Buddhist Approaches to Impermanence: Phenomenal and Naumenal
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Part I: The Phenomenal Approach of Early Buddhism
- Given any aggregate, it is impermanent.
- Whatever is impermanent is unsatisfactory.
- What is impermanent and unsatisfactory, is not fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine; this is I; this is my self’
- The Tathāgata has expounded the causes
- Of whatever be the phenomena that arise from causes.
- He has also expounded their cessation;
- This is what the great recluse has said.2
2.1. Three Contexts of Impermanence
- The context of empiricism;
- The context of conditioned/constituted objects;
- The context of causes and conditions: Dependent arising;
- The practical context of suffering and emancipation.
2.1.1. The Context of Empiricism
2.1.2. The Context of Conditioned/Constituted Objects
2.1.3. The Context of Causes and Conditions: Dependent Arising
2.1.4. The Practical Context of Suffering and Emancipation
2.2. Unanswered Questions and the Nature of Nibbāṇa
- (1)
- Is the world (loka) eternal or non-eternal?
- (2)
- Is the world infinite or finite?
- (3)
- Does the Tathāgata exist after death?
- (4)
- Is the self (jīva) same as body or different from body?7
“Whatever is the sensuous pleasure or the great heavenly pleasure, it does not amount even to the sixteenth part of the pleasure arising from the destruction of craving”11
3. Part II: Naumenal Approaches of Later Buddhism
3.1. From Empiricism to Absolutism: Post-Buddha Developments
3.1.1. Realism (Sarvāstivāda)
3.1.2. Atomism
3.1.3. The Doctrine of Moment (Kṣaṇa)
3.1.4. Personalism (Pudgalavāda)
3.1.5. Transcendentalism (Lokātītavāda)
3.2. From Empirical to Conceptual: Dharmakīrti
3.3. Beyond Permanence and Impermanence: Nāgārjuna
3.3.1. Impermanence, Non-Substantiality, and Essence-Less-Ness
- In the early Buddhist model, the notion of aggregates is primary. It is not doubted that the aggregates are real; they are only argued as impermanent, non-self, and unsatisfactory. Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, denied the very existence of the five aggregates in chapter 4 (Skandhaparīkṣā) of MMK.
- In chapter 18 verse 6, Nāgārjuna says, “Buddhas have conveyed that there is self. They have also taught that there is “nonself”. They taught as well that there is neither self nor non-self”. This suggests that the truth (that is, śūnyatā) according to the Buddha, as Nāgārjuna understood it, is beyond Self and Non-self.
“Neither the existence nor the nonexistence of the self is established in any way. How will the existence or nonexistence of the defilements be established without that?” (MMK, 23.3);29
“The perversions concerning the good and the bad do not occur essentially; in dependence on what perversion concerning the good and the bad will there be defilements then?” (23.6);30
“If it would be a perversion to think with respect to impermanent things that they are permanent, how can there be a perversion then, there being nothing that is impermanent with regard to what is empty?” (23.13)31
“If to think with respect to impermanent things that they are permanent is a perversion, then, isn’t it a perversion to think with respect to empty things that they, are impermanent?” (23.14)32
- As we have seen, the content of the Buddha’s teaching is famously described by the following verse:“The Tathāgata has expounded the causes of whatever be the phenomena that arise from causes. He has also expounded their cessation; This is what the great recluse has said”.(See Note No. 2)Opposed to this, Nāgārjuna, in the first chapter of MMK, denied the very possibility that things can arise from causes. In fact, he denies ‘arising’ as such when he says, “Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor without cause: Never in any way is there any existing thing that has arisen”.33
- A basic formulation of the rule of impermanence according to early Buddhism is that whatever is characterized by origination, is characterized by cessation (“yat samudayadharmaṃ tat nirodha-dharmam”). This implies that in fact there are things which have origination and destruction. According to Nāgārjuna, on the other hand, things have no origination at all. Thus, he argues, when origination is denied, cessation automatically gets denied.34
- In chapter 7 (Saṃskŗta-parīkṣā), Nāgārjuna examined the definition of a conditioned thing as that which has origination, stability, and destruction (utpāda-sthiti-bhaṅga) and denies all three with many arguments.
- In Chapter 15 (Svabhāvaparīkṣā), Nāgārjuna considered eternality (śāśvatatva) as an undesirable consequence (MMK, 15.11b). However, he also denied change (being otherwise, ‘anyathātva’).35
- Nāgārjuna devoted the whole chapter 21 (Sambhavavibhavaparīkṣā) to the critical examination (and subsequent rejection) of both arising and dissolution and also of transmigration (series of births, ‘bhavasantati’). The above evidences show how Nāgārjuna’s position is in favor of the non-essentiality of everything, rather than impermanence and change characterized by origination and destruction as the nature of reality. In fact, Nāgārjuna seems to be arguing that non-essentiality is the Buddha’s original position, rather than impermanence or non-substantiality.
3.3.2. Kātyāyanāvavāda-Sūtra
“This world is not liberated, Oh Kātyāyana, because it dogmatically adheres very much to existence or non-existence, …”37
“…Venerable sir, they say, right view right view. In what way is there right view?” “The world in general, Kaccāna, inclines to two views, to existence and to non-existence. But when one sees with right discernment the things in the world as they actually originate, ‘non-existence’ with reference to the world does not occur to one. And when one sees with right discernment the cessation of the things in the world as they actually take place, ‘existence’ with reference to the world does not occur to one.It is in this way, Kaccāna, that there is right view. ‘All exists’, Kaccāna, is one extreme. ‘All does not exist’ is the second extreme. Avoiding these two extremes, the Realized One teaches Dhamma by the middle way…”38
3.3.3. Argument from Dependent Arising
4. Conclusions
Funding
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Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
AKB | Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu as in Pradhan and Jayaswal (1967) |
BGB | Bhagavadgītābhāṣya of Śri Śaṅkarācārya as in Warrier (1983) |
HB | Hetubindu of Dharmakīrti: A Point on Probans as included in Gokhale (1997) |
MMK | Mūlamadhyamakakārita as in Vaidya (1960) |
MPS | Mahāparinibbāṇasuttanta, as in Davids and Carpenter (1995) |
PP | Prasannapadā by Candrakīrti as included in Vaidya (1960) |
SN | Saṃyuttanikāya, Part II, as in Feer (1994) |
TAS | Tattvārthasūtra as in Tatia (2007) |
TS | The Tarkasaṅgraha as in Mehendale (1893) |
VD | Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣyam as in Shrikrishnashastri (1890) |
1 | |
2 | “Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesaṃ hetuṃ tathāgato āha| tesaṃ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī mahāsamaṇo||”, Mahāvagga (Oldenberg 1879, p. 40). |
3 | “Handa dāni, bhikkhave, āmantayāmi vo, vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādethā”ti. MPS, p. 156. |
4 | Kalupahana (2011, p. 80) called Buddha a radical empiricist. Gombrich (2013, pp. 114–15) understood the five skandhas as the processes which are the constituents of experience. |
5 | As Kalupahana (2011, p. 53) put it, “Abandoning the search for ultimate objectivity, the Buddha had to renounce most explanations of reality presented by his predecessors. The Brahmanical notion of self (ātman), the Materialist and Ājīvika conceptions of nature (svabhāva) and even the Jaina theory of action (kiriya), appeared to him too metaphysical”. |
6 | I think that for a proper understanding of the twelve-linked chain, links such as misconception (avijjā), formation (saṅkhāra), consciousness (viññāṇa), etc. up to suffering should be regarded not as objects or events but as tendencies or processes. |
7 | These questions were asked to the Buddha with minor variations in the suttas Aggivacchagottasutta, Cūlamaluṅkyasutta, and Potthapadasutta. |
8 | Humphreys (1987, pp. 54–55) (Based on Saṃyuttanikāya, Avyākatasaṃyutta (XLIV), Section 10 called Ānando or Atthatto). |
9 | Walpola Rahula understood Nirvāṇa as the Truth which is beyond cause and effect. (cf. Gombrich 2013, p. 156). Gomrich disagreed with him for his use of the word ‘Truth’, which according to Gombrich should have been replaced by ‘reality’. However, Gombrich, too, regarded Nirvāṇa as real and unconditioned, as something beyond experience and language. He explained Nirvāṇa as a mystical experience and suggested that the Buddha was influenced by Upaniṣads in this approach. I have tried to argue that these interpretations do not capture the so-called permanence of Nibbāṇa. |
10 | This idea was later on conceptualized by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, when they discussed absence (abhāva) as a category. They accepted four types of absence: prior absence (absence of a thing before it is produced), destructional absence (absence of a thing subject to its destruction), absolute absence (unconnected-ness of a thing with another thing), and mutual absence (difference). Nirodha (cessation) of a thing is comparable with destructional absence. According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the destructional absence of a thing, as Annambhaṭṭa defines it, has a beginning, but no end. (“sādir anantaḥ pradhvaṃsaḥ”, TS, p. 30). However, the major difference between the ‘destructional absence’ of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and the nirodha of Buddhists is that the former is regarded as an ontological entity (padārtha, which exists), whereas Buddhists do not regard absence to be so. |
11 | “yac ca kāmasukhaṃ loke, yac ca divyaṃ mahat sukham| tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasyaite nārhataḥ ṣoḍaśīṃ kalāṃ”, Udānavarga (Barnhard 1965, XXX.31). |
12 | Dharmakīrti, in his theory of ‘real as momentary’, seemed to have developed the concept of kāritra into arthakryākāritva (causal efficacy). |
13 | Buddhadeva’s view is understood as relativistic, which can be compared with the view of the Jainas. It can also be compared with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, according to which a thing is described differently depending on the qualifying condition (viśeṣaṇa or avacchedaka). Ghoṣaka’s view that some qualities of a changing thing are manifest (vyakta), whereas others remain latent (avyakta), can also be found in Sāṅkhya. |
14 | |
15 | For my discussion of the doctrine of three constitutive elements of hetu as understood by Diṅnāga and differently interpreted by Dharmakīrti, see Gokhale (1992, pp. 37–46, 87–90). |
16 | The term svabhāva here means own nature or a natural aspect or an essential aspect of a thing. In the inference of this type, both probans and probandum are svabhāvas. The pervaded (vyāpya) svabhāva is probans and the pervader (vyāpaka) svabhāva is the probandum. Hayes (1987, p. 323) claimed that the expression “svabhâvahetu” should be analyzed as a saptami tatpurusa compound: “svabhâve hetur iti svabhāvahetuḥ”. This is not necessary. Dharmakīrti describes both probans (‘gamaka’) and probandum (‘gamya’) as svabhāva as in (Pandeya 1989, 3.192cd-193ab) (“siddhaḥ svabhāvo gamako vyāpakas tasya niścitaḥ||gamyaḥ svabhāvas tasyāyaṃ….”). |
17 | “na caivā kṣaṇikasya kvacit kācit śaktir asti kramayaugapadyābhyām kāryakriyāśaktivirahāt”, HB, p. 50. Dharmakīrti gave a detailed argument for momentariness in (HB, pp. 16–50). Dharmakīrt’s method here was not empirical but that of conceptual analysis. This raises a doubt about Steinkellner’s (1974, p. 127) claim: “we cannot but say that an inference from the concept of an essential property (svabhāvaḥ) is as empirical as the inference from the concept of an effect(kāryam)”. |
18 | Here, I differ from Steinkellner (1974), who in opposition to Stcherbatsky’s suggestion that the inference based on svabhāvahetu has an analytic character, argued that Dharmakīrti, while establishing the necessity of the pervasion, refers to the identity between hetu and sādhya as essential properties, but does not refer to the containing relation between the two concepts. The following points need to be considered in this context: 1. The object of inference is not a real particular object (svalakṣaṇa), but a conceptually constructed object which can be expressed by a word. Hence, even if ‘svabhāva’ as hetu is understood as ‘essential property’ as Steinkellner does, the essential property there is to be understood as a conceptual property. 2. The identity (tādātmya) between the two essential properties, namely hetu and sādhya, is to be understood not as absolute, but qualified identity. Basically, it is unilateral and not bilateral. For example, every śiṃśapā, by its very nature, is a tree; however, every tree is not by its very nature a śiṃśapā. Hence, there is a containing relation between the two concepts, namely hetu and sādhya, where the hetu-concept is supposed to be pervaded by the sādhya-concept. 3. Moreover, the relation between them is supposed to be an internal relation as against the cause–effect relation, which is external. This is suggested by Dharmakīrti by the expression svasattāmātrabhāvin as the adjective of sādhya in the case of svabhāva-hetu, which suggests that sādhya can be derived from the very being of hetu. Hence, just saying that there is a factual identity between svabhāva-hetu and sādhya does not capture what Dharmakīrti wanted to say. 4. Lastly, Steinkellner considered for comparison only Kantian formulation of analyticity. We come across some other formulations also. Quinton (1964), for instance, discussed at least three formulations of analytic necessity (which is the necessity according to him), one of them being that “necessary truth depends on identity or repetition”. The point is that analyticity should be considered in a wider perspective in order to appreciate Dharmakīrti’s theory of svabhāvahetu better. |
19 | As Śaṅkara said in his commentary on Bhagavadgītā 2.16 “The real is that the cognition of which does not deviate and unreal is that the cognition of which deviates. In this way, when the distinction between real and unreal is governed by cognition….” (yadviṣayā buddhir na vyabhicarati, tat sat, yadviṣayā vyabhicarati, tad asat, iti sadasadvibhāge buddhitantre sthite… BGB, 2.16). |
20 | “utpādavyayadhrauvyayuktaṃ sat” TAS, 5.29. |
21 | “ṣaṇṇāmapi padārthānāṃ sādharmyamastitvābhidheyatvajñeyatvāni”, (VD, p. 13). |
22 | “dravyādīnāṃ trayāṇām api sattāsambandhaḥ”, Ibid. |
23 | The statement “Whatever is real is momentary” can be called analytic, as it is true by virtue of the definitions of the terms involved in it. This is consistent with one of the formulations of Quinton’s (1964, p. 45) analytic necessity that “if necessity depends on meaning it depends on logic and definitions”. |
24 | Steinkellner (1974, p. 129) regarded the essential properties, namely existence (what I have called realness) and ‘having origin’, as a pure generic property and particular property where a certain exclusion is referred to, respectively. This does not seem to be correct, as even the ‘pure generic property’ refers to a certain exclusion. Since every meaningful word refers to the exclusion of what it is not, the word real (sat) cannot be an exception to this rule. ‘Sat’ would refer to the exclusion of unreal objects, such as God and soul. Secondly, treating different essential properties as on par with each other does not explain why Dharmakīrti took up realness and not either originated-ness or made-ness for analytically deriving momentariness from them. |
25 | The Buddhist conception of momentary is more radical than that of the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Buddhists, a momentary thing exists for only one moment. It comes into existence (and that is its moment of existence) and then ceases to exist. According to Vaiīśeṣikas, a momentary object exists for two moments. It comes in to existence, stays for a moment and ceases. |
26 | That the doctrine of momentariness is not found in the early stage of Buddhism is clearly borne out by Von Rospatt (1995, pp. 14–16). According to him (Ibid., p. 18), the oldest testimony to the theory of momentariness is the Khaṇikakathā of the Kathāvatthu, where the doctrine is refuted that “all phenomena (dhamma) are as momentary as a single mental entity (ekacittakkhaṇika)”. |
27 | Von Rospatt (1998, p. 470) seems to be right when he said “…since only advanced yogins seem to have been able to perceive momentariness directly, the soteriological significance of this doctrine remains very limited. This explains why it only played a marginal role in the wider context of Buddhist spirituality”. |
28 | In Dhammapada, (Buddharakkhita 1985) verse 277 it is said that all conditioned things are impermanent, in verse 278 it is said that all conditioned things are unsatisfactory, and in verse 279 it is said that all things are not-self (non-substantial). |
29 | ”ātmano’stitvanāstitve na kathañcicca sidhyataḥ|taṃ vināstitvanāstitve kleśānṃ sidhyataḥ katham ||”. |
30 | “svabhāvato na vidyante śubhāśubhaviparyayāḥ|pratītya katamān kleśāḥ śubhāśubha-viparyayān ||”. |
31 | “anitye nityam ityevaṃ yadi grāho viparyayaḥ|nānityaṃ vidyate śūnye kuto grāho viparyayaḥ ||”. |
32 | “anitye nityam ityevaṃ yadi grāyo viparyayaḥ|anityam ityapi grāhaḥ śūnye kiṃ na viparyayaḥ ||”. |
33 | “na svato nāpi parato, na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ| utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana||” MMK, 1.3. |
34 | “anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodo nopapadyate”, MMK, 1.11ab (Cessation is not tenable with respect to the things which have not arisen). |
35 | “prakŗtau kasya cāsatyām anythātvaṃ bhaviṣyati | prakŗtau kasya ca satyām anyathātvaṃ bhaviṣyati || MMK, 15.9 (If intrinsic nature is not there, what will undergo change? And if there is an intrinsic nature, what will undergo change?). |
36 | “kātyāyanāvavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam| pratiṣiddhaṃ bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā||” MMK, 15.7 (In “The Admontion to Katyāyana” the venerable one denied both “it exists” and “it does not exist”, who clearly perceives the existent and the non-existent). |
37 | “yad bhūyasā kātyāyana ayaṃ loko’stitāṃ vā abhiniviṣṭo nāstitāṃ ca. tena na parimucyate”, PP, p. 118. |
38 | “…Sammādiṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhī”ti bhante vuccati, kittāvatā nu kho bhante sammādiṭṭhi hotīti? Dvayaṃnissito kho’yaṃ kaccāna loko yebhuyyena atthitañceva natthitañca. Lokasamudayañca kho kaccāna yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā, sā na hoti. Lokanirodhaṃ kho kaccāna yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā, sā na hoti. ……. Ettāvatā4 kho kaccāna, sammādiṭṭhi hoti. Sabbamatthī’ti kho kaccāna, ayameko anto. Sabbaṃ natthī’ti ayaṃ dutiyo anto. Ete te kaccāna ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti…”, Kaccānagottasutta, SN, p. 17. |
39 | For example, Chapters 8 (Karmakārakaparīkṣā), 10 (Agnīndhanaparīkṣā), and 20 (Sāmagrīparīkṣā). |
40 | “tat tat prāpya yadutpannaṃ notpannaṃ tat svabhāvataḥ”, PP, p. 3. |
41 | Candrakīrti in PP (pp. 2–3) interprets pratītya as prāpya and prāpya as apekṣya. |
42 | “asmin satīdaṃ bhavati, hrasve dīrghaṃ yathā sati”, PP, p. 3. |
43 | Hence, the following extreme claim of Kalupahana (2011, pp. 45–46) about the Buddha’s approach to truth is not acceptable: “Absolute truths had no place in Buddha’s view of experience and reason…The explanation of experience and reason left no room for a sharp dichotomy between the true and the false” etc. Would not the statement “Everything conditioned is impermanent” be absolutely true (or timelessly true) according to the Buddha? |
44 | The argument advanced here is continuous with my other paper, “Essentialism, Eternalism and Buddhism”, see Gokhale (1996). I had made a distinction there between svabhāvavāda in a logical sense and in a metaphysical sense. The distinction is parallel to the one I am making here: logico-linguistic essentialism and ontological essentialism. |
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Gokhale, P.P. Buddhist Approaches to Impermanence: Phenomenal and Naumenal. Religions 2021, 12, 1081. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121081
Gokhale PP. Buddhist Approaches to Impermanence: Phenomenal and Naumenal. Religions. 2021; 12(12):1081. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121081
Chicago/Turabian StyleGokhale, Pradeep P. 2021. "Buddhist Approaches to Impermanence: Phenomenal and Naumenal" Religions 12, no. 12: 1081. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121081