Gross National Happiness in Bhutan: Is Buddhist Constitutionalism Legitimate in the Age of Secularism? A Post-Colonial View

Abstract

Bhutan’s current constitution draws upon the historical dual system of religious-civil governance under the monarchy (previously Abbot-king) embodying the Mahayana Buddhist concept of Boddhisatva-leadership. Bhutan’s democracy includes an executive-military and pluralist religious custodian role for the King who can be abdicated by parliament. It includes Gross National Happiness as spiritual core, which is non-binding law, incorporating many human rights and human values like compassion. The ban on proselytization in the secular constitution should be viewed from a geopolitical post-colonial perspective of the Christian civilization mission and India/China annexation-politics, and Asian definitions of secularism (Royal patronage of religious pluralism). Christians do experience restrictions on congregation. Hindu Nepalese-origin migrants experience(d) citizenship issues due to geopolitical context but can express religion fully. GNH-policy also has certain implementation difficulties and the GNH index indicates declining community values and spirituality in the face of modernist development. Bhutan’s constitution does not fall within the definition of theocracy. The clergy is excluded from the electoral process. The King’s authority is mainly based on moral leadership, popular uncertainty about imported democracy, and is non-absolute but larger than conventional constitutional monarchies. The constitution is more secular than Buddhist in its binding provisions and offers space for non-GNH oriented governments, also in recent practice. Preserving identity and stability is Bhutan’s aim and secularism needs to look at a group approach, apart from individualist approaches. Human rights traditions could acknowledge the cultural-religious roots that inspired them and keep human dignity alive, instead of wanting to remove it from the state altogether and making human rights the new religion.

1. Introduction

The people of Bhutan adhere to Mahayana Buddhism and its (probable) sub-strand Vajrayana (‘the diamond vehicle’). Mahayana Buddhists strive at becoming a Boddhisatva and have a strong focus on compassion. Vajrayana Buddhists also lay strong focus on the use of mantras and incorporate local deities. They distinguish themselves from those practicing Theravada Buddhism (aiming at breaking the cycle of Samsara or reincarnation, whereas Mahayana Buddhists may reincarnate out of compassion for others). Bhutan is the last remaining independent Vajrayana Buddhist country. Both Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism are practiced as a state religion (Dorje 1990). This has historically been translated in the governance system of religious and civil authorities. More recently, this system was modernized and translated into a new constitution in 2008. This constitution is based on the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH). GNH was introduced as a policy in Bhutan in 1998 (B2; Thinley 1998; Phuntsho 2013, p. 597). Though the term was first coined by the King in 1972 (Ura et al. 2012). It is based on the Buddhist concept of the Middle Path and rests on four pillars: culture as a basis for development, socio-economic wellbeing for the population, guardianship of nature and good governance. It finds its origin in Buddhism, underpinning the culture of the country. Though Bhutan transitioned to a Western oriented democracy, it has found its own hybrid form of secularism—separation of religion and state—whereby religious culture is allowed to play a role in law and policymaking. This article investigates if there is space for Buddhist constitutionalism within the concept of secularism. To answer this question, it firstly examines how Bhutan’s constitution, with specific (historic) religious and executive duties for the King, fits into the concept of democracy. Secondly, it looks at the constitutional provisions on secularism, specifically the prohibition on proselytization, mainly affecting Christians. Though Western secularists may reject the ban on proselytization, post-colonialists may view this differently. Thirdly, it looks at the spiritual core of the constitution namely the extent to which GNH influences its provisions. and examines allegations of Bhutan being a theocratic state. It will be argued from a post-colonial perspective that secularism does not need to be interpreted in its strictest sense, but can find creative expressions, adapted to local circumstances. However, the Bhutanese government could create more room for practicing Christian faith and for (improved) citizenship of certain Nepalese origin Hindu’s.

Materials & Methods

For the research a literature study was carried out of local and international sources and 55 interviews with people in Bhutan, in total 68 persons, done for my PhD research, of which some interviews are used for this article. It builds on a literature review on GNH by (Schroeder 2014). In one case the quotes of people of the same organization have been combined into one interview.

Table 1. Breakdown of interviews in Bhutan.

Age Group	No of Interviews	Profession	Region/ Ethnicity Residence	Other Origin	Origin	Gender
<12 12–18 18–25 25–50 50–65 >65	Children 1 (3 persons) College 1 (2 persons) Student 1 Professional 35 (45 persons) Senior 9 Retired 8 Total =55 interviews =68 persons	Government 12 Civil service 8 Politics 3	West -> Thimphu 34 (42 persons) (max. 26) Central -> Bhumtang 12 (15 persons) Wangdue 1 Trongsa 1 (min. 11) East -> Tashiyangts 2 Trashigang 2 (min. 8) South -> Reside- none (min. 6)	of which originally at least 3 from East, 3 Central, 1 Southern Buddhist, 3 foreign, 1 Tibetan parentage (some unkown) of which originally 2 from West, 2 from South and 1 of East and 1 of South-East (others mostly Bhumtap, 1 Merak) of which 1 originally from Central of which 5 Southern Nepali origin (Hindu), 1 Kinga	Bhutan 50 (61 persons) Foreign 4 (5 persons) (Europe, India)	M 51 F 17
		Private sector 12 Tourism 8 Business 3 Farmer 1
		Education 11 Academic 4 (7 persons) Education 4 Studying 3
		Civil society 14 CSO 8 Media 4 Indept 2
		Judiciary 1 Internat. org. 1 Religion 4

gives the breakdown of interviews into different sectors, age, male-female, regions. A few foreigners, who had residence in and indepth knowledge of Bhutan, were interviewed. All interviewees were made aware that interviews will be used and published for research purposes and that the content of interviews are anonymized.

The research employs a post-colonial, critical realist method, accepting a layered reality and seeing reality as a social construction. Critical realism opposes putting a Western lens over a non-Western society, or rather a country of the Global South with its own distinct culture (Removed for peer review). As Duara argues historically in most societies there was a fusion of religion ‘with politics, society, knowledge and perhaps even technology’ after which came ‘the separate institutionalization of “religion” together with allied concepts such as “differentiation”, “secularization”, “disenchantment” [and] “privatization”.’ (Duara 2010, p. 4). When analyzing the Buddhist constitution of Bhutan, one needs to therefore take into account ‘the historical impact of the global—heretofore, largely Western—history of secularization and Protestantization of Asian societies’ (Duara 2010). Duara even goes one step further and states: ‘We can see the missionary effort itself as a means of affiliating Christianity with the emergent legitimacy of science’ (Duara 2010, p. 3). As Witte and Green argue this has led Asian societies, amongst others, to articulate their own traditions of human rights, especially with regard to religious rights. They conclude that cultural traditions are essential for the formulation and implementation of rights: ‘The human rights regime is not a fundamental belief system. It is a relative system of ideas and ideals that presupposes the existence of fundamental beliefs and values that will constantly shape and reshape it. Human rights norms have grown in international law out of longstanding religious and cultural traditions (…) They are derived from and dependent upon the transcendent principles that religious traditions, more than any other groups, continue to cultivate.’ (Witte and Green 2009, p. 6). Or as Tan (2010, p. 153) concludes on striking the right balance between religion, culture and secularism and constitution-making, on a quirky note: ‘It requires that people believe in the value of human life, liberty and human dignity. One wonders then, is it possible to have a workable secular state without having God somewhere in the background?’

This article deals partly with Christian proselytism. Even if this increasingly takes place from the Global South, the post-colonial argument can still be applied, since countries like Brazil or South Korea were themselves subject to (neo)colonialism and indigenous cultures, especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, were forcibly repressed which in certain cases led to the extinction of peoples. Therefore, the colonial enterprise has affected the mindset of those who were colonized, descendants of colonizers and those who escaped colonization like Bhutan.

2. Buddhism as Inspiration for GNH

The core values of Buddhism consist of the four noble truths. These postulate that (1) humanity’s fate is suffering. (2) Dissatisfaction with one’s life emanates from craving for material things and short term satisfaction (also called attachments). (3) This human suffering will end when one no longer desires worldly things and detaches from one’s cravings. (Daniels 2011, pp. 44–45; Tashi 2004, p. 490). To achieve detachment in Buddhism, one needs to follow the eight-fold path. This includes a right understanding of life, an attitude of love and compassion, truthful communication, ethical action, proper livelihood, healing effort, developing awareness, and meditation, all leading to enlightenment.

In Mahayana Buddhism it is, however, more customary to refer to the six perfections, the practices of the Boddhisatvas, those who have ‘gone beyond’ and are therefore holy beings. They have renounced the self and by doing so transcended selfishness. Their sole purpose is the wellbeing of others. Each practice of the perfection is flawless. The six perfections are as follows:

• Charity
• Morality
• Patience
• Perseverance
• Concentration
• Wisdom

(Lama Zopa Rinpoche 2020). These are further explained in

Table 2. The six perfections in Mahayana Buddhism.

The Six Perfections	Description
Charity	“The first perfection is the perfection of charity. Its nature is the virtuous thought of giving. With that thought we perform the three types of charity: giving material objects, giving fearlessness, and giving the Dharma. These encompass all our actions of body, speech, and mind, such as giving material objects, protecting from fear, and giving the Dharma.
Morality	The second perfection is the perfection of morality, of which there are three types: refraining from nonvirtue, gathering virtuous deeds, and working for others. The first, refraining from nonvirtue, is abstaining from actions that harm sentient beings. The second, gathering virtuous deeds, means completely giving up the thought of seeking happiness for the self, including seeking self-liberation. The third, working for others, means
Patience	Then there is the perfection of patience. The nature of patience is keeping the mind in virtue whenever we encounter disturbance and harm. (We could endure these with a nonvirtuous mind as well, which is why the distinction is made.) There are three types of patience: not retaliating when harmed, accepting suffering, and having certainty about the Dharma. Accepting suffering means our mind remains calm and undisturbed whenever we receive harm from either sentient beings or nonliving things. Having certainty about the Dharma. Accepting suffering means our mind remains calm and undisturbed whenever we receive harm from either sentient beings or nonliving things. Having certainty about the Dharma means always abiding in the wish to continuously practice the Dharma no matter what the circumstance.
Perseverance	The perfection of perseverance means being happy to practice virtue—specifically, being happy to practice each of the perfections—and doing work for all sentient beings. This includes virtuous actions of the body and speech, such as doing prostrations and reciting mantras. The perfection of perseverance means being happy to practice virtue—specifically, being happy to practice each of the perfections—and doing work for all sentient beings. This includes virtuous actions of the body and speech, such as doing prostrations and reciting mantras.
Concentration	With the fifth perfection, concentration, through both analytical meditation and single-pointed concentration we constantly reflect on the meaning of the teachings and put them into practice. For instance, when we do a shamatha, or calm-abiding meditation, using Guru Shakyamuni Buddha, the Buddha is the object of meditation; if we are meditating on bodhichitta, the mind of enlightenment, when we place our mind single-pointedly on bodhichitta, that is the object of meditation.
Wisdom	The last perfection is the perfection of wisdom, of which there are two types. One type realizes the conventional (or all-obscuring) truth, which includes the nature of impermanence or the law of cause and effect. The other type realizes the ultimate truth, the emptiness of all phenomena. Generally, the perfection of wisdom refers to realizing emptiness”

Source: Lama Zopa Rinpoche (2020).

.

While practicing these, it is important that one always walks the Middle Path of moderation between pleasure and asceticism; and that one behaves with skills of generosity and compassion (Daniels 2011, p. 46). This middle path is the basis for GNH policy. Buddhist happiness means inner peace, finding the right balance between spiritual and material wealth.

The four noble truths are also translated into the Buddhist code of ethics of the 10 precepts or virtues (B10) or the ‘Bhutanese alphabet’ (Whitecross 2009, p. 209). These are considered the Buddhist fundamental freedoms (Tobgye 2015, pp. 139, 149), which also formed the basis of the Bhutanese King’s legal authority (Kinga 2009a, p. 234). They consist of refraining from the flowing non-virtues:

-

related to the Body—killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, intoxication

-

related to Speech—lying/slander, praising oneself, harsh words

-

related to Mind—greed, maliciousness, wrong view (of the three jewels- Dharma, Sangha and Buddha). (Trangu 2001; Jo 2010).

Or in positive terms:

-

protecting life, giving generosity, maintaining one’s discipline (body)

-

speaking honestly, reconciling, speaking pleasantly, speaking meaningfully (speech)

-

generosity, loving kindness, correct view of reality (mind).

Moreover, Buddhism postulates that all things—human and otherwise—are connected and arise simultaneously (co-dependent origination). They all possess the Buddha nature (Daniels 2011, p. 45) and every action has an effect on all else. This is also how one assembles ‘karma’ for one’s next life (Daniels 2011, p. 45).

All these teachings are considered Bhutan’s spiritual heritage and referred to in the constitution (see below).

Keown (2013, 7 citing Ninian Smart) classifies Buddhism as religion, giving seven criteria for religion. Buddhists, however, often view it as philosophy and claim that non attachment includes eventually letting go of Buddha’s teachings (the religion itself): ‘Don’t cling to anything including the teachings.’ (Allan 2022). Therefore GNH as formulated in the constitution may also be viewed as principals based on a philosophical tradition.

3. Bhutan’s Governance system

3.1. The Historic Dual System of Religious and Civil Governance

Bhutan historically possessed a dual system of religious and civil governance united under the religious leadership of the Abbot and later the hereditary King. This system was the inspiration for the current system of governance and model for constitutional secularism in Bhutan nowadays.

The first Abbot King or Zhabdrung was Ngawang Namgyal, who ruled from 1616 to 1651, fulfilling both a religious role as Buddhist monk and worldly role as ruler. His successors were determined by reincarnation. This was in 1907 replaced by a regular hereditary King or Druk Gyalpo, who continued the dual system of government, with a religious and a civil branch, including the religious teachers of the Durkpa Kargyupa (New School) tradition that became the state religion of Bhutan (Dorje 1990). The religious branch was called the Dratshang Lyenshog (Commission for Monastic Affairs) and ruled by the Chief Abbot (Je Kenpo) together with the five Teachers (Lopons) and the Central Monastic Commission (Zung Dratshang), under which resorted the monastries.

The civil branch was headed by the Regent (Druk Desi), under which fell three regional governors (Chila/Pönlop). These oversaw the three rulers (Dzhongpön) of the central administrative seats, under which resorted the administrative Chief of Protocol (Zhung drönyer). In 1953 a national Assembly was added to this constellation, which also included the clergy Clergy as observers and representatives of the civil service as well as people’s representatives. Under this a civil administration acted as well as local rulers (Dzhongpöns) and village heads (Gups) (Lee 2014, pp. 8, 10; Phuntsho 2013, pp. 566–72). See

Table 3. Bhutan’s Historic system of governance (adapted from Van Norren 2017).

	Ruling System
Ruler	1616 onwards: Zhabdrung: Ngawang Namgyal (first Abbot-King 1616–1651) (and reincarnations)1907 onwards: Druk Gyalpo (hereditary King)
Legal system	Application of the Kathrim, or Laws (codified in 1729)
Dual system	Religious branch	Civil branch
Governing bodie	Dratshang Lhentshog (Monastic Affairs) Je Kenpo (Chief Abbot) Chair Five Lopons (5 Teachers) of Zung Dratshang (Central Monastic Commission)	Druk Desi (Regent) Three regional governors (Chila/Pönlop) Three rulers of central administrative seats (dzhongpön) Chief of protocol (Zhung drönyer)
Implementing Institutions	Monastries	Civil service Local rulers ‘dzhongpöns’ and village heads, ‘gups’
Other (newer) Institutions		1953 General Assembly, consisting of: Clergy (observers), civil service, people representatives 1959 Supreme Laws 1965 Royal Advisory Council Lodoe Tshogde 1967 High Court 1972 Cabinet

Sources: Constitution of Bhutan; Lee (2014, pp. 8, 10); Phuntsho (2013, pp. 566–72).

.

Bhutan can be called a theocracy until the early twentieth century. The monarchy, established in 1907, also descended from a major fifteenth century Bhutanese Buddhist saint, Pema Lingpa (Whitecross 2007, p. 707). Secularism (and thus theocracy) has, however, a different meaning in South East Asia, as Whitecross (2007, p. 710) argues. It is also referred to as ‘religious tolerance by which all religions are equal before state patronage’ (Sheikh 2015, p. 156). Some Bhutanese intellectuals therefore consider the Bhutanese state secular—even prior to the establishment of the monarchy -because as Whitecross confirms ‘the Central Monk Body never sought to control the royal government’ (Whitecross 2007, p. 711).

Most of the laws were uncodified during the reign of Zhabdrung except for a Chayig (Code of Law), based on the Buddhist scriptures of Vinaya Pitaka, which ‘stated that the head of the state should be a Bodhisattava or a compassionate leader’ (Jamtshoi and Sharma 2022, p. 590). The first ruler of Zhabdrung issued rulings, which were codified in 1729 in the Kathrim (Kinga 2009a, p. 95). It regulated taxation, social life, the conduct of rulers and criminal offenses (Kinga 2009a, pp. 98–100). This legal system was continued with adaptions over time under the hereditary Kings. This was supplemented by customary law which was not codified, governing the commons (such as grazing rights and water sources management) and regulating community service. Justice on local level was administered though mediators. The regions were administered by local fortified onasteries or dzongs (Phuntsho 2013, pp. 567, 257 and 259). Happiness, or balance, of the people was the objective of governance. This included all sentient beings to be happy (Kinga 2009a, p. 172).

The formal system of justice was instituted in the late 1960’s during the reign of the Third King when Bhutan started building a society based on the rule of law. He formalized the laws on marriage, inheritance, livestock, land and local resource management which were previously governed by customary laws and regulations (Jamtshoi and Sharma 2022, p. 592). The King gradually relinquished power from 1953 onwards. Firstly, a National Assembly was established, enacting the first ‘Supreme Laws’. Then the royal advisory council emerged (1965), followed by an independent judiciary (1967 onwards). Next a cabinet was appointed (1968) and the civil service (1973).

On the local level, district development committees1 emerged (1981), county development committees2 (1991), the election of head of a county (‘Gup’) (2002). ‘From approximately 1991 onwards, there has been a conscious engagement by the judiciary and the emerging cadre of legally educated lawyers to integrate the laws with a broader understanding of Bhutanese values’ (Whitecross 2007, p. 708). As the Chief Justice stated at the time about Bhutan: ‘Laws are always strong only when they have social sanction and religious sanctity’ (Kuensel 2003). Bhutan then drafted its first constitution in the period between 2001–2008. The draft constitution removed the state sponsored Central Monk Body from any formal role in the new legislature. Thus far, the Central Monk Body had representation in the National Assembly and on the Royal Advisory Council (Whitecross 2007, p. 710). In 2006 the 4th King abdicated voluntarily. The coronation of the 5th King as constitutional monarch took place in 2008 as well as the first parliamentary elections (Phuntsho 2013, pp. 566–72) and the adoption of the Constitution through successive stages of consultation and parliamentary approval (Kinga 2009b).

3.2. The Modern System of Governance in Bhutan’s Constitution of 2008: Trias Politica and the Religious-Executive Role of the King

The new constitution follows the historical model: it is now a ‘Dual System’ of religious and civil affairs under a constitutional monarch. The King has handed over his executive power to the government and parliament. The former regent (Druk Desi) is abolished (Lee 2014, p. 8). An independent judicial system has been added. See

Table 4. Current system of constitutional monarchy (adapted from Van Norren 2017).

	Ruling System
Ruler & Functions	Ceremonial Druk Gyalpo (King) upholds Constitution art. 2.18 and dual system of religion and politics (art. 2.2) appoints Chief Abbot on recommendation of 5 Teachers (art. 3.4) appoints ministers on recommendation of PM (art. 17.3) appoints important members of Civil service/Judiciary on recommendation (art. 2.19) dissolution of Parliament on recommendation of PM (art. 10.24) assents legislation (art. 13); right to return the Bill once with amendments or objections (art. 13.10) manages ad hoc humanitarian relief fund (art. 14.12) Chief of Armed Forces (art. 28.1)
Dual system	Religious branch (Sangha)	Civil branch
Governing bodies	Dratshang Lhentshog Je Kenpo (Chief Abbot) Chair Five Lopons (5 Teachers) Zung Dratshang (Central Monastic Commission)	Government Lhengye Zhungtshog art. 20 constitution Since 1972	Parliament King National Council National Assembly) can abdicate King (art. 2.21 constitution)	Judiciary High Court Supreme Court Attorney General National Judicial Commission
Implementing Institutions	Monasteries	Civil service–1973 Local government (dzongkhag/gwog)

Sources: Constitution of Bhutan; Lee (2014, pp. 8, 10); Phuntsho (2013, pp. 566–72).

below.

The absolute monarchy in Bhutan was abolished in 2008, when the new and first constitution of Bhutan entered into force. This transition happened by a voluntary act of the King (Lee 2014, p. 8) and according to local sources in protest by large parts of the population who thought the country was not ready for this (Kinga 2009b). Bhutan now has a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy as stipulated in article 1.2 of the constitution. The King is both the protector of all religions (art. 3.2) and has a special role in upholding both religion (in casu Buddhism and other religions) and politics in Bhutan (art. 2.1). He maintains some executive and legislative power. The King is the head of the armed forces (art. 28.1). He is part of the parliament and also appoints 5 members of the upper chamber of parliament (art.11.1.b). The King also holds certain other powers such as awarding titles and land as a form of welfare (kidu)3, granting citizenship, amnesty and sealing appointments (Sebastian 2015, pp. 122 and 130) (Table 4). This constitution is the first written constitution of the country, replacing the Kathrim and the Supreme Laws established from 1959 onwards. The constitution introduces the Western concept of ‘trias politica’, a separation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government (article 1.13), although that separation is not absolute—considering the role of the King—as we have seen above.

The government is called Lhengye Zhungtshog (article 20) and already existed as a Cabinet under the Druk Desi (regent) since 1972. The government and parliament replace the former regent (Druk Desi) (Lee 2014, p. 8). The civil service that exists since 1973, is held in high regard and the largest employer of the country (Phuntsho 2013, p. 569).

The parliament that was introduced in 1953 now comprises of an elected upper chamber (National Council) and lower chamber (National Assembly) and the King (art. 10). Yet it can force the King to abdicate (article 2.21). The King can, however, still command bills or return bills for further amendments (Sebastian 2015, p. 122).

The judiciary consists of a High Court, Supreme Court, Attorney General and National Judicial Commission. Until 1952 government officials were performing judicial functions (Sebastian 2015, p. 51).

For the religious branch, the constitution maintains the Commission for Monastic Affairs (Dratshang Lentshog) (art3.6), just like in the historic system, chaired by the chief abbot (Je Kenpo) overseeing the five teachers (Lopons). These conduct supervision over the monasteries. Monasteries are funded by the state (though some receive private funding; B21). The Monastic Commission also underwent reforms (Whitecross 2012). Table 4 summarizes the above.

3.3. Is Bhutan a Democracy or a Religio-Presidential Monarchy?

Given the executive and legislative powers the King still holds, Gallenkamp (2010, p. 18) sees the Bhutanese King more as President and refers to this system as a presidential system or ‘semi-presidential monarchy’. Sebastian (2015, p. 11) concludes that the reason for this is that ‘democracy was introduced (…) from the throne itself’. Therefore, he calls ‘the power and position of the monarch (…) unchallengeable’ (Sebastian 2015, p. 221). Since the constitution was also considered a gift by the King, who himself has religious roles, the fundamental provisions of it were not challenged. It did go through an independent drafting commission, popular consultation and was debated and slightly amended in parliament (Kinga 2009b).

The power of the King is balanced, however, by the fact that Parliament can force the King to abdicate (article 2.21). Furthermore, he assents legislation but can amend legislation only once (art 13.10). Appointments of cabinet members and the Chief Abbot are ceremonial, though appointments of parliamentarians, security chiefs and constitutional office holders are not. One can say that he can exert a large moral influence both on legislation as through the five parliamentarians he appoints, as well as by giving charity and managing the relief fund (art 14.12), but ultimately parliament has the last say. This leaves the theoretical possibility of a coup from the throne, as the King is Chief of the armed forces. In general careful checks and balances have been introduced into the constitution to mitigate his executive role. One could say that the leadership of the King currently is unchallengeable, because of the moral authority he exerts, whilst politicians are unpopular. On the one hand politicians are seeking advice of the King, and on the other hand the King embarked on a journey to win people’s hearts and minds: ‘Walking to villages in Bhutan’s remote districts in order to listen to the grievances of the people, help settle land ownership disputes and provide counsel in times of natural disaster, such as the 2009 earthquake in eastern Bhutan’ (Adhikari 2022). Adhikari raises the opposite question whether Bhutan is an imposed or ‘dictated democracy’, given the popularity of the King and the unpopularity of democracy (Adhikari 2022).

Bhutan thus has a specific form of democracy, which is a mixture between Western democracy with separation of powers and—what I would prefer to call—the constitutional religious-executive Custodian Monarch, which is not elected and hereditary. This role is a traditional one in balancing the religious and civil aspects of society. His role in charity aligns with the first of the six perfections in Mahayana Buddhism. His moral authority with the second perfection. This means he will be held to a high standard with regard to the other perfections: Patience, perseverance, concentration and wisdom. Whether the people will chose to keep him depends on how he fulfills his duties. Leaning on the historic model and the King may well be necessary for keeping the stability of the country. One local commentator concluded in 2015: ‘It is a stressful rough transition: From a subsistence society to consumption society, from rural to urban, Buddhist to secular, oral to audiovisual, monarchy to democracy, it is a lot in one go. There is lots of confusion, stress and chaos in Bhutan’ (B37). Many interviewees stressed that the abolishment of the absolute monarchy was in their view an unnecessary innovation and democracy had introduced conflicts in families (Van Norren 2017) (see also below). Interestingly, the King’s uncle lost the elections in 2008 (Denyer 2008). However, over time Bhutan may chose for a less prominent and entirely ceremonious role of the King, adhering to a more conventional Western democratic system with a constitutional monarch. This, from a post-colonial view is, however, not a panacea for a stable government, as civil strife over elections in for example Kenya has demonstrated.

As Whitecross (2012) argues, Bhutan is still a nascent democracy. He puts his hope for reinforcement of this democracy in the university graduates from India and Thailand. As we will see, this foreign developmentalist education also has drawbacks. Furthermore, the legal provision that parliamentarians need to have a university education is basically anti-democratic, excluding amongst others an entire older (possibly wiser?) generation. Lastly, the pre-2008 Bhutan was not devoid from local traditional democratic procedures, in which women played an important role, even though it was an absolute monarchy. The current system of democracy building on the historical dual system of governance solidifies an entirely new—and for the population sometimes bewildering—system of democracy and roots it in ancient tradition.

From a postcolonial view it is important to also acknowledge historic local democratic traditions and judicial mediation practices, that may sometimes be more effective and popularly supported, than ‘imposed’ traditions from the West such as the imported adversarial politics in parliamentary procedures. When asked why these local good governance traditions were not taken on board in the constitution, despite the reliance on local GNH, the principal drafter admitted that it had not occurred to them to do so; western good governance and global constitutionalism had been the principal inspiration (B10). Moreover, it is important from this viewpoint to acknowledge various epistemologies (knowledge systems) and philosophical traditions. As Witte and Green (2009, p. 5) conclude: ‘discussions of “Asian values” (….) have revived earlier questions about the universality of human rights, particularly human rights grounded in or having to do with religion (…) these debates have prompted religious traditions to reconsider and retrieve their own traditions of and commitment to human rights.’ Whilst this may raise fears of cultural relativism, I agree with Witte and Green that ‘they are worthwhile conversations to have.’ (idem).

3.4. Religious Monarch and Non-Proselytization: Is Bhutan a Secular State?

The King in the new constitution is the symbol of the unity of religion and politics (Chhoe-sid, art. 2.2) and dual system of religion and politics (Chhoe-sid-nyi). Is this concept reconcilable with secularism that is also promoted in the constitution? Kinga (2009a, p. 26) states as a motivation that ‘even the best of secular laws (…) must be tempered with spiritual laws’. It symbolizes ‘interdependence between common people and spiritual rulers’ (Kinga 2009a, p. 73). The people are, according to him, patrons of the rulers, in a distinct notion of citizenship (Kinga 2009a, p. 99). Lee (2014, p. 9) draws a parallel with the United Kingdom, where the monarch is ceremonial head of the church as well as the state. The King indeed has more civilian responsibilities than religious, although he does appoint the Chief Abbot, on recommendation of the five Teachers (article 3.4).

The constitution introduces a secular state in article 3.6 and grants freedom of religion in article 7.15, prohibiting discrimination. It recognizes freedom of religion furthermore in article 7.4, together with freedom of thought and conscience. The constitution imposes a duty on the religious leaders, not the state, to ensure that religion remains separate from politics. They are not allowed to vote (article 3.3 constitution). Political parties on the other hand cannot have a religious denomination (article 4b) or use religion for their purposes (article 15.3).

At the same time there is a caveat, namely a prohibition on proselytization. The prohibition on proselytization is mainly aimed at Christian organizations, in an attempt to protect the Buddhist nature of the nation. Bhutan is predominantly Buddhist, but has a large (Nepalese origin) Hindu minority and a few Christians (between 8.000–30.000 or 3.5%, mainly converted Nepalese Hindus) (US State Department 2019; latter number Open Doors in 2022).4 The constitution also contains several provisions expressly protecting Buddhism and laying the foundation for a Buddhist state, governed by Gross National Happiness. Notably article 3.1 which stipulates: ‘Buddhism is the spiritual heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance’ (art. 3.1) However, it is not the state religion. The King is both the protector of all religions (art. 3.2) and has a special role in upholding both religion (in casu mainly Buddhism) and politics in Bhutan (art. 2.1).

Once can say that Bhutan currently possesses a unique concept of secularism that is different from the conventional one. Before we address this question further, we will look at how GNH is enshrined in the constitution.

4. The Spiritual Core of the Constitution: Gross National Happiness

4.1. Constitutional Buddhist Happiness and Its Pillars

The entire constitution is built around the concept of GNH and its four pillars. At the same time the constitution also contains more Western oriented provisions regarding sustainable development and elements derived from constitutions in the Global South (Kinga 2009b, p. 135), such as South Africa (which like the Bhutanese constitution contains inter alia constitutional values and the concept of future generations and socio-economic rights).

Former Chief Justice and drafter of the constitution states on GNH and the constitution: ‘the promise of happiness (…) is its soul’ (Tobgye 2015, p. 182). As one of the constitution drafters said: ‘Happiness is only mentioned once (…), but the four pillars are the very core of the constitution (…) it springs from sovereignty [of people]. Happiness promotes that. I was inspired by the principle that subjugation of others cannot lead to happiness’ (B10). The constitution places the power on the people of the country, in article 1: Happiness is popular sovereignty. This signifies that according to the drafter that ‘only the people can change the law’ (B10). Happiness in the constitution is thus a popular choice by the majority of the country. Happiness in this context should be understood as inner balance and harmony, as promoted by Buddhism, not the concept of (hedonistic) happiness in the Western sense. Art. 1 to 9 are supporting the concept of happiness (B10).

This one-off mention of happiness was a purposeful choice, as the four pillars of GNH are on the one hand seen by some Buddhist intellectuals to reduce Buddhist philosophy to a simplistic concept and on the other hand, by economic realists seen as unable to replace conventional growth economics: ’There is opposition in Bhutan. [They say] GNH should be aspirational, no pillars or metrics. Others say it cannot be a replacement to GDP. That’s why I did not want the constitution to be tied to one idea, it should be timeless, some ideas [read GNH] may gain political importance at a certain time’ (B10).

The state has a clear duty in implementation of GNH. This is consistently articulated throughout the constitution (see

Table 5. Constitution and GNH pillars (Van Norren 2017).

Pillar	Provisions of the Constitution
General (art. 1, 2, 9)	Kingdom, sovereignty of people, flag, anthem, national day, language, constitution (art. 1) Monarchy as symbol of unity (art. 2.1) and chhoe-sid-nyi (art. 2.2.) GNH as principle of state policy; State creating enabling conditions for GNH (art. 9), including free education, health, etc.
Cultural pillar (art. 4, 3)	The state is ‘to preserve, protect and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including (…) religion’ (art. 4.1), recognizing it as ‘an evolving dynamic force’ (art. 4.2) Free cultural participation (art. 9.23) Duty to heritage preservation (art. 8.2) Spiritual heritage of Buddhism: Peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance (art. 3)
Environmental pillar (art. 5, 8)	Whereas every Bhutanese is ‘a trustee of the Kingdom’s natural resources’, the state will (a) Protect, conserve and improve the pristine environment and safeguard the biodiversity of the country; (b) Prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (c) Secure ecologically balanced sustainable development while promoting justifiable economic and social development; and (d) Ensure a safe and healthy environment Mandatory forest cover of 60% Possibility for enacting protected areas Fundamental duty, A Bhutanese citizen shall have the duty to preserve, protect and respect the environment, culture and heritage of the nation. (art. 8.2) Right over mineral resources, rivers, lakes, forests, vested in the state (art. 1.12)
Good Governance (art. 7, 8, 9, 15, 19, 20, 21–29)	Separation of power (art. 1.13) Fundamental rights, e.g., freedom speech, thought, press, movement; right to life, vote, equal pay, property; no capital punishment (art. 7) Fundamental duties, e.g., towards sovereignty, environment/cultural heritage, tolerance, non-killing/torture, taxation, non-corruption (art. 8) Citizenship (art. 6) Justice/Legal aid: The State shall endeavor to provide legal aid to secure justice (art. 9.5 and 9.6) Gender: Non-discrimination/exploitation of women (9.17) Respect for international law 9.24 Political parties; represent ‘values and aspirations of the people’, ‘national unity’ and ‘well-being of the nation’; no incitement on basis of regionalism, ethnicity, religion (art. 15.1, 15.2, 15.3); auditing by parliament (15.16) Trias Politica: Regulation of Executive (art. 19 and 20), Judiciary (art. 21 and 29), Local government (art. 22), Elections (art. 23 and 24), Audit (art. 25), Independent civil service (art. 26), Anti-Corruption Commission (art. 27), etc. Decentralization: Local governments (art. 22)
Socio-Economic pillar (art. 9, 14, 22)	Equity: Policies to minimize inequalities of income (art. 9.7) Economic self-reliance (art. 9.9) (meet recurrent expenditures from internal resources of the country 14.6) Right to work (art. 9.12) Right to rest and leisure (art. 9.13) Cooperation in community life and family (art. 9.19) Right to reasonable remuneration (art. 9. 14) Education: Obligation of the state geared towards knowledge and skills as well as values, aiming at ‘full development of the human personality’ and is free (art. 9.15 and 16)5 Health: Basic public health services and disability pensions (art. 9.21 and 22) Finance: Servicing of public debt will not place an undue burden on future generations (art. 14.5)

which categorizes the constitution into the four pillars of GNH). The State shall strive to promote those conditions that will enable the pursuit of Gross National Happiness (art. 9.2); and a true and sustainable development of a good and compassionate society rooted in Buddhist ethos and universal human values (art. 9.20). The policy of GNH is however not enforceable in court. This leaves room for governments of political parties that are less GNH oriented (see below). From Table 5 it can be concluded that GNH is included throughout the constitution, but also includes human rights.

Finally, rather than imposing strict secularity from the constitution, Bhutan has reversed this idea and made the constitution a sacred spiritual document itself, thereby reinforcing its democratic power and popular support. ‘The constitution has become a sacred document (…) one copy (…) is done in the form of a scripture’; it’s ‘legitimacy has also been derived from divine blessings’ (Kinga 2009a, pp. 355, 354; Kinga 2009b, p. 150). The constitution is not only sacred, it is considered a gift from the king (Kinga 2009b). One could say that the secular and democratic aspects of the constitution have also been made spiritual for a people that attach great importance to these rituals.

4.2. Does GNH Fulfill Its Promise: Downsides of the Bhutanese Democracy and GNH

The new Bhutanese constitutional set-up has some downsides as well. People criticize the democratic system as having created divisions within families along political party lines, where they did not exist before as families voted as households for their local leadership. The educational requirements make that only younger people qualify for parliament, and older and uneducated people (often farmers) are excluded. The individualist electoral system has also eroded the position of women as head of the rural household, who used to cast the vote on behalf of the family (Van Norren 2017). The educational system and prominence of the civil service as main employer, and its standing, has eroded the standing of the traditional majority profession of farmer and created rural-urban migration, especially of younger people. The youth experiences unemployment and related problems such as drugs addiction (Phuntsho 2013, p. 569). Secular education introduced from the West has not necessarily instilled Buddhist values in pupils, on which lies the future responsibility of upholding the constitution, though GNH tried to pay more attention to for example meditation in schools. Spiritual festivals, also called Tsechus, are however declining in popularity or even dismissed as superstitious by younger generations (Choden 2015, p. 33).

Policy making has long be informed by India, itself colonized by the British, and Bhutan’s principal sponsor. It sent many civil servants to ‘develop’ the country and its educational system. Some blame current problems partly on this secular development model (B30). Increasing urbanization, including the introduction of television, brings with it less connection to the rural hinterland, more individualism and lesser connection to the land, the community and to spiritual values (all are intertwined) (B28). ‘Nobody is promoting community solidarity in the villages. It is only a presentable discourse for an international audience’ (B37). The position of women is reinforced in the Western sense of emancipation, yet may be eroding in the traditional sense of being guardians of the household, the upbringing of children and (national, family and spiritual) values:

‘Women are the main actors of culture in Bhutan (…). Women take the values forward from generation to generation (…). We embody it, by looking after our parents (…) the individual families have to carry it forward from generation to generation, like That-Dham-Tse—patriotism and nationalism, love for one’s country, community and family—and Leg-Jum-Drel—the law of cause and effect, taking the consequences of your actions. It can’t be taught, it has to be lived. If there is violence in a family the That Dham Tse is not there, we say’ (woman, B33).

For further analysis of GNH implementation see (Schroeder 2014; and Van Norren 2017, 2020). A further indicator of its success is the GNH-index.

4.3. GNH Policies and Index

GNH policy is rooted in walking the middle path of the four dimensions of its policy, namely preserving the country’s spiritual and cultural heritage, the wellbeing of the people in economic and social terms, the preservation of the country’s pristine nature and democratic governance.

The government policy of GNH is supplemented by a GNH index which measures the society’s wellbeing rather than solely the Gross National Product (GNP) of the country. This index consists of nine domains (see the nine circles in Figure 1). These domains also reflect Buddhist values and the four pillars of GNH and contain some unconventional dimensions, not found in for example the Human Development Index or the Multidimensional Poverty Index, that generally do include living standards, education and health but not dimensions such as spirituality, cultural diversity and time use. GNH also combines development indicators with environmental indicators.

Figure 1 explains these dimensions. Going clockwise: The core Buddhist value of Inner peace is measured in the indicators for psychological (emotional) and spirituality wellbeing (green upper circle). Social wellbeing is reflected in the domains of education and health, where again mental health takes a prime position (purple, right circle). The importance of keeping one’s balance is also stressed through the indicator for time use (rest and sleep) (blue, right circle). Culture is furthermore stressed in the domains of cultural diversity and resilience, which incorporates attending religious festivals, mastery of one’s language and artistic skills as well as etiquette (red, below circle). The pillar of good governance (green below circle) measures government performance and services, democratic participation and adherence to fundamental rights. The domain of community vitality can also be said to be part of culture, Bhutan being a collective society (purple left below circle). It enshrines values such as generosity to one’s community (in time or money), safety, family values and the strength of relationships within the community. The wellbeing of nature is given attention through ecological diversity and resilience (blue, left circle), which includes citizens’ responsibility towards the environment as well as ecological, wildlife and urban issues. Economic wellbeing is measured through standard of living (orange, left circle). As is argued below the index is a good indicator for the success (or failure) of keeping Bhutan’s culture and spirituality alive in the wake of modernism, democracy and development.

Declining traditional and spiritual values, due to modernization and development, are made visible in the outcome of GNH index surveys. Although certain more conventional dimensions increased in the 2015 survey, the unconventional dimensions of spirituality decreased (slightly), negative emotions increased, national etiquette (Driglam Namzha) was perceived to be declining and most importantly the sense of belonging to a community declined by 19%. The latter is attributed to social isolation of elderly left behind in the villages and new urban migrants (Tobgay 2015). Women were less happy then men (2008).6 This in itself demonstrates the value of the GNH index.

4.4. Criticism at Bhutan and GNH: Identity Politics, Citizenship and Fundamental Rights

Other than the criticism that Christian identity is denied to the few converted in Bhutan (discussed above), the most harsh criticism towards GNH is that it is viewed as a cover-up operation to smoothen the image of Bhutan (Pellegrini and Tasciotti 2014; Munro 2016; Frelick 2008, 2011; Mørch 2016). The past Bhutanese policies in the 1980’s towards Nepalese migrants, the Southerners or Lotshampa, enforced national dress codes and etiquette (Driglam Namzha). This led to protests, forced deportations of those claimed by the state not to possess Bhutanese citizenship and resettlement of refugees in the West in the 1990s (100.000 peoples; Open Doors 2010). This had more to do with fears around geopolitics in the region than with religious tensions. Since then the government has eased requirements (though not taking back the refugees): Wearing the national dress in public is no longer required, but in government offices it is still obligatory. Citizenship issues are, however, still lingering (Arora 2014; Rahimi 2020; Riza 2022).

Certain freedoms in the constitution are limited to ‘Bhutanese citizens’: Freedom of speech, information, thought, religion, vote, movement, residence, joining public service, property, profession, equal pay, assembly (art. 7.2–7.12); the same for certain fundamental duties (art. 8.1–8.3). As some people have limited or no citizenship or are stateless, this amounts to an implicit form of discrimination, especially towards Southerners or Lotshampa, who are generally Hindu. This counts for children of mixed marriage without a Bhutanese father (also a gender discrimination) or with parents without citizenship and others with an F5 ID card7, generally those involved in the protests of the 1990s (B27) (Arora 2014).

This attitude of Bhutan stems from the fear of being taking over by Nepal, in a similar way that India confiscated the Himalaya Kingdom of Sikkim in 1975 by an imposed popular referendum, and China annexed Tibet, both closely related to Bhutan and its monarchy (Van Norren 2017; Arora 2014; Open Doors 2010). It is therefore not primarily aimed at promoting Buddhism but at unifying the state. Nevertheless, one can say the minority migratory population has in certain cases less freedom (to travel, to study, to vote, to own land, etc.), be it generally not a restriction on practicing Hindu religion.

5. Discussion: Is GNH Jeopardizing Secularism and Is Bhutan a Theocratic State?

In the spectrum of full theocracies (like Iran) and secular constitutionalism, one can ask where does Bhutan position itself? As Bhutan takes Buddhist religion as a basis for public law and policy, it may privilege one religion over the other and it criticized for that (Lee 2014, p. 3). Theocracy is a ‘government by divine guidance or by officials who are regarded as divinely guided’, with government often consisting of members of the clergy and a legal system based on religious law (definition according to Britannica online).8 However, Bhutan does not meet these criteria, as the clergy are excluded from government and the electoral system, and Gross National Happiness is not a binding provision of the law. Political parties in the West are allowed to have religious denominations, unlike in Bhutan. Religious leaders and monks are allowed to vote in the West, unlike in Bhutan. The GNH values in the constitution are non-binding rights, leaving sufficient room for governments who wish to take other directions (which also occurred in the recent past, when Prime Minister Thinley, international standard bearer for Happiness politics, lost the elections). GNH policies have been rationalized in pillars and domains, that could also be related to human rights values, deep ecology, democratic governance, psychology, economy and other domains of science. Interviewees recognize that human rights are part of GNH (B6, B9, B10, B12, B17), but ‘it is not very pronounced’ (B13). GNH’s overall aim is more expansive and reinstates the value dimension: ‘In the concept of human right, human values are the missing links (…). GNH can reorient people back to their values’ (B19). ‘Human rights are the conventional truth, this is the absolute truth’ (B23).

Furthermore, one can also argue that it is not the prerogative of the West to define secularism as the state guarding against interference from religion. In this case, the religious leaders themselves are excluded from the electoral process and made the guardians of secularism; and the political parties and leaders are forbidden to align or associate themselves along religious lines. Funding by the state of religious institutions as well as the King as upholder of the religion, may raise secular objections, but also occurs in Western democracies (resp. Greece; and UK). The ICCPR (international covenant on cultural and political rights) ‘protects a person’s freedom to “manifest” religion or belief through “teaching”, but also prohibits outright any “coercion” that would impair another’s right “to have or adopt a religion or belief”. The state must protect the juxtaposed rights claims of majority and minority religions, and of foreign and indigenous religions. And, in the end, the state must craft a general rule to govern multiple theological understandings of conversion’ (Witte and Green 2009). Bhutan does not coerce anyone to be Buddhist and it guarantees the plurality of religions under the patronage of the King, be it with practical restrictions on Christian congregation (and organization) and a permit system for religious societies (excluding Christians) (Arora 2014).

The prohibition that is made against proselytization leads to further criticism as mentioned by Lee (2014) (15). The National assembly saw proselytization as offensive to the religious feelings of the Buddhist and Hindus, therefore the article targets Christian, Muslim and ‘any alien culture or tradition’ (56th National Assembly; Lee 2014, 14 and 13 note 72). The exact formulation in the constitution became: ‘No person shall be compelled to belong to another faith by means of coercion or inducement’. US State Department (2021, p. 1) reports that ‘The law restricts religious speech promoting enmity among religious groups and requires religious groups to obtain licenses to hold public religious gatherings’. The penal code (2011) puts a punishment if a person ‘uses coercion or other forms of inducement’ (Section 463A Penal Code; Lee 2014, p. 13). Lee argues the penal provision is very broad and thus could include prayers and blessing as a form of spiritual inducement, as well as charity as material inducement (Lee 2014, p. 14).

Even prior to this penal code there were incidents of arrests of Christians showing a Christian movie, sentenced to three years imprisonment but released after international pressure especially from India. Since 1965 Christian organizations were prevented from entering although some non-governmental organizations did manage to (Dubey 2006). US state department reports that Christian groups cannot ‘organize publicly, own property, raise funds, conduct outreach activities, or import literature’, but that they can worship in private (US State Department 2021). Although there is no room for church buildings, people are allowed to use homes to worship, the Christian organization Open Doors (2010) reports, though putting the country on its watchlist. If in practice Bhutan is too strict in interpreting the ban on religious coercion, this is, however, not a matter of having created a theocratic state in the constitution. After all the democratic constitution has been declared ‘divine’, rather than the divine or clergy commanding the laws of the state.

A Bhutanese scholar cites the harshness of Hinduist religious customs as reasons for conversion to Christianity, although this does not explain why they do not convert to Buddhism. She recommends trying to influence and lessen these cultural prescriptions (Sharma 2016), clearly demonstrating that Bhutanese see it as more problematic to have Christians in their midst rather than Hindus. An act of voluntary conversion is, however, not punishable, though people may be under popular pressure not to do so (State Department 2021).

One can also see the ban on proselytization as an effort at post-colonialism, as Christianity has long be part of the Western ‘civilization mission’ of so called developing countries, after colonialism lapsed. This is of particular importance in the geopolitical context of Bhutan. ‘Bhutan’s people see their distinct [spiritual] culture, rather than the military, as having protected the country’s sovereignty’ (Open Doors 2010). ‘India can survive riots and unrest, but Bhutan may not, because it is a small country between two giants [India and China]’, the Culture Minister Dorji expressed (Open Doors 2010). Discussing proselytization bans needs to be done taking into account Christian successful history of often forced conversion: ‘The question of conversion forces Christians to confront their own often violent histories of inquisition and heresy’ (Witte and Green 2009, p. 11). Furthermore, the individualist approach of religious freedom, originating in the Western notion of individual rights may overlook the notion of identity: Therefore, Witte and Green (2009, p. 17) plead for a better definition of ‘religious rights’ in order to ‘capture their communal and identity-based dimensions—often experienced as given, not chosen—in ways that protect the true core of religion.9’ As the GNH index shows Bhutan clearly embraces the communal notions of its society including its spiritual heritage.

Calling Bhutan a ‘theocracy’ implies that Bhutan is not a democracy and undermines the validity of Bhutan’s constitution. There are certain legal restrictions on the right to religious freedom, but those also exist in other countries, where for example education is secular only (France), whereas in other countries education can have a religious denomination (Netherlands). Protection of religion in the form of blasphemy laws also exist(ed) in Europe, such as art. 147 Dutch criminal code (abolished in 2013; NPO 2015). Thus the debate on religious freedom versus freedom of speech varies over time and is dependent on value judgments in a historical context. Prohibition of holocaust denial in France is one such example. Proselytization is sensitive in the context of colonization and development processes. Christian proselytization has been considered by postcolonialism as part of the civilization mission of the West (Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela 2004; Duara 2010). According to some Buddhist scholars, ‘it was never (…) the Buddhist way to proselytize, in the sense of forcing ideas and beliefs upon an unwilling audience, much less to exert pressure of any kind, or any kind of flattery, deceit or cajolery, to win adherence to one’s own point of view’ (Dr. G.P. Malalasekera quoted by Sarada Maha Thero and Ariyadasa 1993, p. 246). This is echoed by a Bhutanese interviewee: ‘When you proselytize without the responsibility of first understanding the religion you want to convert, it is wrong (…) and based on the conviction that your values are superior’ (B2).

If there were to be widespread proselytization in the West by Muslim organizations, under the guise of charity and ‘development’, the political establishment might consider it as eroding the Western culture and therefore undesirable. Already the presence of large Muslim communities and diaspora—mainly due to labor migration in the past encouraged by European governments—are giving rise to popular resentment in Europe, without any proselytization taking place. Fears include the taking over of Muslim culture and erosion of certain rights including women and gender rights, as well as the influence of other states such as Turkey on diaspora. Bhutan has a minority Nepalese origin population of an estimated 20% and Hindu religion enjoys full freedom (US State Department 2021). This is not to deny that certain mistakes have been made in unification policies by the Bhutanese government, leading to human rights violations.

A careful balance in rights needs to be struck. The Bhutanese constitution is doing just that: Balancing secularism versus the need to preserve culture and identity; a culture in which Buddhist values (including religion) have a strong influence. Whether the one provision weighs heavier than the other in practice should be derived from case law and cannot be assumed a priori (e.g., the case law found upholds secular arguments, see Van Norren (2017)). To avoid religious sensitivities, denial of church gatherings may be better challenged under freedom of association and general discrimination provisions. After all the international controversy about conversion is such that it has hampered further development of international law on religious rights (Witte and Green 2009, p. 11).

6. Concluding Remarks

GNH deconstructs existing legal theory as far as it concerns separation of religion and state, and reconstructs a new model. It is criticized for that reason. Backer (2009, p. 171), however, optimistically notes that there is now a new market for constitutionalism: Judeo-Christian separation of state and church; Islamic theocracy and Buddhist theocratic constitutionalism (Lee 2014, p. 16). Lee (2014) criticizes this theocratic constitutionalism. He opposes post-modern tolerance (all views are of equal veracity). He calls this ‘hegemonic’ as it would be ‘imposing conformity of thought’ and ‘discriminating against people who disagree’. He supports the views of Locke and Voltaire upholding respect for the other’s point of view (Lee 2014, p. 7).

Postcolonialism, however, poses that Western culture is hegemonic, the arbiter of all other cultures, the ‘universal’ yardstick against which others are measured. Buddhism can be viewed as much as a religion as a philosophical tradition. Limiting philosophy to European traditions only, would amount to epistemological discrimination. Therefore, using Buddhism as an inspirational source for one’s constitution cannot a priori be equaled to theocracy. Tan (2010) in his article ‘Secularism and the Constitution: striking the right balance’ cites Bhutan as an example in this regard: ‘Bhutan, which has traditionally regarded itself as a Buddhist country, consciously rejected making Buddhism its state religion, but instead referred to it as the ‘spiritual heritage’ of Bhutan. It is noteworthy that the Bhutanese constitution further guarantees the freedom of worship of all religions by making its “Dragon King”, the Druk Gyalpo, the “protector of all religions in Bhutan”.’ (Tan 2010, p. 146).

Futhermore, GNH has been objectified: It is part of a rationalized policy framework with abstract non-religious notions. General human values like generosity and compassion are part of the framework which applies to all citizens regardless of their religious denomination. An interviewee points at the difference between religion and values: ‘Religion binds people with a frame (…) (but) spiritual values are about innate human values (…) compassion, love and consideration’ (B19), ‘that is the heart of Buddhism’ (B23). The constitution defines Buddhism as spiritual heritage (art. 3), different from state religion. It incorporates ‘secular values that are supplementary’. This approach of ‘pervasive spirituality’ as the former Chief Justice calls it, is derived from established customs, recognized in Western legal tradition such as in Edmund Burke (Tobgye 2015, p. 108):

‘Though wars are fought and injustices perpetuated over religion, laws, social structures, institutions, or differing conceptions of liberty, these are not the true causes of civil strife. By destroying these pretenses—abolishing established rights, executing kings, divesting religious institutions—revolutionaries merely shifted the material through which human vice would manifest itself. Here is a warning against the belief that, by manipulating the material world, we can perfect the human condition.’ Selected Works of Edmund Burke/Further Reflections on the French Revolution

(Burke 1999).

Let us therefore acknowledge the cultural-spiritual traditions that inspired human and religious rights and continue to uphold those rights, and not ban them from the state domain altogether in a uniform interpretation of secularism, making human rights the new religion.