The Dynamics of Islamic Radicalization in Bangladesh: Confronting the Crisis

Abstract

This article examines the implications of banning Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, from running in elections and the effect of the Bangladesh government’s co-optation of the radical Islamic group Hefazat-e-Islam. The article contends that more Islamic radicalization occurs as the opportunity for moderate Islamist parties decreases. Using a variety of qualitative methods, the article finds that banning Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami led to a rise in perceptions of the Bangladesh government as anti-Islamic. To counter that sentiment, the Awami League (AL) government co-opted the more radical Islamist organization Hefazat-e-Islam. Such acts increased Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s tendency to engage in violence. Moreover, radical Islamists working under Hefazat-e-Islam secured a window of opportunity for country-wide Islamic radicalization. Together these findings illuminate the tradeoffs faced by the Bangladesh government when confronted with religious radicalization in the political sphere, offering insights into how the Bangladesh government can better manage such tradeoffs in the future.

1. Introduction

On 1–2 July 2016, five militants seized the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. They took all customers and workers in the café as hostages and, ultimately, killed 22 of the patrons, including one American, four Bangladeshis, one Indian, nine Italians, and seven Japanese (Gohel 2016). The Islamic State (ISIS, or ISIL) declared responsibility for the attack via their news agency “Amaq” (Hammadi et al. 2016). The militants who attacked Holey Artisan were Bangladeshi and did not travel to Syria or Iraq but were inspired by ISIS and carried out the attack under ISIS’s advisory supervision. The militants’ main target was to kill the foreigners in the restaurant, claiming that they were the enemy of Islam (Manik and Anand 2016). All of the attackers were young, mostly in their early 20s. Of the six attackers, three came from wealthy families and had Western educations. It becomes apparent from the profile of these attackers that extremist ideology can influence not only the poor and uneducated but also the rich and educated to commit terrorist acts. On 5 July 2016, ISIS released a video through SITE intelligence in which a Bangladeshi national ISIS fighter in Syria mentioned the Holey Artisan attack and stated that “what you witnessed in Bangladesh … was a glimpse. This will repeat, repeat and repeat until you lose and we win and the sharia is established throughout the world” (Paul and Karla 2016). The video portrayed a clear message that ISIS would target Bangladesh for its terrorist activities. These incidents illustrate that the attack on Holey Artisan Bakery is not an isolated incident. Instead, these attacks reflect recent trends whereby some Bangladeshi citizens, regardless of their political affiliation, perceived that Islam was under attack. Following this, ISIS and Al Qaida (AQ) carried out deadly terrorist attacks to take advantage of people’s sentiments and protect Islam. It is evident that many people are becoming more religiously intolerant, and there is a sharp polarization between radical Islamists and secularists.

In this article, I investigate the underlying rationale for the rise of Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh over the past decade. I examine the roles of state and (non)state actors in the radicalization process. Using qualitative methods, I review secondary resources, including scholarly articles and reports generated by international organizations that reflect Islamic radicalization dynamics in Bangladesh. I also analyze Bangladeshi and international news reports and press releases to acquire further insights.

Since Bangladesh emerged as an independent state in 1971, almost all governments have used Islam as a tool for legitimacy. From 1975 to 1990, Bangladesh was ruled under military regimes. These regimes Islamized the country and tried to shape popular culture. Their purpose was not to introduce an Islamic state. Instead, they were interested in diffusing Islamic discourse in society so that other discourses, such as democratic discourse, would be overlooked (Riaz 2004, p. 139). From 1991 to 2006, Bangladesh was ruled by democratic institutions. Two major political parties, the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party) and the AL (Awami League), captured power in alternative election terms. Although these parties were elected democratically, they felt that they must establish the idea that they were the sole supporters of Islam. Therefore, they could safeguard Islam from imaginary threats. In continuation, these parties made alliances with Islamist groups; the party heads displayed personal piety just before the elections and delivered statements supporting the Islamic agenda (Siddiqi 2011, p. 20). All these factors, ultimately, set the political and social conditions leading to Islamic radicalization today.

Being a Muslim-majority state, Bangladesh has many moderate and radical Islamist groups. I argue that Islamic radicalization occurs when the opportunity for moderate Islamist parties decreases. In 2010, the Bangladesh Supreme Court prohibited religion-based politics (Chaudhury 2020). Following this, in 2013, the Bangladesh High Court canceled the registration of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (commonly referred to as Jamaat), the largest moderate Islamist political party in Bangladesh. Therefore, the party was banned from running in elections. Since 2013, Jamaat senior leaders have been prosecuted for war crimes under the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) Act. Banning Jamaat and prosecuting its top leaders propelled sentiment that the Bangladesh government is anti-Islamic. To counter that sentiment, the AL, the current ruling party, co-opted Hefazat-e-Islam (commonly referred to as Hefazat), a radical Islamist organization. It all started in 2013 when Hefazat organized a mass demonstration and challenged the AL government during the Shahbag movement. In response, the AL government negotiated several accommodations with the group so that Hefazat would avoid challenging the government (Fair and Patel 2020). However, these moves influenced the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami members to engage in violence. Moreover, the radical Islamists under the umbrella of Hefazat received a favorable environment to facilitate Islamic radicalization in the country.

Schmid (2013) distinguishes among the terms radicalism, radicalization, and extremism. According to Schmid (2013), radicalism may be characterized by two main elements representing thought/attitude and action/behavior. It entails advancing significant political changes, believing that the status quo is unsatisfactory while offering a fundamentally distinct alternative. Additionally, the process of implementing a radical, system-transforming solution can either be nonviolent and democratic (via convincing or reforming the system) or violent and undemocratic (via force or revolution) (p. 8). Schmid reviewed definitions of radicalization proposed by governments, international organizations, and think tanks. He concluded that radicalization is as “an individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarisation, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favour of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging” (p. 18). The process can encompass nonviolent coercion, political violence short of terrorism, or outright terrorism and war crimes. Since the existing system is no longer regarded as appropriate or legitimate, rebel factions perceive the world through a dichotomous lens and accept “an alternative focal point of political mobilization” beyond the conventional political system (p. 18). Schmid identifies extremism as “divisive and destructive.” Extremism can be both secular and religious. While radicals can be violent or nonviolent, they can be persuaded back to the mainstream, but extremist militants possess rigid “closed minds” and do not respond to persuasion (pp. 10, 55). In this article, I consider radicalization as a process of adopting more uncompromising views, which may include violent or nonviolent actions. In other words, radicalization is not necessarily associated with violent actions. Even if the action is nonviolent but intolerant of different views, the action is radicalized.

This article is concerned with Islamic radicalization. In general, Islamic radicalization refers to radicalization influenced by Islamic ideology. Many scholars offer several definitions of Islamic radicalization (Schmid 2014; Groppi 2017; Hashmi 2004), but most of them agree with the basic tenets of Islamic radicalization. They mostly define Islamic radicalization as a process where an individual or a group adopts strict interpretations of Islam, mostly based on Salafism. Such interpretations contradict the values of liberal democracy and may or may not justify violent action to undermine the democratic system. This process influences individuals or groups to embrace authoritarian characteristics, demonstrate an intolerant attitude towards other groups’ viewpoints through aggressive attitudes and hate speech, and disregard equal rights for all, including the rights of women and minorities.

For the purpose of this study, I combine several indicators of Islamic radicalization from the existing literature (Schmid 2014; Hashmi 2004; El-Said and Harrigan 2013; Groppi 2017) to define Islamic radicalization. These indicators are as follows: 1. reject different interpretations within Islam; 2. support violence to achieve goals, possess an intolerant view towards other religions, faiths, or culture; 3. oppose women’s liberation; 4. reject democracy but seek to establish sharia and/or have sympathy for Islamist extremists; 5. reject innovation; 6. support hate speech; 7. force people to follow Islamic rules. A radicalized person does not need to have all of these criteria, as even one is enough to convey radicalization. Persons or groups exhibiting more than one criterion will be considered more radicalized. Based on these indicators, I will explain why I consider Hefazat-e-Islam a radical Islamist organization (see Section 7).

Drawing from McAdam et al.’s (2001) Dynamics of Contention, I contend that several mechanisms of contentious politics, such as “attribution of threat and opportunity”, “framing of the dispute”, “competition among contenders”, “innovative collective action”, and “repression”, are at play. The remaining sections of this article proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical foundations of the study. Section 3 demonstrates that Islamic radicalization has increased in recent years. Section 4 outlines Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’s political challenges in recent years. Section 5 explores the Jamaat’s response to government repression and its gradual radicalization. Section 6 discusses Hefazat’s emergence as a powerful force in Bangladesh. Section 7 explains why the Hefazat is a more radical alternative to the Jamaat. Section 8 explores the interplay among the AL government, the Hefazat, and the Jamaat that contributes to Islamic radicalization. This section presents the risks posed by Hefazat’s increasing influence. Finally, Section 9 provides an overall conclusion and summarizes the study findings.

2. Theoretical Underpinnings

Mechanisms of contentious politics can be used to understand the rise of radicalization in Bangladesh. In their book Dynamics of Contention, McAdam et al. (2001) propose several mechanisms to understand the contentious political process. In doing so, they recognize similarities, dissimilarities, trajectories, and pathways of various ranges of contentious politics, including social movements, ethnic mobilization, revolutions, strike waves, wars, and democratization (p. 9). Generally, a social movement involves “a sustained challenge to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment” (Tarrow and Tilly 2007, p. 442). McAdam et al. (2001) identify varieties of mechanisms within a social movement agenda that assimilate “several variables into relation with one another and with other significant actors” (p. 43). The authors insist that several mechanisms that they propose can operate in different combinations in different contexts. Thus, the larger-scale effects of those mechanisms will also vary from case to case based on the settings, sequence, and combinations in which they operate. The key social mechanisms that McAdam et al. (2001) propose to understand transgressive mobilization include attribution of threat and opportunity, social appropriation, framing of the dispute, innovative collective action, identity shift, brokerage, category formation, object shift, polarization, competition, certification, decertification, diffusion, repression, radicalization, and convergence. In most cases, these mechanisms do not operate independently. Instead, they connect to other mechanisms in a chain to form broader processes. The authors reiterate that they are not interested in developing general theories of contention but in partial theories based on similar causal relations.

In my research, I employ a relational approach developed by McAdam et al. (2001) within the framework of contentious politics and social movements. A relational approach recognizes that different sequences and combinations of causal chains involving mechanisms can result in a variety of collective outcomes. Furthermore, the cultural and historical context affects the dynamics of contention. According to this perspective, radicalization is the result of complex and dynamic interactions of individuals, groups, and institutional actors (Della Porta 1995, 2013, 2018). Radical organizations are often split off from social movement organizations (Della Porta 2018). Thus, it is critical to identify the mechanisms within social movements that lead to radicalization.

I argue that as the opportunity for moderate Islamist parties decreases, there is an increase in Islamic radicalization. To support my argument, I identify five mechanisms developed by McAdam et al. (2001) that interplay in this context. These mechanisms include “attribution of threat and opportunity”, “framing of the dispute”, “competition among contenders”, “innovative collective action”, and “repression”. “Attribution of threat and opportunity” suggests that an actor reacts to threats and seizes an opportunity (McAdam et al. 2001). If the feelings of group threat are strong, the group members may resort to violence. However, in order to act and seize an opportunity, the actors/group members need a favorable environment where the opportunity structure can be perceived and balanced against the threat. The “framing of the dispute” is an essential mechanism to understand mobilization. “Framing” is not only used as a strategic tool of movement leaders but is also used as an instrumental tool for “challengers, their opponents, elements of the state, third parties, and the media” (ibid., p. 44). This whole process is an interactive construction of disputes. For instance, the political context helps to shape the demands, the media frames the movement for the participants and the audience, and the cultural resources determine the framing attempt of the movement leaders. In this way, the framing of the dispute mechanism functions through collective interpretation and social construction.

“Competition among contenders” is one of the most common mechanisms of dynamics of contention. This mechanism causes factionalism and reorientation (ibid., p. 33). When groups strive to achieve the same goals and target common constituencies, they are most likely to compete with one another. This competition causes them to differentiate themselves through varying goals and tactics (Della Porta 2018). McAdam et al.’s (2001) “innovative collective action” mechanism is a fluid concept that includes creative modifications of existing routines. Collective action is guided by “shared prior knowledge, connections among key individuals, and on-the-spot direction” (ibid., p. 49). Innovation is not just for challengers. Polity members and subjects can participate in innovative collective actions.

“Repression” is another mechanism that influences and supports waves of contention (McAdam et al. 2001). Repression occurs when groups or organizations become suppressed by the authority to restrict their demands. However, repression originates its own wave of demonstrations that intersect mass protests and elite politics (ibid., p. 180). Radicalization is more likely to occur if the state does not provide the movement with a platform to express their grievances peacefully and protests are policed (Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Della Porta 2013).

To influence radicalization, repression does not have to occur directly to oneself—people can also become radicalized if they see others being repressed. Marc Sageman (2008) suggests that the humiliation of Muslims triggers such reactions. He contends that radicalized people themselves do not feel humiliated. Instead, they feel immense anger and act in solidarity with their humiliated brothers. Media narratives fuel moral outrage through negative portrayals of events. This story is structured around the idea of an evil individual inflicting grave injury on an innocent victim. Watching images and videos depicting brutalities against Muslims, radicalized people seek to understand the environment. They connect this to their personal experience and perceive themselves as defenders of virtuous Islam. They accuse “Western values of greed and moral decadence” responsible for this situation (ibid., p. 80). Despite becoming radicalized, these individuals are not terrorists. Radicalized people could turn into terrorists if they are mobilized by networks guiding them to become violent radicals.

In Bangladesh, the AL regime transformed from a democratic regime into an electoral authoritarian regime in 2014. The regime is also recognized as a “hybrid regime”, as it resulted from a “manipulated general election in 2014, boycotted by all parties, paved the way for reversal of democracy” (Riaz 2019, p. 21). More specifically, Riaz and Parvez (2021) contend that the AL regime shifted from a competitive authoritarian regime to a hegemonic authoritarian regime from the 2014 election to the 2018 election. Electoral authoritarian regimes may seem democratic from a distant perspective. However, with a closer look, these regimes have established institutional facades of democracy. They hold regular multiparty elections to hide the realities of authoritarian governance (Schedler 2006). The electoral authoritarian regime employs several tactics to ensure its position in the government. These tactics include manipulating electoral rules, banning opposition candidates from participating in elections, infringing on citizens’ political rights and civil liberties, and impeding the mass media’s freedom. Before and after the 2014 election, the AL employed authoritarian manipulation tactics that secured its position in the government. To restrict the freedom of expression, the AL government employed the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act that targeted bloggers, journalists, and human rights activists who criticized authorities (Feldman 2015). Mahmudur Rahman, the editor of Amar Desh, a pro-opposition newspaper, was arrested for questioning the International Crimes Tribunal. The government also closed down Amar Desh’s print edition in April 2013 (Parvez 2022). The Rapid Action Battalion, the State Security Force, was involved in extrajudicial killings of political opponents of the AL during the election campaign (Feldman 2015).

Before the 2014 election, the AL suppressed the moderate Islamist party Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and co-opted a radical Islamic group Hefazat-e-Islam. According to Schedler (2015), the electoral authoritarian regime’s ultimate goal is to prevent the uncertainties of regime change, and it is expected that the AL government will try its best to prevent this. In continuation, the AL government executed several Jamaat leaders and banned the Jamaat from participating in the general election in 2013. Additionally, many of the Jamaat grassroots members and supporters were abducted, shot, and arrested by law enforcement officials (Human Rights Watch 2014a). All this caused a rise in sentiments that the Bangladesh government is anti-Islamic. Later, the AQ and ISIS exploited this sentiment and recruited many members to conduct terrorist attacks in Bangladesh in the name of protecting Islam.

In response to the threat posed by the government, Jamaat has also increased its involvement in violent demonstrations. After Jamaat’s registration was canceled and several of Jamaat’s leaders were executed, Jamaat members and supporters carried out a large number of attacks against law enforcement officials and the government between 2013 and 2018. During this contention between the AL and the Jamaat, the AL framed the Jamaat as razakars (anti-patriotic), pro-Pakistani, and a radical party. Conversely, the Jamaat framed the AL as anti-Islamic and pro-Indian. At the beginning of these tensions, when the Jamaat leaders were facing war crime trials in 2013, the Hefazat also protested in solidarity with the Jamaat against the Shahbag movement (organized by Bangladeshi secularist bloggers and students to demand the trial of Jamaat leaders responsible for war crimes in 1971) at Dhaka. Hefazat supported Jamaat during the Shahbag movement because it believed Islam was at risk in Bangladesh. However, later, Hefazat made a strong connection with the AL because it was convinced that it would be the sole powerful Islamic organization in the country in the absence of the Jamaat. Additionally, it would have access to government resources. Thus, Hefazat utilized the opportunity to compete with its contender Jamaat. Co-opting Hefazat was an innovative action from the perspective of the AL, because it wanted to establish a base of support among Islamist voters. In turn, Hefazat also received a favorable environment to facilitate radicalization in the country.

3. Measuring the Rise of Islamic Radicalization

My dependent variable is the rise of Islamic radicalization. While radicalization may or may not advocate for violence itself, terrorism is always followed by a radicalization process. Building upon Robert Pape (2006), Veldhuis and Staun (2009) state that, generally, radicalized people do not engage in terrorist activities. Terrorism can be considered “one of the worst possible, but nevertheless avoidable, outcomes of violent radicalization. In other words, although every terrorist is a radical, not every radical is a terrorist” (Veldhuis and Staun 2009, p. 6). Lidewijde Ongering, the Dutch Deputy National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, stresses that people experience the radicalization process before murdering other people for religious or political reasons (Ongering 2007). Based on this logic, I measure the rise in Islamic radicalization by the number of Islamist attacks in Bangladesh. In order to measure the number of Islamist attacks in Bangladesh, I utilized the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by The University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. The database includes only incidents that are reported in authentic open media sources.

The database shows that 118 Islamist attacks occurred in Bangladesh between 2000 and 2019 (

Table 1. Terrorist attacks by Islamic terrorist groups in Bangladesh (2000–2019).

Year	Number of Islamist Attacks
2000	0
2001	2
2002	2
2003	1
2004	3
2005	15
2006	3
2007	4
2008	0
2009	1
2010	2
2011	0
2012	0
2013	3
2014	5
2015	27
2016	26
2017	14
2018	2
2019	8
Total	118

Notes: Source: Global Terrorism Database (GTD) by The University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START 2022). Please see https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed on 20 June 2023). Note: This list does not include attacks by unknown perpetrators, since their motives are unknown.

). The perpetrator groups that led the attacks in the name of Islam in Bangladesh are Al Qaida, Al Qaida Network for South Western Khulna Division, Al Qaida in the Indian subcontinent, Al-Yakin Mujahidin, Ansarullah Bangla Team, Islamic Shahantantra Andolan (Islamic Freedom Movement), Hizb al-Tahrir al- Islami, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islam, Islamic State in Bangladesh, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jadid Al Qaida Bangladesh, Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Muslim Extremists, and Jamiat-ul-Mujaheden (JUM). The number of Islamist terrorist attacks from 2020 has not been considered in this study, considering that the COVID-19 pandemic began that year, which may affect the data itself.

There are numerous terrorist attacks in Bangladesh conducted by various groups. However, Table 1 only includes attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorist groups whose motivations are purely Islamist. The attacks conducted by Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami have not been listed here, as most of their attacks were against rescinding their party registration and executing their top leaders under the war crimes tribunal. During election periods, Jamaat also attacked minorities, and these attacks were motivated by Jamaat’s perception that Hindus always vote for the AL. Hefazat has targeted minorities several times over the past decade. At present, there is no public database that adequately documents attacks committed by Hefazat-e-Islam between 2009 and 2019. If those attacks were recorded correctly in the database, the number of Islamist attacks would have been much higher in the last few years.

Table 1 shows that Islamist attacks increased in Bangladesh from 2000 to 2019. Particularly, Islamist attacks increased gradually from 2013 to 2019 and sharply in 2015, 2016, and 2017 (between 2000 and 2012, the year 2005 indicated a spike in Islamist attacks, primarily perpetrated by JMB). This can be attributed to the rise of radicalization in Bangladesh. In 2013, the AL government cracked down on the Jamaat and banned it from running in general elections. In 2014, the AL shifted from a democratic regime to one ruled electoral authoritarian regime. At the same time, the AL co-opted Hefazat and kept meeting Islamist demands. In continuation, we can see the surge in Islamist attacks in 2015, 2016, and 2017. These attacks targeted secular intellectuals, minorities, atheists, civil society members, LGBT community members, etc. These trends are suggestive of the potential that the country’s shift towards an authoritarian regime, the government’s alliance with the radical Islamist organization, and suppression of the moderate Islamist party have, together, led to a rise in Islamic radicalization in the country.

4. Political Struggles of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami in Recent Years

Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami is the most influential Islamic political party in Bangladesh. Yet, it presently faces significant political challenges. Many Jamaat leaders have been accused of war crimes during the 1971 Liberation War and were tried before the court, leaving the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami leaderless. Additionally, the High Court has revoked the party’s registration and banned it from participating in general elections. The “framing of the dispute” mechanism worked here as the government framed the Jamaat as an anti-patriotic, war criminal, radical, and pro-Pakistani group. The Jamaat framed the government as a political opportunist, conspirator, anti-Islamic, and pro-Indian group. In addition, Islamic extremists from Bangladesh and worldwide promoted the narrative that Islam was under threat in Bangladesh.

Originally, the Jamaat-e-Islami was established by an Islamist thinker, Maulana Sayyid Abu’l A’la Maududi, in India in 1941 (Khan and Lutful 2020, p. 207). The Jamaat-e-Islami, as a social and political organization, was primarily dedicated to achieving a unified Islamic state in India. However, this vision was crushed because of India’s partition in 1947. Maududi believed that India was conspiring to divide Pakistan, the Muslim state, and the AL was helping India. Consequently, the Jamaat-e-Islami in East Pakistan supported the West Pakistani Army to suppress Mukti Bahini (freedom fighters) in East Pakistan. West Pakistan formed a group called the “East-Pakistan Central Peace Committee” (Shanti Committee) to conduct their military operations against Bengali freedom fighters. Ghulam Azam, the leader of the East Pakistan Jamaat, was one of the founders of the East-Pakistan Central Peace Committee. Many Jamaat members actively led branches of this committee. This committee was responsible for many war crimes. Jamaat also formed two other groups named “Al-Badar” and “Al Shams” to assist the West Pakistani Army (Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future 2017). Islami Chatra Shibir, the student wing of the East Pakistan Jamaat-e-Islami, established Al Badr, which is notorious for killing more than 200 Bengali intellectuals only two days before the final victory for East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

After the creation of Independent Bangladesh on 16 December 1971, top Jamaat leaders fled to Pakistan to escape prosecution as war criminals. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the President of Bangladesh, promulgated the country’s first Constitution that banned political parties based on religious belief. In addition, the ICT Act 1973 was enacted to prosecute war criminals. In 1974, Bangladesh signed a tripartite peace agreement with India and Pakistan and released 195 Pakistani soldiers who were accused of war crimes without trial (Ahamed 2014). Bangladesh’s foreign minister announced that “the Government of Bangladesh had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency” (Weinraub 1974). Consequently, the Jamaat members in Bangladesh who supported the Pakistani army perceived this incident as a signal of general amnesty from the Bangladesh government.

During the Zia regime (1975–1981), the Jamaat regained its eligibility to participate in political activities (Griffiths and Hasan 2015). Under the Ershad regime (1981–1990), the Jamaat introduced itself as a full-fledged religious political party in the country. In 1984, the Jamaat registered as a political party and developed its institutional strength. During the late 1980s, the Jamaat joined the BNP and AL in their struggle against the autocratic rule of General Ershad (Islam 2015). Towards the end of the 1990s, General Ershad resigned, and parliamentary elections were held in 1991. During the election, the Jamaat won 18 seats out of 222; the party contested and became the fourth biggest political party in the legislature. With Jamaat’s help, the BNP formed a government in 1991. However, Jamaat’s relationship with the BNP rapidly fell apart.

In 1996, the Jamaat participated in a movement with the AL that led to the thirteenth Constitutional Amendment, which stipulated that an interim government must be in place for three months before any future elections can be held (Shehabuddin 2008). Although the AL branded itself a secular political party, it allied with the Jamaat in the 1996 election (Hasan 2020). In the election, the AL won, but the Jamaat performed very poorly, and the alliance between the AL and Jamaat broke apart. In the 2001 general election, Jamaat joined the four-party alliance led by the BNP (Islam 2021). The four-party alliance won over two-thirds of the parliamentary seats and formed the government. Two Jamaat leaders were appointed to the cabinet. Similar to the 2001 general election, Jamaat participated in the election of 2008 as an alliance member of the BNP-led four-party alliance. The AL and its alliance won the election by a huge margin. Jamaat only secured 2 out of the 39 seats it contested in the 2008 election.

One of the AL’s 2008 election manifestos was to prosecute the 1971 war criminals under the war crimes tribunal. As soon as the AL came to power, it decided to punish the Jamaat for its crimes during Bangladesh’s Liberation War in 1971. The original International Crimes (Tribunals) Act was enacted by the AL government in July 1973. According to the Act, the tribunal can punish anyone, regardless of nationality, who commits a crime on Bangladeshi soil. The AL amended the act in 2009 and tried the top Jamaat leaders (Khan and Lutful 2020, p. 215). Among the most significant changes to the 1973 ICT Act was the extension of ICT to “organizations” instead of only to “individuals” (Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh: Past, Present and Future 2017).

The ICT Act tried several political leaders, including the nine most senior leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and two leaders of the BNP (Bangladesh War Crimes Trial: Key Accused 2016). Considering that most of the defendants are Jamaat members, the Jamaat asserted that the ICT was politically motivated (Riaz 2014). Jamaat published a leaflet on their website named “Jamaat e Islami k nischinno korar Awami shorojontro” (Awami conspiracy to wipe out Jamaat-e-Islami), which states that the Jamaat leaders who are accused of war crimes were not accused previously in the Collaborators Act 1972 (previous act to prosecute the local collaborator who supported West Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War). In addition, none of the Jamaat leaders were listed among the 195 war criminals who were released without trial under the tripartite peace agreement in 1974 (Awami Conspiracy to Wipe Out Jamaat-e-Islami 2014, p. 14).

The pamphlet insists that Jamaat leaders were not engaged in war crimes; if they were engaged in such acts, they would not be elected by the people in general elections. The leaflet claims that Jamaat was not serving the interest of the AL. Jamaat made strong alliances with the opposition BNP and worked as a kingmaker in the country’s general elections. This led the AL to abolish Jamaat from the country’s political platform. Thus, the AL organized the war tribunal and prosecuted Jamaat leaders illegally (ibid., pp. 15, 16).

In 2010, the Bangladesh Supreme Court overturned most of the provisions of the 5th Amendment, which resulted in criminalizing religion-based political activity (Chaudhury 2020). In August 2013, the Bangladesh High Court ruled that Jamaat’s registration with the Election Commission was invalid. The party was disqualified from contesting future elections on the grounds that the charter violated the Constitution’s secular provisions. According to Dhaka’s legal experts, the ruling did not declare the party illegal but prohibited it from participating in elections (Bhattacharjee 2014).

The High Court petition argued that the Jamaat qualifies as a communal party. The Jamaat rejects the belief that the people are the source of all power as well as the state representatives have undisputed authority in making laws. Additionally, the Jamaat’s charter allows for religious and gender discrimination. It prohibits a woman or a non-Muslim holding the top position. In 2018, the Election Commission also canceled Jamaat’s registration. In 2022, the Election Commissioner stated that Jamaat’s registration was revoked because its charter violated the Constitution and Liberation War spirit. If Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami meets all constitutional requirements and excludes all war criminals from the party, they can register under a different name (Jamaat-e-Islami Can Get Registered If Conditions Are Met 2022).

The decision to ban Jamaat from running in elections based on its ideology is contradictory from the standpoint of a secular and inclusive democratic system. According to Dr. Amena Mohsin, a political analyst at Dhaka University, the court can expel Jamaat because of its criminal acts in 1971 but not for its ideological basis. She contends, “secular democracy accommodates all kinds of ideological political parties. This kind of system gives you space. It is up to the people to accept a party or not” (Kumar 2013). Thus, banning a party based on its ideology violates the principle of secular democracy.

5. Jamaat’s Response to Repression

Della Porta (2018) suggests that victims of brutal repression are likely to become radicalized. Additionally, when people perceive repression as indiscriminate and targeting both nonviolent and violent militant groups, they feel a strong sense of solidarity with militant groups. Over the past decade, the state has repressed Jamaat members and sympathizers. Not all Jamaat supporters, whom the government repressed, were engaged in violence. Thus, state repression has increased Jamaat supporters’ likelihood of becoming radicalized and supporting militant groups in the future.

Since 2013, several human rights organizations reported that law enforcement officials abducted, shot, and arrested many Jamaat members and supporters. According to Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 and 2018, Jamaat activists claimed they were arrested, tortured, and killed by security forces, including the Detective Branch. The 2016 report mentioned that when a Jamaat supporter was found dead after being arrested by police, the police claimed that he was killed as a result of a crossfire between Jamaat supporters and police. In addition, several Jamaat supporters claimed that they were shot while in police custody (Human Rights Watch 2016). The 2018 report stated that Jamaat supporters were severely tortured by police while in custody, including drowning, beating, and shooting. Between 1 November and 13 December 2018, Jamaat estimated that 1858 members were detained by police (Human Rights Watch 2018).

Using the “attribution of threat and opportunity” mechanism, we know that group members can resort to violence if they feel threatened. The Jamaat also retaliated against the police, perpetrating numerous violent acts. In particular, the Jamaat has engaged in violent demonstrations over the past decade. According to data collected by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, Jamaat was responsible for 76 attacks from 2000 to 2018 (START 2022). Jamaat carried out 71 out of 76 attacks in the time span between 2013 and 2018. Most of the violent demonstrations were primarily protesting government policies, including banning the party from running in elections, executing party leaders, and detaining party supporters. Jamaat mostly targeted the police and the government. Sometimes, the group also attacked citizens’ property, religious institutions, transportation, and educational institutions. Several people were injured and killed during the clashes.

According to Esposito (2007), Islamic political movements may pursue both radicalization and democratization paths. Individual countries’ political, economic, and social realities will shape the movements’ development. He contends that “a more open political system will enable the development of mainstream Islamic movements that pursue democratization; more repressive regimes, as in the past, will feed the growth of extremism and terrorism” (Esposito 2007, p. 32). As government repression increases, Jamaat’s engagement in violence increases as well. Another serious concern is that the Jamaat may become a solely militant group in the near future. In terms of banning religion-based politics in Bangladesh, Motiur Rahman Nizami, the then head of Jamaa-e-Islami, who was later executed by the war crimes tribunal, provided his views during an interview with PROBE. He said (The Interview of Maulana Motiur Rahman Nizami n.d.),

“Awami League wants to prohibit religion-based politics. What does this mean? On one hand they are speaking against militancy; on the other hand, they want to ban the politics of the Islamic organisations which are involved in the democratic political process. By permanently banning religion-based democratic organisations, they are pushing them towards militancy. This is very short-sighted on their behalf. It cannot help in keeping Again, they speak against religion-based politics, yet they signed a memorandum of understanding with a religious party for the sake of the election. They signed an agreement with Azizul Huq’s Islami Oikya Jote. So isn’t this self-contradictory? …”

The above speech indicates that there is a possibility that the Jamaat might resort to militancy if they do not get the opportunity to run in elections. In a narrow political space, the opposition has difficulty challenging the state within the system (Hasan and Macdonald 2022). In turn, this condition creates frustration and anger among the opposition, leading to a situation in which the opposition resorts to violence to challenge the state. Ultimately, this could lead to the Jamaat becoming more radical and embracing militancy.

6. Rise of Hefazat-e-Islam in Bangladesh

In January 2010, the Hefazat-e-Islam (protector of Islam), a fundamentalist Islamic Association, was formed to oppose the plan of providing women the same inheritance rights as men (Griffiths and Hasan 2015). The association was composed of the teachers of many Qawmi madrasahs in Chittagong, Bangladesh. Under the leadership of Shah Ahmed Shafi, it supervised 12,000 Quranic students (Bouissou 2013). It came into the spotlight when it demanded a 13-point program and organized a mass demonstration in 2013 during the Shahbag movement (Ruud and Hasan 2021; Oldmixon 2016). The Shahbag movement, branded as a secularist movement, was organized in February 2013 against war criminals (mostly Jamaat leaders). It was organized by students, writers, bloggers, and other civil society members. Some of the bloggers who founded the movement were atheists and anti-Islamic. Observing that the Shahbag movement demanded capital punishment for top Jamaat leaders and many of the representatives of the movement were atheists, Hefazat believed that Islam was under threat in Bangladesh. Following the “attribution to threat and opportunity” mechanism, Hefazat members resorted to violence. By labeling the movement as “un-Islamic”, Hefazat seized the opportunity to convince Islamic-minded people that Islam was at risk and that their decision to organize mass demonstrations was valid.

On 5 May 2013, the Hefazat arranged a rally in Dhaka. The primary purpose of their rally was to pressure the AL government to enact their 13-point demand. Consequently, they vandalized and torched several possessions at Motijheel, Dhaka. The 13-point demand includes some of the hardline policies similar to the Taliban’s rule, such as an anti-blasphemy law, punishment of people (especially bloggers) who “insult Islam”, the annulment of women’s development policy, a ban on alien culture, a ban on men and women mixing in public, a declaration of Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims, a ban on public sculptures, and the abolishment of anti-Islamic activities by nongovernmental organizations (Mustafa 2013; Hossain 2013).

In response to Hefazat’s demonstrations, the security forces ran an operation against the Hefazat to push them out of the city (Ashraf 2013). According to a 2014 Human Rights Watch report, 50 people were killed, and many were injured during the demonstration between Hefazat and government security forces (Human Rights Watch 2014b). According to a report published by Odhikar, a Bangladesh-based human rights organization, 61 people were killed by security forces in the overnight protests against the AL government (Amnesty International Press Release 2014). The Odhikar report also stated that the organization was concerned that a section of educated society was silent despite the high death toll publicized. Additionally, during the crackdown on the demonstrators, the government switched off the electricity supply around Motijheel. It shut down two pro-opposition TV channels and blocked other media from covering the story. These actions demonstrated the government’s desire to hide the extent of violence and the number of deaths and injuries it caused (Fact Finding Report, Odhikar 2013).

However, after the publication of the report, the secretary and director of Odhikar were charged and captured by security forces under section 57 of the ICT Act. This Act itself violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which Bangladesh is a state party. The government alleged that Odhikar falsely reported against government security forces regarding 61 extrajudicial killings. However, both Odhikar officials were later released on bail (Amnesty International Press Release 2014). These efforts at suppressing the condemnation against the government also questioned the role of the government and generated sympathy for the Hefazat-e-Islam activists.

Some leaders of Hefajat-e-Islam had ties to the Taliban. A key organizer of the Hefazat’s rally in May 2013, Maulana Habibur Rahman, had previously worked with the Taliban in Afghanistan. An article published in the Bangladeshi newspaper “The Daily Star” revealed that Habibur visited Taliban militant camps and met Osama bin Laden in 1988 (Manik 2013). In light of such connections, it can be seen why the Hefazat is inclined towards setting up Taliban-style rule in Bangladesh. AL’s handling of Hefazat in May 2013 by killing its members played directly into Hefazat’s strategy of gaining sympathy from regular people. After this incident, people started to perceive the Hefazat as a victim of the government instead of a perpetrator.

Soon after the AL understood that Hefazat was gaining public sympathy, the AL changed its strategy. However, once again, it was a mistake by the government that facilitated Islamic extremism in the country. The AL knew that Hefazat had the potential to cause unrest, particularly during the Shahbag period when war crime trials were in progress. Thus, the AL made attempts to win over the Hefazat. It was the AL’s innovative collective action that developed a bond with the Hefazat. In continuation, the government arrested atheist bloggers under section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the 2006 ICT Act of Bangladesh on the grounds of offending religious sentiments. Additionally, to control the situation, the government called on the assistance of the party-affiliated Ulema League and Anjumaan-e-Baiyanat (Pattanaik 2020).

7. What Makes the Hefazat a More Radical Alternative to the Jamaat?

Jamaat can be considered a moderate Islamist party, as it believes Islam and democracy can coexist. The party is still Islamist, but Jamaat’s current rhetoric has changed considerably from its original position. It now possesses a moderate position regarding the principles of democracy, including women’s rights. Additionally, Jamaat formally acknowledged the 1971 Liberation War in its Constitution in 2008 (Hajjaj 2023; Momen 2009). Conversely, Hefazat believes that the Islamic Khilafat can take on the democratic order and offer a viable alternative (Wolf 2022). The group holds an ultraconservative outlook on social issues, including opposing the secular education system and women’s rights.

Despite Jamaat being the largest Islamist party in the country, Jamaat’s election performance suggests that its chances of ruling the country independently are extremely slim. Thus, Jamaat must form a coalition with other political parties to form a government. Since 1991, Jamaat has allied with BNP, the leading political party in Bangladesh. Jamaat and BNP, however, have different ideologies. BNP’s alliance with the Jamaat was not ideological but strategic (Rahman 2007, p. 228). Allying with the BNP made the Jamaat more liberal, not the other way around. Rahman (2007) argues that many predicted the BNP government would speed up the Islamization program because of the Jamaat’s influence during the 2001 BNP-led coalition government. In reality, nothing like that happened. In order to rule the country, Jamaat became “less doctrinaire and more pragmatic” (p. 229).

For Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, the organization’s constitution (Section 3) declares that it aims “to establish a welfare society based on equity and justice through democratic strategies and to attain the satisfaction of Almighty Allah (The Constitution Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami 2017)”. Chapter I, Section 6 of its constitution states that the permanent program of Jamaat shall try to bring honest and morally upright people to leadership positions by changing the government in a legitimate and democratic manner. The organization’s constitution provides the power to the Majlish e Shura (central committee) to take necessary steps in order to “defend the independence, democracy and sovereignty of the country whenever necessary” (section 20, 2(g)).

In terms of women’s rights, Jamaat’s current position has shifted significantly from its original stance. According to its founder, Maududi, women have a divinely assigned place at home. This has changed over time, and the group now emphasizes the importance of women in society. The Jamaat is now encouraging women to become active in politics, education, and other public aspects of life. Current Jamaat leaders still believe women should perform domestic duties. However, they also emphasize that Islam recognizes women as “individuals” who have their own responsibilities towards God and Islam, along with the right of women to “study, work and vote” (Shehabuddin 2008, p. 578).

Jamaat adapted to the “local social and political” environment of the country and realized that they needed to function in a democratic polity and compete with more secular parties of the country (ibid., p. 577). Jamaat understood that to win elections as a political party, they required support from the educated middle class and the illiterate and poor sections of the country. One of the major reasons Jamaat performed poorly in the 1996 election was its opposition to poor women’s involvement in NGOs. Jamaat learned its lessons and tried to attract poor women’s support by addressing their educational and employment opportunities concerns. In the waz mahfils, Jamaat speakers also started to emphasize the significance of women to Allah. Delawar Hossain Saidi, the influential speaker of the Jamaat, delivered a sermon at a waz mahfil that men and women are equal before God and will be rewarded equally for the same acts (ibid., p. 593). Saidi also stressed that women cannot refuse to get an education, work, or start a business just because they are born women. The only restriction is that all these things must be conducted in purdah. Jamaat understood that only the spiritual promise of direct admission to heaven for voting for the Jamaat was not enough to attract poor women’s votes. Jamaat had to introduce a broader platform that addressed the needs of poor women. This included starting social welfare programs or supporting NGO activities to demonstrate that they were serious about improving women’s lives. Before elections, Jamaat instructed women voters to vote independently of their husbands’ wishes.

The official website of the Jamaat mentions that during the part of the coalition government, the Jamaat minister established a national entrepreneur forum to create jobs for women and support their participation in small and cottage businesses. Jamaat, as an organization, seeks to attract women members. There is a separate female section of Jamaat dedicated to the work among women. In 2001, when Jamaat was a part of the coalition government, the party had four female legislators out of 30 reserved seats for females (Five Years of Four Party Alliance Government 2012). Even though Jamaat has publicly endorsed increasing women’s representation in parliament, accepted women’s quotas in parliament, and served in a coalition government led by a woman prime minister, the party does not nominate women candidates directly for parliament (Shehabuddin 2008). In other words, Jamaat’s women members do not hold high-level decision-making positions in the party.

The Hefazat-e Islam is an influential Islamic group in Bangladesh. More than 25,000 madrassas in Bangladesh are part of the Hefazat coalition (Mustafa 2013). If I compare my perceived indicators of Islamic radicalization that I mentioned at the beginning of this paper (see Section 1), Hefazat meets all the criteria of being an Islamic radicalized group. The group dismisses other interpretations of Islam, which can be seen in its effort to declare the Ahmadiyya as non-Muslims. Hefazat supports violence to achieve its goal, as evidenced when the group engages in violent demonstrations to oppose France and India. The group opposes women’s liberation as its former Ameer Shafi advocated not sending girls to school. It further seeks to establish Sharia as its late leader Babunagari promoted Sharia law and sought to establish a caliphate (Choudhury 2023). The group rejects innovation and supports hate speech as it demands to punish all Bangladeshi atheist bloggers. Hefazat also forces people to follow Islamic rules as it advocates ending Western cultural intrusions.

Hefazat claims that it is not interested in politics and has no desire to obtain power through elections. Still, Hefazat has certainly made its presence felt in the political arena by making intense demands of the government. It has organized several protests and rallies in the country to press its demands. Hefazat has also been accused of inciting violence and causing disruption in the country. In 2013, the movement gathered the most support when it protested against atheist bloggers. Complying with Hefazat’s radical demands will undoubtedly restrict freedom of expression and minority rights.

Hefazat has a record of engaging in terrorist activities both directly and indirectly. In 2013, one of the Hefazat-controlled madrasahs at Chittagong was found manufacturing bombs and explosives (Sengupta 2013). In addition to engaging in terrorist activities, Hefazat members and leaders often make provocative statements at religious gatherings, such as waz mahfils, and in social media posts (Zayeef 2021). A 2018 International Crisis Group Report shows how Hefazat facilitated terrorist activity indirectly. During the 2013 Shahbag protest, Hefazat compiled a list of 84 bloggers and activists and submitted it to the government. Hefazat accused these bloggers of making disparaging remarks about Islam. Therefore, Hefazat demanded the prosecution and execution of these bloggers. Soon after, the Ansarullah Bangla Team, a terrorist group, utilized Hefazat’s list of bloggers to target them for assassination and started executing secular bloggers. The government also extrajudicially killed many Hefazat members during the Shahbag protest. Ansar Ullah Bangla Team used this event to recruit followers by posting images of the 2013 Hefazat protest victims on its telegram channel (Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh 2018).

In regard to women’s rights, the Hefazat-e-Islam has an extremely conservative stance. The organization itself was formed to protest the Women’s Development Policy (Nari Unnayan Niti) draft (Wolf 2022). Hefazat perceived the equal inheritance policy as a threat to Islamic values. The organization continued vocalizing its opposition to women’s rights, claiming they should not participate in public life. Shafi, the then Hefazat chief, stated that women should not be “seen” outside the boundaries of a home because they are like tamarind, which causes “men’s hearts to salivate upon seeing them” (Amin 2020). The head of the Hefazat was very vocal in his opposition to women’s education. In January 2019, Shafi declared at the annual waz mahfil held at Hathazari Madrasah that girls should not be allowed to study beyond fourth or fifth grade. He stated (Islam and Hossain 2019),

“Do not let girls study at schools and colleges. At best, you can allow them to study up to fourth or fifth grade. If you let them study any more… You have seen in the newspapers that… If you educate your girl up to ninth, tenth, MA, BA levels then that girl will be out of your control.”

He also added that girls will be snatched away from their parents if parents educate them, so parents need to promise to prevent their daughters from continuing their education. Later, the Organizing Secretary of Hefazat responded to Shafi’s comments. He said Shafi had stated that if girls wanted to study higher education, separate educational institutions were needed to protect them from eve-teasing and sexual violence. In 2015, the Hefazat head made another controversial statement against women. Shafi said women’s dresses are to blame for rape (Das 2018). He implied that nonadherence to the Islamic dress code was the cause of rape. His statement sparked a victim-blaming and misogyny culture. In social media, his followers conveyed the message that Bangladeshi women may suffer rape if they do not wear Islamic clothing.

On 6 April 2013, when Hefazat members gathered to protest atheist bloggers in Dhaka, they brutally beat a female journalist from Ekushe Television, named Nadia Sharmin (Nadia Sharmin 2014). For Hefazat, her fault was covering the event despite being a female journalist. While beating Sharmin, Hefazat members asked her if she had read the 13-point demands and if she knew women were not allowed to attend these events (Dehlvi 2013). The Hefazat-e-Islam rally was also filled with many instances of other women being harassed for not wearing burqas or head scarves or simply for appearing in a “man’s space” (Nadia Sharmin 2014). Sharmin’s experience is a reminder of the danger female journalists and, in general, women working outside may confront due to radical people who support radical ideologies similar to Hefazat members.

It has not been argued here that the Jamaat is a particularly progressive political party. Instead, while recognizing the Jamaat is an Islamist party, I maintain that the Jamaat has adopted moderate roles to compete in elections. In the end, it is a political party that wants to win elections. As a result, it understands that it must change from a conservative to a moderate position in order to attract all types of voters. On the other hand, Hefazat is not a political party. Thus, it does not have to adapt to the country’s social environment. Therefore, it is just a mouthpiece of radical Islamist organizations that presses the government to adopt conservative policies.

8. Threat of Islamist Radicalization: Understanding the Interplay between the AL Government, the Hefazat, and the Jamaat

As the government continued to co-opt Hefazat, the Islamist groups under the umbrella of Hefazat continued to take advantage of political opportunities. This has led to an increase in Islamic radicalization. Hefazat was closer to the AL government when it was led by Ameer Shafi. When Shafi died in 2020, Junaid Babunagari took over as Ameer of Hefazat, and he was not close to the AL. Accordingly, the AL and Hefazat had strong ties until 2020. However, there is still a faction within Hefazat that has close ties to the AL. Until 2020, the government frequently met Hefazat’s irrational demands, and even after 2020, there is no doubt that Hefazat will continue to exert a powerful influence on the country and facilitate further radicalization.

In 2013, the AL repressed Hefazat during the Shahbag movement but quickly co-opted it. Using the “innovative collective action” mechanism, the AL adopted a modified course of action. The AL’s decision was guided by knowledge, such as Hefazat’s popularity and ability to create turmoil during war crime trials to the extent that it could collapse the government. In addition, there was a growing perception that the AL regime was anti-Islamic, which arose due to banning the Jamaat. Thus, the AL made a connection with Hefazat Ameer Shafi and co-opted the organization. Dhaka Tribune, a leading newspaper, reported that since the 2013 Shahbag event, the government has controlled all Hefazat’s top leaders (Miazee 2017).

As the AL co-opted Hefazat, the group envisioned an opportunity to become the country’s most powerful Islamic organization by replacing the Jamaat. The “competition among contenders” mechanism worked here. Under this mechanism, contenders compete to attain power and resources. Because of the absence of the Jamaat, Hefazat became the dominant Islamist organization and successfully pressed the government to meet their radical demands. Additionally, Hefazat has benefited financially from its collaboration with the government (Pattanaik 2020). For instance, many AL members have made donations to the organization. To improve the relationship between the AL and Hefazat, a 33-acre piece of railway land was leased by the government to expand the Hathazari madrasah in Chittagong. Furthermore, government officials have also been attending the events organized by Hefazat. In June 2023, the Home Minister of Bangladesh attended an event as a chief guest at Hathazari madrasah organized by Hefazat (Home Minister Visits Hathazari Madrassah in Chattogram 2023). All of these activities indicate progress towards strengthening the relationship between the two organizations.

According to Della Porta (2013), radicalization occurs when police conduct indiscriminate repression, and the state seems to overreact to challengers. A sense of injustice increases when the state represses some groups’ violent activity but tolerates other groups’ violence (Della Porta 2018). The AL government suppresses Jamaat’s violent protests against government policies, while Hefazat’s violent behaviors are tolerated. For example, police repeatedly failed to protect the Hindu community from Hefazat activists in 2021 (Wolf 2022). This may lead the Jamaat supporters feel more at odds.

The “framing of the dispute” mechanism has played a significant role in the context of radicalization in Bangladesh. Jamaat framed the AL government as an “anti-Islamic” party. Hefazat framed the Shahbag movement as an “un-Islamic” movement. Consequently, many Islamists perceived the war crimes trials as a threat to Islam. AQ and ISIS utilized this sentiment and took advantage of the situation. In continuation, they framed the narrative that Islam is in danger in Bangladesh and needs to be protected. They urged Muslims to “confront the crusader onslaught against Islam”. In January 2014, Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the AQ leader, posted a video on social media titled “Bangladesh: Massacre Behind a Wall of Silence”, where he argued that the security forces in Bangladesh are consistently conducting atrocities against pro-Islamic protesters. Thus, he urged Bangladeshi Muslim scholars and clerics to take the lead, teaching Bangladeshis what it means to defend Islam and to be martyrs (Roul 2016). As Sageman (2008) suggested, seeing others being repressed (or humiliated) may lead people to become radicalized. Moral outrage arises when people perceive that a blatant physical injustice is committed against an individual, such as killing, injury, rape, or arrest. Similarly, in response to the video by the AQ, many people became enraged and motivated to defend Islam. In this way, by using the “framing of the dispute” mechanism, the AQ influenced Islamic extremists in Bangladesh. Islamic terrorist organizations, such as Ansarullah Bangla 7, were founded, grew, and attacked civilians, including non-Muslims, atheists, and gays. In 2016, all these subsequent events triggered the young Bangladeshis to become radicalized and carry out the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in support of ISIS.

Despite the horrific attacks at Holey Artisan Bakery in 2016, the AL continued to co-opt Hefazat, exacerbating Islamist radicalization threats. One of Hefazat’s many irrational demands to the government was to exclude the Lady Justice statue from the Supreme Court premises. The sculpture was a representation of the Greek goddess Themis wearing shari (Bengali traditional dress) and holding a sword and scales (Safi 2017). Hefazat argued that the sculpture does not represent Bangladesh; Islam prohibits idol worship and, therefore, the sculpture needs to be excluded from the Supreme Court Premises. Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister and the head of the AL, ordered the removal of the Lady Justice statue from the Supreme Court in April 2017 (Miazee 2017).

In 2017, the Bangladesh Education Ministry removed 17 poems and stories from Bengali textbooks because of Hefazat’s demands. The conservative Islamist group claimed that these poems and stories represented atheism and, therefore, should be excluded. Eventually, the government gave in and edited the book according to the demands. Additionally, other changes were made to the textbook. For instance, first graders were taught that “o” symbolizes “orna”, which is a scarf worn by religious Muslim girls from puberty, not “ol”, a kind of vegetable (Barry and Manik 2017). In eighth grade, “Ramayan Kahini” (Story of Ramayan), related to the Hindu religion, was excluded. The literature of many well-known authors, such as Sharat Chandra Chattopadhyay and Rabindranath Tagore, has been deleted (Bangladesh Textbooks Erase Hindu Literary Giants 2020). Even though the Bangladesh Education Board denied any link between Islamic groups’ demands and textbook changes, Hefazat leader Mufti Fayez Ullah stated that they requested that higher government officials make these changes. The government understood their point and made the necessary changes (Barry and Manik 2017). The textbook of the madrasah also changed following the demands of conservative Islamic groups. For example, Islamists requested that beautiful Muslim names be substituted for Hindu, Christian, or foreign names in the madrasah textbook. Additionally, they requested that talking between boys and girls be omitted, stating Islam prohibits speaking to a young girl without a reason. Subsequently, these demands have been met regarding changing names to Muslim ones and excluding conversations between boys and girls in English textbooks.

As the AL complied with Hefazat’s demands, Hefazat’s courage increased. Hefazat began to propose another round of revisions. For instance, one of Hefazat’s leaders suggested that rather than teaching children to portray living things, which is prohibited by Islam, arts and crafts courses should instead teach calligraphy. Further, the group wanted physical education textbooks to eliminate images of women and girls exercising. The group wants to enforce the complete separation of boys and girls from the fifth grade onwards (Barry and Manik 2017). The trend of these demands is evident: conservative Islamic groups such as the Hefazat will never be satisfied until they convert Bangladesh into an Islamist country. Complying with their demands encourages these groups to continue their agenda of diffusing radicalization in the country.

For many years, Islamists demanded recognition of the Qwami degree (highest madrasah degree) as the equivalent of a master’s degree in Islamic Studies and Arabic. In August 2018, the AL regime recognized this demand and made Qwami (also spelled as Qawmi or Quomi) degrees equivalent to master’s degrees in Islamic studies and Arabic. Qwami madrasahs are not under the supervision of the government, and their curriculum is also not comparable to general education. Consequently, past governments have not recognized its highest degree. Prior to the 2006 general election, the then BNP government decided to recognize the Qwami degree but was unable to implement the decision because of time constraints. Finally, under the AL government, Islamists, especially the Hefazat, succeeded in obtaining official state recognition for the Qwami madrasah Dawra certificates. Civil society in Bangladesh explicitly criticized the government’s decision to recognize the Qwami degree without revising the syllabus and curriculum (Master’s Status for Top Qawmi Degree: Towards Legal Recognition 2018). In contrast, Islamists do not agree that the curriculum for the Dawra degree needs to be changed. On 3 November 2018, Hefazat leader Shafi arranged a “shokrana mahfil”. In the mahfil, Shafi declared Sheikh Hasina as the “mother of Qwami” because of Hasina’s contribution in acknowledging the Qwami degree as a parallel to a postgraduate degree (Fair 2019).

Rather than dismissing Hefazat’s irrational demands, the AL government continued negotiating with the group. Consequently, the country experienced a surge in extremist views. Hefazat’s intolerance tried to undermine Bangladesh’s relations with countries like France and India under the leadership of Babunagari. In 2020, a refugee from Chechnya executed a French teacher for drawing caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad during class. French President Emmanuel Macron described this event as an “Islamist terrorist attack”. Following this, Hefazat led a demonstration in Dhaka, Bangladesh, against the French President’s remarks, where 50,000 demonstrators gathered. Hefazat called on the Bangladeshi government to criticize the French President. The group urged the Bangladeshi government to sever diplomatic ties with France and close the French embassy in Dhaka within 24 h (Mahmud 2020; Bodetti 2020). The group also asked people to boycott French products.

In March 2021, Narendra Modi, the Indian Prime Minister, visited Bangladesh for its 50th independence anniversary (Mohan 2021). Hefazat orchestrated violent protests against Narendra Modi, resulting in 12 casualties (Ali 2022). During the protest, the Bangladesh parliament’s official Twitter account tweeted that Hefazat received funding for the protest against Modi from the Pakistani military intelligence agency, ISI (Mohan 2021). According to the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) investigation, some Jamaat and Hefajat leaders are affiliated with the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (Roul and Nayak 2021).

Hindus have always been targeted by Islamist parties and organizations. In 2001, when the four-party alliance formed the government, Jamaat was instrumental in exterminating the Hindu minority. However, since 2013, Hefazat has become the representative of the country’s fundamental Islamic associations and plays a vital role in spreading radicalization. In no way do they have a better record than the Jamaat in treating religious minorities of the country. Instead, in some cases, they are responsible for creating mayhem for religious minorities. According to Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), a prominent human rights organization in Bangladesh, Hindus were attacked 3679 times during the period from January 2013 to September 2021 (With 3679 Attacks in 9 Years, Bangladesh’s Hindus at Regular Threat of Violence: ASK 2021). These attacks included murder, physical violence, and property destruction, such as vandalizing temples and idols, destroying houses, and attacks on business organizations. The ASK has reported that 559 houses, 442 shops and businesses, and 1678 Hindu temples were attacked by fundamentalists from 2013 to 2021. In 2016, seven Hindus were killed, the highest number of deaths in this period. Since 2013, the Jamaat has weakened, and the Hefazat rules the country’s Islamic organizations. It is more likely that Hefazat supporters were responsible for most attacks against Hindu minorities.

Media reports indicate that Hefazat members and supporters attacked religious minorities throughout the years. For example, in 2021, they perpetrated the most violent communal violence against Hindus in years. In March 2021, a Hindu man posted a social media post criticizing a speech given by Mamunul Haque, the Joint Secretary General of Hefazat (Wolf 2022). In response, thousands of Hefazat members and supporters attacked that Hindu man’s village in Shunamganj (Sakib 2021). They destroyed homes and businesses, leading to the displacement of many Hindu families. Another incident occurred in October 2021, during Durga Puja, the largest Hindu festival, when photos circulated on Facebook showing a Quran placed at a Hindu temple near the Hanuman (Langur) statue’s feet in Cumilla. Hefazat spread a rumor that the Hindu community insulted the Quran, which was a blasphemous act against Islam (Wolf 2022). Consequently, radical Islamists attacked Hindu villages and damaged homes, businesses, temples, and idols throughout the country. The event led to six deaths.

Currently, Bangladesh is suffering from a severe Rohingya refugee crisis. Over 900,000 Rohingya people fled to the Cox’s Bazar region in Bangladesh and lived in refugee camps because of human rights violations committed by the Myanmar government (Rohingya Refugee Crisis Explained 2023). In this situation, Hefazat endorsed Rakhine’s liberation. The group also threatened jihad against Myanmar if the army continued to torture Rohingya Muslims. According to a New York Times report, it is possible that Rohingya refugees may engage in extremism under Hefazat’s influence, since that state has a limited presence in the area (Joehnk 2017).

The main problem with having ties with Islamists is that Islamic fundamentalists become more substantial and bolder. The general people of the country became influenced by fundamentalism, which affects the country’s secular culture. Often, radicalized people start engaging in moral policing and start committing violent crimes in the name of religion. Eventually, a climate of fear and religious intolerance emerges in society.

9. Conclusions

Political parties based on religion are common in countries worldwide. In addition to Bangladesh, religious political parties can be found in Israel, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Germany, the Netherlands, and Indonesia (Salabi 2021). These religious political parties often promise to prioritize the interests of their particular religious community. Many of these parties are so influential that they largely contribute to shaping the direction of a country’s politics. It is important to understand that these religious, political parties have pros and cons. On the one hand, some of these parties often have controversial views that can contribute to a nation’s social and political divides and have the potential to create an atmosphere of animosity among different religious groups. On the other hand, these political parties embrace democracy, which leads to a more transparent and accountable government and ensures that the interests of the people are heard and represented in the country’s politics. Research shows that to compete in elections, religious groups change their attitudes from opposing the government to embracing democracy and accepting pluralism (Rosenblum 2007; Salabi 2021). In other words, religious political parties moderate themselves to participate in elections.

In this article, I maintain that Islamic radicalization increases when moderate Islamist parties’ opportunities decrease. I do not intend to argue that this is the sole reason for the rise of radicalization in Bangladesh. Instead, I contend that suppressing the opportunity of moderate Islamist parties is one of the significant reasons for the increase in radicalization. I have illustrated several mechanisms of contentious politics, including “attribution of threat and opportunity”, “framing of the dispute”, “competition among contenders”, “innovative collective action”, and “repression” that operate together in the radicalization process. I do not offer any specific sequences of these mechanisms. However, I maintain that all mechanisms are interdependent and connected to build broader processes. I demonstrate that Islamic radicalization increases in Bangladesh as the opportunity for the moderate Islamist group Jamaat-e-Islami decreases. The AL’s decision to execute the Jamaat leaders under war criminal trials and conduct extrajudicial killings of Islamists and the High Court’s decision to ban the party from participating in elections caused many people to think that the current AL government is the enemy of Islam and that they need to sabotage the government by conducting terrorist attacks so that Islam can be restored in the country. Also, the AL government’s failure to protect minority citizens (gay activists, atheists, Hindus, Ahmadiyyas, etc.) and to restrict militant activity assists Islamist terrorist groups, such as AQ and ISIS, in infiltrating Bangladesh. The AL claims to be a secular political party. Since 2014, the party has led an electoral authoritarian regime. Thus, the AL government is insecure about its electoral legitimacy and feels an urgency to portray itself as a defender of Islam. Consequently, the AL co-opted the religious extremist group Hefazat-e-Islam and complied with their radical demands. This created a dangerous precedent as the government compromised secular ideals to appease religious extremists. Undoubtedly, this move has made the Hefazat a powerful force in the country. It is also evident that the government’s co-optation of a radical Islamist group, Hefazat-e-Islam, and reduction in the chances of a comparatively moderate Islamist party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, caused supporters of both groups and Islamist sympathizers to become more radical. To destroy this tide of Islamist radicalization, the Bangladesh government must shift towards democracy from electoral authoritarianism. The government needs to allow moderate Islamist parties to participate in democratic elections so that moderate Islamists will have a platform to discuss their issues. Additionally, the government must break its alliance with radical Islamist organizations to prevent them from facilitating radicalization or influencing the government to comply with extreme Islamist policies.