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Peer-Review Record

Portuguese Youth Religiosity in Comparative Perspective

Religions 2023, 14(2), 147; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020147
by José Pereira Coutinho
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2:
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Religions 2023, 14(2), 147; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020147
Submission received: 27 December 2022 / Revised: 18 January 2023 / Accepted: 19 January 2023 / Published: 26 January 2023
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Religion, Quo Vadis? Secularization in the Modern World)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

The article deserves to be published, has relevance to the European context, and is prompt for the dossier. Although I miss highlights that I keep listing below. Right at the beginning, he uses the term “parochial civilization” from Lambert (1985), without correlating what D. Hervieu-Léger (in the book: O Peregrino e o Convertido, Rio de Janeiro: Loyola, 1985) when she highlights the idea. Hence, it would be worth at least a footnote indicating the work of the French sociologist of religion.

Although widely used, Baumann’s “liquid modernity” concept says very little about the intense process of “European modernity, so I suggest that it be taken out, as it is even imprecise in terms of sociological distinction.

Be very cautious with the sentence “European countries are among the most developed in the world, with more income, 80 education, and health, as shown by the Human Development Index”, as it is an identitarian one, pointing to a Europeanizing interpretation and, therefore, elitist. I suggest that it be reformulated, as those who build the HDI surveys are actors in Europe itself. This type of phrase exalts what European civilization disregards the years of coloniality and slavery that it has imposed on the Americas, Africa, and Asia.

At the same time, the following paragraph indicates that Portugal was a model European country, which, mainly in the context of Northern Europe, is not so easily accepted. Within Europe itself there are regimes of distinct “development” and prejudices initiated between different regions and nationalities. I suggest that this detail be the same as described in the article.

The assumption that education removes young people from the religious universe is one of the main sources in the article. However, it should be, at least, problematized, given the fact that religious young people do not lack training or intelligence. Religious youths indeed show different forms of knowledge.

The complex relationships between authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal and their responsibility for the religious decline have been described by Raimundo Barreto and Fábio Py, in the case of Brazil. The evident relationship of hegemonic Christianity with Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism has led to the consolidation of new communities that claim to be ex-evangelicals. This phenomenon was written by them in “Ex- and Post-Evangelicalism: Recent Developments in Brazil’s Changing Religious Landscape”, International Journal of Public Theology, 2022: https://brill.com/view/journals/ijpt/16/2/article-p197_6.xml. Although the cases of Portugal and Spain are older, it is worth highlighting the updating of this phenomenon in Brazil.

Concerning The World Youth Days studied in Brazil by Cecilia Mariz, Paulo Gracino and Wania Mesquita in the article “Os Jovens e a Religião na Sciedade Contemporânea”, Interseções, v.20, 2018: https://www.e-publicacoes. uerj.br/index.php/intersecoes/article/view/39011. The authors have observed an increase in religious adherence among young Catholics after WYD, which may help the argument about the religious downsize of the journey in Portugal in 2023.

 

The detail about Giddens indicates an increase in strong convulsions that can change and turn into brutalization acts, that was what Fábio Py recently has called Christofascism, which is, the relationship of the great Christian structures with the daily performance of intolerant, genocidal governments, in his: “Bolsonaro's Brazilian Christofascism during the Easter period plagued by Covid-19”, IJLAR 4, 2020, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41603-020-00120-4.

Finally, I miss a more theoretical discussion about Youth. What was missing was a closely-pack discussion on the “generation theories” so used by Ortega y Gasset (1966), which was duly updated by Feixa and Leccardi (2010), in their: “The concept of generation in theories of youth”, Revista Estado e Sociedade, v.25, n.2, 2010. Thus, I ratify that all indications are duly complied with for the acceptance of the article.

Author Response

I attach a file with my responses to your comments. Thank you very much for your time and recommendations. 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

The present study can complete the understanding of the evolution of the religiosity of young people in a secularized world.

Author Response

Thank you very much for your time

Reviewer 3 Report

This is an interesting and well researched paper, grounded in the sociology of religion literature. It offers a clear outline of the study's findings about youth religiosity in Portugal, grounded in an understanding of international patterns of religious change, and clearly justifying how it addresses a gap in the research. It demonstrates how the Portuguese context corresponds and differs with wider patterns. I have a few small suggestions for minor changes only.

 

At first mention, abbreviations (e.g. EVS, ISSP) need to be expanded. 

When mentioning Duque's study in the introduction, it would be helpful to signpost that the findings of this will be discussed in the next section as it currently feels a bit odd that it is mentioned with no allusion to the findings.

When discussing Portugal in the introduction, the reference to Denton and Flory is misleading. It needs to be clear that this is a US study where the religious context is different and the link made needs to be more tentative on this basis.

In the methodology, it needs to be clear that 'youth is generally considered to begin at 15' is a UN definition that is not universally followed in all countries or contexts. UK, for example, generally sees youth as starting at 13.

Lines 372-3 of Discussion: where it is stated '...community, practice, and norm variables generally decrease over time, while beliefs 372 do not. It is an odd pattern difficult to explain.' More could be referenced here from those who have attempted to explain it through how, for example, adherence to institutional religion has declined faster than beliefs have (e.g. Davie's believing without belonging which preceded vicarious religion) as well as that in some cases beliefs may have changed rather than declined - e.g. Putnam and Campbell's finding in the US that religious youth are more likely to accept homosexuality than previous generations. Decline in affiliation does not necessarily immediately correspond with decline in belief - though it may lead to it over time, as shown by Davie. Changes in beliefs (e.g. the adoption of inclusive theologies) means that acceptance of homosexuality is not necessarily an indicator of being less religious.

Some editing is needed for clarity in places, including in the abstract.

Author Response

I attach a file with my responses to your comments. Thank you very much for your time and recommendations. 

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

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