A Catholic Pope and a Rawlsian Statesman: War and Peace through the Lens of Non-Public and Public Reason

Abstract

A Catholic pope and a Rawlsian statesman respectively represent religious and political leaders who confront the reality of war and face the challenge of responding to it. A political decision during conflict based exclusively on religious or secular justifications will be unconvincing in a contemporary plural public space. John Rawls’s solution to this dilemma was to offer justifications based on public reason grounded on political values and not on religious or secular values that support non-public reason. However, restraining religious arguments can ignite passionate religious objections when the decisions of government contradict the demands of their religious values. Hence, this paper argues against an exclusive position and highlights the importance of a nuanced approach that engages religious and political perspectives. The arguments are presented by engaging both Catholic and Rawlsian responses to war by focusing on just war theory and the role of a statesman.

1. Introduction

The twenty-first century is witness to many instances of conflict, each of which awakens the world to the fragility and unpredictability of international relations. According to John Rawls, “the crucial fact” concerning democratic societies is that there is “no cause” for them to wage war against each other and, hence, “peace reigns among them” (Rawls 1999c, p. 8). On the other hand, the Catechism of the Catholic Church underlines the obligation of citizens and governments “to work for the avoidance of war” (Pope John Paul II 1994, #2308). However, the omnipresent reality of war in the contemporary context leads us to question the optimism of “perpetual peace” and the “end of history”. Furthermore, the situation demands engaging with diverse perspectives in confronting the reality of war. In this article, I engage Rawls’s and the Catholic Church’s perspectives on war.

In contemporary times, the pope is confined to spiritual affairs, whereas the temporal political realm is where decisions are made in times of conflict. Hence, it is insightful to take into account the views of an influential political philosopher who can respond to the pluralism of religious and secular doctrines in contemporary public space. I see Rawls as an ideal candidate because he responds to the reality of the plural public space in his Political Liberalism (Rawls 1996) and confronts the reality of war in The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1999c). Furthermore, in the latter text, he engages the Catholic just war approach.

A Catholic pope1 and a Rawlsian statesman2 embody Catholic non-public reason and Rawls’s public reason, respectively. For Rawls, non-public or domestic reason consists of non-shareable reasons such as those of universities, families, and churches. The reasons of the Catholic Church belong to non-public reason because they have their basis in Catholic thought, which other religious and secular citizens may not accept. Conversely, public reason consists of reasons that are not grounded in any religious or secular doctrines and are shareable when deliberating matters pertaining to the public political forum (Rawls 1996, pp. 212–22). By focusing on Catholic non-public reason and Rawls’s public or political liberal approach, I will compare and evaluate their response to war by concentrating on just war theory and the role of a statesman.

I begin by briefly sketching the history of the Catholic Church’s response to conflict. I then outline Rawls’s approach to the problem of war, focusing on the role of a statesman and the use of public reason. Subsequently, I compare the Rawlsian and Catholic responses to war exploring overlaps and divergence. Finally, I evaluate the roles of a statesman and a pope towards responding to the question of war, indicating the importance of going beyond binaries and stressing the need for active engagement in the quest to attain peace.

2. The Catholic Church’s Response to Conflict

The just war theory predominates the Catholic tradition in responding to conflict situations. However, the spirit of non-violence and the movements oriented towards peace also existed parallelly. Notwithstanding the complexities, Roland Bainton points to three significant attitudes of Christianity towards conflict: pacifism, just war, and the Crusades (Bainton 2008, p. 14). These attitudes arise from attempts to maintain equilibrium by balancing the ideal of Jesus’ call to ensure peace and practice love, and the reality of providing order among imperfect humanity (Justenhoven and Barbieri 2012, p. 1). Even though it is impossible to accurately state the periods in which these attitudes dominated, a glance through history reveals the general trends.

Until the fourth century, the Early Church and Church Fathers, through their practice and preaching, underlined the importance of non-violence. The overarching motive that guided them was the expectation of a “kingdom of peace”, which would be established with the second coming of Jesus Christ (Justenhoven 2021, p. 43). The Church Fathers, especially, echoed this spirit of non-violence. However, the historical evidence indicating the presence of Christian soldiers leads us to question the extent of pacificism in practice. Modern scholarship critiques the uncritical acceptance of a predominant pacifist tradition until the fourth century (Shean 2010; Iosif 2013). For instance, John F. Shean observes that “the statements of individual ecclesiastical writers are not reliable indicators of the attitudes of mainstream Christians” (Shean 2010, p. 11). The contested view of the prominence of pacifism in the Early Church was followed by the Christian adaptation of just war theory, furthering the complex relationship between war and peace.

The transition of the Church from the private sphere to the public sphere required sophisticated responses to the question of war. The Church’s transition to the public sphere began with the legal recognition of Christianity in 313 CE and culminated in official acceptance of Christianity as the state religion in 380 CE. Together with these recognitions came the responsibility of securing the life, property, and borders of the empire. Consequently, waging war was inevitable. This is the broad context within which Augustine adapted the just war theory in Roman thought.

The Christian adaptation of just war theory from the fourth century was not intended to glorify war but was oriented toward peace. Augustine and Aquinas adapted and developed Cicero’s rudimentary idea of just war. They both maintained Cicero’s understanding of just war as oriented towards peace. However, Augustine and Aquinas presented a contrasting basis for just war. While Augustine treated “war as an expression of ‘loving’ punishment of the offending party”, Aquinas considered war “as justified defense of the common good” (Cahill 2015, p. 3). Augustine and Aquinas outline three criteria for a war to be just, namely: just cause, legitimate authority, and right intention.3

The Crusades are another defining moment in the Christian response to conflict. Even though the term “crusade” was coined in the fifteenth century, one can trace the development of the idea of crusades beginning in the eleventh century and culminating in the thirteenth century (Cahill 2019a, p. 214). According to Beatrice Heuser, the Crusades combined the fighting spirit of Germanic tribes and Augustine’s idea of just war (Heuser 2010, p. 47). The Crusades modified and conceived Augustine’s idea of just war from a totally different outlook. This changed view summoned violence residing in the peripheries to the centre stage of Christianity and was treated as a core of the Christian calling (Cahill 2019a, p. 220). Crusades were advocated by popes and were undertaken with various goals and religious motives, such as expelling the Turks from the Holy Land and reconquering the territories once ruled by Christian rulers. Cahill states, “the Crusades are unparalleled as the nadir of Christian advocacy of violence and bloodshed” (Cahill 2019a, p. 213). Following the Reformation in the sixteenth century, more violent wars followed, such as the Eighty Years’ War (1568–1648) between the Protestant Netherlands and Catholic Spain. The treaties signed under the umbrella term “Peace of Westphalia” were one of the important steps towards settling boundaries and securing peace in Europe.

The history of the Catholic Church cannot be reduced to the violence associated with just war theory and crusades. There were also movements and individuals within the Church upholding the commitment to peace. “The Peace of God” and “the Truce of God” were two medieval peace movements oriented towards protecting certain groups of people from violence, such as women and peasants, and setting aside certain violence-free days, such as advent and lent (Musto 1986, pp. 71–75). Other notable individuals and movements include Peter Damien, Francis of Assisi, Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker Movement, and Pax Christi International. Cahill observes that “pacifism has been a minority witness in Christian tradition and theology” (Cahill 2015, p. 3) and “pacifist authors remain a clear minority” (Cahill 2019b, p. 171). However, the statement of The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (1993) entitled, “The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace”, unequivocally observes that the non-violent and just war approach traditions in the Catholic Church are oriented towards “a common goal: to diminish violence in this world”.

The teachings of the modern popes increasingly underline the importance of peace. Gregory M. Reichberg states that in “the pronouncements of the contemporary popes, discourse on peace has largely eclipsed the related discourse on the just war” (Reichberg 2012, p. 1082). The encyclicals such as Quadragesimo Anno, Mater et Magistra, Pacem in Terris, Populorum Progressio, and Fratelli Tutti are cases in point. Cahill observes another notable change, where the emphasis is on “international cooperation for peace to a far greater degree than the right to go to war” (Cahill 2019a, p. 313). It is in this same spirit that the Second Vatican Council document, Gaudium et Spes, calls for “firm honest agreements about world peace” so that humanity can save themselves from “the dread peace of death” resulting from conflicts (Flannery 1988, #82). Together with many other arguments, Fratelli Tutti warns of the “broad interpretations” diluting the legitimate options for military actions mentioned in the Catechism of the Catholic Church.4 This makes it impossible to call a war a just war and therefore states, “never again war!” (Pope Francis 2020, #258) Christian Nikolaus Braun argues that the popes continue to operate within the just war framework, but we perceive a change because they “forcefully stress the tools of nonviolence within the just war framework” (Braun 2018, p. 64). However, the role of the pope or the Church is limited in the present state of affairs.

3. Rawls’s Statesman and Public Reason

Rawls’s most articulated response to the question of war is presented in the Law of Peoples.5 By “Law of Peoples” Rawls means a political conception of justice applicable at the international level (Rawls 1999c, p. 3). He states, “the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples” (Rawls 1999c, p. 1).6 Given “the highly nonideal conditions of our world”, Rawls’s movement from the domestic to the international realm necessitates a response to the issue of war (Rawls 1999c, p. 9).

A statesman is an ideal decision-maker in Rawls’s The Law of Peoples. A statesman is not an official government position but an ideal that reflects a virtuous and truthful character. Political authorities such as presidents and prime ministers can be called statesmen when they make the right discernment, display ideal leadership skills, and act with strength, wisdom, and courage during critical moments such as war. During a war, the statesmen act selflessly, without the motive of revenge, and with the ultimate aim of securing peace. He sums up the ideal of a statesman in comparison to a politician. While a politician is concerned only about the next election, the statesman looks forward to the consequence of his or her action on the next generation. Examples of statesmen include George Washington and Abraham Lincoln (Rawls 1999c, pp. 97–98). Notably, Rawls treats the statesman as a “central figure” concerning matters related to war (Rawls 1999c, p. 105).

However, deliberations on the question of war and the decision-making arguments of statesmen have to be expressed by public reason. This means that statesmen must rely on political values and cannot base their arguments on religious or secular reasons. A brief sketch of the basics of Rawls’s political liberal approach will clarify his insistence on the necessity of using public reason.

Given the reality of a plural public space in contemporary times, the basis of justification in political matters requires careful attention. Neither religious doctrines, such as those of the Catholic Church, nor secular doctrines, such as those of liberalism, could be the grounds for justification. Rawls identifies this problem in Political Liberalism and calls it the “fact of reasonable pluralism”. This reasonable pluralism is not an upshot of a pluralism of narrow points of view. Instead, it is “the inevitable outcome of free human reason” (Rawls 1996, p. 37). This was one of the major reasons for Rawls’s “political turn” (Weithman 2010, pp. 3–4) from his arguments in A Theory of Justice. In this book, Rawls expected that his political conception of justice, justice as fairness, would be affirmed by everyone in the society for the same reasons. However, Rawls concluded that the presence of a plurality of reasonable religious and secular comprehensive doctrines would “contradict” his expectations in A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999b, p. 179).

Rawls casts his theory in the political framework of Political Liberalism where public reason plays an important role. Public justification of coercive laws in a society is done using the idea of public reason instead of “nonpublic reasons” (Rawls 1996, pp. 220–22) such as religious or secular reasons. The idea of public reason is connected to “the criterion of reciprocity”. According to this criterion, the use of political power can be justified only if we offer public reasons that “may reasonably be accepted by other citizens” (Rawls 1996, xlvi). The use of public reason is limited to the “public political forum” when deliberating on “constitutional essential and matters of basic justice” (Rawls 1996, pp. 227–30). Public reason is a “political value” (Rawls 2011, pp. 91–92) that all citizens can accept as reasonable.

A political conception of justice gives the content of public reason. A political conception of justice spells out and prioritises “certain basic rights, liberties and opportunities” and ensures that citizens have the means to use them. It also consists of guidelines of inquiry indicating “the principles of reasoning and rules of evidence” that help citizens to choose suitable laws and policies (Rawls 1996, pp. 223–24). Rawls does not restrict himself to “justice as fairness”7 as “the” political conception of justice. Instead, he opens up the possibility of diverse formulations of a political conception of justice. He states, “the view I have called ‘justice as fairness’ is one example of a liberal political conception” (Rawls 1996, p. 226). A political conception of justice can act as a “module” that “fits into and [is] supported by” reasons from secular and religious comprehensive doctrines (Rawls 1996, pp. 144–45). This “overlapping consensus” is possible because a political conception of justice does not have controversial content based on philosophic or religious doctrines but is “expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas8 seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls 1996, p. 13). Rawls does not expect unanimity after the deliberations using public reason. There could be equally reasonable solutions offered during deliberations. The advantage is that the final outcome would be legitimate (Rawls 1999b, p. 169). However, there are many criticisms against Rawls’s public reason approach. One of them is from the perspective of religion,9 which we will explore in the next section focusing on statesmen and Rawls’s response to this conflict in Law of Peoples.

4. Comparing Rawls’s and Catholic Responses to War

Rawls compares Christian just war theory with the Law of Peoples and outlines the intersections and disjunctions between both approaches. Both the Christian theory and the Law of Peoples dovetail on attaining universal peace (Rawls 1999c, p. 103). However, they are not exclusively pacifist. As we have seen, the Catholic Church’s initiatives on peace operate within the framework of just war theory. According to Rawls, the total rejection of war as “an unworldly view [is] bound to remain a sectarian doctrine” (Rawls 1999a, p. 335). Rawls and the Church agree on waging war in self-defence when human rights are at stake. Rawls states that war “is justified only in self-defense, or in grave case of intervention to protect human rights” (Rawls 1999c, p. 79). Human rights, for Rawls, consist of the right to life, liberty, property, and equality (Rawls 1999c, p. 65). However, Rawls outrightly rejects declaring war to further the selfish rational interests of a state.

Rawls’s statesman makes the decisions on declaring war and on conduct during the war. The outcome of these decision-making processes could differ from the point of view of the Catholic Church, especially regarding the basis and conduct of the war. There are two major points of divergence between Rawls’ statesman and the Christian doctrine of just war. First, the doctrine of just war is based on natural law. From a Catholic perspective, natural law is the foundation of fundamental rights and duties. It is above all moral rules and civil laws because, through it, human beings created in God’s image participate in God’s wisdom and goodness (Pope John Paul II 1994, #1978–79). However, Rawls’s views on just war are based on a political conception. He states, “the Law of Peoples falls within the domain of the political as a political conception” (Rawls 1999c, p. 104).

The second point of divergence is on the question of a supreme emergency exception. Even though Rawls and the Christian doctrine of just war theory are against the direct attack against civilians, the point of contention has to do with instances of supreme emergency exception. This exception allows direct attacks on civilians in particular special cases. For instance, Rawls justifies Britain’s bombing of German cities during World War II because it was the only way to fight and weaken the violent Nazis. However, the US fire-bombing of Japanese cities in the spring of 1945, and the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are unjustified. This was a failure of statesmanship to understand that the situation did not demand such strong action but required exploring the possibility of negotiations (Rawls 1999c, pp. 98–101). The Catholic Church’s doctrine of double-effect rejects supreme emergency exceptions because the death of civilians can only be justified if it results from unintended or indirect consequences during a military operation. Rawls observes that this doctrine rests on the divine command never to kill the innocent, so a statesman cannot accept it as a ground for basing decisions (Rawls 1999c, 104.5). In short, a statesman can only accept public reasons.

5. Evaluating the Roles of a Statesman and a Pope

A statesman’s political decision based on public reason is politically legitimate and can be justified to a plural populace. However, the extent to which religious arguments can contribute to the decision-making process is limited. This limited access to religious arguments, such as the Church’s understanding of the just war theory, evokes reactions from critics such as Eberle. He refers to the “Principle of Religious Insufficiency” to indicate the “claim that religious reasons cannot decisively justify state coercion in a liberal polity” (Eberle 2015, p. 32). Taking just war theory as an example, he argues that even though there is a presumption against war in the just war tradition, this can be overcome if the particular situation satisfies certain conditions and certain restrictions are honoured. Similarly, to overcome the presumption against state coercion, certain restrictions apply to all (and not particular) instances and reasons. One prominent restriction among these is the insufficiency of religious reasons to justify coercion (Eberle 2015, p. 32). Hence, Rawls insists that the statesman has to separate his or her personal moral doctrines and other religious and secular comprehensive doctrines in society and uphold the ideal of public reason by focusing exclusively on the political world (Rawls 1999c, p. 105). When a statesman works within the ideal of public reason, he or she must explain his or her decision based on a political conception of justice that is reasonable to all citizens (Rawls 1999b, p. 135).

Rawls understands this limitation of working within the limits of public reason and redraws the boundaries to a certain extent. From a very demanding requirement of an exclusive view, he moves to an inclusive view, and then to a wide view. The exclusive view does not allow the introduction of arguments from any comprehensive doctrine such as religion. Conversely, the inclusive view allows arguments from comprehensive doctrines provided it strengthens the ideal of public reason (Rawls 1996, pp. 247–52). The wide view of public political culture allows the introduction of religious arguments in the public political forum if it fulfills the “proviso”. Fulfilling the proviso involves providing “proper political reasons” in “due course” (Rawls 1999b, p. 152). However, the ambiguity surrounding the word “due course” and the omnipresent requirement for providing public reason imposes a burden of restraint for introducing religious reasons. The outcome of this restraint is that citizens and government officials are deprived of religious resources when making decisions.

A statesman employs the same restraint when deciding on war, such as declaring a supreme emergency exception. However, justification based on public reason alone and the legitimacy of the decision-making process need not guarantee a just outcome. As discussed in the previous section, Rawls understands this limitation when he observes that bombing German cities in Germany was justified. In contrast, the US fire-bombing of Japanese cities was unjustified. Hence, restraining a religious argument and, thereby, the rich traditional resources and insisting on public reason may not always guarantee a just outcome.

When faced with the reality of war, the statesman’s sincerity and the pope’s influence are potential causes for concern. Even though Rawls portrays the ideal picture of a selfless statesman, an elected representative may not step up to this role. One can always expect a Bismarck in the head of affairs who keeps the Washingtons and Lincolns waiting. On the other hand, the influence of the pope is becoming increasingly limited to the religious realm. The restraint imposed by public reason on non-public religious arguments, and the decreased role of the Church in the political realm, contribute to this decreasing influence. Consequently, the efforts of the pope for peace and the concerns against the supreme emergency exception could make only a limited impact.

Confronting the concerns of a dystopian future caused by a potential World War III requires engaging a Rawlsian statesman and a Catholic Pope. This involves going beyond the restricting binaries of a political liberal framework and a Catholic religious framework. A religious framework with its rich traditional wisdom, rational doctrines, and spiritual awakening could be a rich resource for the citizens of a liberal democracy to make informed decisions. However, the Church must recognise the need for a political framework that considers contemporary society’s diverse worldviews. At the same time, a political liberal framework must recognise the limitation of working with only political values and give a fair hearing to those subscribing to religious values.

A dialogue between these two positions can facilitate their mutual engagement and effectively articulate a middle path. This dialogue presupposes openness and receptivity from religious leaders and statesmen, where both parties try to understand each other’s perspectives and concerns. Religious leaders could make an attempt to understand the responsibilities of statecraft in times of war, while statesmen could take steps to understand the demands of religious values. This engagement between statesmen and religious leaders can be further enhanced by using what Rawls calls “a non-public political culture” (Rawls 1999b, 134n13) consisting of print and digital media, which mediate between the people and the government. A responsible media organisation can enlighten its audience about the subjects under discussion and promote productive conversation and healthy debate on these subjects. This can help to raise awareness and understanding of the issues at hand and encourage citizens to act responsibly.

Even though discussions in the media can raise awareness among religious citizens, the demands of religious values may keep them from taking decisions. Here, interpretations of religious leaders and translations of statesmen hold the key. Religious leaders could take the lead in interpreting religious doctrines by being true to the religious teaching and being aware of the signs of the times. Similarly, statesmen could convey their decision on responding to conflict by taking into account the sensitivities of religions. Furthermore, apart from the carefully scripted words upholding the spirit of public reason, the statesmen could also translate the grounds of a decision into religious terms for better receptivity among religious believers.

A dialogue between statesmen and religious leaders could also explore the possibilities of resources within religions to deal with psychological effects before, during, and after war. Arguments and directives based on public reason can do little to provide emotional support to civilians, soldiers, and bureaucrats in times of violence, uncertainty, economic distress, and other traumas associated with conflict. Religious resources and volunteers open up one of the many possibilities that can instil hope and provide emotional support during times of crisis. In sum, the decision to wage a just war and the orientation to peace depends on the active engagement of the public reason of an ideal Rawlsian statesman and the non-public reason of religious and secular leaders such as a Catholic pope.