Animal Suffering and the Laws of Nature

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The author argues that Sterba and Tooley’s atheistic arguments from natural evil contradict themselves.

For Sterba, he says that God’s invention must allow for soul-making, but Sterba admits that God’s intervention would be detectable. But God revealing himself would eliminate the possibility of soul making, and thus the contradiction.

For Tooley, he maintains that God could have instigated laws that don’t lead to natural evil, but that humans could not discover that laws were issued by God; but he also says that humans can discover that natural evils are not caused by (e.g., supernatural) agents. These two things, the author argues, cannot be true together.

Regarding the author’s critique of Sterba’s argument, I’m not wholly convinced. I feel like character development is still possible even if God’s existence is known; for example, if God didn’t threaten to reward and punish based on behavior, you could know that God exists without feeling like you had to behave one way or the other. In other words, the author assumes that “God exists” necessarily includes the idea of divine reward and punishment; but the two are not necessarily connected (and an argument could be made that God would be better if he didn’t set out to reward and punish in that way). If that were gotten rid of, God could reveal himself without hindering soul making. So I don’t think the argument works. It’s logically possible for God to reveal himself by stopping natural evil without hindering soul making because he could not set out to reward and punish good and bad behavior.

Regarding the author’s critique of Tooley—I think it is based on an uncharitable interpretation of Tooley. What tooley is saying is that, of the laws themselves, we cannot know that they were put in place by a supernatural agent. What we can know, however, is that the laws that are in place are what cause events in the world (like those that cause suffering). For example, we can discover that earthquakes are a result of shifts in tectonic plates, rather than the rath of some supernatural being, or the curse of a witch, or something like that. And there is no contradiction there. Now, if Tooley was saying “we can’t know that the laws were put in place by God, but we can know that the laws weren’t put in place by some other supernatural power, like a demon”—yeah, that would be odd. That would seem contradictory. (In 2011, David Johnson argued that the only way out of the problem of natural evil is to suggest that someone else, besides God, is responsible for the natural laws that govern our universe.) Our inability to know that God put the laws in place would seem to be due to our inability to detect “supernatural causes of the laws themselves.” But that is not what Tooley is saying. (And since the author is saying that is what Tooley is saying, the critique is based on a misinterpretation of Tooley.) We  can know that events in the world are naturally occurring, rather than supernaturally occurring—that they are a consequence of the laws rather than supernatural agents--even if we can’t tell whether the laws themselves have supernatural causes. And that is all that Tooley is saying. So I think this objection is just dead in the water.

Because I don’t think the arguments are fixable, I am going to recommend rejection—but I’ll leave it to the editor to decide whether a fix is possible.

Author Response

Thanks for the two helpful comments (reproduced below). Responses in bold.

FIRST COMMENT: Regarding the author’s critique of Sterba’s argument, I’m not wholly convinced. I feel like character development is still possible even if God’s existence is known; for example, if God didn’t threaten to reward and punish based on behavior, you could know that God exists without feeling like you had to behave one way or the other. In other words, the author assumes that “God exists” necessarily includes the idea of divine reward and punishment; but the two are not necessarily connected (and an argument could be made that God would be better if he didn’t set out to reward and punish in that way). If that were gotten rid of, God could reveal himself without hindering soul making. So I don’t think the argument works. It’s logically possible for God to reveal himself by stopping natural evil without hindering soul making because he could not set out to reward and punish good and bad behavior.

I have added the following to the text:

 

One might object that God’s existence being known threatens human moral development and soul-making only if that knowledge is accompanied by the belief that God punishes wrongdoing or rewards right doing.¹⁷ But if it were known that God would not punish wrongdoing or reward right doing, then Sterba’s constrained intervention is rescued. This objection contends that an essentially morally perfect agent could prevent natural evil if the agent engaged in constrained intervention and was morally indifferent toward punishing or rewarding human actions as appropriate.

The problem with this objection is that it forfeits the idea of moral perfection. Consider again Sterba’s Just State analogy. No one would hold that a state that treated criminal behavior the same as lawful behavior was acting justly. If a state neither punished where appropriate, nor rewarded where appropriate, the state would be morally and legally indifferent and would not be just. Moreover, a state that did not make it known that certain behaviors were criminal and due punishment would also fall short of justice. Likewise, an essentially morally perfect agent could not be indifferent toward human behavior, such that the agent neither punishes Stalin, nor rewards Mother Teresa. If an agent S did not punish where appropriate or reward where appropriate (assuming ability), then there is good reason to doubt that S is morally perfect.   

 

17 = I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.

 

SECOND COMMENT: Regarding the author’s critique of Tooley—I think it is based on an uncharitable interpretation of Tooley. What tooley is saying is that, of the laws themselves, we cannot know that they were put in place by a supernatural agent. What we can know, however, is that the laws that are in place are what cause events in the world (like those that cause suffering). For example, we can discover that earthquakes are a result of shifts in tectonic plates, rather than the rath of some supernatural being, or the curse of a witch, or something like that. And there is no contradiction there. Now, if Tooley was saying “we can’t know that the laws were put in place by God, but we can know that the laws weren’t put in place by some other supernatural power, like a demon”—yeah, that would be odd. That would seem contradictory. (In 2011, David Johnson argued that the only way out of the problem of natural evil is to suggest that someone else, besides God, is responsible for the natural laws that govern our universe.) Our inability to know that God put the laws in place would seem to be due to our inability to detect “supernatural causes of the laws themselves.” But that is not what Tooley is saying. (And since the author is saying that is what Tooley is saying, the critique is based on a misinterpretation of Tooley.) We  can know that events in the world are naturally occurring, rather than supernaturally occurring—that they are a consequence of the laws rather than supernatural agents--even if we can’t tell whether the laws themselves have supernatural causes. And that is all that Tooley is saying. So I think this objection is just dead in the water.

The reviewer says that “We can know that events in the world are naturally occurring, rather than supernaturally occurring”.  And Tooley says the same on page 16. Call this Tooley’s first claim. But Tooley also holds (page 18) that God could have replaced all laws of nature with “God-willing laws” – particular volitions of the divine that mimic our common understanding of the laws of nature. These “god-willing laws” are NOT laws of nature as they contain a theological or supernatural condition (the god-willing part).  Moreover, Tooley holds that we cannot distinguish between laws of nature and “god-willing laws”. Call this Tooley’s second claim. Tooley’s second claim is essential for his further claim that divine hiddenness is irrelevant to the POE. But if we cannot know that what appears as regular and predictable natural laws are not in fact “god-willing laws”, then Tooley’s first claim is in trouble.  But Tooley holds that we cannot know that what are appear as laws of nature really are laws of nature rather than “god-willing laws” - as Tooley holds that divine hiddenness has no role in the matter. 

          The reviewer ignores the distinction between the establishment or origin of the laws of nature (or as the reviewer puts it: “of the laws themselves, we cannot know that they were put in place by a supernatural agent”), and the operation of what appear to be laws of nature.  The issue is not the “putting in place” (establishment or creation) but the operation. Tooley holds that we can know that the regular and predictable operations are laws of nature (and not god-willing laws), but he also holds that if those regular and predictable operations were god-willing laws (and not laws of nature), we could not know that. Tooley is not entitled to both his first and second claims.  I have made the distinction clearer in the text.

 

Reviewer 2 Report

This is a reasonably sensible, and crisply written, piece of analytic philosophy, which could be published if (and only if) the following relatively minor problems are attended to:

Lines 32f: the distinction between natural and moral evils is oversimplified. First, because natural evils are often exacerbated by the moral evils of folly and neglect. Second, because aspects of human decision-making are arguably a product of our evolutionary inheritance, not of conscious choice.

Lines 38f: It is not accurate to say that theism is the intersection of the the great monotheisms, as there are other types of theism. Likewise, theism is not simply the proposition of an 'omni-God' - this definition of theism would exclude e.g. process theism, open theism, etc.

Lines 91f: having been at pains to distinguish between probes and models the article seems to make little use of them.

Lines 205f: The example of the marrying pairs seems to me a case of limited resources, and hence of natural, not moral evil. The author does not attempt to address this objection, despite acknowledging that Sterba holds a similar view.

Line 236: 'severe suffering' is not a satisfactory (or necessary) compression of 'significant or horrendous natural evil'.

Lines 299ff: By focussing the discussion around soul-making in the human, the author neglects the millennia of animal suffering that preceded the evolution of humans.

Lines 376f: There is little discussion of hiddenness of God arguments - this should be made more explicit (especially given their mention in the abstract).

Lines 430f: The hypothesised 'god-willing' worlds bear some relation to best of all possible worlds arguments and this should be acknowledged.

Line 469: On this argument it might be helpful to cite Clayton and Knapp, The predicament of belief, OUP 2011: Ch 3.

Lines 567f: It would be sensible to cite Murray's 2008 monograph Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, and Trent Dougherty's The Problem of Animal Pain (2014). 

 

Author Response

Thanks for the ten helpful comments (reproduced below). Responses in bold.

 

Comment 1. Lines 32f: the distinction between natural and moral evils is oversimplified. First, because natural evils are often exacerbated by the moral evils of folly and neglect. Second, because aspects of human decision-making are arguably a product of our evolutionary inheritance, not of conscious choice.

Please note that omissions are included in the definition of the paper, and presumably folly and neglect are captured by that. I have added an endnote (#11): “Even though the human mind is a product of natural selection, that fact is not relevant as regards the distinction between moral and natural evil.

 

Comment 2. Lines 38f: It is not accurate to say that theism is the intersection of the the great monotheisms, as there are other types of theism. Likewise, theism is not simply the proposition of an 'omni-God' - this definition of theism would exclude e.g. process theism, open theism, etc.

Open Theism fits with the definition provided in the text – “there is an agent who is omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect and the creator of the universe” (Open Theists differ from “Classical Theists” as regards the implications of omniscience and, perhaps, omnipotence).  I have also added an endnote (#4): “There are, of course, revisions of Classical Theism – think of J.S. Mill’s idea of a finite deity or what is called Process Theism – which substantially revise the idea of Classical Theism.

 

Comment 3. Lines 91f: having been at pains to distinguish between probes and models the article seems to make little use of them.

As noted in the text, the argument is a refutation and not a defense or theodicy. The purpose of the second section is to provide some understanding of incompatibility arguments. I’ve also revised line 142 to read ”Refutations attempt no justification for the appalling suffering we see around us, nor do they seek to demonstrate compatibility.

 

Comment 4. Lines 205f: The example of the marrying pairs seems to me a case of limited resources, and hence of natural, not moral evil. The author does not attempt to address this objection, despite acknowledging that Sterba holds a similar view.

I’ve added these paragraphs:

“One might object that the suffering involved in our Nozick case is an artifact of a kind of scarcity – a scarcity of diverse preferences – as the preference ranking of all the males are the same, but only one will have his top preference satisfied.¹¹ All others will not. The same is true of the females – only one of the females will have her top preference satisfied. All others will not. This scarcity results in suffering, which, according to this objection, is an instance of natural evil and not moral evil. If the preferences varied over the respective populations of males and females, rather than being uniform, there would be no suffering.

Does this objection succeed? It does not. The first thing to notice is that a scarcity can be an artifact of human decision and action rather than a natural process. In our case, there is a sufficient number of potential mates such that each person can be married. There is no lack of resources. If there is a scarcity, it is due to human choice. Second, persons are not captives to their preferences. Even if preference voluntarism, like doxastic voluntarism, is false, it does not follow that person have no control at all. Just as one can indirectly, or in a roundabout way, control at least some of her beliefs, so too one can modify, revise, and even discard a preference. Various kinds of therapies and our own experiences show that we have at least indirect control over our preferences, even if we lack direct control. Third, with at least some of our preferences, there is a close connection with reason and deliberation. Deliberating about alternatives can generate, revise or change our preferences and our rankings. Deliberation about our preferences can be efficacious. Fourth, satisfaction or not of any given preference in our Nozick case is a function of the conscious decisions of others. Agents make decisions and those decisions can impact others. Finally, notice that the size of the population is arbitrary as intrinsically undesirable states (unhappiness, disappointment, frustration, heartbreak and despair) can result as long as one person’s preference is frustrated because of a decision another makes. Unrequited love may generate unhappiness, disappointment, frustration, heartbreak, and perhaps even despair, but whether a love is reciprocated depends on the decision of another. 

Seeing that the third assumption is false is important as it is too often assumed that moral evil originates exclusively from the wrongful actions of moral agents. But moral evil is not limited to wrongful actions. Moral evil and natural evil are jointly exhaustive of the possibilities and mutually exclusive. Every case of suffering then is brought about either by a moral agent or a natural process or event. In our Nozick case, unhappiness, disappointment, frustration, heartbreak and despair, all intrinsically undesirable, result from the morally permissible and rational actions of moral agents. There are no immoral or suboptimal actions bringing about the suffering. The decisions and actions of agents are not instances, in the relevant sense, of natural processes or events, so they are not generators of natural evil.¹² While moral evil typically results from immoral actions, it can result from moral actions as well. Moreover, seeing that (ASP-3) is false shows us that there could be evil – intrinsically undesirable states – even in possible worlds in which no human ever engages in wrongdoing or makes a suboptimal decision. The common charge that God could and should have brought about a possible world in which no moral agent ever engages in wrongdoing is underdeveloped given the falsity of (ASP-3).”

 

11 = I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.

 

12 = Even though the human mind is a product of natural selection, that fact is not relevant as regards the distinction between moral and natural evil.  

Comment 5. Line 236: 'severe suffering' is not a satisfactory (or necessary) compression of 'significant or horrendous natural evil'.

I dropped severe and replaced with significant or horrendous.

Comment 6. Lines 299ff: By focussing the discussion around soul-making in the human, the author neglects the millennia of animal suffering that preceded the evolution of humans

Please note that Sterba includes the opportunity for soul-making as a right that humans have. I just build on that.

I also added an endnote that: “Laws as complex as the actual laws of nature would extend into deep evolutionary history and would involve pre-human suffering.”

 

Comment 7.Lines 376f: There is little discussion of hiddenness of God arguments - this should be made more explicit (especially given their mention in the abstract).

I added an endnote that: “By desirability of divine hiddenness is meant, roughly, the idea that there is good reason for God to hide or mask the fact that God exists in order to bring about or preserve an important good (if God exists)”. 

 

Comment 8. Lines 430f: The hypothesised 'god-willing' worlds bear some relation to best of all possible worlds arguments and this should be acknowledged.

I am not sure about this comment.

Comment 9. Line 469: On this argument it might be helpful to cite Clayton and Knapp, The predicament of belief, OUP 2011: Ch 3.

I am not familiar with the work.

Comment 10. Lines 567f: It would be sensible to cite Murray's 2008 monograph Nature Red in Tooth and Claw, and Trent Dougherty's The Problem of Animal Pain (2014). 

I have added an endnote that: “For detailed arguments seeking to provide a theodicy regarding animal suffering, see (Murray, 2008) and (Schneider, 2020). “

Reviewer 3 Report

Lines 8, 49:  nature   instead of  natural

Line 180  emphasis should be emphasize 

 

Line 153  If humans can do it, logically, God can probably do it.   

It is unlikely that, if humans can do it, God logically can’t do it.

    If this is what this means, it would be less obtuse to use one of these two formulations.

 

 Line 475   A3   It is not clear how richness leads to natural evil.  Furthermore, it fails to explain natural evil that arises prior to human scientific sentience.

 

Line 476    To get from B to B1 you need a statement about God wanting humans to do something about evil.  

Author Response

Thanks for the five helpful comments (reproduced below). Responses in bold.

Comment 1. Lines 8, 49:  nature   instead of  natural

Good catch - change made. 

 

Comment 2. Line 180  emphasis should be emphasize 

Good catch - change made. 

 

Comment 3. Line 153  If humans can do it, logically, God can probably do it.   

It is unlikely that, if humans can do it, God logically can’t do it.

If this is what this means, it would be less obtuse to use one of these two formulations.

Change made. In particular, (ASP-1) now reads - it is unlikely that God cannot do X if humans have the causal power to do X.   Plus, I’ve added an endnote that the modality of (ASP-1) should be understood as logical.

 

Comment 4. Line 475   A3   It is not clear how richness leads to natural evil.  Furthermore, it fails to explain natural evil that arises prior to human scientific sentience.

I’ve replaced “rich” with “complex” and added an endnote that: “Laws as complex as the actual laws of nature would extend into deep evolutionary history and would involve pre-human suffering.”

 

Comment 5. Line 476    To get from B to B1 you need a statement about God wanting humans to do something about evil.  

I’ve revised (A) to read: “A. The opportunity for humans to discover, generate, and disseminate knowledge, including scientific knowledge, would be a plausible divine goal in creation, in addition to the divine goal that humans can morally develop.