International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church
Abstract
:The barbarians did not dare leave an enslaved Rus’ at their rear, and returned to their Eastern steppes. Christian enlightenment was saved by a ravaged and dying Russia.1
1. Introduction
2. Church-State Relations in Russia
3. The ROC’s Goals beyond Russia
The Orthodox Christian is called to love his fatherland, which has a territorial dimension, and his brothers by blood who live everywhere in the world. This love is one of the ways of fulfilling God’s commandment to love one’s neighbor, which includes love of one’s family, fellow-tribesmen, and fellow-citizens.
The Church grieves when, in the division of a multiethnic state, a historical comm-unity of people is destroyed, their rights are violated, and suffering enters their life.
The division of a multinational state can be justified only if one of the peoples is clearly oppressed or the majority of a country do not exhibit a definite will to pre-serve unity.
3.1. The ROC’s Geographic Representation
We are witnessing blatant lawlessness: Several strong and rich countries, inso-lently considering themselves the worldwide arbiters of good and evil, trample the will of people who want to live differently. Bombs and missiles are raining down on this land not because they are protecting someone. NATO’s military actions have a different goal—to destroy the post-war world order paid for with great bloodshed, to impose an order alien to them, based on the dictatorship of brute force.
3.2. Institutions Representing the ROC Abroad
4. The Russian State’s Priorities Abroad
The Russian Federation, as a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional state, having centuries-long experience with harmonious coexistence among various peoples, ethnic groups and religions, promotes the development of dialogue and the formation of partnerships between cultures, religions and civilizations, including within the framework of the UN and other international and regional organizations; it supports civil society initiatives to correspond to these aims and actively cooperates with the Russian Orthodox Church and the country’s other main religious bodies to counter extremism, the radicalization of society, intolerance, discrimination, and division based on racial, ethnic, confessional, linguistic, cultural, and other grounds.
4.1. Representing the Kremlin across the Russian World (and Beyond)
Today in many countries norms of morality and ethics are being reassessed, national traditions and differences between nations and cultures are being erased. The demand now is for society to not only recognize the sensible right of everyone to their freedom of conscience, political views and private life, but also the obligatory recognition of the equivalence—no matter how strange this might seem—between good and evil, which are opposite in meaning. Such a destruction of traditional values “from above” not only brings in its wake negative consequences for societies, but is also fundamentally anti-democratic, since it is carried out on the basis of abstract, theoretical ideas, contrary to the will of the national majority, which does not accept the ongoing changes and proposed revisions.91
4.2. Institutional Bases of Church-State Relations in the Foreign Policy Arena
5. Analysis: Areas of Cooperation (and Dissent)
In the case of Crimea, Russian culture and Orthodox religion were used to popularize a policy that that had already been deemed in the strategic interests of the nation, whereas in the case of the Donbass similar appeals were ignored (some observers even say suppressed) because they did not correspond to Russia’s strategic interests. The ROC had no discernible impact on immediate policy choices in either instance.
6. Conclusions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Conflicts of Interest
1 | These words were written by Aleksandr Pushkin (1799–1837) regarding the Mongol invasion (widely considered Russia’s greatest poet, as a young man Pushkin briefly served in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry). The epigraph points to a well-attested theme in Russia’s foreign affairs that is repeated down to the present day, namely, the idea that Russia has more than once saved Europe from oblivion. |
2 | In 1914, the ROC had over 55.5 thousand parishes; in 1940, fewer than 500 were left. Moreover, between just 1937 and 1938 some 168 thousand clerics were arrested, the majority of whom perished (Sherr and Kullamaa 2019, p. 4). |
3 | Sergii had been acting patriarchal locum tenens since December 1925, when Metropolitan Peter (Polianskii) of Krutitsii was imprisoned just eight months after assuming the role of locum tenens in April 1925 following the death of Patriarch Tikhon (Bellavin). (Rumors that Tikhon had been poisoned by the Bolsheviks circulated widely at the time.) He became locum tenens after Peter was executed by the NKVD in 1937. Although he died in 1944, Sergii continues to the be a very polarizing figure in the ROC due to his 1927 declaration pledging the Church’s loyalty to the new Soviet regime, an action that indelibly compromised him as a religious leader in the minds of many. |
4 | The available evidence suggests that many if not most of the ROC’s hierarchs during the post-World War II period cooperated in some capacity with the NKVD and its successor organization, the KGB. This was personally confirmed to me in a 2007 telephone conversation with Fr. Gleb Yakunin, who, as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and a member of the committee tasked with investigating the 1991 coup attempt, had direct access to the KGB archives in the early 1990s. |
5 | |
6 | While there is no research known to me that systematically examines the relationship between the Russian elite and the ROC, a comprehensive survey of societal attitudes toward religion carried out by the Pew Research Center demonstrates (its findings are in-line with other such surveys) that claiming to be Orthodox in post-communist Russia is mainly about asserting cultural and national identity, with far more people responding that they belong to the ROC than exhibiting belief in the core tenets of Orthodox Christianity (Religious Belief and National Belonging 2017). |
7 | The incongruity of its reputed birthplace not coinciding territorially with the Russian Federation’s present-day borders is assuredly not lost on Moscow. |
8 | For his efforts, Vladimir was canonized with the exalted title of ravno-apostalnii (“Equal-to-the-Apostles”). |
9 | The last royal family of Russia was canonized by the ROC as “passion-bearers,” or those who faced death in a Christ-like manner. In contrast, the exile-led and fiercely anti-communist Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia had canonized them in 1981 as “new martyrs,” or those who had been killed for their faith (after the fall of the Soviet Union the latter insisted on the canonization of the Romanovs as a preliminary step towards reunification with the ROC). |
10 | The original was destroyed by the Soviets in 1931; the current cathedral is a replica that was erected during the 1990s. |
11 | Victory Day, which marks the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War (as World War II continues to be known in Russia), falls on this date, having become the preeminent Russian state holiday in recent decades. (However, in 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic forced its public commemoration to be postponed until June 24, when the initial Victory Day parade on Red Square took place in 1945.) The Cathedral itself was opened on 22 June 2020, the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s attack on the USSR, which is now commemorated as the Day of Remembrance and Sorrow. |
12 | The structure is laden with symbolism; its metal floors, for example, were cast from melted-down Nazi tanks and other war trophies. Initially, there were also plans to adorn its interior with two controversial mosaics. One of these was to feature Stalin’s image, while another would have depicted the annexation of Crimea, complete with the likenesses of Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and other government officials (Inside Moscow’s New Military Megachurch 2020). However, both these projects were eventually scrapped. Putin reportedly objected to being depicted in this fashion (Russia Inaugurates Cathedral 2020; Russian Mosaic Featuring Putin 2020), while the potential display of Stalin’s visage caused an understandable backlash within the ROC (Russian Orthodox Church Says ‘No’ 2020). |
13 | In the Orthodox world, neither the Patriarch of Moscow, nor the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople (who has historically been recognized as primus inter pares, or “first-among-equals,” within Orthodoxy), have the same hierarchical standing as the Roman Catholic Pope. While the Catholic model is centralized, the more conciliar Orthodox model has always been multivalent, with its five ancient patriarchates (the “pentarchy”) comprising Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. However, the Moscow Patriarchate (established in 1589) has long claimed the greatest number of adherents, which has caused it to repeatedly challenge Constantinople (consult Keleher 1997). |
14 | Depicting Moscow as the inheritor of Constantinople’s mantle after its fall in 1453 has a long precedent. The best-known example of this is the eschatological prophecy of the monk Filofei of Pskov, dating from the early 16th century, that “two Romes have fallen [the original and Constantinople, the new Rome], the third stands [Moscow], and there shall be no fourth.” However, the idea of Moscow as the “third Rome” (i.e., the rightful successor to the Christian imperial project) was not embraced in governing circles until much later, only gaining traction in the latter half of the 19th century (Klimenko and Yurtaev 2018; Poe 1997). |
15 | During the post-communist period, the ROC has emerged as one of the most trusted Russian institutions, with a 2020 Levada survey finding 66 percent of respondents report they “completely trust” the military, 58 percent the president, 53 percent the FSB, and 42 percent the Church and religious organizations. In contrast, 36 only percent “completely trust” the police, 31 percent the courts, 29 percent the Duma, and 22 percent political parties (Doverie Institutam 2020). |
16 | It reads: “The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion can be established as official or compulsory.” Additionally, article 13.2 prohibits the imposition of any government-sponsored or otherwise mandatory ideology Available online: http://www.constitution.ru/10003000/10003000-3.htm (accessed on 2 January 2022). In reality, however, Russia is only secular insofar as it accords legal recognition to three other religions (Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism) deemed to be indigenous (“traditional”) by the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. Even so, this legislation highlights the singular contribution that the ROC has made to the history of Russia and its spiritual-cultural development (see Daniel and Marsh 2007). |
17 | Although Yeltsin did claim that he was baptized. Putin is guarded when it comes to speaking about his own spirituality; however, while he has not unambiguously professed himself to be a believer, he has carefully cultivated such an impression. |
18 | It is worth noting that Putin referred to Russia as an “Orthodox power” as long ago as 2005, making the statement while visiting Mount Athos in Greece (Putin: Rossiia 2005). |
19 | By his third term, Putin was overtly blaming a perceived loss of morality (and what is for him the closely associated concept of patriotism) among Russians for creating, as he put it in his 2012 address to the Federal Assembly, “long-term threats for society, and the security and integrity of Russia.” This caused him to argue that it is necessary to “fully support institutions that are the bearers of traditional values, which have historically proven themselves capable of passing them on from generation to generation” (Putin 2012). He was even more forceful in his 2013 speech to this same body, dismissing the West’s “so-called tolerance” as “asexual and sterile,” while emphasizing that Russia’s historical responsibility in the world was growing and stressing the need to protect its values-driven approach, including in the sphere of international relations (Putin 2013). |
20 | As Maria Engström elaborates, this “new conservative narrative is characterized by strong messianism and anti-Western (anti-American) sentiment” (2014, p. 357). However, the beginnings of this trend considerably predate 2012, as witnessed by Putin’s vituperative 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference (Vystuplenie i diskussiia na Miunkhenskoi konferentsii 2007) and the Kremlin’s party-of-power, United Russia, adopting conservatism as part of its political platform in 2009. |
21 | It also reflected longer-term legacies and more distal causes, including Western condemnation of Russia over the death of Sergei Magnitskii in 2009, international fallout from the 2008 Russo-Georgian War (and Georgia’s associated departure from membership in the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States), NATO’s 2011 military intervention in Libya, and anxieties over the so-called “color revolutions” that roiled the post-Soviet space in the 2000s. |
22 | It is particularly well codified in the constitutional amendments that were adopted in 2020. Among other things, these recognize that Russians are “united by a thousand-year history, preserving the memory of ancestors who passed on to us our ideals and faith in God” (article 67; explicitly lobbied for by Kirill, this is the first mention of God in the Russian constitution since the 1906 Tsarist version was adopted (Patriarch Kirill Proposes 2020)) and pledge to protect the sovereignty of states (article 79). They also define marriage as being between a man and woman (article 72), commit to preserving “traditional family values” (article 114), and aver that the constitution supercedes the decisions of inter-governmental organizations relative to Russia’s international treaty obligations (article 97) (Popravki v Konstitutsiiu RF 2020). |
23 | The ROC was not the only societal actor advocating for the adoption of socially conservative positions relative to Western progressivism, LGBT rights, and similar matters, but it was certainly the most vocal in this regard (and possessed the most coherent agenda). |
24 | Not all who identify as Russian Orthodox recognize the authority of the MP (or the legitimacy of its current leader) due to what they consider to be the insufficient contrition ROC leaders have exhibited for their past collaboration with the Soviet state. |
25 | Adapted from the typology presented in Soroka and Rhodes (2020). |
26 | As Shekhovtsov argues, positioning Russia on the world stage as the leading proponent of “international conservatism” allowed Putin, who has a vested interest in dividing his domestic opposition (among whom social views run the gamut) and propping up not just the Russian state but his own rule, to seek legitimation “from a variety of Western political sources ranging from genuine conservatives to right-wing extremeists” (2018, p. 84). |
27 | In late 2017, Kirill stated that the ROC had 36,878 functioning parishes and 944 monasteries (Patriarkh Kirill nazval chislo 2017). In contrast, in 1988 the ROC only had around 7000 (Solodovnik 2014, p. 38). Although reliable figures are lacking, a great many of these continue to be located outside of Russia (in early 2017, over 12,000 parishes loyal to the MP were found in Ukraine alone (Soroka 2018b, Table 1), but this number has declined since the formation of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in 2019). |
28 | Such stances, while quite prevalent in the ROC, are far from idiosyncratic; rather, for the most part they align with conservative Christian perspectives across denominations, as evinced in the joint statement that Patriarch Kirill and Pope Francis issued after their historic 2016 meeting in Cuba. Noting that the world has entered “a period of epochal changes,” Francis and Kirill declared that “Christian conscience and pastoral responsibility do not allow us to remain indifferent” to societal challenges such as terrorism, same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia, and assisted reproduction. Moreover, the two church leaders emphasized the persecution of Christians throughout the MENA region and especially the dire refugee situation in Iraq and Syria. As for Europe, they declared that the continent needed “to be faithful to its Christian roots” so as to “preserve its soul, formed by a two-thousand-year Christian tradition” (Sovmestnoe zaiavlenie Papy Rimskogo 2016). |
29 | See, for instance, Kirill [Gundiaev] (2000). The current patriarch has been described as the “primary author” of the ROC’s turn towards civilizationism (Lunkin 2018, p. 166). |
30 | One year prior, Kirill had given a speech in which he argued that if the Church continues to “repeat the phrase, which is loved by some, that politics is too dirty for us, that it is a non-Christian matter, then we will voluntarily surrender the life of the state into the hands of people who are at best indifferent to Christian moral values” (‘Ob osnovakh sotsial’noi kontseptsii’ 2008). |
31 | However, his statements on the matter have at times been contradictory. For example, Kirill declared soon after becoming patriarch that the ROC must remain autonomous from the state and “stay above the fray of politics.” In this same interview, he noted that true symphonia has never been realized in practice, and that it is “more a dream than a real project of church-state relations” (Interv’iu Sviateishego Patriarkha Kirilla 2009). This is in contrast to earlier remarks wherein he had stressed the importance of this principle (see Solodovnik 2014, p. 55). |
32 | As article XVI.2 notes, “the danger of discrepancies between the will of the people and the decisions of international organizations should not be underestimated.” |
33 | Apart from the spiritual damage materialism engenders, there is also a pragmatic reason for opposing it: According to Kirill, a non-believer living in a consumeristic world is not inclined to be patriotic or defend his homeland, whereas a believer—precisely because he thinks not just in terms of the material world—is disposed to do so (Otvety Sviateishego Patriarkha 2016). |
34 | In reality, the EU has historically been far from a secular project, though there is a tension between politics and religion inherent in its founding and continued functioning (Soroka 2017). Institutionally, meanwhile, Europe remains a continent “riddled with Christian privileges” (Klausen 2005, p. 555). As for religiosity in Russia, although surveys consistently show that somewhere in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 percent of Russians self-identify as Orthodox, a recent poll found that only 6 percent attend weekly services (Religious Belief and National Belonging 2017, p. 11), a rate that looks similar to that of Scandinavia, where church attendance is among the lowest in the world. |
35 | Relations between states, therefore, “should be based on the following foundational principles: love for one’s neighbor, one’s people and the Fatherland, an appreciation of the needs of other peoples, and a conviction that it is impossible for the good of your people to be served by immoral means” (VIII.3). |
36 | Article IV.9 explicitly notes that the exercise of an individual’s rights “should not be destructive to the unique way of life and traditions of the family, as well as various religious, national, and social communities.” This suggests that there is a practical point of compromise between the what the Church sees as universal moral criteria and the specific norms and mores of distinct peoples, though this is not elaborated on. |
37 | As Solik and Baar remind us, “the ROC became an important vehicle for the Russification policies of the Russian imperial regime in newly acquired territories” (Solik and Baar 2019, p. 21). As such, the goal of the Empire-era Church was not only to save souls but also to turn indigenous peoples into loyal subjects of the Tsar, a legacy that—along with Soviet-era policies that saw large numbers of ethnic Russians settle along the USSR’s western periphery and in Central Asia—continues to be reflected throughout the post-Soviet states. |
38 | Kirill is widely recognized as a legitimate religious figure beyond Russia’s borders, with the majority of Orthodox Christians in Estonia, Latvia, Belarus, and Moldova regarding him as the highest authority in Orthodoxy (Religious Belief and National Belonging 2017, p. 30). |
39 | The ROC has historically also enjoyed good relations with Armenia and Georgia (the former, however, is not in communion with the Eastern Orthodox Churches but rather part of the Oriental Orthodox world). |
40 | Kirill came to understand that his use of “Russian world” was being associated with Russian neo-imperialism in post-Maidan Ukraine (and elsewhere). Consequently, Lunkin reports that after expressing displeasure at the manner in which its meaning had been politicized (see Patriarkh prizval ne politizirovat’ 2015), Kirill stopped utilizing the term because it required too much clarification to convey what he intended (2018, p. 171). Indeed, my keyword search of the MP’s website (patriarchia.ru) for the period January 2016 to December 2021 revealed that although other Church officials continued to talk about the “Russian world,” Kirill himself only referenced it in 1 speech out of the 101 documents the query returned (and here it was largely unavoidable, as he was addressing the 10th Assembly of the Russian World Foundation (Doklad Sviateishego Patriarkha Kirilla 2016)). Nonetheless, Kirill continues to employ it in his writing, as attested by the 2019 release of his book Dialog s istoriei, which features an entire chapter on the “Russian world” (V Moskve predstavili novuiu knigu 2019). |
41 | Regarding the eastern Slavic states of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, Kirill uses the analogy of three adult brothers to represent their relationship, noting that while each of them has “his own home, his own family, his own interests, [and] his own economy,” what is apparent to all of them is “that only together will they be able to withstand adversity and move forward” (Slovo Sviateishego Patriarkha 2009). |
42 | Consequently, “civilizational diversity” must be protected; however, the reason for doing so is not to “recreate any political structures, build new empires, create military blocs, but to preserve the greatest heritage that we received from our ancestors” (Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill 2014). |
43 | Elevated to the rank of archimandrite in 2019, he now serves as the ROC’s representative to Europe in Strasbourg. |
44 | These include the Order of St. Seraphim of Sarov, 1st class (2015); the Order of the Holy Equal-to-the-Apostles Grand Prince Vladimir, 1st class (2007); the Order of the Holy Blessed Grand Prince Dmitrii Donskoi, 1st class (2005); and the Order of St. Sergius of Radonezh, 1st class (2002). |
45 | This is the highest award given out to laity by the ROC, in the highest of three ranked degrees. It was personally bestowed by Kirill, with whom Yanukovych reportedly enjoyed close ties. |
46 | Relations were similarly severed between the ROC and Phanar, albeit only for a few months, in 1996 over a dispute regarding Estonia (consult Sherr and Kullamaa 2019, pp. 22–28). However, one result of the current imbroglio is that on 29 December 2021 the MP established a Russia exarchate for Africa, infringing on territory traditionally controlled by the See of Alexandria. While this is widely understood as a response to Alexandria recognizing the OCU, Cyril Hovorun suggests that it may complement the Russian state’s attempts to exert greater influence on the African continent, following in the footsteps of China (Hovorun 2022). |
47 | While Bartholomew does not occupy a position equivalent to that of the Roman Catholic Pope, the Patriarch of Constantinople has traditionally exercised special prerogatives, among them the right to adjudicate disputes between fraternal Churches. |
48 | A particular point of contention concerns NATO’s refusal to stop its bombardment on Orthodox Easter (which fell on April 11 in 1999), along with the fact that numerous churches and monasteries were damaged/destroyed by the aerial campaign. Moreover, in Russia photographs circulated of bombs with the message “Happy Easter” painted on them. This deeply offended the religious sensibilities of believers not just in Serbia, but throughout the Orthodox world. |
49 | The Social Concept (released in 2000) obliquely references the Serbian bombing campaign in article VIII.3: “In the current system of international relations, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an aggressive war from a defensive one.” However, despite the ROC’s vociferous criticism of NATO’s actions in Serbia (and later the West’s involvement in the MENA region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring), Kirill defended Moscow’s intervention in Syria, labelling it a “defensive war” intended to prevent terrorist groups from gaining power and possibly posing a threat to Russia (Russian Church Leader Defends 2016). As Robert Blitt writes, the “deafening silence” of the ROC in the face of credible allegations of war crimes committed by the Russian military in that country “betrays the full extent of the [Church’s] unflinching support for the Kremlin’s selective grasp of international norms” (Blitt 2021, p. 4). |
50 | Disputes over ownership had previously flared up in dramatic ways, as with ROC-instigated seizures of property in Jericho and Hebron by the Palestinian Authority (see Beshkin and Mank 2000; Schmemann 1997). The complexity of the matter was compounded by the fact that Tsarist-era ecclesial properties were frequently owned by the state and not the ROC. |
51 | Included in his holdings is Tsargrad TV, a conservative and pro-Orthodox broadcaster that Malofeev launched with the assistance of an American, former Fox News producer Jack Hanick, in 2015. A staunch monarchist, Malofeev criticizes Western powers for what he perceives to be their discrimination against believers and articulates a civilizational mission for Russia: “Just as Christians in the West in Ronald Reagan’s time helped us against the evil of communism,” Malofeev proclaims, “we now have to return our debt to Christians who are suffering under totalitarianism in the West” (Keating 2014). |
52 | Available online: https://vrns.ru/ (accessed on 2 January 2022). This body has been described as the “ideological center” of the ROC (Lunkin 2018, p. 166). |
53 | Up until 2008, when it suspended its membership, the ROC also participated in the Conference of European Churches. Available online: https://www.ceceurope.org/member-churches/ (accessed on 27 November 2021). |
54 | Available online: https://mospat.ru/ru/department/ (accessed on 27 November 2021). |
55 | Available online: https://orthodoxru.eu/ (accessed on 27 November 2021). |
56 | Available online: http://strasbourg-reor.org/ (accessed on 27 November 2021). |
57 | Available online: https://lobbyfacts.eu/representative/79b00aed228249288605d206a1b48817/ (accessed on 2 January 2022). Other members of this body include the Patriachates of Constantinople, Bulgaria, and Romania, along with the Churches of Cyprus and Greece. |
58 | The DECR is currently comprised of three divisions, respectively dealing with inter-Orthodox relations, inter-Christian relations, and foreign affairs with non-CIS states. |
59 | In the immediate aftermath of the Maidan protests, the Moscow Patriarchate attempted to establish a very even-keeled approach to the unfolding conflict in Ukraine, with Kirill stating that the Church would not take sides in what amounted to a political struggle (Obrashchenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Moskovskogo 2014) and urging an immediate end what he characterized as “fratricide” and “internecine strife” (Obrashchenie Sviateishego Patriarkha Kirilla 2014). Since then, however, he and other highly placed figures in the ROC have been quite critical of the post-Maidan government in Kyiv and its supporters, whom they have—with some justification—repeatedly accused of targetting the UOC-MP (see, for example, Mitropolit Volokolamskii Ilarion 2019). |
60 | The Metropolitanate of Montenegro and the Littoral comprises a diocese within the SOC, which has historically enjoyed robust ties to Russia. For the text of the law, along with commentary from the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, see: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF(2020)019-e (accessed on 15 January 2022). |
61 | The ROC clearly insinuated that the motivation for these actions originated with the Western powers (Patriarshee i Sinodal’noe poslanie 2019). |
62 | For example, in 2019 the UOC-MP sought legal relief for parishioners ejected from their church, allegedly with the connivance of government officials, in the Ukrainian village of Ptichya. Meanwhile, in 2020 there were two applications brought before the ECtHR by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP) in Crimea requesting the Court prohibit Russian officials from expelling its members from the cathedral in Simferopol and demolishing a UOC-KP chapel in Yevpatoria, actions to which the ROC was an indirect but obviously interested party. |
63 | The next meeting of the latter body will take place in St. Ptersburg in May 2022, with Lavrov pledging to collaborate with the ROC in planning the event (Interv’iu Ministra inostrannykh del 2021). |
64 | Before the formation of the OCU, the three main Orthodox bodies in Ukraine were the UOC-MP, the UOC-KP, and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). However, the UOC-MP not only comprised the largest Church in Ukraine before the Maidan protests, but it was also the only one recognized as canonical by world Orthodoxy. (The UOC-KP and UAOC dissolved themselves in December 2018 in anticipation of the formation of the OCU, although internal squabbles lead to the re-establishment of the UOC-KP in 2019, albeit in a greatly diminished capacity). |
65 | Another proximate source of controversy between the two concerns the ROC (along with the Churches of Antioch, Bulgaria, and Georgia) pulling out of the Pan-Orthodox Council held in Crete in 2016 at the last minute, despite this event being over 50 years in the planning. Some believe that Bartholomew granted Ukraine’s request for autocephaly, which was heavily pushed by the post-Maidan government, as a means of disciplining Moscow for attempting to scuttle the Council (at a meeting of Orthodox leaders in Switzerland in January 2016, Kirill had voiced concerns that representatives of Constantinople were supporting independence for the Ukrainian Church and complained about what he characterized as the illegal seizure of UOC-MP properties by schismatics and nationalists in the context of raising objections to how the planning for the Council was proceeding (Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill vystupil so slovom 2016)). For his part, the DECR’s Metropolitan Ilarion has stated that what Constantinople did was “revenge,” though he denies that the MP intended to sabotage the Cretan meeting (Mitropolit Volokolamskii Ilarion 2019). |
66 | Legally, compatriots are defined as Russian citizens permanently domiciled beyond the Russian Federation’s present-day borders and individuals (along with their descendants) who are related to peoples that have historically resided on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as persons who choose to maintain spiritual, cultural, and legal ties with the Russian Federation and whose direct ancestors lived in Russia or the Soviet Union (O gosudarstvennoi politike [1999] 2010). |
67 | As Maksim Shevchenko wrote in a widely noticed article critiquing the West, “[t]here is no more sin or holiness—there are desires, opportunities to achieve them and the permission of society.” He continued: “Faith is antisocial, religion is radical and creates inequality. Here are the theses of neoliberalism, written over the entrance to the prison of the modern world” (Shevchenko 2013). |
68 | The 2021 Security Strategy repeats many stresses already present in the prior 2015 text, which notably blames (article 17) the U.S. and EU for fomenting the 2013–2014 Maidan protests in Ukraine (Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti 2015). |
69 | In the 2015 Security Strategy, the term “spiritual-moral” appears 12 times, 10 in relation to values and once each in reference to upbringing and education. More broadly, the term “spiritual” appears 4 times (Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti 2015). In comparison, the 2009 Security Strategy uses the term “spiritual” or “spirituality” a total of 8 times, while the phrase “spiritual-moral” does not appear at all (Strategiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti 2009). |
70 | This text also mentions countering the “negative influence of foreign religious organizations and missionaries.” |
71 | A clue as to how the Kremlin views the ROC and affiliated civil society organizations was revealed in Lavrov’s comments about the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society, a body formed in the 19th century to promote good relations in the Holy Land and to facilitate pilgrimage. The Foreign Minister noted that today, in addition to its spiritual dimensions, this organization is “a very important tool for the strengthening of Russia’s positions” in the region (Lavrov: Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society 2016). |
72 | Such views are widely shared among Russian elites. For example, Irina Iarovaia, head of the Duma Security and Anti-Corruption Committee, observes that “the fundamental basis” of Russians’ security resides in their “unique experience of multi-confessional and multi-ethnic unity and cooperation, which is based on respect.” As such, she claims that “Russia provides an example for the whole world in its protection of spiritual-moral values, which have a common humane meaning, which protect against extremism and aggression” (Iarovaia: Popytki sopriazheniia tekstov 2015). |
73 | |
74 | He also compared the annexation of Crimea to the West’s support for carving out an independent Kosovo from Serbia, citing it as evidence of Western hypocrisy in international relations. |
75 | “Russian nationalist discourse presents European civilization as degenerate,” Oleg Riabov and Tatiana Riabova write (Riabov and Riabova 2014), “and ‘the perversion of the normal gender order’ in the EU serves as clear evidence of this.” As such, they note that Russia’s anti-gay and anti-EU narrative (the two are in large measure connected) “offers a compensatory boost to Russian identity, not only in terms of helping to rehabilitate Russianness but by offering a new version of the messianic idea.” To wit: “As a stronghold of Christianity and a bastion of traditional values, Russia will save Europe and the world.” |
76 | Indicative of the relevance Constantinople’s granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church has for the Kremlin, it was discussed in Russia’s Security Council on 12 October 2018 (Putin obsudil s Sovbezom 2018). |
77 | Washington’s diplomatic efforts made clear its desire for an independent Ukrainian Church (Ponomariov 2019, p. 9). Moreover, in the fall of 2018 the U.S. State Department put out two statements supporting Ukrainian autocephaly. Then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo subsequently tweeted on 3 January 2021 that he had “made sure the U.S. supported international recognition of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine” and “helped the Metropolitan [Epiphanius, head of the newly created OCU] escape Russian influence” (Pompeo Tells of U.S. Help 2021). |
78 | More specifically, he claimed that the United States is “openly seeking to drive a wedge into the Orthodox world, whose values are viewed as a powerful spiritual obstacle for the liberal concept of boundless permissiveness.” (See also Lavrov: US backs Patriarch Bartholomew’s Provocation 2018). |
79 | This occurred despite the Kremlin’s concerted efforts to interfere with its accession to this organization (Milosevich 2020). Montenegro likewise recognized Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (a particularly sore point for Serbia) and backed the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia in the wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. |
80 | She also drew an explicit analogy between the situation in Montenegro and Ukraine. |
81 | Additional countries surveyed included Belarus, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, and Serbia. |
82 | Aside from Russia, wherein 85 percent of respondents agreed with this statement, the respective figures ranged from 83 percent in Armenia to 52 percent in Georgia and Romania. |
83 | Lavrov made this comment at a meeting concerning the protection of Christians put together by Russia, Lebanon, and Armenia, which occurred in Geneva on the sidelines of the 2015 assembly of the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC). In recent years the MFA and ROC have partnered with other each other and various religious and political leaders to address the issue of persecuted Christians in both the UNHRC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Interv’iu Ministra inostrannykh del 2021). |
84 | This has been a consistent theme in recent years. For example, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov characterized the beheading by ISIS militants of 21 Coptic Christians in Libya as “a consequence of what has been done [in Libya] by Western partners” (Paraszczuk 2015b). Similarly, Lavrov excoriated “the irresponsible policy of several Western countries aimed at regime change in the region,” as a result of which “vast territories in the Middle East have turned into a zone of chaos and instability and have become breeding grounds for terrorism and extremism, as well as a source of illegal migration.” Further noting that followers of Jesus are being persecuted and their religious sites destroyed, he stated that the resultant “mass exodus of Christians upsets the established ethnic and religious balance in the region that has evolved over centuries” (Lavrov 2017). |
85 | Indicative of the enduring salience of this event for Russia’s relations with the West, on the twentieth anniversary of the bombing Aleksandr Lukashevich, the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the OSCE, produced a statement that criticized NATO (and particularly the U.S.) for attacking Serbia, calling it an act of aggression that violated Serbian sovereignty and underscoring that messages mocking Serbs were “scrawled by pilots from NATO countries on bombs and missiles” (Lukashevich 2019). |
86 | However, Lavrov sees matters already beginning to change, arguing that “clearheaded” Western politicians are coming to recognize “that the world has more than just one civilization, that Russia, China and other major powers have a history that dates back a thousand years, and have their own traditions, values, and way of life” (Lavrov 2021). |
87 | According to him, Western states “also dislike the fact than Moscow stands up for countries that have fallen victim to Western gambles, have been attacked by international terrorists and risked losing their statehood, as was the case with Syria”. |
88 | As Putin explained not long after the start of his third presidential term, the “Euro-Atlantic countries” have renounced their roots and along with them Christian values, “which form the basis of Western civilization.” As a result, they equate “a large family and same-sex partnership, faith in God or faith in Satan” (Zasedanie mezhdunarodnogo diskussionnogo kluba 2013). |
89 | Among other means of accomplishing this goal, the ROC now has a network of parishes in the EU that can be utilized to mobilize public opinion against liberal European values (Alekseev 2017, pp. 269–70). |
90 | Article 8 of this document notes that: “the Russian Government is employing a wide range of tools and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations (e.g., Russkiy Mir), special authorities (Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (e.g., RT), pseudo news agencies and multimedia services (e.g., Sputnik), cross-border social and religious groups [sic], as the regime wants to present itself as the only defender of traditional Christian values.” Available online: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2016-0441_EN.html (accessed on 15 November 2021). |
91 | The idea that Western elites are imposing controversial political agendas that run contrary to the will of their own societies is also a theme that Kirill has emphasized (see Sostoialas’ bratskaia beseda 2014). |
92 | For more about this bizarre (and untrue) claim, see Western Schools Teach (2021). |
93 | Mikhail Pozdnyayev explains Putin’s intervention in these terms: “The ROC, the ROCA [Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, another name for ROCOR] and the Russian president are all pleased that the idea that a ‘superpower’ like our country should have a ‘superchurch’ is being advanced as the main argument in favor of reunification” (Pozdnyayev 2004). |
94 | During the reconciliatory service, which took place in Moscow’s rebuilt Cathedral of Christ the Savior, Patriarch Aleksii was effusive in his praise of the role Putin played in reuniting the two bodies. |
95 | He went on to observe that the Foreign Ministry, along with Russia’s embassies and general consulates, “always cooperate with parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church in different countries, with representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate,” noting that they are “doing the same significant and much-needed work for the country”. |
96 | Available online: http://russkiymir.ru/en/fund/index.php (accessed on 15 November 2021). It is chaired by the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Dmitrii Kozak, and, in addition to Lavrov, its members include Sergei Kratsov (Minister of Education), Olga Liubimova (Minister of Culture), and Valerii Falkov (Head of the Ministry of Education and Science). |
97 | Available online: https://rwp.agency/ (accessed on 12 January 2022). In 2015, when the 1000th anniversary of Grand Prince Vladimir’s repose was commemorated, Rossotrudnichestvo and the ROC held approximately 150 events in 54 non-post-Soviet countries, along with 50 or so in the CIS and Baltic states (Mitropolit Volokolamskii Ilarion 2015). |
98 | Available online: https://russkiymir.ru/en/news/280562/ (accessed on 27 November 2021). |
99 | While many would claim these are Enlightenment values, they only make sense in a post-Reformation world, the latter being a phenomenon that Russia, unlike the rest of northern Europe, never experienced directly (despite being indirectly affected by it in a myriad of ways, including some that were quite profound). Consequently, the ideological premises upon which liberalism was built are largely alien to its worldview. The ROC’s stance therefore reflects not just a rejection of Western secular arguments concerning human rights but also a fundamental ontological and epistemological incompatibility with them. |
100 | Ninteenth-century Slavophiles would have immediately recognized arguments disparaging the Western world as decadent and envervated. |
101 | Theologically, this in significant measure results from its emphasis on apophatic as opposed to cataphatic understandings of the Divine. Historically, meanwhile, the relationship between Western and Eastern Christians has been colored by centuries of religious and political acrimony that neither side has forgotten. See, for example, the 2008 documentary Gibel’ imperii. Vizantiinskii urok (“Death of an Empire: The Lesson of Byzantium”), which is narrrated by Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov), a well-known religious figure in Russia who is reputedly Putin’s father-confessor. In it, Tikhon casts the collapse of the Byzantine Empire as brought on by Western perfidy and makes a series of thinly veiled comparison between its demise and contemporary Russia’s situation. |
102 | |
103 | Already in 2007, Putin was comparing Russia’s “traditional confessions” to its “nuclear shield,” arguing that both “strengthen Russian statehood and create the necessary prerequisites for ensuring the country’s internal and external security” (Stenograficheskii otchet o press-konferentsii 2007). |
104 | This is especially palpable when it comes to Russia’s nuclear forces (Adamsky 2019). The Church, however, is not unwavering in its support; indicative of a more nuanced position, in 2020 the ROC considered instituting guidelines that would discourage priests from blessing nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction (Balmforth 2020). |
105 | Illustrative of this way of thinking, Igor Kholmogorov (2019) writes that “[i]t is Moscow, and not Paris that today defends the values of the European tradition, the high state of European culture”. |
106 | Respective examples include outreach to the Russian diaspora, the ROC’s push to regain ecclesial properties abroad that were lost as a result of the 1917 Revolution, and the manner in which the ROC has adopted the geopolitical language of multipolarity as a complement to its emphasis on preserving cultural distinctions. |
107 | The Church’s understanding of what constitutes the “Russian world” expanded well past the borders of the former Soviet states in the 2010s (Lunkin 2018, pp. 166–68), paralleling Moscow’s widening application of the concept. (This latter phenomenon can be traced back to the so-called Medvedev Doctrine, first articulated in the aftermath of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war; among its other precepts, it averred that Russia would protect “the lives and dignity” of its citizens “wherever they might be” (Friedman 2008)). Reflective of this, Kirill stated during the 12th annual All-Wold Russian People’s Council that “[i]t is our common duty to protect the rights of our compatriots abroad, their interests, in whatever part of the planet they live” (Sviateishii Patriarkh Kirill obratilsia 2021). |
108 | The idea of the “Russian world” was circulating long before the Kremlin claimed it for its own, having been initially promoted by the ROC and in various academic and political groupings (Pieper 2020, p. 771). However, there exist distinctions in how the Church and Kremlin understand this concept. For the ROC, it predominantly embodies a religious meaning, whereas it exhibits overwhelmingly geopolitical connotations for the Russian state (Petro 2015; Jarzyńska 2014, pp. 6–7). (Nonetheless, the term also displays “clear geopolitical and statist projections” for Kirill (Suslov 2015, p. 45)). |
109 | Historical ties and precedents are frequently invoked by politicians and Church leaders to justify Russian interest in the MENA region. For example, in speaking about the post-Arab Spring plight of Christians in this part of the world, Kirill reminded the then-head of the Assyrian Church of the East, Mar Dinkha IV, that Russia saved many Assyrians from genocide in the waning days of the Ottoman Empire (Patriarkh Kirill vstretilsia s Predstoiatelem Assiriiskoi Tserkvi 2014). |
110 | The ROC has become a key partner of the state in promoting a Russophilic version of history. This includes a pro-Soviet narrative of World War II, though the ROC is otherwise quite critical of the USSR (and particularly its Stalinist period). For his part, Lavrov has declared that the MFA is “open to close cooperation” with the ROC and “other traditional religions in our country” when it comes to providing historical education for Russian youth (Lavrov 2020). |
111 | |
112 | Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, the then-head of the ROC’s Synodal Department for the Cooperation of Church and Society, encapsulated this logic when he noted that Russia’s decision to intervene in the Syrian conflict reflected its long-standing role as a peacekeeper in the Middle East, where Christians were experiencing genocide. He went on to opine that the fight against terrorism was “a very moral fight; it is, if you will, a sacred fight” (Tserkov i voina 2015). |
113 | Russian diplomatic efforts have traditionally accorded a role to Church leaders, with the latter either acting as overt agents of the state or in a more informal capacity, and this has continued in the post-Soviet period (Curanović 2012, pp. 146–47). |
114 | Regarding the first of these influences, the idea of immorality in society stemming from the demise of the USSR is frequently encountered in contemporary Russia. Putin has himself drawn positive comparisons between communist and Christian values (Valaam: Vladimir Putin o pravoslavii 2018). |
115 | A 2019 survey found that 33 percent of U.S.-based respondents who identified as Republicans agreed with Putin on matters of international relations and 60 percent believed he was a good leader for Russia (Hale and Kamenchuk 2020). Similarly, 31 percent of Republicans or those who lean Republican reported that they “have confidence in Russian President Vladimir Putin to do the right thing concerning world affairs.” The commensurate figure for Democrats or those who lean Democrat was 10 percent (About a Third 2020). |
116 | Putin embodies a form of unapologetic “muscular Christianity” that appeals to a certain segment of the political right. The Scottish journalist and conservative commentator Gerald Warner conveys this position when he writes: “The contrast between the West and Russia is one of infatuated liberalism, cultural masochism, indigenous depopulation, loathing of the family and hedonism substituted for personal responsibility in confrontation with a virile nation, firm political will and ruthless pursuit of national interest. The clever money is not on the Western wimps” (Warner 2013). |
117 | Though the Russo-Georgian War did cause tensions to flare between the two national Churches (Kishkovsky 2008). Moreover, we need to be careful in interpreting the MP’s actions in Crimea and the two breakaway regions of Georgia as signifying substantive disagreement with the Kremlin’s policies. Although it is understandable why the ROC would want to give the appearance of neutrality in these instances, its subsequent statements and activities have generally been supportive of the Russian state’s position. |
118 | On the topic of civil religion in Russia, consult Mitrofanova (2018). |
119 |
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Soroka, G. International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religions 2022, 13, 208. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030208
Soroka G. International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religions. 2022; 13(3):208. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030208
Chicago/Turabian StyleSoroka, George. 2022. "International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church" Religions 13, no. 3: 208. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030208
APA StyleSoroka, G. (2022). International Relations by Proxy? The Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Religions, 13(3), 208. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030208