Main Cathedral of Mutual Legitimation: The Church of the Russian Armed Forces as a Site of Making Power Meaningful

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The article discusses processes of mutual legitimation of the Russian Orthodox Church and the state under “Putinism” by the example of the newly erected Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces in Kubinka. It offers an analytical model for understanding mutual legitimation as a process of discursive creation of identity, and argues that the ROC and the state, independently from each other, develop a statist and nationalist discourse, and by so doing legitimize each other. The analytical part of the paper provides many sophisticated points. For example, it uncovers the logic of “différance” in the way, how the Church renders the concept of national unity: as both a fait accompli and a “moving target”. Elsewhere, the author shrewdly discusses political uses of the passive voice in description of the state of religion in the Soviet Union.

Having said this, I have to mention that the deductive logic of the research precluded the author from seeing a bigger picture and prodded her/him to making sweeping conclusions. The author takes both the state and the ROC as monolithic entities, neglecting meaningful variations inside these institutions. The logic of considering the statements of only the Russian President and the Patriarch could hold some water, but the author considers, for example, views of Natalia Narochnitskaia, who definitely is part of the political mainstream but its most representative member. There are also important differences in representing the Soviet period by Metropolitans Hilarion and Tikhon. This is not to mention some anti-state and anti-Putin’s voices inside the ROC, which were raised during the pandemic.

 

Another problem is that the author is totally insensitive to the dynamics of the Church-State relations or to the dynamics of the recent Russian intellectual history for this matter. So the conclusions are made on the assumption that the regime ideology in Russia is predominantly conservative. Leaving aside the question if we can refer to the regime ideology after 2012 as conservative, it is important to note that the political mainstream is less interested in the religious values now than it was five or ten years ago. The author represents the opening of the Army Cathedral as the climax of the State-Church friendship.

This leads us to the third aspect, which is exactly the balance in relations between the ROC and the regime of “Putinism”. I think that we will misconstrue reality if we disregard the imbalance in their relationship, and as a matter of fact, the ROC needs the state more than the other way ‘round. In this connection, the distinction between the state-related discourses about “religion”, “faith”, “spirituality”, and the “ROC” is not made fully clear in the article. As a result, we get an impression that Putin talks about the ROC as often as the Patriarch talks about state and power, and this is not correct. As a minor remark, on p. 16 it is written that the main overlapping discourse is about strong statehood, while in the next paragraph it is emphasized that the discourse about “people” is “central”. If this is the latter, then it suggests a new and promising avenue of research, towards understanding of populism in the Russian context.

All in all, while recognizing the analytical qualities of the paper, it is hard to recommend it for publication in its present form. It should include a decently written contextualizing section, which would address the problem of the Church-State relations in its complexity and dynamism. The article definitely needs to engage with a broader scope of the existing literature, because as it is now, it is very selective in this account.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

The novelty of the proposed article is determined by its topic and transdisciplinary methodology. As the erection of temples dedicated to military victories in polities and states dominated by Eastern Orthodoxy has not been an object of systematic research, the presented study will stimulate scholarly efforts in this direction.

The author’s hypotheses are comprehensively introduced and explained against leading concepts in the study of church-state relations in post-Soviet Russia. At the same time, the author fails to provide arguments for his/her thesis about the Russian Church's involvement in the sacralization of the memory of the Soviet past. The section “The State in the discourse of the Church" contains only vague references to the Soviet victory in the Second World War and the enemies of the Fatherland.

The article has an easy-to-follow structure. Its goals and object of analysis are clearly outlined. The author’s theoretical considerations are accurately presented. There are, however, some problems that need to be addressed.

The article does not provide an overview of the history of the temple and/or the present outlook of the Armed Forces Church – which is at the centre of the proposed study, e.g., that this is the third biggest Orthodox temple in Russia after the cathedrals Christ the Savior in Moscow and St Isaac in Sankt Petersburg. As a result, the readers are not able to correlate the presented church and state narratives with a tangible image. For example, without knowledge about the church’s architecture, they will be confused by the reference to an “upper church” (p. 9). 

The conceptional framework of the article presents in great detail the author’s understanding of “legitimation” and the definition of terms and concepts employed in his/her research. The proposed text, however, reveals some disbalance between its meticulously developed theoretical section and the analytical one. In particular, the author fails to apply the thoroughly defined terms (“structural/object/subjective power” & “mutual/objective/subjective legitimation”) from the theoretical part of the article in the analysis of the sources (“Results and Discussion”, pp. 8-15), e.g., he/she speaks about “structural elements” and “subjective practices” (p. 12). Similarly, the statement that “The people” is the most active agent in Patriarch Kirill’s discourse” (p. 11) might arise confusion. Meanwhile, the terms coined in the theoretical section appear mostly in the last section “Conclusions”. However, this section is also marked by certain deviations from the terminology suggested, e.g., the reference to “structural influence” (p. 16). Such unevenly employed terminology distorts the theoretical and interpretative sections of the analysis and leaves an impression of a theoretical one is for its own sake.

Furthermore, the discourse analysis fails to take into account the over 25-year collaboration between the Moscow patriarchate and the Russian state in the military sphere, e.g., the first collaboration agreement between the Moscow patriarchate and the Russian Ministry of Defense was signed in 1994. (Sergey Mozgovoy, “Vzaimootonosheniya Armii i Tserkvi v Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [The relations between Army and Church in the Russian Federation], The Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies, Issue 3, 2005, pp. 1-22). In short, the author does not discuss the impact of this experience on the current church and state rhetoric. This weakness also limits the efficiency of the four textual mechanisms employed by the author for the ends of his/her discourse analysis.

At the same time, the proposed comparison of the case of the Armed Forces Cathedral with that of the Church of Holy New Martyrs and Confessors of Russia has a slightly contradictory effect on the author’s arguments. In particular, the provided evidence reveals that the Holy New Martyrs and Confessors Cathedral is another site of mutual legitimation, e.g., the Armed Forces Church as another “main cathedral of mutual legitimation” (in addition to its functioning as a site of making power).

The analysis of some notions used in the church and state rhetoric seems insufficient as well. This is especially true for the widely used notion of Homeland (Rodina). The article does not disclose its imaginary “sacred borders” (p.10) of Homeland. How do the church and state leaders define them? Are the Homeland borders overlap with those of the Russian Federation or with the former Soviet ones? Without such clarity, the presented analysis is unaccomplished. In particular, the theses of the Russian church and state leaders about the protection of homeland from enemies (pp. 10, 12, 15) remain abstract. They do not tell us much about the mutual legitimation between church and state and how both have been making sense of each other’s power. Similarly, the issue of the sacralization of borders is mentioned without further analysis. In particular, no evidence is provided in support of the statement that “the sacralisation of the borders of the Soviet Union highlights the essentialist construction of Russia as a firmly established subject in history, regardless of its shape and form” (p. 10).

In addition, the reference to the Second World War as “Great Patriotic War” raises methodological questions. While its constant use in the narrative of the Russian state and the Moscow patriarchate is a result of a specific tradition, it is bizarre to find it in the author’s own narrative. Besides, the subject of analysis presupposes reflection on the different naming of this event in Russian and world historiography. The analysis of the use of alternative names also deems necessary from the perspective of the advanced hypotheses.

Finally, the choice of words for some subtitles might be confusing, e.g., the subtitles “World” (pp. 8, 13). It seems that the first one addresses the realm of the State (p. 8), while the second - the realm of the Church (p. 13). In a similar way, the subtitles “Place” (pp. 10, 14) might become more comprehensive if replaced with the word “position”.

In conclusion, the submitted text needs some improvement. To resolve the weaknesses identified the author needs:

• to provide arguments for the thesis about the Russian Church's involvement in the sacralization of the memory of the Soviet past;
• to provide an overview of the history of the temple and/or the present outlook of the Armed Forces Church;
• to apply the terms elaborated in the theoretical section of the article in the analytical one;
• to take into account the impact of over 25-year collaboration between the Moscow patriarchate and the Russian state in the military sphere on the current narrative of church and state representatives;
• to analyze the notion of Homeland (and its sacred borders) as well as the reference to the Second World War as “Great Patriotic war” in the rhetoric of Russian church and state leaders.

 

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

The work has a lot of important and precious ideas, the topic of the article is timely. I can absolutely support the author’s idea to show how the discourse of mutual legitimation between the Church and the State is illustrated by the newly built Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces (MCRAF). It is indeed quite important to make a special analysis of different senses which this Cathedral can demonstrate as a symbol sacralizing the Fatherland. The process of construction of the nationalist normative framework where loyalty to "the Fatherland" is of utmost value has many forms today, and such a Cathedral is one of the most remarkable among them.

The topic and the focus of the article are certainly relevant, and there is a novelty in the text. Most of the conclusions are well based on the analysis.  The article has numerous merits.

It is remarkable that the author examines in many details the significance of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces for assertion of the understanding of the Fatherland as the highest value. And it is a big advantage that the author analyzes the meanings of the Great Victory in the Great Patriotic War, which Patriarch Kirill voices in his sermons, and the analysis of the statements of secular officials regarding the spiritual meaning of war and the military sphere, in particular, Defense Minister Shoygu, where he expresses the idea of representing through the Church the space of national and martial inspiration, and the words by V.Gerasimov.

However, while providing citations of the Church leaders it is reasonable to keep in mind that the Church voices are not limited to Patriarch Kirill.  Examples of the statements of other Church speakers regarding the Great Victory and the meaning of MCRAF are needed in order to compare them with the words of the Patriarch, noting the similarities and differences. It would be better to take into account the voices from some “low” representatives of the ROC clergy, and in this regard today there are quite a lot of statements from ordinary priests regarding the understanding of the Great Victory in the Second World War.

The author writes the appearance of the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces marks a specific development in Church-State relations in Russia.  However, it would be better to clarify in more details to what extent and in what aspects can the MCRAF be considered a completely new phenomenon, and in what aspects - a continuation of some older tradition? The author explains a specifics of MCRAF by the specific development in Church-State relations in Russia through the new stage in relations between the Government and the Synod manifested itself in a tight "discursive fit".  However, does MCRAF mean a fundamental novelty for the Church itself, beyond the Church-state relations?

If we scrutinize this matter from the point of view of legitimation, a similar question also emerges: to what extent MCRAF is essentially new? Because it is obvious that before the revolution there was a fact of mutual legitimation of the Church and the state, this legitimation was even much more institutionally and historically generated, and was more based in the institute of Russian Monarchy: the state power in the person of the monarch was more sacralized, and this sacralization was supported mainly thanks to the Orthodox tradition in Russia.  The Church legitimized the state before the revolution no less than today.

 

It is absolutely right when the author writes that the “notion of mutual legitimation does not exhaust the full complexity of the Church-State relations in Russia today”. However, to say truth – the very Church-state relations also do not exhaust an explanation of so wide spread of militarization in Orthodoxy, in our case – in Russian Orthodoxy. And while taking into account that the author focuses on the MCRAF, the question of the cause of so popularity of namely military symbolic form raises.

Why the Russian state and the ROC in their interaction choose primarily the militaristic sphere as the point of legitimation, and not some other? The emergence of the Main Cathedral is just the tip of the iceberg, behind which there are many less noticeable, but no less important forms of militarization of Russian Orthodoxy. Is this militarization explained only by the goal of legitimation and generally only by political motives, or are there other internal reasons for the church-military symbiosis?

The author refers to the tradition of Roman religion when he (or she) explains a unity between religious and martial: «a long tradition of unity between religious and martial (indeed, the term derives from the Roman god Mars) symbols going back at least to the times of the ancient templum Victoriae on the Palatine Hill in Rome”.  However, such a reference seems insufficient to explain the normativity of the Church-military symbiosis.  Of course, Christianity has learned a lot from the attributes and elements of the Roman Empire, but in the Church Christian tradition, and in the Russian Orthodox tradition in our case there are still significantly different principles of spirituality and values from the Roman paganism, especially those formed within monasticism which ethics permeates Christianity, what Scott Kenworthy calls a contemplative and anchoretic spiritual traditions and questions, if they save or renounce the world (Kenworthy 2008).

It is quite obvious (and it is supported by a big amount of research literature) that ascetical-monastic tradition is quite important for Russian Church tradition. So, some clarifications for explanation, what finally helps in the eyes of believers the fact of newly appearance of unimaginable hybrid forms of becoming quite spread Church-military culture and a certain “theology of war” with a traditional for the Orthodox tradition contemplative mode are needed. Are they stipulated by utilitarian or political reasons only, by the desire to legitimate a state power in favor of the State priorities and the right of the State to consider itself a succeeder of Soviet and Pre-1917 periods simultaneously?

Does the popularity of the militaristic aspect in the Church culture have some not external, but internal reasons? I mean preconditions inside the Church culture itself, without regard to situational political tasks. The researchers answer this question differently, it would be interesting the author’s preference of what point of view is closer to him (or her), or to see his or her own explanation?

In this regard, one could refer to the work by Betsy Perabo (2019) “Russian Orthodoxy and the Russo-Japanese War. London”, her concept of a "Christ-loving army", as well as to the works of the Church authors – especially an American Orthodox priest Alexander Webster  – for example, to a book by A.Webster & D. Cole. «The Virtue of War: Reclaiming the Classical Christian Traditions East and West” (Salisbury: Regina Orthodox Press Incб 2004) and to the article by A.Webster with quite an intriguing and provocative title for Orthodoxy “War as a Lesser Good,” (2003), where the priest proves that the Church people should consider wars rather than a “lesser evil”, but a “lesser good”.

It is obvious that the Orthodox Church in the USA has neither position nor the role that it plays in Russia. And unlike the Kremlin authorities, the USA do not need a legitimization of its power and historical continuity from the Russian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, we can find sympathizers of Church-army rapprochement and symbiosis in the USA, such as, for example, the ideas of well-known apologist of "military Orthodoxy" archpriest Alexander Webster. Obviously, the priest has a motivation different from the goal of legitimation described by the author in relation to Russia. What kind of motivation could it be?

Concerning the modern period, I would recommend to pay attention to the works by Boris Knorre and Alexey Zygmont “Militant Piety” in 21st-Century Orthodox Christianity: Return to Classical Traditions or Formation of a New Theology of War?” (Religions 2020), where the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces is also analyzed or by B.Knorre “Bogoslovie voyny v postsovetskom rossiyskom pravoslavii” (Stranitsy 2015), where some concepts of the adhesion of the Church and the army and even of in a certain sense military spirituality and ritual reception of War are presented, and which state that the Church can sometimes be considered in the eyes of military and even Church officials as a kind military branch and some concepts of the Church-military symbiosis.    

Church leaders themselves can even arrange Church-military parades with the participation of priests and military in one “formation”, invent Church-military uniforms for military priests, conduct military cross-processions, which make us speak about phenomenon a ecclesial ritual-symbolic adoption of war. That is, the strengthening of the sacralization of war today is taking place at the deepest level of the mystical feeling of Church people. It is unlikely that such a phenomenon can be explained only by the ‘cynical sensate’ according to Pitirim Sorokin recalled by Karpov (in the manuscript - lines 414 - 416).  The idea of legitimation seems quite reasonable, and I support it, however it would be too primitive if we prefer to explain such things as a MCRAF only by political goals.

The author draws attention to the state security discourse in the words of Patriarch Kirill, appeals of the Patriarch to national security discourse, which alongside the “strength, unity, faith, prosperity, peace”, according to author’s conclusion “form a web of widely accepted structural elements, which make the power of the regime meaningful” (lines 288 - 294).

I would recommend the author to draw his (or her) attention to the article focused on the security discourse and on the way it is used for interpreting Church values in Russia – it is a work by Jardar Østbø (2017) “Securitizing ‘spiritual-moral values’ in Russia”, in Post-Soviet Affairs 33(3): 200–216.  I also would like to recommend to see the book of Østbø “The New Third Rome: Readings of a Russian Nationalist Myth” (Columbia University Press, 2016).  In this book the aspect of Church-state collaboration is also analyzed, however, from another angle of view.

It is remarkable that the author shows, how Patriarch Kirill mentions Great Victory in the Great Patriotic war. However, there is a question:  is legitimation of power an only reason for implying Great Victory into the ecclesial lexicon?  Or there are some other reasons of such adoption. I would recommend (though not necessary) to see a paper of Anna Briskina-Müller (2015).  Power and Victory as Central Categories of the Russian Church and State Discourse Today. Paper presented at the Conference «Political Orthodoxy and Totalitarianism in a post-Communist Era», Cultural Centre «Sofia» (Helsinki, Finland, May 28–31) if it is possible for the author to obtain it (I am not sure, that it has been already published, so I understand that it can be difficult to obtain).

I appreciate the author’s concept of interpreting Church-military symbiosis in favor of Church’s legitimation of state power and sacralization of Fatherland as a highest value, however my point is that such utilitarian task can not completely explain the phenomenon of Church-military symbiosis. I would offer to draw author’s attention to this deficiency in order to avoid a simplified picture where ideological actions are exclusively introduced from above, or from the such a highest Church official as a Patriarch.  

Of course, it is not the task for one article to analyze the reasons of the support of militarization in the Church culture inside the Church milieu in its full complexity, however, I think some additional clarifications should be made.

Finally, concerning composition, argumentation and the structure of the article I would like to make one more important remark.   In the beginning of the article the author gives quite an impressive section “Theoretical and conceptual framework” where a lot of theoretical and conceptual approaches are given, in particular, such theoreticians as Guzzini, Lacan, Laclau and Mouffe, Howarth, Gilley and some others are referred to.   These discussions provide a good background for the analysis. However, when reading the other parts one can feel a lack of connection between mentioned above theoretical approaches and the main telling focused on the meaning of the Cathedral and the Church–state ideological collaboration. It would be good to further reflect their relationship with the analysis of the manuscript. That is, to have a more dialogical relationship between this part and the analysis.  Ideas of some theoreticians are mentioned further and implied in the main telling, like for example, the ideas of Iver Neumann.  However, most of those mentioned in the section “Theoretical and conceptual framework” are not used in the main telling further. So, theoretic-methodological part seems in many points a some kind of “a thing-in-itself” and separated from the other parts.

Of course, the article deserves publication in a perspective. However, I consider this article should be essentially improved and needs major revisions before publication.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 3 Report

The author has revised the manuscript significantly in response to an earlier version, and documents these changes carefully. The article has improved considerably compared to the earlier version. A lot of the issues addressed in the review have been improved.  In general the quality of the research is fine and the argument is easily accessible.

If the purpose of the study is to understand how the official discourses operate, and what are their mechanisms of making power meaningful, it seems justifiable that the author does not include ecclesial voices “from below”.  So I agree with the author’s explanation.

In the phrase:

"The Orthodox faith" is to be "preserved as the spiritual foundation of the nation's life" (veru pravoslavnuyu как duxovnuyu osnovu zhizni naroda) (Kirill 2020a) a transliteration should be checked.

If “duxovnuyu osnovu” should be transliterated through “x” (duxovnuyu)

Or  “strong spirit" (sil'nyj dux)” provokes a similar question.