Next Article in Journal
Anger and Hope in Rural American Liturgy
Next Article in Special Issue
Secular Mysticism
Previous Article in Journal
The Visual Representation of the Crown of Thorns Motif in Irish Stained Glass: A Symbol of Universal Suffering for the Catholic Revival in France and Ireland in the Early Twentieth Century
Previous Article in Special Issue
Methodology and Mysticism: For an Integral Study of Religion
 
 
Article
Peer-Review Record

Mystical Experience†

Religions 2022, 13(7), 589; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070589
by Johannes Bronkhorst
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Religions 2022, 13(7), 589; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13070589
Submission received: 6 June 2022 / Revised: 18 June 2022 / Accepted: 20 June 2022 / Published: 24 June 2022
(This article belongs to the Special Issue The Philosophy of Mystical Experience)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

An original, interesting, readable  and important contribution to the conceptual analysis of mystical experience, drawing on pertinent studies in human psychological theory.  The paper draws on the social scientific study of religion rather than on philosophical analyses of religious experience, but nevertheless makes a most useful contribution to the debates over constructivism, ineffablilty and other issues that are generated at the language/experience interface. 

Possible changes: While the use of secondary sources for reporting the views of Vygotsky and Katz is acceptable, I think that some reference to the primary sources should also be given.

The claim that some classic writers on mysticism did not have mystical experiences is based on an argument from silence.  Does it need further support? How pivotal is this claim?

It should surely be recognised that the religious practices listed on page 10, lines 501/2 serve many functions other than (additional to?) the evocation of a state of experience?

 

 

 

Author Response

Thanks for your pertinent observations. Following your suggestions, I have made the following changes:

-I have added references to the works of Vygotsky and Katz.

-My article seems, misleadingly, close to claiming that Meister Eckhart, the authors of certain Upanishads, and Nagarjuna did not have mystical experiences. Such a claim would of course be hard to prove. I have added a footnote, pointing out that no such specific claim is intended, but that these three merely illustrate the general claim that certain “mystical” teachings may not be based on “authentic mystical” experiences.

-I have added a parenthesis to explain that I do not claim that the religious practices concerned were onlypractised to attain a certain experience.

Reviewer 2 Report

 I found your argument well-written and logically constructed--it was accessible to me as a generalist and I found your thesis compelling. You established key points in the order that they needed to be established, and you drove those points toward a logical conclusion about the nature of mystical experience as a reduction from or suppression of standard consciousness.

 

Author Response

Thank you.

Reviewer 3 Report

This is an exciting and novel article that opens a new direction in studies of mystical experience. One problem is the claim that people who have not had mystical experiences and who write mystically might be remembering their early childhood type of consciousness. This seems quite implausible given that people generally do not remember anything or scarcely anything from that young an age. A better option presents itself that people can have the appropriate experiences, unplanned, and yet do not label them as mystical or don't label them at all. They take them in their stride but can then use them to make claims of a mystical nature, not even thinking of their claims as mystical. 

Author Response

Thank you very much for your suggestion. It reminded me that I had failed to draw attention in my article to infantile amnesia. Infantile amnesia is about remembering facts, people, things, relationships, and places, not mental states. Moreover, “normal” memory cannot go back to a period before a sense of self has been constructed. That is to say, the memory dealt with in my article is not “my” memory, “I” will not remember it, because there is not yet an “inner autobiographer” (to quote Gopnik). Given that young children are conscious and that these early days are highly formative (and therefore leave traces), memories are no doubt formed, but will not be “remembered” in anything like its normal sense. I have now added a note to my article to clarify all this.

Back to TopTop