The Process Theology of John Elof Boodin
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Who Was John Elof Boodin?
3. What Is Process Theology and How Is Boodin Related to It?
(1) Plato rather than Aristotle is the starting point. Whitehead famously remarked that all of Western philosophy consists of a “series of footnotes to Plato” (Whitehead 1978, p. 39). Aristotle’s categorical scheme of substances with properties is very uncongenial to process thought. This is not to say that Aristotle had no insights, but his Prime Mover is far too stiff a presence and unilateral an actor for process theology. Although Christianity owes much to both Plato and Aristotle, it was Aquinas who stultified change by taking Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover and turning it into a divinity that split nature into supernatural and natural orders that reflected God’s eternal purpose in both realms. Process theology rejects such notions—even of the supernatural itself—and, therefore, stands as a corrective to Aristotelian and especially to Thomistic influence in Christian thought.
(2) Process philosophy/theology relies on experience and relationally based radical empiricism, thus incurring an indebtedness to pragmatism. Whitehead frequently mentioned “the pragmatic test”—that of our own experience and empiricism—that he regarded as essential to all sound metaphysics (Whitehead 1978, pp. 13, 179, 181, 269). In many ways, experience, pragmatism’s leading principle, is as important as time in the toolkit of process thought. As C. Robert Mesle puts it, “Each momentary event in the enduring series of experiences we call our mind or soul is a bundle of experienced relationships. Take away the experienced relations and nothing is left” (Mesle 1993, p. 56). As previously mentioned, the centrality of William James in Whitehead’s thought and the latter’s deconstruction of sensationalist epistemology follows James’s “radical empiricism” as a well-established principle in process theology (Griffin 2017, pp. 21–22, 26, 28). Some assign great power and significance to experience, even talking about “experience all the way down” or panexperientialism (Griffin 2001, pp. 94–128; Mesle 2008, pp. 31–41). However, it has been noted that Whitehead never used this term or the other one it is sometimes synonymous with—panpsychism—and unless reduced to meaning simply ubiquitous subjectivity, its extension into these more ambitious categories is at best controversial in process thought.
(3) Teleology is a cosmological given. Process philosophy/theology rejects the Aristotelian notion of passive substances and is generally opposed to the idea of substance. Whitehead’s formulation is altogether different. He states that “occasions”—his word for happenings, occurrences, events which comprise all entities except God (Cobb 2015, p. 13)—arising from novel “prehensions”—one of Whitehead’s most original concepts, roughly “feelings” or the act of seizing or grasping the objective and subjective, what Cobb calls “the bond between two actual occasions” (Cobb 2015, p. 29)—arise “as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. In between lies the teleology of the universe” (Whitehead [1933] 1967, pp. 193–94). It is as if this cosmic trend represents the glue or mortar fitting together pieces of occasions, forming an overall meaning of purposeful direction. What is its aim? Whitehead says, “The teleology of the Universe is directed to the production of beauty” (Whitehead [1933] 1967, p. 265). Because the universe is absolutely free and undetermined, an element of chance is always involved, but it is never blind chance.
(4) There are two ultimates, God and creativity. The eternally necessary and existent God is essentially creative, working toward novelty, and so are all the finite entities (actualities) of this world. In fact, Whitehead says that being and entity are synonymous with creativity. For Whitehead, creativity is “the universal of universals,” a process whereby “the many become one, and are increased by one” (Whitehead 1978, p. 21). This replaces the Aristotelian category of primary substances where a Prime Mover moves these substances around, acting upon them at its pleasure. Instead, creativity replaces the passive receptivity of matter to become the dynamic actualizer of reality. Because creativity is an ultimate, it simply is; it never wasn’t. For Whitehead, there could be no relevant novelty without God (Whitehead 1978, p. 164). Again, distancing themselves from Aquinas (so influenced by Aristotle’s Prime Mover), Whitehead and Hartshorne reject the familiar creation ex nihilo story in favor of Plato’s creation from a formless void. No one has given a better overview of these two process ultimates than David Ray Griffin (2001, pp. 260–84).
(5) God is panenthic. This states that all parts of reality [pan] are included in [en] and creatively synthesized by the one all-inclusive eternally-creative whole of reality [theos]. Contrary to pantheism, panentheism regards theos as greater than and inclusive of all parts of reality or the universe. In short, God is in the world, not one with the world. In terms of process thought, this idea comes from Hartshorne, who originally called his position pantheism, but was inclined to suggest panentheism as a better term because “it distinguishes God from the ‘all’ and yet makes him include all” (Hartshorne [1941] 1964, pp. 185, 347–48). In his later preface to Beyond Humanism, he made his position unequivocally panenthic: “I have long ceased to call my position ‘pantheism,’ since I hold that classical theism … and classical pantheism deny contingency, and the possibility of a real increase in content, to deity, whereas my panentheism asserts of God both necessity and contingency, both immutability and openness to novelty” (Hartshorne [1937] 1969, p. viii). Although Hartshorne’s panentheism is not identical to Whitehead’s, clearly, this comes closer to an accurate description of God’s relationship to the world than traditional theism or pantheism. Myers, emphasizing differences between Whitehead’s and Hartshorne’s panentheisms, states, “The world, for Whitehead, has an independence from God that Hartshorne simply does not accept, thereby allowing on Whitehead’s account for greater resistance [and freedom] on the part of actual occasions. Hartshorne’s panentheism, on the other hand, is one that affords God greater power” (Myers 1998, p. 185). It is important to note that Myers’ position on Whitehead is a detailing rather than a denial of his panentheism. Others have questioned whether Whitehead was a panentheist at all (Conner 2009), but despite their differences, it seems more coherent to suggest that both Hartshorne and Whitehead subscribe to varying versions of that position (Dorrien 2008, p. 325).4 Most process theologians adhere to panentheism rather than to pantheism.
(6) God is omnipresent but not omniscient or omnipotent. Here there is more agreement among process theists, and it comprises its central and fundamental distinction from traditional theism. Process theology takes freedom seriously. God does not wield unilateral power over creation. This means that choices and options are real. As such, God cannot possibly know in advance what those choices or options are going to be. Godly preferences may invoke a divine “lure” to privilege those preferences, but the principle of genuine freedom means that lure can be ignored or even thwarted, in which case God will necessarily reevaluate and provide a second optimal course, again open to indeterminate freedom. Put another way, divine knowledge is perfect but only insofar as God knows all that is knowable at a given time since the future has not actually occurred. All major proponents of process theology adhere to this.
(7) God and everything else are relational, which means the ability to affect and be affected. This relational power has three stages: first, to be open and sensitive to the world; second, to be self-creative; and third, to influence others having been initially influenced by them (Mesle 1993, p. 30). This carries with it an important social dimension. It should not go unnoticed that Hartshorne’s most complete metaphysical statement was titled Reality as Social Process (1953). However, Whitehead does not neglect this either. He refers to the “philosophy of organism” that is usually expressed socially, as “a group of actual entities connected in specific ways” and is also a nexus, which in Whiteheadian terms is “any kind of togetherness of actual entities” (Mesle 2008, pp. 106–7). However, a society is much more than this. “To constitute a society,” writes Whitehead, “the class-name has got to apply to each member, by reason of genetic derivation from other members of that same society. The members of the society are alike because, by reason of their common character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions which lead to that likeness.” Most importantly, he adds, unlike mere occasions, “the society, as such, must involve antecedents and subsequents. In other words, a society must exhibit the peculiar quality of endurance. The real actual things that endure are all societies. They are not actual occasions” (Whitehead [1933] 1967, p. 204). All of Western metaphysics has failed to understand this, according to Whitehead. Put more theologically, it can be said that the salvation received through the revelation of God in Christ is essentially social in nature. Thus, “Every aspect of this revelation is a call to community” (Suchocki 1989, p. 122). More significantly, the social aspect can also be construed in metaphysical and theological terms adding a trinitarian element (God as communitarian), which Jesuit priest and process theologian Joseph A. Bracken has done brilliantly. This idea is not a new one, taking twelfth-century Canon Richard of St. Victor’s social model of the Trinity and applying it in a process context (Bracken 2008, pp. 21–22). For Bracken, apart from God’s social/communitarian nature vis-à-vis the Trinity, other societies are ontological realities too that exercise “a collective agency derivative from the individual agencies of its constituent actual occasions” (Bracken 1991, p. 45). Bracken has solved the problem of the one and the many.
Once we conceive God as a pervasive energy stimulating toward the best, we get a new light on the ontological attributes… The abstract idea of omnipotence makes a mockery of the goodness and justice of God. Rather must we conceive of God as limited in His effectiveness by our willingness, by our cooperation or opposition. Our attitude makes a real difference to God’s activity. And while God, because his activity means the wholesome, the economic and best, both in human and cosmic evolution, must win out in some fashion, the character of the result is conditioned by our activity…
We must be careful not to dogmatize about the mind of God… We have been too ready to make a logic machine of God [a reference to Whitehead]. It is possible that He may have ways of perceiving and comprehending our world that infinitely pass ours—more sensitive than the camera film [a jab at Bergson’s cinematography], more comprehensive in His intuitions of relations than our slow thought can fathom. More is His thought a mere abstract verbal relation to things [a dart thrown at Whitehead’s neologisms]. His is creative intelligence. While “he sees all over, thinks all over, hears all over,” what is more important is that He enters into creative relations with our world to produce order, goodness, and beauty. This relation is more than interpenetration, more than intussusception [contra Whitehead]: it is a new birth in grace and beauty. We cannot, as finite, be of “one essence with the Father” [against Hartshorne’s objective immortality], but the essence of God is present everywhere and always, and by being compounded with the divine energy, we emerge as a new and higher unity of life.
4. Boodin, Bergson, and the Early Historiography of Process Theism
It must not be forgotten that the force which is evolving throughout the organized world is a limited force, which is always seeking to transcend itself and always remains inadequate to the work it would fain produce. The error and puerilities of radical finalism [teleology] are due to the misapprehension of this point.
5. Conclusions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
1 | Boodin’s publication chronology can be misleading because significant portions of his monographs appeared much earlier in a variety of peer-reviewed journals. For our purposes, the most pertinent are the following: Chapter XVII of Truth and Reality (1911) was originally published as “The Reality of Religious Ideals,” The Harvard Theological Review (Jan. 1909), representing a substantially revised version of “The Reality of the Ideal with Special Reference to the Religious Ideal,” The Unit (Iowa College) (1900); chapter I of A Realistic Universe (1916, rev. ed. 1913) first appeared as “The Divine Five-Fold Truth,” The Monist (Apr. 1911), and chapter XVIII of that same volume was originally published as “The Reinstatement of Teleology,” The Harvard Theological Review (Jan. 1913); the Introduction in The Religion of Tomorrow (1943) originally appeared as “The Function of Religion,” The Biblical World (Aug. 1915). Boodin’s work on social minds appeared as chapter XI in A Realistic Universe (1916) first as “Individual and Social Minds,“ The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods (Mar. 27, 1913); chapter IV of The Social Mind (1939) first appeared as “The Existence of Social Minds,” American Journal of Philosophy (Jul. 1913); and finally, chapter XV of The Social Mind first appeared as “Social Immortality,” International Journal of Ethics (Jan. 1915). In order to emphasize Boodin’s priority, I have elected to reference each of these in their respective journal forms, although in some cases, direct citation of later publications has been unavoidable, appearing nowhere else in Boodin’s writings. In all cases, complete citations can be found in the references. |
2 | Whitehead’s Process and Reality first appeared as a series of Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1927–28. For purposes here, however, the “corrected edition” is cited (see References). Similarly, Religion in the Making was first published by Macmillan in 1926 (originally delivered as Lowell Lectures), but the new edition of 1996 with Judith Jones’s introduction and Randall Auxier’s glossary is cited. |
3 | Whom is a perfectly legitimate pronoun to use in reference to God since for the process theist deity is not an abstract thing or entity but essentially personal. This point was well established by the process-inclined personalist philosopher Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884–1953) in The Problem of God (1930), a book that caught the attention of Charles Hartshorne and launched a lengthy correspondence. Nevertheless, pronouns referencing God should be used with caution. Process feminists have well pointed out the folly of using masculine pronouns “He,” “His, “Him” for God. Boodin’s and others’ use of these masculine forms must be ascribed to the socio-cultural times in which they were written. |
4 | Dorrien also sides with Drew University’s Catherine Keller on this question, who argues in her On the Mystery: Discerning Divinity in Process (2008) that panentheism is undoubtedly the mainstream process interpretation. Conner insists in his note (Conner 2009, p. 179) that “Keller and Dorrien are both eminent interpreters of process theology, and yet neither hesitates to ascribe panentheism to process theology categorically. This in my view is a serious error.” However, Conner’s is the more egregious mistake because its only reasonable alternative—pantheism—robs God of all personhood (see note 3). While Hartshorne is clearer on this than Whitehead, Cobb and Slettom are right when they conclude that although the Whiteheadian God is technically not a person per se, “Yet much of what believers have in mind when they ask whether God is a person is present in God for Whitehead as well” (Cobb and Slettom [2003] 2020, p. 14). A Creator indistinguishable from creation loses meaningful personality. |
5 | Boodin’s social theology captured an essential truth, but unfortunately missed God’s communitarian nature by neglecting Bracken’s trinitarian emphasis. In fact, at one point, Boodin referred to the trinity as a “confused and antiquated concept” (Boodin 1943b, p. 76). One wonders what “past” Boodin thought he was “fulfilling” in such a cavalier dismissal of this longstanding tenet of Christian belief. Given his attitude toward the Trinity, Boodin was ill-equipped to discover Bracken’s key contribution toward understanding the corporate reality of God in unity with what Boodin called “social minds”. |
6 | Miquel does not simply equate élan vital with psychology. He understands that Bergson’s is a metaphysics of duration; it is more than our consciousness but part of our becoming and, therefore, part of a larger cosmic property in which duration is a part, including élan vital. See Paul-Antoine Miquel. 2022. “Duration and Becoming in Bergson’s Metaphysics.” De Gruyter. Open Access: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110753707-008. Accessed on 7 January 2022. |
7 | Pottinger’s dissertation is the most extensive treatment of Bergson’s religion. It has not become a part of the secondary literature on Bergsonian philosophy because it has not been readily available until relatively recently, not being digitized by the Edinburgh Research Archive until 22 May 2018. Nevertheless, Pottinger’s analysis is detailed and thorough, deserving more attention than it has thus far received. |
8 | It should be noted that Boodin considered C. Lloyd Morgan (1852–1936) and Samuel Alexander (1859–1938), like Bergson, to whom they acknowledged their debt, emergent materialists. Morgan invoked God only for heuristic purposes and Alexander was a committed physicalist. |
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Flannery, M.A. The Process Theology of John Elof Boodin. Religions 2023, 14, 238. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020238
Flannery MA. The Process Theology of John Elof Boodin. Religions. 2023; 14(2):238. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020238
Chicago/Turabian StyleFlannery, Michael A. 2023. "The Process Theology of John Elof Boodin" Religions 14, no. 2: 238. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020238
APA StyleFlannery, M. A. (2023). The Process Theology of John Elof Boodin. Religions, 14(2), 238. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020238