Building the Nation: The Success and Crisis of Korean Civil Religion
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
When I received this article and took a quick look at the abstract and bibliography, I was fully confident that this would be one of the easiest pieces to review ever: solid writing, solid referencing, and a very firm theoretical framing at the beginning of the article.
A few pages into the article, I was struck by some phrases that seemed oddly outdated, but put that down to an attempt at recreating older narratives. Halfway through the article, my heart sank as I realized that the author is stuck in some very outmoded visions of Korea. One of the most difficult tasks in covering Korean society and religion is that the ground is always shifting: reflecting the seismic changes that take place in society, Korean religions are also always “on the move.” As Boudewijn Walraven phrased it so aptly, it is like a “moving target” so that no matter how much we try to focus, we will always be a little off target. In this article the author does not even try to focus; he simply revisits material that would have been acceptable perhaps in the 1990s, but not in 2020.
Despite the plethora of critical scholarship cited, the author seems to ignore it and fall back on clichéd notions of “Koreanness.” In the beginning I though he was trying to give an impression of what a typical “Hanguginnon” (to coin a term parallel to the existing term Nihonjinron) was like under the dictatorial regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doohwan, but it becomes clear as the article progresses that the author is simply rehashing clichés without any critical distance. The first inkling of this I got when the author blithely states the fundamental assumptions on which government propaganda of the 1960s to 80s (and also partly 90s) was based as if they were factual: as if the bitterness over colonialism and enmity towards the North were simply self-evident facts that do not need further examination. When the author states that “strong civil religion was needed to get rid of the feelings of defeat and humiliation caused by the Japanese colonial rule and to restore the national identity,” (p. 6) he is simply justifying state rhetoric rather than critically examining it. While the oppression of Japanese rule may have been a “living memory” (p. 6) for some, as so many scholars have attested, memory is constructed and manipulated, not something that is tapped into “naturally.”
Starting from p. 7, we get the full-blown rehash of what makes Korea unique: some of the statements about Korea being the “most Confucianized society” might have been true up to the nineties, but are in urgent need of reconsideration, since the remnants of that Confucian society (or its post-war reconstruction) are crumbling all around. Especially the statements about filial piety etc. as markers of unique identity sound tone deaf: “As the most Confucianized society… [Koreans] strictly obey their parents, care for and provide financial aid to them in old age,….” This may be the author’s fantasy, but we live in the real world, a world where Korea is literally “no country for old men [and women].” A country with the highest rate of elderly poverty and neglect, not to mention suicide.
And then we get to the ethnic homogeneity myth, the Dangun story, the country of many invasion myths…. All myths that have been diligently deconstructed by scholars over the past decades; even most schools no longer teach this as simple historical fact. (p. 10: using a reference from 2002, the stone age in terms of Korean sociology).
And the nonsense continues: “Government sponsored interpretations of the country’s ancient history are nearly universally accepted by the population and has formed the basis of a strong civil religion.” (p. 12) Again, not true; once upon a time this may have appeared to be the case, but fortunately there is now a lot more discussion and divergence of opinion. The comparison with other countries who are supposedly less unanimous about their history, is frankly offensive.
I can only conclude from this that the author belongs to the right-wing, conservative section of Korean society; indeed, no mention is made of the long-standing struggle for democracy as one of the foundations of modern Korean civil society. Whichever side of the spectrum one stands on, it has to be at least acknowledged that South Korea was NEVER such a monolithic fairy tale land, but a land of struggle, struggle for a better life but also over ideologies and values.
Somewhat puzzlingly, towards the end (p. 17) the author suddenly writes “Yet, this is a facade. There was nothing natural or inevitable about the shape or content of South Korea’s civil religion, even though it is taught as if it were.” Yes, indeed, but then why do you write the preceding ten pages as if it were true? I can only conclude from this that the author is reluctant to heed any lessons from previous research, and uses critical research as a mere foil to add a gloss of sophistication.
In sum, this piece reads as if it was written by someone who has been hibernating for 20+ years, and after emerging into the light notices that things have changed, but does not fully realize just how much. By failing to notice the fissures that preexisted in South Korean society, of course the author is puzzled by what is happening now. The article should really start at p. 18, and might have been interesting were it to really question how civil religion has been transformed over the past 20 years, but seeing the lack of any critical reflection in this section too I cannot see how this article could be salvaged.
Author Response
Please see the attached file.
Thanks.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
The article has potential as an exploration of South Korea's civil religion. My primary concern is with theoretical clarity. The introduction lays out several definitions of civil religion and then doesn't commit to any of them, nor does it provide its own. While I acknowledge (as the author does) that civil religion is not easy to define (hence the multiple definitions from different scholars), this seems to me inadequate for a paper that places civil religion front and center. Even if the definition offered is contestable or problematic (and that's definition singular, not plural as the article currently stands), I don't see how the analysis can proceed if we don't even know what it is we're analyzing. This is exemplified by my next, related issue: that civil religion as discussed is not sufficiently distinguished from nationalism. At a number of points in the paper, aspects of "civil religion"--national anthems, flags, slogans--that struck me as simply "nationalist" or part of Korean national identity. The reader really needs to know 1) what civil religion is, 2) how it is distinct from nationalism, and only then 3) how civil religion plays into nation-building. I fear that as it stands, the paper reads as arguing essentially that Korean elites constructed nationalist symbols to build the nation, which seems rather tautological. I feel I could do a find/replace of "civil religion" with "identity" (in the sense of Korean national identity) and the paper in its current form would still work. In my judgment, more work needs to be done to tease out civil religion as distinct from identity, nationalism, ideology, etc.
The following are more minor issues that are both less important and easier to address:
The analysis treats civil religion as either a "natural outgrowth" or constructed. Page 3 does suggest both aspects might be present, but this is quickly discarded and Korean civil religion is judged "constructed". While it may be the case (and it probably is) that Korean civil religion is heavy on the "constructed" side, perhaps we could acknowledge that it is not wholly constructed and some of it does come from the bottom up; the author's own example of the candlelight vigils held against the political elite spring to mind. Also, I recoil from using the terms "natural" and "naturally" in this context. Perhaps we might say "unintended"?
It is curious there is no mention of actual religion. The paper is about civil religion, of course, so there is no reason to discuss non-civil religions at length. But surely Christianity at least merits some mention, given that (among other things) 4 of the last 6 presidents have been Christians?
I know it is a trope that Korea is the most Confucian country in the world, but if for no other reason than its being a trope, we should closely examine it. I'm not sure a country is "the most Confucian" when people who are identified by the author as "marginal Confucians" are included in the total. If most Koreans are at best marginal Confucians (and I think they are), is the society then really "Confucian"? I don't see any advocates of Confucianism on the National Assembly floor. The president of Korea is not and has never been a "Confucian". Neither does any politician or government official invoke Confucius's blessing before making a speech or a law, nor does anyone prominently advocate basing laws on Confucianism or legally mandating the performance of ancestral rituals.
Throughout the paper (I counted at least 5 occurrences), the author mentions Korea's being invaded and occupied numerous times in its history. This, of course, is just as much a myth as Dangun and Han'gul's being the best way to write the sounds of any language. But unlike these myths, the "countless invasions/occupations" myth is never explicitly identified as false. I think this should be clarified at least the first time it's mentioned, if not every time. After all, Joseon was invaded only twice in over 500 years(!) and was never occupied before the 20th century. (Hideyoshi controlled part of southern Joseon for less than 1% of that kingdom's history.) You have to go all the way back to the 14th century and the Mongols to find the last time Korea was occupied. (You also have to ignore that King Sejong attacked Tsushima island with a major invasion force and subdued the Jurchen tribes of the northeast, that Joseon sent army units to fight alongside the Qing army against Russia, that Goryeo snatched territory from the Khitans and built fortresses there in order to hold it, etc.)
Page 8 has a nonstandard romanization ("choong"). Since the author is using Revised Romanization, it should be "chung".
The discussion of the national flower felt long to me at 4 whole paragraphs. (The national anthem only got 1 paragraph.) Same with that of national heroes. Apart from Yi Sun-sin (who deserves his own discussion), several of them are generals so I think you could just lump them together as "guys who defended the country" without getting into details like how big their armies were. Conversely, Ahn Jung-geun is not identified at all. Every Korean knows who he is, but not every reader of this journal will, and they'd probably be interested to know that Korean civil religion sanctifies an assassin!
Page 19 has a projection that Korea's economy will become 9th in the world in 2020. Now 2020 is here and as of October at least, this has not happened, so we might consider removing that.
Author Response
Please see the attached file.
Thanks.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 3 Report
This is an interesting and well-written examination of Korean civil religion. It largely sticks to common approaches to civil religion, and its originality is largely through the application of a 'civil religion' analytical rubric to the context of South Korea. However, it does this application in systematic, comprehensive and helpful ways. It therefore makes a significant contribution to scholarship on both South Korea and civil religion.
I recommend that rather than provide three similar definitions of civil religion at the outset (pp.1-2), that instead you seek to provide a clearer sense of what civil religion means in this paper. This may involve adopting one definition, and relegating the others to footnotes, or indicating clearly how your own definition builds on that of others.
On issues of sacrifice, Paul Kahn (Political Theology) and William Cavanaugh (Migration of the Holy; The Myth of Religious Violence) have both located concepts and practices of sacrifice as central to American 'political theology'. Both approaches may help give ideas of sacrifice in the Korean context a greater analytical rigor.
In the discussion of Korean missionaries, the author suggests an "intriguing possibility" that these religious actors are closely embedded within the Korean state. While not using the frame of 'civil religion', Hui-Yeon Kim nevertheless adds significantly to this argument in her recent chapter "Missionaries of a Korean Model of Development: Pentecostalism, Asian Modernity, and the Mission of the Yoido Full Gospel Church in Cambodia", published in The Mission of Development: Religion and Techno-Politics in Asia edited by Catherine Scheer, Philip Fountain and R. Michael Feener (2018; Brill). Kim's chapter helps place Christian missionary activity from Korea as embedded in the developmental and political 'soft power' objectives of the South Korean state.
Author Response
Please see the attached file.
Thanks.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 4 Report
At the outset, the author of the manuscript correctly states that the idea of a Korean ‘civil religion’ is an under-researched topic. Consequently, the content of this article should make an important contribution to our understanding of contemporary Korean history and society. Unfortunately it does not.
The article is strong on the theoretical issues involved both at the beginning of the article and at the end. In between, there should have a much stronger statement of the empirical (historical) aspects of the Korean case. Specifically, there should have been a much clearer statement of the pre-independence (pre-1945) background to the ‘civil religion’, and a historical periodisation of the history of the ‘civil religion’ showing how it developed over time. Also a bit more should have been made of how the northern regime used similar elements to create its own ‘civil religion’. This is stated but a bit more comparison would have been useful. Finally, one question the author might want to consider is whether the civil religion is in crisis, or if the issue is a competition amongst competing elites to claim a common civil religion.
There are some specific issues which the author must correct or amend:
1) On page 8, he/she refers to the Confucian concept of ch’ung (忠) as ‘loyalty to the state’, which it most certainly is not. The loyalty is to the ‘ruler’, the ‘leader’, but not to the state. Korean school textbooks for years cited the late Koryŏ dynasty scholar official Chŏng Mongju as an example of ch’ung because he died (was murdered) rather than renounce his loyalty to the king.
I would also note that the author has a very mixed way of rendering Korean names and terms into the Latin alphabet. Although the author generally uses one system rather than the standard scholarly system, he/she here uses a rendering which adheres to neither system but appears to be ‘made up’. The term here is written as ‘choong’ rather than as ’ch’ung’ or ‘chung’. I will discuss this question at the end.
2) Also on page 8, the author refers to ‘morality’ lessons which in Korean are called Kungmin yulli or National Ethics. This course was a prime means for instilling ethical values into Korean children and youth. More should have been made of this as a means for building national ethical consensus.
3) On page 9, the author refers to ‘ancestor worship’. There is a whole debate about the use of the word ‘worship’ because it is an internal attitude. Better phrasing would indicate that the issue is about visible participation in these rites. This issue is important because both early Catholics and Protestants had to deal with these rites as worship of deities other than God. Thousands of Catholics in the nineteenth century died for refusal to participate in these rituals and it is only recently that Catholics have been able to participate. On the other hand, Protestants (initially Methodists) in the late nineteenth century created a Christian liturgy called ch’udo yebae to avoid the question of idolatry (see footnote 2).
4) On page 10, there is a reference to 50,000 years of Korean history. Should this be 5,000 years ?
5) On page 11, there is an extensive discussion of ‘peoplehood’, but there is no discussion of where this idea came from. The author at this point should have discussed the role of people such as Son Chint’ae, an ethnographer and folklorist, who used the idea of Minchok-chu’ŭi as a key focus of his research. In 1948, he was the Vice-Minister for Education with the specific remit to revise the school textbooks. It is at this point that a statement of the periods in the development of the civil religion is important. The question is how did it come about ?
6) On page 12, the author discusses the selection of a name for the new state, but does not give us the Korean name for the Republic of Korea (Tae Han min’guk) and why the name Tae Han for Korea was selected. This was the name for the former Empire of Korea (1896-1910), and as the name for a republic used by the conservative nationalist movement during the colonial era (1910-1945).
7) Likewise on page 13, the issue of the historical background comes up with regard to the national flag, the T’aegŭk-ki. It was the flag of the Korean empire, and of the nationalist movement in the colonial period. Interestingly, one of the earliest north Korean postage stamps shows Kim Ilsŏng with the T’aegŭk-ki and the hibiscus flower in the background. This means that these were common symbols of the Korean nation which even initially the northern regime used because they were widely understood.
The author makes reference to the white colour of the flag interpreted as ‘purity’ but makes no reference to the Yin-yang symbol and four of the eight trigram symbols used on the flag as its motifs. These are Neo-Confucian philosophical symbols and their use would bolster the idea of the creation of Confucian Korean identity. The author must
discuss these symbols.
8) Also, on pages 14 and 15, in discussing the creation of the civil religion, there is no significant discussion of the creation of shrines. There were existing shrines at the beginning of the Republic, but during the Park regime, this increased greatly, especially those to Yi Sunsin and Kim Yusin. Also there is no mention of the ubiquitous ch’ungnyŏl-t’ap (loyalty monuments = war memorials) to the deceased from the Korean War. This is a point where a periodisation in the narrative is important to show the changes and developments of the Korean civil religion.
9) On page 18, there is a reference to ‘Korean writing script’ which should be ‘Korean script’. Also, there is a confusion between ‘script’ and ‘language’. Han’gŭl is a script, NOT a language.
10) On page 21, there is a reference to a ‘36-year long colonization’ which should be ‘35-year long’.
In the conclusions and observations, the author points out, correctly, the challenges to the idea of a homogenous people given the growth of immigration and mixed-race marriages. It is here that the author needs to think a bit more. Is it the case that the civil religion is weakening ?, or is it the case that competing elites are claiming the same heritage ? This issue could be brought out more clearly.
Finally, the vexed issue of Romanisation.
First, the author mixes Romanisations of the Korean language. The bibliography shows the use of both the current Government system, and the system most widely used by scholars. Also, in places in the text, he/she seems to use no system at all.
The author for the most part uses the system now approved by the Korean Government, whereas most scholars use the misnamed McCune-Reischauer System because it is the most accurate in representing the actual sounds of Korean words. Moreover, terms in the M-R system are the established form, and should be used for continuity as well as accuracy. The most recent general history of Korea in English (Kim Jinwung, A History of Korea, 2012) uses the scholarly system, McCune-Reischauer, because the author refers to it as the standard system.
This scholarly system should be called Ch’oe-Chŏng-Kim (CCK) as it is the only system for the Romanisation of an East Asian language which was created by East Asian nationals (before the use of pin-yin in China). CCK was used by the ROK Government until 2000 and was the creation of the three most important Korean phoneticians of the mid-twentieth century (Ch’oe Hyŏnbae, Chŏng Insŏp and Kim Sŏn’gi). It was created at a time (mid-1930s) when the use of the Korean language was actively discouraged by the Japanese colonial government, and it is ironic that this system is rejected by the Korean Government because it also is a part of the nationalist movement of the colonial period. It was created to present accurately the sounds of the Korean language when the outside world knew virtually nothing of Korea.
Author Response
Please see the attached file.
Thanks.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
I would like to thank the author for the extensive revisions and apologize for the rudeness of my original comments.
Perhaps our differences in looking at Korean society stem from different disciplinary backgrounds: schooled in the humanities, I am very distrustful of any rhetorical strategy that presents something as a matter of course: indeed, I try to teach my students that the very presence of words like 'naturally' 'of course' or statements such as 'strong civil was necessary for the young nation' should make them wary: these should prompt them to question whether it was natural or necessary at all, who benefited from this, what alternative voices are suppressed by such statements etc etc.
Of course the author is right in pointing out that what he described in the original paper does represent the aspirations of (many) Koreans: indeed, and now that the distinction between aspiration and practice has been clarified I agree to publication of the article. That does not mean I agree with all points, but the author is right in arguing that his article can contribute to global debates about civil religion (for those in Korean Studies or those who study Korean religion it would be less relevant).
I do wonder why the author switched to an older Romanization system; perhaps this was a remark by another reviewer, but I do believe that most articles on Korea in Religions use the Revised system (note T'angun > Tangun, and a few other mistakes)
Author Response
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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
This is a vastly improved version of the article. It should be published, with perhaps a few tweaks suggested below:
It appears the authors have switched to the McCune-Reischauer romanization system. With that in mind, here are a couple of romanization issues
"Hell Joseon" still uses the RR system.
It should be "Tangun" rather than "T'angun", but the latter appears a few times on pages 11, 12, and 20.
A few names use McC-R instead of their preferred spelling. I noticed Park Chung-hee and Park Geun-hye, and there are probably more. People's own spellings of their names should trump romanization systems (especially when they're still alive, like Park Geun-hye!).
The discussion of including "Choson" on p. 14 seems like the perfect time to bolster the author's argument there by pointing out that North Korea in fact did include it in its name.
Similarly, p. 17 might make reference to the film "Roaring Currents", which starred Choi Min-sik and was I believe a major hit in 2014. And it is rather, shall we say, flattering to Yi Sun-sin and portrays the Japanese in a less than pleasant light.
Note 2 on p. 6 seems like it should be added to the main text.
On p. 14 it says President Moon's claim that Korea has never invaded another country is "questionable". I'm curious as to why this word is used. The claim is clearly false even for Choson, to say nothing of Koryo and Koguryo(!).
Finally, I suggest one more readthrough to strengthen the emphasis on the crisis that is indeed going on in Korean civil religion. The more or less unquestioningly nationalism and emphasis on a (modern reconstruction) of Choson Confucianism has been breaking down over the last 20 years. Page 22 talks about Korea's high suicide rate, but there's even more sociological evidence out there. Korea also has the highest rate of elderly poverty in the OECD, and I believe the rate of elderly still working and elderly suicide is also among the highest, if not the highest. So clearly "taking care of my elderly parents" is not the obligation it once was. Unification and military service, once nearly universally supported, are also seeing more and more opposition even in the mainstream.
Author Response
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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 4 Report
I am disappointed at this revised manuscript. It gives strong evidence of having been done in great haste without sufficient editing. Clearly, there has been an attempt made to meet some of the concerns about content and presentation. However, insufficient care has been taken in ensuring both correctness and uniformity.
A few examples are the following:
p.8 - despite the author acknowledging the need to change 'ancestor worship' to 'ancestral rites' or some similar phrase, this term is still on this page and elsewhere.
p. 8 - the author has agreed to use the M-R (CCK) system but here, and in many other places writes Chosŏn as Joseon and in many other places. In the bibliography, it is written as Ch'osun ! The author simply must familiarise him/herself with this system. A simple comparision with any standard history textbook such as Jinwoong Kim's book mentioned in the initial report would have seemed a good place to begin. There is also a programme for the conversion for converting words written in Han’gŭl into Latin letters available on the internet.
p. 10 - Footnote 6 refers to 'Yu' but this name does appear in the bibliography.
p. 11 - Again, transcription problems. 단군 is written as T'angun rather than Tan'gun. The ' is used either to represent aspiration - or to create a syllable break. In the case Tan'gun, leaving out the ' means that speakers of a European language will nasalise the 'ng'. However, later on the name is Romanised properly. This is a sign of poor editing.
p. 12 - Long words should be broken up into shorter groups of syllables. For example, on this page the term should be minjok kongdong-ch'e. This practice makes it easier for the reader to read and pronounce. Minjok in this case is an adjective describing kongdong-ch'e. This problem is found extensively throughout the whole article.
p. 17 - The traditional source 남중일기 should be italicised as it is the title of a work, and written as Namjung ilgi. The problem of italicisation should be thoroughly checked throughout the article.
p. 22 - Korea is NOT in 'Southeast Asia'; it is in Northeast Asia, or East Asia. This again is a case poor editing and checking.
The Bibliography - This has not been checked for accuracy. With virtually every title not in English, there are significant issues of consistency and accuracy.
These examples are not isolated matters, but are found throughout the article and make it unpublishable. More time and care must be taken in a resubmission.
Author Response
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Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 3
Reviewer 4 Report
The revised manuscript is much improved. However, there are still some editorial issues which need to be tidied up.
First, footnote 18 (p. 21) makes a reference to Korea as if it is in southeast Asia, whereas it is in northeast Asia ! This has been mentioned before and has not been corrected.
Second, in the bibliography Park Chung-hee is referred to as Pak ! whereas in the text he is Park. It should be Park for the English-language text of his because that is how it appeared in that book.
Third, attention must paid to word break in Korean terms and titles. This has not been given any attention. It is best (varied according to the word) that words are composed of two syllables (for Chinese character-based words) or three at the most. Pure Korean words are obviously multi-syllabic.
Author Response
First, footnote 18 (p. 21) makes a reference to Korea as if it is in southeast Asia, whereas it is in northeast Asia ! This has been mentioned before and has not been corrected.
Sorry again for the confusion. The footnote discusses Hui-yeon Kim’s work, which focuses on the Korean government’s interests in Southeast Asia (not Northeast Asia). We reworded the text to make this clearer by adding “overseas interests” to hint to the reader that this is not just a typo.
Second, in the bibliography Park Chung-hee is referred to as Pak! whereas in the text he is Park. It should be Park for the English-language text of his because that is how it appeared in that book.
Thank you for spotting this. We fixed it.
Third, attention must paid to word break in Korean terms and titles. This has not been given any attention. It is best (varied according to the word) that words are composed of two syllables (for Chinese character-based words) or three at the most. Pure Korean words are obviously multi-syllabic.
The following changes have been made in accordance to word breaks in Korean terms and titles:
- 6: kukwisŏnyang → kukwi sŏnyang
such’ulchŭndae → such’ul chŭndae
minjokchunghŭng → minjok chunghŭng
kangnyŏkh’anch’ujin → kangnyŏkh’an ch’ujin
chalsaraboja → chalsara boja
- 9: paramjikhan → paramjik han
- 11: minjokchuŭi → minjok chuŭi
- 12: minjokkukka → minjok kukka
minjok kongdong-ch’e → minjok kongdong ch’e
hongik’ingan → hongik in’gan
- 14: Taehanmin’guk → Taehan Min’guk
Chosŏn Minjujuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk → Chosŏn Minju Chuŭi Inmin Konghwaguk
- 17: Namjun ilgi → Namjun Ilgi
Imjinjangch’o → Imjin Changch’o
- 21: Hunminjŏngŭm → Hunmin Chŏngŭm
Changes were also made for references in Korean, which are too many to list here.
Thank you for your comments.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
