The latter idea leads directly to the issue of non-violence in the sense of Gandhi. It seems obvious that Gandhi was well aware of the multidimensionality of violence (
Allen 2019, p. 6), which matches with his conviction that non-violence (ahimsa) has to be all-pervasive in the sense of a live shaping tenet. That means that not only he addressed direct, physical violence but also what in the wake of Johan Galtung we may call structural and cultural violence (
Galtung 1969,
1990). Each social structure or institution preventing people from meeting their needs and developing their potentials represents structural violence. Cultural violence is rooted even deeper in the collective consciousness and justifies structural sometimes direct violence by providing imageries of “normal” or justified exploitation, suppression, or exclusion. We could add the form of epistemic violence currently under discussion, which can be seen as an expression of cultural violence in academically influenced discourse. The essential element of this violence consists in not allowing a certain part of reality, especially marginalized groups of people, to have their say (
Spivak 1993). Particularly in a situation in which we are faced with scientific expertise and its authority widely marketed in the media, the depiction of reality distorted by narrow-minded epistemic frameworks is a crucial aspect of indirect violence that demands our attention. The use of terms and theories shapes public discourse and thus could establish manifest structures of violence. That Gandhi addressed the group of untouchables as Harijan (children of God) can be interpreted as an action against epistemic violence. Even if this is criticized today as a possible trivialization of a dramatic situation of injustice, Gandhi’s intention to express the dignity of Dalits beyond all caste logic by using this term seems to be beyond doubt. This is supported by statements like the following: “The removal of untouchability means treating the so-called untouchables as one’s own kith and kin. He who does treat them so must be free from the sense of high and low…” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 379).
With regard to the concrete handling of the Indian caste tradition, there have always been disputes. The best known is probably the conflict between Bhimrao Ramji Ambedakr and Gandhi. Ambedkar, who himself had to suffer the experience of untouchability represented a reason-centred approach, which was strongly influenced by western enlightenment thinking. This led the important reformer to a kind of strict secularity that—although it does not discard religion completely—was far from Gandhi’s understanding (
Rodrigues 2011, p. 57). Gandhi largely judged modernity to be a reality that “was deeply caught in violence and stressed on power. It was not self-determining moral agents that were its priority but satisfaction of externally induced wants” (
Rodrigues 2011, p. 60). He fundamentally valued India’s religious tradition. In the course of this effort, he may have portrayed an element such as the ideal meaning of caste too positively and criticised too little the real political outcome and impact in the present. Nevertheless, he clearly condemned untouchability (
Gandhi 2015, pp. 37–38). The disputes between Ambedkar and Gandhi require a more in-depth discussion, which cannot be achieved here. It may suffice to note that both persons emphasised different aspects of social reform, which must complement each other. For Gandhi, the spiritual maturation of individuals and the inner change of attitude were at the centre of any social design, while Ambedkar had more of an eye on the question of structures.
Since violence comes in such a variety of forms, ahimsa must signify more than pacifism or foregoing of the use of weapons or brute force, it requires a change in the structures and concepts that shape our thinking and our attitudes and thereby also society at its core. Gandhi was deeply aware of this. Let me refer to two social areas now in which we particularly may detect both structural and at least traces of cultural and epistemic violence: economy and technology.
2.1. Economic Violence
Gandhi often mentions economic violence like exploitation or exclusion from the area of sufficient survival conditions. Perhaps his most sensational action during the Indian independence movement, the Salt March of 1930, was directed against a form of economic, structural violence. As Gandhi mentioned: “The salt-tax is not a small injustice” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 12). His approach to the sphere of economy moreover is stricter than the mainstream of the traditional Christian one that should have shaped the actions of the British colonial government. In Christian tradition, Thomas Aquinas mentions that keeping much more goods than is needed while others are lacking necessities is injustice. In this context, he speaks of abundance (superfluous goods), which denotes possession exceeding what is appropriate to a person’s social position. (Summa Theologiae II-II q. 32, a. 5–6) To Gandhi economic violence is already there when one takes more for her- or himself than absolutely necessary. As he put it: “A thing not originally stolen must nevertheless be classified as stolen property, if we possess it without needing it” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 103). However, both traditions consider glaring economic inequality violence. Accordingly, not only does the tradition of Catholic Social Teaching speak of justice being another name for peace, but Gandhi also says that any political programme is “a structure on sand if it is not built on the solid foundation of economic equality” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 381). Therefore, for Gandhi exploitation of the weak ones must be overcome no matter in whom it originates, either in foreign colonial powers or in domestic elites. Gandhi’s resistance is thus not to be understood as a purely anti- or postcolonial one. If it is against anything at all, it is against injustice and violence in all its forms; but it is more appropriate to speak of resistance in favour of the oppressed and the poor.
A form in which structural violence manifests itself today is post-democracy in which an economic elite rules over the majority of the people although formally democratic structures do exist. The majority of people is excluded from very decision-making and overruled by the restricted interests of a small group of haves. “Their accumulated wealth has given them the power to influence governments” (
Gandhi 2020, p. 78). Post-democratic structures can therefore be understood as a form of economic violence in which the one-person-one-vote principle is undermined by the logic that each act of purchase is a vote. The number of votes a person has is thus analogous to his or her ability to pay. Such conditions seem to be quite present in today’s India confirming Gandhi’s warning that a liberated India that follows Western patterns will never be truly free.
These brief reflections may suffice to draw our attention to the possibilities of economic injustice, since it is probably uncontroversial that economic exploitation and extreme inequality constitute a form of oppression that we rightly call violence against which Gandhi’s satyagraha approach was consequently directed. Much more controversial is the topic of technology.
2.2. Violent Aspects of Technology
In general, advancement in technology today is considered to be one of the most important tools to overcome poverty, social inequality and also ecological threats. Gandhi however considered the modern mode of technical development to be structural violence. He made this judgement under the impression of British industrialisation, which alienated and enslaved the masses of workers. He feared an analogous effect for India. Particularly in his early book
Hind Swaraj he rejected technology which he called machinery completely. “I cannot recall a single good point in connection with machinery” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 59). Such and similar formulations contributed to Gandhi’s reputation as an anti-modernist ignorant of the reality of our time and its requirements.
Hind Swaraj was written in 1909. In an introduction newly written on a further edition of the book 16 years later, the editor quotes the author still arguing that technological tools are but a lesser evil. His approach depicted there one may not only deem radical but also somatophobic. For Gandhi claimed that technology—like the human body—was inevitable but—like the body—it was also a hindrance to the highest flights of the soul and therefore had to be rejected (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 255). However, Gandhi realized that his approach though helpful in the context of the individual longing for spiritual growth could not be equally helpful in shaping communal life. Therefore, he argued a little bit more sophisticated nevertheless sceptical about technology, when the student Ramachandran, asked him during an interview in 1924 if he had been against all machinery. His response was: “How can I be when I know that even this body is a most delicate piece of machinery? The spinning-wheel itself is a machine; a little tooth-pick is a machine. What I object to, is the craze for machinery, not machinery as such” (
CWMG 1956–1994, pp. 250–51). The mentioned craze is rooted in greed according to him by which modern economy, as well as science and technology, are driven for the most part. The central point of his argument is that machines and factories should not work “for profit, but for the benefit of humanity, love taking the place of greed as the motive” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 251) Therefore, the human person must be placed at the centre of considerations. Or as it was put by J.C. Kumarappa an economic advisor of Gandhi: “Gandhism aims at the development of the human being” (
Kumarappa 1951, p. 48).
Since Gandhi’s scepticism towards technological progress in general and the technologization of the economy in particular is not only accused of being backward but also could be perceived as rooted in a specific Hindu-Buddhist asceticism and renouncement, two more current approaches should be mentioned. They have emerged in the Western world and are characterised by a Christian approach to the topic. This may prove that Gandhi-like critique is not irrelevant to the western sphere as well as that it must not be attributed to resentment-ridden victims of colonialism, but rather always appears in a similar form where a spiritual–holistic worldview is established and urges for the formation of a new mindset.
One approach was developed by Ivan Illich one could call a catholic dissident or even anarchist, who like Gandhi was very sceptical about institutions of education and health care as far as they do not consider personal subjects comprehensively enough, including all their physical, intellectual, emotional, interrelational and spiritual dimensions. In general, there are parallels in the approaches of Illich and Gandhi that cannot be overlooked (
Hardiman 2003, pp. 87–89). It is said that Illich “once told Madhu Suri Prakash that all of his writings could be thought of as a series of footnotes to Mahatma Gandhi’s work” (
Grego 2013, p. 92). His critical thoughts on technique can be found in a compacted form in his 1973-book
Tools for Conviviality. In German, this book is titled
Selbstbegrenzung (self-limitation); a term closely related to self-rule (
swaraj) as it means a conscious decision for what is necessary and helpful for the unfolding of one’s freedom, whereby the dominance of drives and external influences is broken. This kind of self-limitation entails the search for a new form of technology that no longer encounters us as an independent power to which we are subject in analogy to the laws of nature. “People need new tools to work with rather than tools that “work” for them. They need technology to make the most of the energy and imagination each has, rather than more well-programmed energy slaves” (
Illich 1973, p. 23).
Depicting social reality as being in accordance with conviviality Illich targets the participation of people in decisions on technological development which requires small and manageable structures. As the Indian philosopher Gobinathan Pillai put it according to Gandhi, he “would appreciate the technological development beyond the “primitive” but it would be a highly selective technology and would be of such a nature that it could be controlled by relatively small communities” (
Gopinathan Pillai 1988, p. 381).
Self-responsibility and self-rule on the one hand and a social system that enables participation on the other are two sides of the same coin. Both are more likely to come into play where the mere pursuit of possessions and power is not dominating. Illich worked out this connection clearly when he reflected on the fact that we have tried for a hundred years to replace slaves with machines that should work for us only to discover at the end that machines are enslaving men (
Illich 1973, p. 24). This paradoxical development was depicted in a similar way by Hans Jonas (
Jonas 1984, pp. 140–42). Illich answered the question of what went wrong with our intentions to make humanity freer by fostering technology as follows: “The illusion prevailed that the machine was a laboratory-made homunculus, and that it could do our labour instead of slaves. It is now time to correct this mistake and shake off the illusion that men are born to be slaveholders and that the only thing wrong in the past was that not all men could be equally so. By reducing our expectations of machines, however, we must guard against falling into the equally damaging rejection of all machines as if they were works of the devil” (
Illich 1973, p. 33). This quotation shows the necessity to rethink our self-perception as rulers, which does not at all mean that we do not have the ability or even liability to shape and conduct our life and its conditions including the use of technical tools. On the contrary, it should lead us to a constructive mode of self-rule as Gandhi would put it. Conviviality based on such self-rule according to Illich, would mean an “autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment; and this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons to the demands made upon them by others, and by a man-made environment” (
Illich 1973, p. 24).
Insofar as technology as such represents a habit of domination, it becomes understandable that it “is incompatible with the accomplishment of a non-violent, decentralised social order” (
Gopinathan Pillai 1988, p. 378). Partnership rather than domination provides the guiding principle for conviviality that helps us to overcome the mingling of means and ends by showing “that only persons have ends and that only persons can work toward them” (
Illich 1973, p. 65). The last point may sound too anthropocentric to a contemporary environmentalist’s ears. Nevertheless, Illich claims that such a person-centrism is the precondition to re-establish ecological balance. It also resembles Gandhi’s critique that in our modern way of living more and more means have been treated as ends.
However, we must recognize that presumably different concepts of reality are deeply engrained in the traditions of East and West, respectively. Human beings as well as God in western tradition cannot be imagined other than being individuals distinct from others. As the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber underlines, a personal individual cannot become a self without a You (
Buber 1937, p. 11). This asserts relationship to be constitutional to human beings, however, a relationship that connects different entities. The starting point of eastern traditions on the other hand seems to be unity permeated by one vivid force or soul that interweaves everything. In Gandhi’s very words: “I believe in absolute oneness of God and therefore also of humanity. What though we have many bodies? We have but one soul. The rays of the sun are many through refraction. But they have the same source” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 199). Further: “The only way to God is to see Him in His creation and be one with it. This can only be done by service of all. … I am part and parcel of the whole, and I cannot find Him apart from the rest of humanity” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 297). Thought through to the end, this also means, any distinction between human dignity the dignity of all living beings and the dignity of all existing reality is less fundamental in this context. For Gandhi, unity among human beings is primary, but where this is realized, there will also be unity between humanity and the whole of creation (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 285). We should try to bring both approaches—the western and the eastern one—together to foster the respect of human persons on the one hand and to strengthen the respect of each kind of living creature on the other. Both will be necessary to find “an alternative to technocratic disaster” (
Illich 1973, p. 25).
At this point of reflection, it may be appropriate to introduce the second author of whom Gandhi reminds us today: Jorge Mario Bergoglio, elected Pope Francis in 2013. Quoting the German philosopher and Catholic theologian Romano Guardini several times he criticises what is called the technocratic paradigm in his second Encyclical Letter
Laudato si. A crucial argument in this context is that we as modern humans are not trained in a proper way to use the power we have gained by science and technology in the right way. Therefore, the formation of responsibility and consciousness did not keep up with the dynamic development of tools and skills we have undergone since the Age of Enlightenment (
Pope Francis 2015, No. 104–5). Tools and skills embedded in a technological paradigm tend to become mere means of domination, domination of other people and domination of nature. This way of dealing with our environment has become so self-evident that there seems to be no alternative. Thus, the Pope writes: “It has become countercultural to choose a lifestyle whose goals are even partly independent of technology, of its costs and its power to globalize and make us all the same. Technology tends to absorb everything into its ironclad logic, and those who are surrounded with technology “know full well that it moves forward in the final analysis neither for profit nor for the well-being of the human race”, that “in the most radical sense of the term power is its motive—a lordship over all” (
Pope Francis 2015, No. 108). From that clearly follows: not the physical object, a specific machine or infrastructure has to be criticized rather it is the habit carrying on the whole system or culture, which occurs to be fundamentally violent. Once again in the very words of Pope Francis: “My criticism of the technocratic paradigm involves more than simply thinking that if we control its excesses everything will be fine. The bigger risk does not come from specific objects, material realities or institutions, but from the way that they are used. It has to do with human weakness, the proclivity to selfishness that is part of what the Christian tradition refers to as “concupiscence”” (
Pope Francis 2020, No. 166).
Even if Gandhi as a Hindu does not use the concept of original sin and concupiscence and even if I have not found evidence for explicit Gandhian Influence on Bergoglio until now the two approaches resemble each other very much (
Tschudin 2020, pp. 264–65) just as they both have similarities with Illich’s approach. Particularly the Pope’s call for more solidarity and respect of human dignity “has demonstrable synchronicity with a Gandhian approach” (
Tschudin 2020, p. 268). All three concepts have in common to consider the intrinsically domination-seeking and acquisitive habit spurring modern economy and technology the crucial problem. As Gandhi answered the question about the reason for the personal and global chaos we observe: “It is exploitation… And my fundamental objection to machinery rests on the fact that it is machinery that has enabled these nations to exploit others. In itself it is a wooden thing and can be turned to good purpose or bad. But it is easily turned to a bad purpose as we know” (
CWMG 1956–1994, p. 129).
A self-centred, domination-addicted human habit does not only affect human interrelations but also the relation between humans and nature. As Douglas Allen writes referring to Gandhi: “In modern civilisation, nature has no inherent value and serves as a valueless object, a resource, a nonhuman other, for us to control, dominate, and exploit for our own, human instrumentally-defined ends. Modern technology is a glorified means for exploiting nature. In Gandhi’s
swaraj,
dharma civilizational approach, nature has value, allowing us to experience and constitute integral, meaningful, harmonious, sustainable relations with the other, and in realizing our unity and interconnectedness with reality. Nature, as other, is an integral relational part of our process of self-realization, self-transformation, and world-transformation” (
Allen 2019, p. 121).
A fundamentally violent habit underlying a competitive style of economy, which is motivated by greed and a kind of technology, which has become an end in itself as far as it seems to guarantee power destroys nature, destroys human interrelations and in the end destroys our possibility to become mature human personalities. Thus, we have to consider such a kind of violent habit a core obstacle to sustainable development as mentioned before in all its different dimensions.