Water in the Mencius: Correlative Reasoning, Conceptual Metaphor, and/or Sacred Performative Narrative?

Abstract

The way the water metaphor is mobilized in Mencius 6A.2 has been interpreted and assessed from a number of perspectives. While several commentators find the analogy developed by Mencius comparing water and human nature intrinsically weak, others see it as partially effective in its use of analogical reasoning or of conceptual metaphors, especially when related to a yin-yang-based cosmology. This contribution develops an alternative perspective: it locates this metaphor in the corpus of references to water found first in the Mencius and second in the works of Chinese antiquity until the early Han period. This survey allows us to highlight three important features: (a) a quasi-sacred status is attached to the aquatic element; (b) water’s characteristics are developed according to a narrative model, causing the reader to circulate from one level of reality to another, such that the communication between the heart–mind and Heaven opens up; and (c) finally, as they mobilize a sense of contemplation and wonder, water narratives are meant to be transformative of the disciple’s consciousness and behavior.

1. Introduction

References to the aquatic element pervade the text of the Mencius: the character shui 水 [water] can be found 48 times. The water metaphor plays a central role in Mencius 6A.2, where Gaozi 告子 (ca. 420–ca. 350 BCE) and Mencius (Mengzi 孟子 [372–289 BCE]1) debate about human nature, the latter arguing that, just as water tends to swirl downwards, human nature has an innate tendency towards goodness. The appreciation of the argument’s rhetorical strength varies from one commentator to another. As will be illustrated by what follows, some readers find it more figurative than argumentative, and ultimately, intrinsically weak. Others interpret the water metaphor as an “analogical argument”, the strength of which depends on the degree of similarity between the two objects being compared or on the weight being given to Chinese “conceptual metaphors”, possessing an epistemic status of their own. Still others place Mencius’ reasoning into the framework of a larger yin-yang cosmology. While appreciating the contribution made by these various approaches to the understanding of Mencius’ text, this article suggests approaching it from another perspective: the way the various attributes of water are described combine into a “sacred narrative” through which human nature is referred to in an overall moral/cosmological structure. Knowing the nature of water allows us to connect our understanding of the heart–mind with our insights into the nature of Heaven and what it requires from us (see Mencius 7A.1). Moreover, this knowledge is performative in the sense that it leads us to direct our lives according to the moral/cosmological design that we intuit.

I will first ponder over the debate between Gaozi and Mengzi and will present how various commentators understand the way the water metaphor is here mobilized. In Section 2, I will insert this specific debate into a general presentation of the role played by water in Mengzi’s thought and its connections with other thinkers. Finally, taking into account the results gathered in Section 1 and Section 2, I will develop the reasons that cause me to argue that water provides Mengzi not only with a “metaphor”, but also with a “narrative” which can be ultimately considered as a sacred story loaded with a performativity of its own.

2. Mengzi and Gaozi on Human Nature: The Interminable Debate

The core of the debate constitutes a locus of Chinese ancient philosophy: in Mencius 6A.2, Gaozi compares human nature to water, swirling aimlessly around a corner and only flowing in the direction of an open passage, suggesting that human nature has no inherent goodness or evilness. Mencius counters that water’s natural tendency is to flow up or down, and not merely east or west, a tendency loaded with moral connotations: just as water tends to swirl downwards, human nature has an innate tendency to seek goodness:

Water certainly does not distinguish between East and West, but does it fail to distinguish between up and down? The goodness of human nature is like the downhill movement of water—there is no person who is not good, just as there is no water that does not flow downward. Now, as for water, if you strike it with your hand and cause it to splash up, you can make it go above your forehead; if you apply force and pump it, you can make it go uphill. Is this really the nature of water, though? No, it is merely the result of environmental influences. That a person can be made bad shows that his nature can also be altered like this.

(Mencius 6A.2. Translation Slingerland 2011, p. 21)

水信無分於東西。無分於上下乎？人性之善也，猶水之就下也。人無有不善，水無有不下。今夫水，搏而躍之，可使過顙；激而行之，可使在山。是豈水之性哉？其勢則然也。人之可使為不善，其性亦猶是也。

As our survey will now show, the views of the commentators on the nature and strength of the argument vary widely.

2.1. The “Example-Only” Interpretation

The “example-only” interpretation focuses on Mencius’s analogy as a means to refute Gaozi, rather than on the passage as a whole. According to its proponents, the analogy is more figurative than argumentative, and Mencius’s reasoning is simply not logically grounded (Waley 1939; Hansen 1992). Mencius’ train of thought would be essentially of an intuitive nature, which would explain his relative disdain for logical reasoning and step-by-step argumentation.

2.2. The Analogical-Argument Interpretation

Proponents of this approach suggest that the source object of the analogy must possess some features that are similar to the target object and that the similarities between the two objects must overshadow their dissimilarities. The strength of an analogical argument depends on the degree of similarity between the two objects being compared. If the similarities between the objects are more relevant to the claimed common features than the dissimilarities, the argument is considered strong and cogent. Conversely, if the dissimilarities are more related to the claimed common features, the argument is weak and not cogent.

Does Mencius pass the test? If we use a scientific lens to examine Mencius’s reasoning, water is empirically evidenced to flow in the direction of least resistance, and not automatically downhill: water has a natural tendency to flow uphill when the region of low pressure is above that of high pressure. This would fatally undermine Mencius’s argument. However, such a line of reasoning may be unfair: following the definition of Salmon (1973, pp. 97–98) and Waller (2001, p. 202), for an analogical reasoning to be convincing, the source object of the analogy must possess some features that are similar to the target object, and the similarities between the two objects must outweigh their dissimilarities. Those who support the analogical-argument interpretation understand the statements of Mencius and Gaozi as enthymematic, meaning that they obey rules inherent to syllogistic or traditional logic. In this approach, the premise on which the argument is based is purposely omitted and left to be inferred by the reader. Mencius’s belief that water tends to flow downward in the absence of externally applied forces was based on the general observation that water seems to seek the lower level, which was considered at that time not only as common sense, but also as deeply meaningful: “The innate tendency of water to flow downward is one of its most important attributes in early Chinese philosophical thinking” (Allan 1997, p. 41). In this perspective, Mencius was entitled to challenge Gaozi’s assertion that water lacks directional tendency, and to conclude that Gaozi’s own analogy was unconvincing, grounding his reasoning upon premises that both thinkers tacitly shared.

Nevertheless, one could not automatically infer from these same premises that human nature shares the same nature as water, i.e., embraces, as water does, a predisposition. In the absence of additional premises, Mengzi’s argument remains weak (Chong 2002).

2.3. From Analogies to “Conceptual Metaphors”

This may still be the case, even when water is not seen as providing merely an “analogy”, but also a “conceptual metaphor”, as Slingerland has suggested (Slingerland 2003, 2011). If Slingerland’s perspective has become popular, it is less straightforward than it first seems to be: the attitude characterized as “effortless action” (wu wei 無為) is described as the all-englobing conceptual metaphor, while water provides a series of related images, such as the picture of “flowing along with” (shun 順) (Slingerland 2003, p. 11). However, water can be considered a full-fledged conceptual metaphor when, for instance, it illustrates the fact that “going against the flow” is an attitude that originates from a wrong understanding of the nature of things (Slingerland 2011, p. 22). The strength of the argument would come from its congruence with universal cognitive processes, themselves based on our embodied reactions (Slingerland 2011). Still, Jones is right to note that Slingerland simply presupposes both the correctness of Mengzi’s original assertion (water flows downhill) and its connection to human nature, rather than anchoring the two propositions to specific cognitive processes (Jones 2016).

2.4. Correlative Reasoning Associated with Yin-Yang Cosmology

Correlative reasoning constitutes a specific type of analogical argument. Analogical arguments use all available kinds of comparisons or analogies to draw conclusions about a subject, while correlative reasoning is a specific type of analogical argument that relies on the relationship between two phenomena or, more exactly, two processes. In ancient Chinese philosophy, correlative reasoning was often used to explain the workings of the natural world, as well as a number of social and existential features, wherein yin-yang cosmology provided thinkers with an overall context in which to insert specific correlations (Fung 2010; Graham 2016). As is well known, the concept of yin and yang is based on the idea of complementary opposites that are interdependent and interconnected, and this idea was used in order to explain the dynamic features of the natural, social, and human spheres, as well as for connecting these spheres with one another.

While Mengzi’s contention that water flows downward possesses basically no weight when appreciated from the perspective of contemporary scientific standards, Nicholas Jones (2016) uses yin-yang cosmology to evaluate the plausibility of Mencius’s claim. According to Jones, Mencius’s argument succeeds in discrediting Gaozi’s analogy because of the fact that the downward flow of water is consistent with the yin nature of water. However, Mencius’s argument for the innate goodness of human nature is less compelling because the underlying analogy drawn between water and human nature is not strong. Although Mencius provides a reason for asserting that water and human nature share a common tendency, there is no basis within the yin-yang cosmology for linking goodness with downward directionality. Moreover, yin-yang cosmological thinking may have only become prevalent during the Han dynasty, long after Mencius’s time, which would undermine Jones’ overall approach (the chronology remains controverted).2 In other words, even in the event that one would consider Mencius’s reasoning plausible when related to yin-yang cosmology, one cannot establish that Mencius was influenced by this conceptual development. Therefore, the framework developed by a sympathetic commentator such as Jones is still not sufficient for establishing the central contention of Mengzi’s argument.

3. Water in the Mencius, and Beyond

At the same time, once they are related to perspectives notably suggested by Allan (1997), the arguments developed by Slingerland (2011) and Jones (2016) lead us to pinpoint a fact crucial to the present discussion: the debate that takes place in Mencius 6A.2 should be inserted into the body of considerations about water found in the whole of the same book. Besides, these same considerations must be assessed within the intertextual network created by their connections with similar passages in relevant Chinese classics.

3.1. Water in the Mencius

The water metaphor first appears when Mengzi hypothesizes that a sovereign loving peace rather than conflict would attract people “like water running down” (Mencius IA.6). Mencius also draws the attention of his listeners towards the way water can trigger death and desolation and evokes how, in response, Yu the Great strenuously regulated rivers (see notably 3A.4). One of the most striking occurrences relevant to our subject matter is found in 4B.18, when Mengzi explains that those rooted in a source progressively fill every hollow, while the reputation of other people is like the surge brought on by a sudden and violent rain, followed by a time of dryness. In 4B.26, Mengzi comes back to the topic of Yu the Great: if literati would stop to “chisel knowledge” and would rather let things “have their way”, as Yu let water “have its way” (yu zhi xing shui 禹之行水), then seeking for knowledge would indeed be a praiseworthy endeavor.

The debate with Gaozi summarized at the beginning of the present contribution occurs after this fragment, and is followed by Mengzi’s renewed assertion that letting water follow its way provides a sovereign with the ultimate political model (6B.11). The final book of the Mencius provides the reader with three water metaphors. The one found in 7A.24 is of such importance that I will comment on it separately below.

Besides these explicit water metaphors, there are a number of implicit examples. The description of qi 氣 as both a moral and cosmological impetus is particularly vivid (Mencius 2A.2). Slingerland rightly writes that the “flood-like qi” (haoran zhi qi 浩然之氣) is described in terms of “hydraulic force” (Slingerland 2003, pp. 154–55). This provides us with the clearest example of the way Mengzi links the physiological, the moral, and the cosmological dimensions into a continuum of the worldview he propounds. This continuum flows throughout phenomenal and infra/supra-phenomenal realities, as does water from its source to the sea.

3.2. Water and Human Nature in the Mencius

As asserted by Tu Wei-ming,

Confucian humanism is fundamentally different from anthropocentrism because it professes the unity of man and Heaven rather than the imposition of the human will on nature. In fact the anthropocentric assumption that man is put on earth to pursue knowledge and, as knowledge expands, so does man’s dominion over earth is quite different from the Confucian perception of the pursuit of knowledge as an integral part of one’s self-cultivation. The human transformation of nature, therefore, means as much an integrative effort to learn to live harmoniously in one’s natural environment as a modest attempt to use the environment to sustain basic livelihood. The idea of exploiting nature is rejected because it is incompatible with the Confucian concern for moral self-development.

(Tu 2010, p. 75)

In other words, in the “Confucian humanism” tradition (which takes its roots from the Mencius), by aligning oneself with the natural order of things and cultivating virtues such as sincerity, knowledge, and moral rectitude, a disciple of the Sages will achieve a state of balance and harmony, both in the innermost heart and with the external world.

Developing from this general framework, the philosophy of Mengzi also emphasizes the interconnectedness and mutual support between humans and nature. Metaphors anchored to natural realities are evocative: Mengzi posits that human beings possess inherent moral qualities, regarded as sprouts that grow naturally from the human heart, and which can be developed through education and self-cultivation (Mencius 6A, in the entirety of this section). Numerous are the passages in Mencius 2A and 4A that point towards the two following correlated propositions: the natural world, including the environment and other living creatures should be respected and protected; the relationship between humankind and the natural world is a symbiotic one.

At the same time, Mengzi’s view takes into account the disruptions that may happen during any process of growth. Although innate predispositions lead towards goodness, in the course of one’s development one may incline towards badness through external circumstances, or by not developing one’s innate constitution in the appropriate direction (see notably Shun 1997; Wong 1991). Such a view has political implications: Mengzi stresses the fact that external factors such as poverty, injustice, and hunger can create a destructive and chaotic social environment that prevents the flourishing of virtue (6A.7). Accordingly, meeting people’s basic needs (i.e., letting people “have their way” (see 4B.26 and 6B.11)) should constitute the ruler’s main axiom (4A.9). A wise ruler should also provide his people with educational resources that support the growth of the four sprouts of virtue and a flourishing ethical life (see the entirety of Mencius 4A). If people live in an environment that supports the flourishing of human goodness, then the latter will be embodied in words and deeds, ideally leading society towards a state where “all men can be Yaos and Shuns” (6A.22). The stress on innate goodness may be even more prescriptive than descriptive: one must bet on human nature being intrinsically good in order to ground a truly harmonious society (Shun 1997).

In other words, the water metaphor in the Mencius speaks of a natural force that nourishes life and shapes the natural order in the same way that our innate potential (i.e., our nature xing 性) nourishes ethical life and shapes our relationships, as well as the way in which social order is defined. Both water and human nature (xing) are to be considered as a spring from which all good things will flow, if channeled and used according to their innate predispositions.

3.3. Water beyond the Mencius

The text of the Mencius strongly resonates with a number of other Chinese classics. Analogies with the Daodejing (a text which, like the Mencius, makes a privileged use of the water metaphor) have been often noted: “The Way is like a river, always flowing and never stagnant. It adapts to its surroundings, always changing but never losing its nature. It flows into the low places and creates the valleys, and it is always present, always the same” (Daodejing 8). The Analects provide us with similar echoes: “The man who moves through the world in a sagely way is like water. Water finds the lowest places and flows downward, and in doing so, it nourishes all things and brings life to the world” (Analects 14.8). Confucius’s comparison of a sage to water, nourishing all things and bringing life to the world, is not without religious connotations, as it suggests a belief in downward flowing water as the origin of the world.

Going one step further, the Yijing 易經 states that “water is the foundation of all things” (Hexagram 29). The Hongfan 洪範 chapter of the Classic of Documents (Shujing 書經) expresses a similar doctrine when assimilating water with the Origin, and subtly, with the One (shui yue yi 水曰一, see Palmer 2014, pp. 94–99). On the basis of the representations provided by these texts and others, the popular doctrine of the five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, and earth) consistently introduces water as the first of them.

Sarah Allan (1997) has shown the myriad ways in which ancient Chinese thought has reflected upon the nature of water and deduced from it the characteristics of the Dao 道.3 Among other features, water, the source of life when it follows a course, becomes source of death when it flows out of it; water submits to everything it encounters, and yet it overcomes all resistance; water, being shapeless, takes any form; it can become a plane and a mirror that reflects the face of everyone bending over it. One of the difficulties raised by Allan’s analysis lies in her specific application of these characteristics to the Dao as approached by the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, which is not the ultimate reference point of several of the authors she quotes—namely, Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi. I will come back to the question this raises in III.1.

Finally, several excavated documents have given us a much clearer picture of the religious representations associated with water (Allan 2003, 2005; Brindley 2019). The term “The Great One” (Tai Yi 太一) evokes the state of things that precedes the distinction between Heaven and Earth. At a time which remains debated (but which is probably that of the Warring States, or even before), a cult is formed around Tai Yi, who identifies him with the North Star and the spirit which inhabits it, represented as the point of origin of the Heavenly River, the Milky Way (tian han 天漢). It so happens that the excavations carried out at Guodian brought to light a text, the Tai Yi sheng shui 太一生水 [The Great One engenders water]. Its cosmogony clearly designates water as the partner of the One (probably assimilated to the Way) in the process of creating Heaven. Heaven, in return, associates with the One in creating the Earth. “The dao was not simply modeled on a river that flows continuously from a natural spring, but that it was taken as the celestial river that flows unceasingly from the womb of the Great One” (Allan 2003, p. 283).

These considerations do not imply that early Chinese philosophers all considered and interpreted aquatic phenomena in the same way. According to the times and the sensitivities, the destructive power of water or its life-giving potential, its moral characteristics (notably humility, shown by its flowing downhill), or its mystical undertones (impenetrability and indivisibility) were variously emphasized. Still, water provided thinkers with a shared conceptual/experiential toolbox for envisioning and describing natural, social, cosmological, and (if the term may be used in Chinese context) “metaphysical” constants. This reliance is particularly striking in the case of the Mencius.

4. A Sacred Narrative

The preceding analyses encourage us to assess the comparison developed by Mengzi in his debate with Gaozi in function of the features that I have just highlighted. I will proceed by developing three interrelated theses: (a) Mengzi mobilizes water metaphors in order to develop an approach to knowledge that links together the human and the supra-human levels of reality; (b) in this light, water metaphors become part of a sacred narrative; (c) this narrative is meant to become performative, i.e., to transform the mind and deeds of the one that makes herself attentive to it.

4.1. Water, Heaven, and the Dao

While the representation of water offered by Mencius is very close to the one found in the Daodejing, Mengzi does not make water an image of the Dao 道: he remains faithful to the traditional conception of Heaven (Tian 天) as the transcendental point of reference. As is the case of the Analects, in the Mencius the term dao refers mainly to specific ways of being (or of doing things), and is not elevated to the dignity of a supreme and universal principle. The Mencius and the Analects both use once the expression tiandao 天道 (Heavenly Way), a possible hint of the evolution that led to the concept acquiring full autonomy. Jean Levi has suggested the reasons for which the concept of Dao may have been progressively endowed with the traditional attributes of Heaven:

The concept of the Dao, the Way, which is very much like Heaven insofar as it is the expression of its creative power, would seem to be the result of a process of confiscation and occultation. Heaven is a distant entity whose contours are vague, and only the emperor can sacrifice to it in solemn and half-secret rites in which the highest officials at court do not participate, with the result that Heaven may be said to have been appropriated by the king. Moreover, Heaven never reveals itself except by its effects—the movement of the planets, the course of the seasons, abnormal weather, that is, secondary manifestations which are so many dao 道, ways or modalities of its action. Outside the processes of hierarchy and categorization, the Principle is without determination of any kind. This lack of specificity gives it a creative power and makes it the basis of all that is conditioned.

(Levi 2009, p. 691)

In the Mencius’ religious and gnoseological representation, the analogy between the nature of water and that of the human species is to be located in-between the knowledge that human beings acquire of their heart–mind, on the one hand, and that of Heaven, on the other hand:

To fathom one’s heart-mind is to know one’s nature. To know one’s nature is to know Heaven. Foster your heart-mind, nurture your nature, for this is serving Heaven.

(Mencius 7A.1)

盡其心者，知其性也。知其性，則知天矣。存其心，養其性，所以事天也。

As asserted in 6B.2, knowing the nature of water provides aspiring sages with a fundamental insight on the nature of humankind. More exactly, “understanding” what it means that water flows downhill will uncover the innate goodness present within my own heart–mind, i.e., will direct individuals towards the source from where goodness flows. “Nature (xing 性)” (i.e., what is common to a species) is strategically located between the (individual) heart–mind (xin 心) and the universality of Heaven (tian 天). Commonalities of nature between water and humankind direct the latter towards the appreciation of the propensities found in each of its members, as well as towards the celestial river (tian han 天漢) from which everything originates.

4.2. Progressing with Water in the Mencius

At this point, we need to turn towards an excerpt of the Mencius that we have not yet analyzed:

Confucius climbed the Eastern Mountain, and [the State of] Lu became small; he climbed Taishan, and small became the world. Thus, for those who have contemplated the sea, it is difficult to make case of rivers; for those who have traveled to study under a Sage, it is difficult to give importance to speeches. There is an art {shu ffi) in observing water; we must observe its undulations: when the sun and the moon shine, the rays that [these undulations] necessarily receive penetrate them. When flowing, water is made in such away (hat it cannot move forward without first filling the pits. As for the path [the way] on which a gentleman has set his mind, if it is not fulfilled at each stage, it cannot attain completion.

(Mencius 7A24: Translation Vermander 2022b, p. 26)

孔子登東山而小魯，登太山而小天下。故觀於海者難為水，遊於聖人之門者難為言。觀水有術，必觀其瀾。日月有明，容光必照焉。流水之為物也，不盈科不行；君子之志於道也，不成章不達。

Vermander (2022b) highlights the spring present in this short narrative and relates it to the water metaphor located at its center:

At the center of our paragraph: the art of observing water. If water is difficult to see, it reveals itself to us through its manifestations, its movements. The commentaries specify that, in this context, ‘to observe water’ means first to gauge its depth. Mencius’s idea appears to be that the play of ripples and rays stealthily reveals the objects that water conceals, thus allowing the observer to gauge the bottom, while still water remains impenetrable. One may infer that studying under a Sage is akin to engage into interaction, and that the Sage’s inner depth will be revealed from his reactions, his moves, the sudden glimpses he offers. The third proposition then explains both how water works and why the person who engages fully in study resembles the one who observes water. […] One learns from water the way one learns from the Sage: one learns to ‘dive’ as deep as it is possible. The ‘height’ referred to in the first proposition is literally reversed: it is none other than that of the pit where one has to descend, rather than spreading oneself over the surface.

(Vermander 2022b, p. 28)

This analysis illustrates the fact that water provides Mengzi not with exact (static) metaphors, but rather with parables (dynamic), i.e., with micro-narratives:4 “Water flows downhill.” “Water flows towards the sea.” “Yu controlled water by letting it having its way.” “Water cannot move forward without first filling the pits.” We are provided not only an image, but also with a displacement of a narrative nature. Considered in this light, the whole body of “knowledge” about water dispersed throughout the Mencius can be read as a meta-narrative that reveals to us both what constitutes the heart–mind and what it means to know and serve Heaven.5 The cycle of water propels a narrative cycle that is at the same time knowledge of the human heart and of the heavenly principle: everything that can be said for water can be said of human nature and can be proved right through the attentive examination of one’s heart; as to the heavenly principle, it sets up a unique standard and an original reference to all spheres of reality—natural, human, and social.

It may well be that the macro-narrative structure of the Mencius expresses such cycle through several rhetorical devices, the study of which goes beyond the scope of this contribution. For instance, Vermander notes that, if the flood myth is found twice in the Mencius—as already noted by Boltz (2005, p. 63—see Mencius 3A.4 and 3B.9)—, the purpose of the narrative differs from one passage to another: the focus of the first occurrence is on the division of work between the rulers and the ones they rule over, and the emphasis of the second occurrence is on the principle of alternance between times of peace and times of trouble (Vermander 2022a, p. 202).6 Similarly, You Min Jung has highlighted the interest shown by the Korean scholars of the Joseon period in the circular textual patterns found in the Mencius. This rhetorical focus was, it seems, part of their understanding of the Confucian canon as sacred scriptures (You 2022). It would be interesting to study in detail whether circular rhetorical patterns and reliance on water parables mutually reinforce the significance of each of these features.

4.3. What Water Accomplishes

Let us pay attention of the previously quoted second part of the sentence found in Mencius 7A.1: “To fathom one’s heart-mind is to know one’s nature. To know one’s nature is to know Heaven. Foster your heart-mind, nurture your nature, for this is serving Heaven.” This second sentence is an extension to the ethical realm of the gnoseological principle stated in the preceding sentence. In other words, true knowledge is necessarily transformative. When duly exercised, “the art of observing water”, detailed in Mencius 7A24, transforms not only the perception, but also the behavior of the practitioner. As shown by the same fragment, “observing water” means to descend from the “heights” to the “hollows”; it makes one go downward, entering the depths of the innermost heart, in a movement that reproduces that of water running downhill. Turning our attention (guan 觀) towards the nature of water leads us not only to realize the propensities of our own nature, but also to make these same propensities become effective by the very fact of choosing goodness and serving Heaven. In other words, the sentence, “The goodness of human nature is like the downhill movement of water (人性之善也，猶水之就下也)” is more than a constative statement. As far as it makes one incline towards goodness by apprizing and appropriating the downward movement of water, the sentence indeed constitutes a performative parable; it makes the disciple or the reader perform the movement it describes, becoming herself “like water” (youshui 猶水 [Mencius 4A.1, 6A.2]).

5. Conclusions

The Mencius‘ statements about water should be understood in light of the sacred aura that, in ancient China, surrounds water: water is the bearer of life and death, the first of the five elements, the image and companion of the Great One, and (as such an approach became more theorized) the perfect parable of the Way. Moreover, the teaching of Mengzi is by nature performative, as it tries to remodel the student’s psyche through transformative experiences.7 The knowledge derived from the observation of water thus bears on the nexus of correlations that make all dimensions of reality a completed whole, and it necessarily renews and reshapes the disciple who has wholeheartedly engaged in attentive observations. The water narrative is meant to be appropriated and retold as the story of the transformative process undertaken by seekers who have “engaged into study in order to find their lost heart-mind” (Mencius 6A.11)8 and turned towards the source from which rightful conduct necessarily originates.