with secularization. This can, in fact, be regarded as a regional alternative to the “Westphalian presumption”, and one that can be given effect within the framework and context of a transnational Muslim region.
This concept of the “transnational region” appears in the work of E. Adler, relating to a so-called “new regionalism” wherein attention as a region emerges is paid not so much to geography and regional organizations, as to common values, norms, and political practice (
Adler 1997;
Zajączkowski 2013, p. 67). Governments are not the sole carriers of this idea, given the involvement of organizations in society whose ranges are not confined to single countries. An approach taking this into account would seem to be of great assistance to the study of the role of religion in IR, given the way it allows for a bringing-together of two levels of analysis important from this point of view, i.e., the regional and the transnational. We may note that the Middle East as a region defined classically is a component part of a transnational Islamic region whose boundaries are set by religion. On the one hand, there is affiliation with the OIC, and on the other, transnational organizations and associations created in bottom-up fashion by Muslims across this whole area (starting with the Muslim Brotherhood).
In the classical regional conceptualization, a Middle East whose core comprises Arab states tended to be described in the literature as a “region without regionalism” (
Aarts 1999;
Coskun 2005). For, despite the geographical location, the very close links between most states, and the existence of an intergovernmental organization in the shape of the Arab League, it is hard to speak of a regional system in this part of the world. There is not much sign of ongoing economic or political cooperation (with “regional projects” including ambitious attempts to create single political or economic organisms so far doomed to rapid failure), while the region continues to struggle with deep conflicts and divisions. Beyond the Arab–Israeli conflict, there are numerous wars in the core sector, i.a. in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. Nor is the situation calm in either Algeria or Lebanon, while Saudi–Iranian rivalry, the ambitions of Iran, Turkey, and Qatar, and even the Kurds’ struggles for independence all encourage reflection as to the futures of this area’s nation-states.
If we then overlay upon this depiction of the region a transnational level of analysis (i.e., by taking account of such transnational situations as the operations of the so-called Islamic State), it emerges that destabilization and internal conflicts in the different countries, but also existing forms of cooperation, are regularly caused by the same phenomena and interlinked entities that take shape beyond the borders present on the map. And many of these hark back to religion.
Also noteworthy here is the fact that, while the wealth flowing from the exploitation of the world’s richest deposits of oil and gas is distributed in a very uneven way, the condition society across the Arab world finds itself in is similar, as Arab Human Development Reports published by the UNDP since 2002 make clear. These Reports conclude that, in connection with events unfolding in the region (since late 2010 in particular), the Arab world finds itself in serious socio-economic crisis. However, the means and methods international institutions advocate to tackle this either prove unacceptable to people (because of their social costs), or else are undermined by ruling elites, who seek to maintain a Westphalian-system façade at any cost, in order that they may hang on to their posts. Yet the difficult social and political situation leaves the Middle East as the Westphalian order’s ticking time-bomb. The moment of explosion remains hard to predict, but the signs that this is coming look clearer and clearer.
The social problems international reports have proved capable of diagnosing are not always noticed by the authoritarian regimes in power in the Middle East. This guarantees the popularity of centers rendering assistance to the needy or offering them support, which typically engage in their activities in line with the dictates of religion. Spheres of operation thus include charity in general, religious education, and social work—all in association with a conviction that, since almost all Muslim states have adopted secular codes of law alongside Sharia, have pursued more- or less-tangible cultural reform, and have approximated Western models (e.g., in regard to traditional social roles), the stagnation present now can only give way to real development if there is a return to a “Muslim path to development” that has been departed from.
Thinking in terms of political Islam (Islamism) is thus very popular through much of today’s generation (
Zdanowski 2009, pp. 15–17), though prescriptions vary in line with the degree of “radicalization” that has taken place. Islamism has its moderate current (usually eschewing violence and open to the idea of participation in the political process (
Meddeb et al. 2017, p. 10), and often linked with the Muslim Brotherhood), as well as a more radical Salafist one, whose extreme faction takes the form of the Jihadism, advocating violence in the name or religion. Radical manifestations of Salafism have been Al-Qaeda and Daesh (IS). This is, of course, a rather simplistic division, albeit one inscribed in the concept of the “ambivalence of the sacred”, with moderate Islam being a good solution for Muslim societies with politicians thereby seeking to promote it, while Jihadism is usually responsible for war and terrorism and poses a threat to the world.
We may note that the political Islam of various different currents is a supporting ideology invoked by organizations and associations of more-than-national reach. These build up a dense network based on interrelatedness and cooperation, but also conflict, on the transnational level. As their area of influence relates in particular to the OIC states, we may use two levels of analysis in IR—regional and transnational—to distinguish a “transnational Muslim region”. Within this, the Middle East has a strong representation, in particular given the broad scope of impact of the first Islamist-type organization, i.e., the Muslim Brotherhood, which now has its branches, spin-outs, and sympathizers around the world.
Eventually defeated by an international coalition in March 2019, the so-called Islamic State (ISIS/Daesh) posed the greatest challenge so far to the Westphalian order in the region, which was genuinely under threat. Reviving the idea of the Caliphate, it offered other socio-political solutions that referred to Islam and its adherents’ aspirations where international relations are concerned. At least 20 different Jihadist groups from around the world swore allegiance to the Caliph during the period November 2013 to January 2016, with the consequence that a succession of provinces from around the Muslim world (e.g., in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Iraq, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Uzbekistan, the Caucasus, and even Nigeria and The Philippines) joined the self-declared “State” (
Wejkszner 2016, pp. 36–41). However, thanks to the methods of implementation it chose, to put the undertaking into effect, IS could not gain the willing support of most Muslims. Nevertheless, the role that religion played in this episode points to its huge potential and to the need for existing research assumptions in IR (and especially the “Westphalian presumption”) to be made subject to re-evaluation.