On the Fiercely Debated Questions of a Chinese Metaphysics and a Tradition of Early Daoism: Western and Chinese Perspectives on the Daodejing and Huang-Lao Daoism
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Metaphysics is from Aristotle. It is a term that does not translate well into warring states-early Han works. Phenomenology is another fancy term too specialized for these texts. This article does not address political (anti ancestral) and social issues at stake in Daoism, which are at least as important as the "philosophical" ones, if not more so. Philology is a better guide but too slightly considered here. For example the graphic identity of dao and tian (heaven). The male gender issue raised by the word huang is another example -- the meaning of Dao as single mother and other references to female power precede the advent of huangdi. This article has no analysis of de-virtue and its relation to Dao. Some of these unaddressed issues are treated in Moss Roberts' translation, not in bibliography.
repetitive, edit down to 3/4 length
Author Response
Please see attachment.
Author Response File: 
Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 2 Report
The author takes on the rather ambitious task to tackle two of the most fiercely debated questions within the early history of Chinese thought: 1. has there been a proper Daoist philosophical textual tradition prior to/during the Han eras, and 2., as the author puts it, has there been “a tradition of early Chinese metaphysics”?
The bulk of the article contrast “Western scholarship,” which, as the author claims, largely negates both questions, with “Chinese scholarship that, deeply grounded in the growing collection of early Chinese excavated manuscripts [affirms both].” Evidently favoring the second approach, the author then modifies the Chinese model according to their own conviction. They conclude that there has been both, an early Daoist tradition as well as early Chinese metaphysics, but concede that the latter did not begin, as some Chinese scholars claim, with the Daode jing, but only its later adaption and reconfiguration within the Huang-Lao circles (which the author accepts as synonymous to “the Daoist tradition”).
All in all, the article is well written, and the author demonstrates both broad and deep knowledge of Chinese as well as Western scholarship and the debates surrounding the topics in question. Furthermore, the author integrates several “recently” excavated texts into the discussion that have often been either not yet available or simply been ignored in earlier studies. The value of this article certainly lies in combining these newly discovered materials with the received texts, and in introducing both Western and Chinese views on early Chinese Daoism and metaphysics.
Nonetheless, there are some major issues that need to be addressed. First and foremost is the intended target audience of the article.
The author clearly sides with “the Chinese” approach that a Daoist tradition/tradition of metaphysics existed at least during the Han periods and can be identified through common themes, conceptions, and so forth that run through the transmitted and excavated texts. The majority of Western scholarship that doubts or even denies the existence of such a “tradition” because of the lack of historical records of self-identified Daoist communities or teacher-student lineages is, by and large, depicted as—to put it diplomatically—‘hampering philosophical inquiries for the sake of historical accuracy.’ And this to a degree that the author appears to cite a lack of engagement with the historical background or sources (in this case the Jixia Academy and the Shiji) as sign of the quality of philosophical discussions? (p. 7-8)
In accordance with the favored Chinese studies, the author declares most excavated texts as belonging to “Huang-Lao”/Daoism due to conceptual overlaps with transmitted texts. That this identification is contested by many Western scholars is only mentioned briefly and not at all debunked.
But what then is the target audience of the article?
The Chinese scholars cited by the author already agree with the gist of this article, and skeptical Western scholars will not be swayed by it because, in the end, it does not offer any proper justification with this identification other than that ‘this is the Chinese approach.’
This is not a problem per se, but it should be more clearly marked throughout the article, as, e.g., within the title “from a Chinese philosophical perspective” instead of “with attention to Chinese scholarship.” But even then, this part of the article, in its current form, might not have the effect that the author desires.
The real innovation appears to lie in the conclusion that metaphysics did not appear with the “original” Daode jing or, as more commonly discussed, within the later Xuanxue discourses (which are completely absent from this paper), but with the Huang-Lao texts. If we take the existence of a “Huang-Lao tradition” for granted, this idea has potential. But within due to the format of the article, it comes rather short and is furthermore hampered by the author’s sudden introduction of their concepts of “Yangsheng Daoism” contra “Zuowang Daoism,” their respective “interpretative communities,” and so forth. These are not well-established categories, and given their importance for the argument, they would require more explanation and justification than brief self-references to very recent articles.
Author Response
Please see the attachment.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Reviewer 3 Report
This is an interesting and insightful essay that gives a good account of how early Daoist metaphysics is interpreted in Western and Chinese scholarship.
I agree with the Author’s overall argument, but there are a few elements that are not as convincing as I would expect. The first one is in relation to the contrast between Western and Chinese scholarship. I do not think that the two positions can be divided so sharply; it sounds as if this is a straw person argument. See for instance how Cheng Chung-ying (1989: 167–168) defines “Chinese Metaphysics as Non-metaphysics” in the sense of a metaphysics that it is not concerned with the “separation of the sensible from the nonsensible, the practical from the transcendental”. I think it would be better to define more precisely what the Author’s means by metaphysics. This will help the reader to understand more clearly the Author’s position.
This leads me to my second comment. The structure of the essay is somehow confusing. The Author does not define their position until section 6, which ends quite abruptly, and it is followed not by a proper conclusion but by a postscript. I think that the Author should seriously reconsider the overall structure of the essay, giving more space to section 6. My suggestion is to position section 6 near the beginning of the essay. This will help the reader to understand that the Author is not fully supporting the Chinese perspective before reaching the end of the article; and it will also help to avoid the straw person argument: indeed, by placing the main argument at the beginning, the Author can use this as a more critical tool to interpret both Chinese and Western positions on early Daoist metaphysics. This is only a suggestion, and the Author will find their way to improve their essay. But I really hope they will make their position clearer throughout the paper. As it stands, the essay seems to be not very focused.
Finally, the Author uses the expression “Laozi’s Phenomenology”. I think they need to give a more precise definition of phenomenology and how it differs from metaphysics.
That said, I totally support the project as expressed in section 6; and I think that, with careful revision, this essay can become a crucial contribution to the Daoist scholarship.
Author Response
Please see the attachment.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
Round 2
Reviewer 1 Report
Re-reading this complex study I still feel there are some basic points that need clarification. Possible Huang-Lao texts like Han Fei, Wenzi, etc seem to be post 221BC. That is when Qinshi huangdi became emperor of a unified Chinese realm. Does huang-lao refer to him? Is this about subordinating earlier somewhat "anarchic" Daoist ideas to the needs of the state--the theme of HanFeizi. Look at the repudiation of di in DDJ #4. And of male authority in many passages. There are an number of polemical issues that get lost in the rather academic (and less important)issue of whether or not there is a Daoist metaphysics. Since there is a lot of valuable information in this article, if other reviewers recommend publication as is, I would agree; but if others think more work is needed, then that would be my choice too.
Shorten and simplify. Very difficult to read and follow.
Author Response
With your helpful comments and suggestions together with those of the other referees, in this revision I have done my best to clarify many basic points. As for yours in particular in this round, please see footnote 22.
Reviewer 2 Report
The author’s extensive revisions created an almost entirely new and indeed improved article. But even though this version solves most issues mentioned in the initial reviews, it neglects others, and unfortunately, also created a few new ones.
The discussion about Western and Chinese metaphysics is primarily a response to the other reviewers and I will therefore leave it up to their judgement whether this part has improved sufficiently.
From my side, I first want to address some minor issues:
- The editing process clearly resulted in an increase of typos and incoherences, as, e.g., in the use (or lack thereof) and position of pinyin transcriptions.
- The prefix “van” is commonly treated as belonging to the surname, and I believe both Hans van Ess and Paul van Els would prefer to be referenced accordingly.
- Point 4 is titled “Western Perspectives on Huang-Lao Daoism” but the latter part from p. 12 onward deals with Chinese perspectives.
- The initial lines quoted from Wang Zhongjiang on p. 20 might be not the most fortunate choice. “We can conclude that the Hengxian comes after the Daodejing for two reasons. One, it stands in the tradition of Daoism founded by Laozi;” Without justification that is an opinion rather than a proper argument.
Apart from that, some things still seem a bit unclear or oversimplified to me:
Western Sinology (p. 12) is indeed more interested in textual criticism than Chinese Philosophy, but that might be the wrong benchmark. Sinology is, after all, rooted in philology and not in philosophy. Western “philosophers” dealing with Chinese texts (to which I would count some of the scholars cited throughout the article), on the other hand, frequently demonstrate a content-focused approach similar to that of the cited Chinese scholars. The point of contention between these two groups indeed tends to be which concepts of Western philosophy can or can not be employed to describe Chinese thought.
A clearer demarcation between these two main issues of the article and the respective “combatants” might be helpful.
On p. 11, the author quotes Mark Lewis lamenting that in regard to whatever is “Huang-Lao,” “modern scholars invent their own traditions by combining whatever texts meet their chosen criteria” and criticizes Chen & Sung (2015) for following this pattern. But is this article not doing the same? The criteria are: texts with “Laozi” and “Huangdi” in the title have been found in close proximity, share certain terminology and ideologies with other texts found elsewhere, and together with these are made to fit the narrative of a Chinese metaphysics that developed via a presupposed Huang-Lao tradition as catalyst.
I do not deny that the most, if not all, manuscripts in question are, if one insists on this type of labelling, best subsumed under the Huang-Lao umbrella. But given the negative judgement of other scholars’ work one might expect a more detailed analysis and justification why all these texts unequivocally manifest the output of a single, clearly defined “tradition.” Whereas one might argue that most scholars who doubt the existence of such a tradition either did not have the excavated manuscripts at hand or willingly ignored them, this cannot be said about other texts such as the Guanzi and Wenzi which the author lists as Huang-Lao works without any hesitation or further discussion. The gist of the argument still appears to be that “Chinese scholarship” regards them as such, and that they share some ideological overlaps with the Laozi. The same, however, could be said for the Hanfeizi which is not mentioned (likely due to it being preserved for a discussion of the political aspects of Huang-Lao), or Han-era “apocrypha” for that matter. The Zhouyi qian zuo du, e.g., not only fits this criterium, but also offers a metaphysical perspective far more elaborate than most of the manuscripts (Thomas Michael, “The That-Beyond-Which of the Pristine Dao: Cosmogony in the Liezi,” in Riding the Wind with Liezi, ed. Ronnie Littlejohn and Jeffrey Dippmann, (Albany: SUNY, 2011), 118-21.) Is this “weft” from the Han era then also a Huang-Lao text, or is it the next step on the way towards metaphysical speculation? Might the “weft” text indeed have had more impact on this development than the Huang-Lao texts which completely disappeared from the records for two millennia?
At the very least this “weft” found its way into the Xuanxue literature, the Liezi, and was echoed in Daoist commentaries at least far into the Song era. It thus played a part in the further development of Daoist philosophical thought—a development the author seemingly denies in the conclusion? Or ascribes to non-Daoist authors and commentators?
I must admit that the conclusion leaves me rather confused. That modern scholars largely rely on the earliest or latest, “Confucian” commentaries does not mean that Daoist readings never existed, they are just not well researched. All in all, the entire conclusion appears rather disconnected from the main parts of the article, and more like a rant on Laozi/Daoist studies in general, but too convoluted and fast-paced to be followed easily. As I recall, the previous version of the article included a “genealogy” of Huang-Lao metaphysics, which might be helpful for a better understanding, and tie the conclusion more closely to the previous parts.
That all being said, I am aware that most of the issues I mentioned cannot be resolved within this paper, at least not without starting (even more) fundamental debates about certain trends in academia. Apart from the conclusion, which in my eyes requires some reworking, the paper in its current state is solid enough for publication and will certainly instigate further discussions. I therefore leave it up to the author whether to respond to my comments within its final version.
Some copy-editing needed.
Author Response
My deepest gratitude to you for the excellent comments and suggestions on your two reports, I remain thoroughly indebted to you.
My specific replies to this report's suggestions:
- The editing process clearly resulted in an increase of typos and incoherences, as, e.g., in the use (or lack thereof) and position of pinyin transcriptions.
I have fixed as many instances of this as I could find.
- The prefix “van” is commonly treated as belonging to the surname, and I believe both Hans van Ess and Paul van Els would prefer to be referenced accordingly.
Fixed.
- Point 4 is titled “Western Perspectives on Huang-Lao Daoism” but the latter part from p. 12 onward deals with Chinese perspectives.
Fixed on line 295 of the tracked version, line 290 of the untracked version.
- The initial lines quoted from Wang Zhongjiang on p. 20 might be not the most fortunate choice. Without justification that is an opinion rather than a proper argument.
Fixed on line 1075 of the tracked version, line 783 of the untracked version.
A clearer demarcation between these two main issues of the article and the respective “combatants” might be helpful.
Fixed on lines 69-84 of the tracked version, lines 66-81 of the untracked version.
On p. 11, the author quotes Mark Lewis lamenting that in regard to whatever is “Huang-Lao,” “modern scholars invent their own traditions by combining whatever texts meet their chosen criteria. But is this article not doing the same?
Fixed on lines 540-563 of the tracked version, lines 497-520 of the untracked version.
I must admit that the conclusion leaves me rather confused.
Fixed the conclusion.
Reviewer 3 Report
This revised paper represents a radical improvement compared to the previous version. The Author made their position clearer at the beginning of the paper and this helps the reader to see in advance where the Author is going and follow them along the way.
The structure has been greatly improved too, and the article ends now with a proper conclusion. The abstract, however, needs to be updated in accordance with the revision. For instance, there still is a reference to phenomenology that does not correspond to any part of the essay.
The only aspect that the Author may still want to consider to further improve the paper is in relation to the section 2 and 3. Indeed, these sections are mostly descriptive and only from section 4 the paper starts to be more critical.
Nevertheless, the paper shows now a clearer and more original contribution to the Daoist scholarship.
Author Response
My deepest gratitude to you for the excellent comments and suggestions on your two reports, I remain thoroughly indebted to you.
Many revisions in this version, but my response to your main suggestion:
The abstract, however, needs to be updated in accordance with the revision.
Fixed.
